ORDER K.M. Dayal, J. - The present petition has been filed by Smt. Jaldhara and others against the judgment and orders passed by the Deputy Director (Consolidation) and other Consolidation Authorities. 2. The petitioners have claimed that they were the sirdars of the disputed land. There was an earlier series of litigation between the parties which was ultimately decided in their favour. The final judgment in that case operated as res judicata against the contesting respondents. 3. Consolidation operations commenced under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953. In the basic year, the petitioners were recorded as Bhumidhar of the disputed Khata. Objections were filed by the respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 or other predecessors-in-interest claiming that they were the Bhumidhars of the disputed land and the names of the petitioners over the disputed khata were wrongly recorded. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objections of the respondents Nos. 4 to 6 and ordered the expunction of the names of the petitioners from the disputed Khata. Three appeals were filed on behalf of the petitioners in respect of the various khatas under S. 11(1) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. All the appeals were dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The petitioners thereupon filed three revisions under S. 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. These revisions were dismissed in default on 2-12-1971. Restoration applications were filed by the petitioners in all the revisions. The revisions of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. Revision Nos. 6128 and 6129 were restored. The revision of respondent Nos. 3 and 4, i.e. revision No. 6134 was not restored and the restoration application was dismissed on the ground that on the date fixed no Medical certificate was produced nor the name of the disease was mentioned with which the applicants in revision were suffering. Consequently the dismissal of the revision No. 6134 dated 2-12-1971 became final. 4. After restoration the revision Nos. 6128 and 6129 were given fresh Nos. 6081 and 6083. These revisions were dismissed on merits by order dated 8-2-1972. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. The facts of the case in all the revisions were similar. The entire land in dispute formed part of the khata of which the respondents Nos. 4 to 6 claimed to be Bhumidhars. The land was in sub-tenancy of one Jokhu and all the petitioners claim through him. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. The facts of the case in all the revisions were similar. The entire land in dispute formed part of the khata of which the respondents Nos. 4 to 6 claimed to be Bhumidhars. The land was in sub-tenancy of one Jokhu and all the petitioners claim through him. Under the circumstances the case of the petitioners in respect of the land in dispute was same. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also challenged the order dated 2-12-1971, dismissing the revision No. 6134 in default and also the order dated 1.1.1972 refusing to restore the revision and decide the same on merits. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Deputy Director (Consolidation) failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in dismissing the revision in default. Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act provided that the Deputy Director (Consolidation) may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings, or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. Once the record of the case was called for, the absence or presence of the applicant or the respondent was not material. If the Deputy Director (Consolidation) wanted to dispose of the case after calling for the record he was bound to examine the record and pass orders on merits. Thus, the order of the Deputy Director (Consolidation) rejecting the revision in default without going into merits is illegal. The learned counsel relied upon a case Smt. K.L. Sehgal v. Commr., Allahabad, reported in 1971 All LJ 595 : AIR 1971 All 573 where a similar matter relating to section 3(3) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, came for examination before the Bench. In that case a revision was dismissed in default under sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act by the Commissioner. In that case a revision was dismissed in default under sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act by the Commissioner. Sub-section (3) provided that the Commissioner, if he was not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order of the District Magistrate or to the regularity of proceedings before him may alter or reverse his order or make such orders as may be just and proper. Interpreting that provision the Division Bench held that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to dismiss the revision in default. He was bound to decide the same on merits. The same is the position under S. 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Deputy Director (Consolidation) had absolutely no jurisdiction to dismiss the revision in default on 2-12-1971. He further acted illegally in refusing to restore the same as the order of dismissal itself was illegal. I, thus, quash the orders dated 1-1-1972 and 2-12-1971 passed in revision No. 6134 filed by petitioner Nos. 3 and 4. 6. I would have remanded the case to the Deputy Director (Consolidation) for deciding the revision afresh, but in view of the fact that the entire dispute arises out of a single sub-letting and all the facts are same and the parties had earlier litigated under the same title in another series of litigation, the decision in the case of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and that of petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 cannot be different. 7. Coming to merits, the case of all the petitioners is alike. The brief facts of the case are that one Mahadei widow of Gobardhan Das was the occupancy tenant of the disputed land. She sublet the same to Jokhu, predecessor-in-interest of all the petitioners prior to 9th April 1946. The tenant Smt. Mahadei later on co-opted Smt. Prem Kumari as a co-tenant in May, 1950. Consequently she also became an occupancy tenant along with Smt. Mahadei. It is important to note at this stage that Smt. Prem Kumari was a married lady and her husband was alive. She was not a disabled person as contemplated by section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Smt. Mahadei Kunwar expired on 6-12-1952 after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is important to note at this stage that Smt. Prem Kumari was a married lady and her husband was alive. She was not a disabled person as contemplated by section 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Smt. Mahadei Kunwar expired on 6-12-1952 after the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Thereafter the name of Smt. Jwala Devi, married daughter of Smt. Mahadei, was entered in her place. Smt. Prem Kumari was the daughter-in-law of Smt. Jwala Devi. Arvind was son of Smt. Jwala Devi. On 9th April, 1953, Smt. Prem Kumari, Arvind Sharma and Smt. Jwala Devi brought a suit against the petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for their ejectment under S. 