JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is by a landlady. It is directed against an order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kanpur on 7.3.1980 allowing an appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 under Section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and dismissing the application filed by the petitioner under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the aforesaid Act. 2. The aforesaid application was filed by the landlady nearly 10 years ago, to be precise on 23rd November, 1972 for an order of eviction against the respondent No. 3 from the first floor of premises No. 32/145, Bagia Mani Ram Kanpur. The eviction was sought by the landlady both on the ground that she needed the same for her own use and occupation after demolishing and reconstructing the same as well as on the ground that the building under tenancy of the said respondent was in a dilapidated condition and was required for being demolished and reconstructed. 3. In so far as her claim under clause (a) of Section 21(1) was concerned, the petitioner's case was that her family consisted of herself, her husband, a son Ashok Kumar, then aged 17 years and five daughters, namely, Beena Devi aged 14, Laxmi aged 12, Rama aged 6 Uma Devi aged 8 and Meera Devi aged 6. This large family of the landlady has to manage with a room on the ground floor of the same building and some accommodation on the second floor thereof. In between these two floors was the accommodation in the tenancy of the said respondent carrying a rent of Rs. 1,250/- per month. The children of the landlady have now grown up since the building was let out. They need a separate place for study and sleep. With the strangers i.e., the family of the tenant occupying the first floor, the privacy of the family of the landlady particularly the daughters was being seriously affected as the bath-room and the latrine are on the ground floor. The family members of the landlady have, therefore, of necessity to pass through the portion which is in the tenancy of the said respondent. The landlady's husband has a shop at 50/88 Naughara, Kanpur where he goes every morning and returns at night. The family members of the landlady have, therefore, of necessity to pass through the portion which is in the tenancy of the said respondent. The landlady's husband has a shop at 50/88 Naughara, Kanpur where he goes every morning and returns at night. Under the circumstances the landlady feels unsafe and insecure quite apart from the inadequacy of the accommodation at present available with her and infringement of the privacy of her family particularly of the daughters. 4. In regard to her case under clause (b) of Section 21(1), the landlady's plea was that the building under tenancy of the respondent No. 3 was in a dangerous condition. It was more than 80 years old and its life has already run out. The Chajjas on the first floor as well as on the second floor have almost fallen down. The dhannls or the store and Verandah of the disputed accommodation as well as the plants covering have also become totally worn out. The roof of the disputed accommodation is on the point of falling any moment. The walls of the rooms have also become completely dilapidated and have cracked at several places. The Engineer who examined the place is of the opinion that the accommodation was beyond repairs. The landlady has already got a plan for the reconstruction of the building submitted to the Nagar Mahapalika for sanction. The cost of construction would be around Rs. 20,000/- which the landlady has the means of providing. In this view the building has become clearly dilapidated and unsafe not only for the tenant but also for the landlady's family. 5. In regard to the tenant the landlady's case was that his was a small family consisting of himself and his wife and three children. The tenant was in Government service and could get a house on priority basis on that ground. 6. The application was contested by the tenant who asserted that the need of the landlady was not bonafide at all. The accommodation already available with her was sufficient for her needs. The building was in a perfectly sound condition. In any case the tenant would suffer great hardship if evicted from the disputed accommodation. 7. 6. The application was contested by the tenant who asserted that the need of the landlady was not bonafide at all. The accommodation already available with her was sufficient for her needs. The building was in a perfectly sound condition. In any case the tenant would suffer great hardship if evicted from the disputed accommodation. 7. The Prescribed Authority upheld the case of the landlady under clause (a) of Section 21 on the finding that it was impossible for the landlady to manage with the accommodation which was presently in her occupation for her large family. He further found that the daughters of the landlady have grown up since the finding of the application and it was, therefore, necessary that the landlady should have the disputed accommodation for meeting her growing needs. 8. In so far the claim of the landlady under clause (b) of Section 21(1) was concerned, the Prescribed Authority negatived it on the finding that the expert's evidence filed by the parties does not show that the building under the tenancy of the respondent No. 3 was in danger of falling. Consequently it could not be said that it was in a dilapidation condition. 9. The net result, however, was that the application of the landlady was allowed in view of the buildings given by the Prescribed Authority as regards her claim under clause (a) of Section 21(1). 