JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J.- This is a plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for injunction. The judgments of the two courts below would show that there were two cross-suits and two cross-appeals. The appellant was the plaintiff in suit no. 151 of 1964 and defendant in suit no. 323 of 1964. The trial court decreed the appellant's suit and directed the defendants to remove the windows and the spouts shown by red colour on the map 30-C-2, which from part of its decree and dismissed the other suit no. 323 of 1964. The lower appellate court dismissed the appeal of Gobardhan and others, who are the defendants in the suit giving rise to the present. Second appeal from the decree dismissing their suit no. 323 of 1964, but allowed their appeal from the decree in the plaintiff's suit No. 151 of 1964. Thus, both suits were dismissed by the lower appellate court's judgment. The defendants did not file a second appeal from the decree of the lower appellate court confirming the dismissal of their suit no. 323 of 1964. Only the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court from the dismissal of his suit no. 151 of 1964 by the lower appellate court and here too the claim has been now confined to the closure of the two windows shown as Jungla No. 1 and Jungla No. 2 in the western wall of the defendants' house on the map 30-C-2, which forms part of the trial court's decree. It is contended that these windows infringe the plaintiff's right of privacy ; inasmuch as the inner court-yard of the plaintiff's house is overlooked from the windows. 2. From the judgment of the trial court, it appears that there were windows on the eastern wall of the house of Bharat, which lay to the west of the plaintiff's house. The trial court observed that the plaintiff had closed those windows of Bharat s house, and from this, the trial court inferred that the plaintiff was conscious of his rights of privacy, and, in the circumstances it was not possible to believe that he would have allowed the defendant's to maintain windows to the east of his house, which, according to the Amin's report are at such a height that any person can look through them into the plaintiff's court-yard. From this, the trial court inferred that the defendants' contention that the windows existed since the construction of his house could not be accepted, and believed the plaintiff's version that the windows were not old but were opened recently in the month of December, 1962, as claimed by the plaintiff. The trial court then proceeded to hold that the opening of the windows infringed the privacy of the inner court-yard of the plaintiff's house and, in that view of the matter, directed their closure. 3. The lower appellate court has, on the other hand, found to the contrary holding that the defendants house was older than the plaintiff, and the windows had been in existence since before the construction of his house by the plaintiff. According to the lower appellate court, the plaintiff took the land, on which he constructed his house, with the windows existing in the defendants' house. He could not now complain of infringement of the privacy of inner court-yard of his house; inasmuch as the windows were in existence since before the construction of the plaintiff's house and the inner court-yard that way. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, I find that the view of the lower appellant, court is unassailable. The finding that the defendants' house with the windows and the spouts had been in existence since before the construction of the plaintiff's house is of fact and it has not been established before me that it suffers from any error of law. That being so there was no right of privacy at the time when the windows were opened by the defendants in their house and the subsequent construction of his house by the plaintiff in such a manner that his inner court-yard was overlooked from the windows of the defendants' house, did not give the plaintiff any actionable right to have the windows closed. 5. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.