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That Act is hereinafter referred to as the Act. The suit was filed with the allegations that the defendants were the Asamis of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were disabled persons as contemplated by S. 157 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and they were entitled to eject the defendants under S. 21(1)(h) of the Act. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on 19-4-1955. On appeal the Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that Jokhu was the Adhivasi Sirdar of the land. A second appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue by the contesting respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. By judgment dated 11th Feb. 1959 the Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree passed by the Additional Commissioner holding that Jokhu was the Adhivasi Sirdar of the land in dispute. A writ petition No. 1416 was filed by the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 before this Court. It was allowed by the learned single Judge of this Court on 20-5-1965 holding that Jokhu was not an Adhivasi and was merely an Asami. Consequently, the suit stood decreed against him. A special appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge which was numbered as Special Appeal No. 344 of 1965. That appeal was allowed and the judgment in the writ petition was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court on 17-7-1972. It was held that the land holders have not been proved to be disabled persons on the date of vesting. Consequently the defendant was not an Asami but had become Adhivasi Sirdar. 8. That appeal was allowed and the judgment in the writ petition was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court on 17-7-1972. It was held that the land holders have not been proved to be disabled persons on the date of vesting. Consequently the defendant was not an Asami but had become Adhivasi Sirdar. 8. During the pendency of the litigation in writ petition and special appeal before this Court, Consolidation operations commenced in the village. The Consolidation Authorities including the Deputy Director (Consolidation) relied upon the judgment in the litigation mentioned above, arising out of the suit under S. 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, by which the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were held to be Bhumidhars and the claim of the petitioner was ultimately dismissed by the judgment in the writ petition. The Consolidation Authorities at that time rightly held that the claim of the petitioners was barred by the judgment in the writ petition and that judgment being inter partes, barred the case of the petitioners by S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e. the doctrine of res judicata. The present appeal has been filed against the aforesaid judgment of the Consolidation Authorities. As discussed above, the judgment in the writ petition which is the basis of the decision of the Consolidation Authorities, was set aside in the special appeal No. 344 of 1965 and the decree of the Board of Revenue holding the petitioners to be Adhivasi Sirdars was restored. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised two questions before me. His first argument is that the decision which was the basis of the judgments of the Consolidation Authorities having been set aside, the final judgment passed in the special appeal is binding on the parties and will operate as res judicata. The second argument of the learned counsel is that this Court is bound to take notice of subsequent events occurring during the pendency of the writ petition and as the judgment of earlier writ petition has been set aside in special appeal, this Court cannot ignore that fact. 10. The reply of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the decision of the Consolidation Authorities was perfectly correct on the date when it was pronounced. The judgment of writ petition stood and the decree of the Board of Revenue stood quashed. 10. The reply of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the decision of the Consolidation Authorities was perfectly correct on the date when it was pronounced. The judgment of writ petition stood and the decree of the Board of Revenue stood quashed. Under the circumstances the Consolidation Authorities did not commit any error in passing their orders on the basis of the decision in the writ petition. The other argument of the learned counsel is that recently a Special Bench had reconsidered the matter, in 1981 All WC 213 : 1981 All LJ 484, Dwarika v. Deputy Director, Consolidation, and held that the landholder was required to prove the disability only on the date of letting and 9th April, 1946, if the date of letting was earlier to that date. It was not necessary to show that the disability continued till the date of vesting. Consequently, in the instant case Smt. Mahadei was disabled on the date of letting as well as on 9th Apri, 1946, and therefore, the petitioners were merely Asamis and could not be Adhivasi-Sirdars. The learned counsel relied upon another decision to the same effect, reported in 1981 All WC 649 : 1981 All LJ 1134 decided by Supreme Court in Richpal Singh v. Desh Raj Singh and others. The learned counsel argued that on merits the petition was liable to be dismissed and the decision in Special Appeal itself has been impliedly overruled. The last argument of the learned counsel was that the proceedings were barred by section 49 read with section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 11. In State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1061 , it was held that: "A wrong decision by a Court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to Higher Tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides. The learned Judge of the High Court who rendered the decision on 4-4-1952 had ample jurisdiction to decide the case and the fact that their decision was on the merits erroneous as seen from the latter judgment of this Court, does not render it any the less final and binding between the parties before the Court." 12. In AIR 1948 All 336 , Mst. In AIR 1948 All 336 , Mst. Pancham Koer v. Ranbir Prasad, a Division Bench of this Court held that "A previous final decision inter partes is binding on the parties and the fact that in some other case a Full Bench of the same High Court had taken a different view of the law would not take away the binding effect of that decision "In AIR 1968 SC 1370 Union of India v. Nanak Singh, it was held that a subsequent suit on the same matter was barred by the decision in the earlier writ petition. In view of these cases there appears to be no doubt that the decision in the special appeal which was final between the parties on the same subject-matter would operate as res judicata and bind them. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon AIR 1968 All 282 , Sri Pal v. Swami Nath, decided by a single Judge of this Court. It was held that the correct legal decision is that a finding given against a party in a litigation which terminates in favour of that party cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent litigation in which arises a similar controversy. In our case, however, we find that the controversy before the Consolidation Authorities as well as in the previous litigation under S. 202, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was the same, i.e. whether the petitioners were Asamis under S. 21(1)(h) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or they were adhivasis and the rights of the land holder were extinguished or not by confirment of Adhivasi or Sirdari rights on the petitioners. As held in the cases referred to above, the decision in the special appeal, though subsequently dissented on the point of law, would be binding on the parties being inter partes decision. 14. The next question that requires consideration is that the decision of the Consolidation Authorities was apparently correct on the date when it was pronounced. It was during the pendency of the writ petition that the judgment relied upon by the Consolidation Authorities was set aside and the view of the Consolidation Authorities became erroneous in view of the subsequent judgment in the special appeal. It was during the pendency of the writ petition that the judgment relied upon by the Consolidation Authorities was set aside and the view of the Consolidation Authorities became erroneous in view of the subsequent judgment in the special appeal. In Abdul Saeed v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 428 , it was held that (at p. 430): "It may be that the view taken seemed justified on the strength of the decisions placed before the consolidation authorities. Nevertheless, if that view appears clearly erroneous when the matter is placed before this Court, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked. It is only this Court which could, in fact, correct such an error as the Consolidation authorities could not correct it even if the error in the view taken had been apparent to them" 15. Thus the judgment of consolidation authorities is rendered ineffective and illegal by the decision in the Special appeal. The impugned orders though valid when they were passed are liable to be quashed in view of the later decision in the special appeal. 16. The last argument that the present proceedings were barred by section 49 read with section 5(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act is misconceived. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the special appeal which was pending before this Court was liable to be abated under S. 5(2) of the Act and any decision given therein was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel relied upon the case of Munshi Muzbool Raza v. Hasan Raza, AIR 1978 SC 1398 : 1978 All LJ 756. It was held in that case that when an appeal before the Supreme Court related to a right in a land in an area subject to consolidation proceedings, the appeal would abate in view of the provisions of sub-section (2)(a) of section 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. There is no doubt about the provision of section 5(2) that any matter pending in appeal in whatever Court was liable to be abated, but before the abatement takes place certain formalities are to be observed The first proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act provides that no order of abatement would be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. The clause (a) provides that the proceedings shall stand abated on an order being passed in this behalf by the Court or Authority before whom such suit or proceeding was pending. This makes it clear that there was no automatic abatement. The abatement takes place only after an order is passed by the Court or Authority concerned after giving notice and hearing the parties. In the instant case it is clear that no such order was passed in the special appeal. On the other hand, the parties proceeded on merits and the decision was given by the Bench on merits. Consequently, there was no abatement in special appeal either in fact or in law in absence of` an order of abatement passed under S. 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Had there been automatic abatement the proceedings could have stood abated even without an order of abatement to that effect, as under Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in section 5(2) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, the abatement order has to be passed. Admittedly no such order was passed in the special appeal and consequently the special appeal did not abate. 17. Learned counsel further relied upon, Om Prakash v. Janki Widow, 1965 Rev Dec 273 : 1965 All LJ 627. That case merely decides that the bar of section 49 would be relating to the suits or proceedings which were instituted before or after the close of consolidation operations. ,In the present case we do not have any material on record to show when the consolidation operations were closed and notification under S. 52 was issued. Even if a notification under S. 52 was issued, the proceedings in writ jurisdiction were expressly saved by sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act which reads as under: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) any order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in cases or' proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub sec. (1), shall be given effect to by such authorities as may be prescribed and the consolidation operations shall for that purpose be deemed to have not been closed." Neither the writ petition and the special appeal arising out of the suit under S. 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was abated nor the present writ petition is barred by the provisions of section 49 read with S. 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. 18. In the result, the judgment and orders passed by all the Consolidation Authorities have to be quashed. The decision in the special appeal No. 344 of 1965 dated 17-7-72 would operate as res judicata and the petitioners have become Adhivasis and subsequently Sirdars and now Bhumidhars without transferable rights, under the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The rights of respondent Nos. 4 to 7, if any, stood extinguished. The petition is allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities are quashed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.