10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the tenant filed an appeal which has been allowed. While the appellate Court concurred with the Prescribed Authority as regards the state of the building it disagreed with the Prescribed Authority in so far as the finding on the issue of bonafide need of the landlady was concerned and held the landlady has failed to prove that she does bonafide require the disputed accommodation. The result was that the appeal was allowed and the application of the petitioner landlady was dismissed. 11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the landlady has approached this Court by way of a writ petition. 12. The petitioner assails the legality of the findings rendered by the appellate Court under both the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1). 13. I shall first take up the finding of the appellate Court as regards the cases of the landlady under clause (a) of Section 21(1). 14. 12. The petitioner assails the legality of the findings rendered by the appellate Court under both the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1). 13. I shall first take up the finding of the appellate Court as regards the cases of the landlady under clause (a) of Section 21(1). 14. For the petitioner it was vehemently contended that the trial Court had recorded a finding on the issue of bonafide need of the landlady on relevant and proper considerations. The appellate Court has, however, set aside the finding of the Prescribed Authority on perverse grounds and on notions which are wholly extraneous to the decision of an application under Section 21(1)(a). It was also submitted that the appellate Court completely ignored the provisions of Rule 16(1) in deciding the issue of bonafide need. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the above contentions are well founded. The Prescribed Authority gave a finding in favour of the landlady on an objective consideration of the evidence on the record. He found that the landlady's family consisted of eight members, five of whom were her daughters. The daughters have grown up since the application was filed in the year 1972. They have to cross the portion on the first floor of the disputed accommodation for going to the ground floor where the bath room and latrine are situate. Having regard to the age of the daughters the landlady can legitimately desire that certain minimum degree of privacy ought to be available with regard to these daughters and they should not be forced to share the building with living on the first floor. The Prescribed Authority has further observed that the son of the landlady is also of marriageable age and would require a separate room for his own family. Apart from these expectations of basic necessities of convenience and privacy there was also the problem of finding adequate accommodation for this big family as it has under its control only one room on the ground floor and two rooms on the second floor out of which one is being used as a kitchen. The Prescribed Authority further referred to sizes of the rooms and observed that they were not enough even for a cot for each member of the landlady family. 16. The Prescribed Authority further referred to sizes of the rooms and observed that they were not enough even for a cot for each member of the landlady family. 16. It would be noticed that each one of the considerations upon which the aforesaid finding was based was relevant and proper and was in accord with the specific provisions of clause (a) of Rule 16(1)(a) which enjoins the Prescribed Authority to have regard construing the need of the landlord to the number of members in his family, his means and social status. 17. The appellate Court, however, without addressing itself to the findings which had been recorded by the Prescribed Authority and to the evidence on the record indulged in generalisation. It observed, for instance, that the convenience and the demands of privacy of the daughters are not of any consequence as the daughters could eventually get married and would go to their own marital homes. This is my opinion was an entirely irrational if not completely non-judicial approach. The unmarried daughters are members of the family of the landlady even according to the definition of the term "family" under clause (3)(g). Until, therefore, the daughters are married the Prescribed Authority is bound to take into consideration their convenience and need also. The present requirements of the unmarried daughters of the family cannot with any legitimacy be disregarded by the Prescribed Authority on the supposition that the daughters may eventually get married and leave their parental home. Further, the daughters of the landlady have not all entered that aged when it could be supposed that their stay in the disputed house was only temporary or for a short while. The appellate Court, therefore, committed a serious error of law in brushing aside the requirements of convenience and privacy of the daughters of the landlady's family. 18. The other observations of the appellate Court are also of the same variety. When it was pointed out to the appellate Court that the bath room is situate on the ground floor and the daughters have to cross the first floor, the appellate Court imported his own individual notions of problems of populated towns and 'congested living' and dismissed the claim of the landlady by moralising that the landlady must tolerate such a condition. He also advised her to construct a bathroom on the second floor. Here again the appellate Court's approach was completely unreasonable. He also advised her to construct a bathroom on the second floor. Here again the appellate Court's approach was completely unreasonable. If the landlady succeeds in establishing that she bonafide requires additional accommodation she could not be told off on the ground that she must continue to tolerate this situation because of the congested living in over-populated towns. In my view the question has to be determined objectively with reference to the need of the landlady and comparison of hardship. If the landlady makes out a case for additional accommodation her application will have to be allowed subject to her proving further that the hardship likely to be suffered by her would be greater than likely to be suffered by the tenant and her claim cannot be negatived on vague generalisation indulged in by the appellate Court, such as, "the daughters of the respondent have grown up and have to put up some botheration in coming to and from the second floor to the ground floor. This botheration shall have to be tolerated rather than the same can be made a ground for eviction of a person who has been living in the middle portion from a pretty long time. The daughters, who are grown up, are likely to be married and thus the difficulty faced will abate". 19. Apart from that has been stated above the appellate Court did not even advert to the various findings given by the Prescribed Authority to the effect that the landlady's family has a total of only two living rooms with her which are not large enough even to admit costs for all the members of the family. 20. It is, thus, apparent that the finding of the appellate Court on the issue of bonafide need has to be set aside as being manifestly unsustainable in law and perverse. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that in the appellate Court an affidavit was filed on behalf of the tenant, as true copy of which has been filed with the counter-affidavit as Annexure CAI in which it was asserted that the landlady has recently made certain changes in the accommodation on the ground floor as a result of which her need must be held to be otherwise than genuine. The complaint of the learned counsel is that the appellate Court has not considered the subsequent facts alleged in that affidavit. The complaint of the learned counsel is that the appellate Court has not considered the subsequent facts alleged in that affidavit. The various allegations made in paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit filed in this Court in which reference has been made to that affidavit have been denied on behalf of the landlady in the Rejoinder-Affidavit filed in this Court. It is asserted that no such changes have taken place. Since I am remanding the case to the appellate Court for a reconsideration, the appellate Court may consider the allegations made by the tenant in the aforesaid affidavit along with the affidavit which the landlady may have filed in rebuttal thereof. 22. As the appellate Court has not decided the issue of bonafide need on an objective basis but on conjectures and surmises it is necessary in the interest of justice to require it to give a fresh finding on the case of the landlady under clause (a). The finding of the appellate Court on the issue of comparative hardship is also unsustainable and as the same was inevitably affected by its finding on the issue of bonafide need which I have disapproved, it is necessary to call for a fresh finding on the issue of relative issue also. On the issue of comparative hardship again I find that the appellate Court has indulged in conjectures and surmises. For example, it has observed that whether or not the tenant can obtain a Government residence is a doubtful question and highly problematical and that if such accommodation had been available the tenant could not have failed to get one. The appellate Court has not bothered to find out whether the tenant really made any such efforts and failed. 23. I now turn to the case of the landlady under clause (b) of Section 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the material existing on the record the conclusion is inescapable that the building is not only in a dilapidated condition but it is in a dangerous and ruinous condition. Learned counsel further submitted that in any case both the Courts below have laboured under a clear misapprehension as to when may building said to be in a dilapidated condition. 24. Learned counsel further submitted that in any case both the Courts below have laboured under a clear misapprehension as to when may building said to be in a dilapidated condition. 24. Learned counsel referred to several decisions of this Court in support of his contention that the building would be deemed to be in a dilapidated condition even if a part of it is in that state. It was further urged that in order that a building may be said to be in a dilapidated condition it is not necessary that it should be on the point of falling down or should be completely in ruins. 25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that both the Courts below have laboured under a patent misconception of what constitutes a dilapidated building is right and is fully supported by series of decisions of this Court. 26. Both the Courts below have undoubtedly assumed that before a building can be held to be in a dilapidated condition, it must be shown that it is in danger of falling. The appellate Court has repeatedly emphasised this aspect and has even while referring to the reports of the commissioners observed that according to them the building was not in danger of falling down. The appellate Court has after referring to the reports of the commissioners, commented that the building was not likely to fall down and that extensive repairs would do. 27. The aforesaid view of the appellate Court is manifestly unsustainable in law. In R.D. Gupta v. Additional District Judge and others, 1976 RCJ 502, K.C. Agarwal, J. observed thus : "Keeping this rule in mind it appears to me that for the application of this provision it is not necessary that the building either must be in a ruinous condition or fallen down. It is also not correct it must either be unsafe or unfit for habitation. Even if a part of the building is in a dilapidated or dangerous condition and has fallen into the state of decay or disrepairs requiring reconstruction, the same may fulfil the requirements of the aforesaid clause. The word 'dilapidated' is not word of art or science having a right meaning". 28. The aforesaid decision has been followed by several other Judges of this Court. The word 'dilapidated' is not word of art or science having a right meaning". 28. The aforesaid decision has been followed by several other Judges of this Court. Thus in the case of Smt. Chandrawati v. District Judge, Pauri and others, 1979 A.W.C. 632, paras 10, 11, 12 and 13 S.D. Agarwal, J. held that the word "dilapidated" implies that the building is in a state of decay or disrepair or partition may be deemed to be in a dilapidated condition it is not necessary that the entire building must be in complete ruins. The same view has been reiterated in other decision of this Court also. See Taqdeer Ali and others Prescribed Authority and others, 1978 All. Rent Cases 133 and Pyare Lal v. IV Additional District Judge, Bijnor and others, 1980 All. Rent Cases 240. 29. The consistent view of this Court, therefore, is that in order that a portion may be treated as in dilapidated condition it is not necessary that it should have fallen down or should be in complete ruins. There is no manner of doubt that the appellate Court was of the opinion that until the portion can be said to be on the verge of collapse it cannot be treated as being in dilapidated condition. The said view is clearly founded on a patent misconception of law. The appellate Court had the reports of two Engineers as well as the reports of the two Advocate Commissioners, one appointed by it and the other by the Prescribed Authority to enable it to come to the conclusion as to whether the building is in a dilapidated condition or not. The appellate Court has not examined the said material in any depth for the simple reason that according to it none of the reports went to the length of saying that the building was on the point of falling. 30. The appellate Court was also wrong in completely ignoring the opinion of the experts whose reports were submitted by both the parties on the short ground that the opinions were divergent. That did not relieve the appellate Court of the duty or obligation to consider the reports for itself on an objective basis. Further, the report of the first commissioner, namely, Sri Harihar Gaur, Advocate was in considerable detail as regards the state of the building under tenancy. That did not relieve the appellate Court of the duty or obligation to consider the reports for itself on an objective basis. Further, the report of the first commissioner, namely, Sri Harihar Gaur, Advocate was in considerable detail as regards the state of the building under tenancy. The appellate Court does not appear to have examined that report in depth. It has picked out only one or two sentences from that report without adverting to the details noticed by the said commissioner. 31. The appellate Court should, therefore, consider the case of the landlady under clause (b) of Section 21 according to law on the material existing on the record. If, however, the appellate Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice to do so it may visit the building itself and make an inspection note of its observations. 32. Coming to the submission of the learned counsel that if a part of the building is found to be in ruins (in the present case the Chajja) the whole building ought to be treated as dilapidated, in my opinion this question cannot be answered in the abstract. It will all depend on the architecture and other related factors as regards the impact which the portion which is found to be in a dilapidated condition is likely to have on the remaining part of the building. In Ram Adhar v. Additional District Judge and others, 1982(1) All. Rent Cases 124, N.D. Ojha, J. has held that this question can be answered only keeping in view the topography and impact which the repairs of the portion which is found to be in a dilapidated condition will have on the remaining portion of the building. The same view has been expressed by M.P. Mehotra, J. in the case of Phool Chand Prasad v. Second Additional District Judge and others, 1982 (UPPRCC 530 : 1982(1) All. Rent Cases 766. The appellate Court will, therefore, examine this aspect also. If the appellate Court finds that only some portions of the building are in a dilapidated condition it will examine the further question as to whether that portion is structurally or otherwise such that the whole building can be deemed to be in a dilapidated condition keeping in view the dicta of this Court in the aforesaid decision and other cases bearing on the point. 33. 33. The appellate Court has also not recorded any finding as to whether the requirements of Rule 17 which are mandatory have been complied with by the landlady in the present case. 34. For all these reasons the case will have to go back for a fresh decision to the appellate Court. 35. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order passed by the I Additional District Judge, Kanpur is quashed. The said Court will now dispose of Rent Control Appeal No. 131 of 1978 filed by the tenant respondent afresh according to law having regard to the observations made in the judgment. The learned District Judge shall try to dispose of the appeal within a period of two months from the date either produced before it a certified copy of the judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs in this petition.