JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - The petitioners have challenged the judgment of the consolidation authorities whereby their claim regarding exclusive sirdari right in the disputed land has been negatived. 2. It is not disputed before me that the disputed land belongs to the contesting opposite parties nos. 4 and 5 or their father Ram Chander. The petitioners claimed exclusive right on the ground that if they were sub-tenants of the disputed land, they acquired adhivasi cum-sirdari right in the disputed land and their claim has been wrongly negatived by the consolidation authorities. Alternatively they claimed sirdari right on the basis of their adverse possession over the disputed land for more than statutory period. It was not disputed before me that in the earlier litigation between the parties it was held that the petitioners being sub-tenancy of the disputed land, the decree in favour of the land holder regarding damages against the petitioners was nullity. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the finding recorded by the executing court regarding petitioners' sub-tenancy right was final and on that basis the petitioners claim regarding adhivasi and sirdari rights should have been accepted. If the claim of sub-tenancy was not accepted, the petitioner is claim on the basis of adverse and continued possession should have been accepted. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that the execution court has no jurisdiction to characterise the decree in favour of the land holder as a nullity and the findings regarding sub-tenancy in execution case should not be treated as final between the parties. It has been suggested that in the instant case the petitioners cannot be sirdars of the disputed land and that the petitioners have already got half share in plot no. 653 and the claim of the petitioners is a dishonest claim, which has rightly been negatived by the consolidation authorities and in writ jurisdiction there should not be any interference with the impugned judgments. It has also been suggested that the petitioners could not acquire hereditary right in the disputed land as it was in the nature of grove since long. 4. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Pyarey Lal v. Bankey Lal and other, A.I.R. 1926 All. 650. It has also been suggested that the petitioners could not acquire hereditary right in the disputed land as it was in the nature of grove since long. 4. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in Pyarey Lal v. Bankey Lal and other, A.I.R. 1926 All. 650. and has contended that the finding recorded by the execution court regarding petitioners' sub-tenancy would be final between the parties on the principle of res judicata. According to him the jurisdiction of the execution court depended upon that the fact whether the petitioners were subtenants or not, hence the determination of the jurisdictional fact would be final between the parties. In this connection the Head Note (c) of the above-mentioned ruling was emphasised. To my mind the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners have no merits. The jurisdiction of the execution court did not depend upon the relationship between the parties. The execution had got jurisdiction to enforce the decree in favour of the contesting opposite parties by virtue of the fact that a decree existed in favour of the contesting opposite parties. The execution court had no jurisdiction to determine the question of sub-tenancy of the grove, hence the findings recorded by the execution court was without jurisdiction and according to the Head Note (b) of the above-mentioned ruling the determination of the petitioners subtenancy right by the execution court cannot operate as res judicata. It has been cited in the Head Note (b) as below :- "Where a judgment has been delivered by a court of incompetent jurisdiction, that is to say, by a Court which had no jurisdiction to hear the case the judgment cannot be pleaded as res judicata." In Upendra Nath Bose v. Lull and others, A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 222. their Lordships of the Privy council have observed as below at page 225 column 1 :- "....A Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction. Such reason are not decisions, and are certainly not decisions by a Court of competent jurisdiction. their Lordships of the Privy council have observed as below at page 225 column 1 :- "....A Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction. Such reason are not decisions, and are certainly not decisions by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It would indeed be strange if on a dispute as to the jurisdiction of a Court to try an issue, that Court by its reasons for holding that it had no jurisdiction, could, upon the principles of res judicata, decide and bind the parties upon the very issue which it was incompetent to try." 5. In the instant case the execution court had no jurisdiction to determine the question of sub-tenancy under the provisions of Tenancy Law. Hence the finding recorded by the execution court cannot be treated as final between the parties on the principle that an erroneous decision can also operate as res judicata. It can be said in the circumstances of the present case that the decree in favour of the contesting opposite parties was held as without jurisdiction and hence the execution court refused to execute the decree. The decision by the execution court that it could not execute a decree without jurisdiction, might be final between the parties, but its reason, that the petitioners were subtenants, cannot be treated as final between the parties because an execution court could not determine the question of sub tenancy under the provisions of any Tenancy Law at the relevant time ; hence the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners became adhivasi and sirdar of the disputed land and their claim was wrongly negatived by the consolidation authorities is not at all acceptable to me. Bereft of the decision of the execution court in favour of the petitioners, they have utterly failed to prove the contract of sub-teancy, hence their claim has been rightly negatived by the consolidation authorities. 6. As regards the petitioners claim based on adverse possession the consolidation authorities have discussed the oral evidence also and have negatived the claim of the petitioners on the ground that the plea of adverse possession was not taken in the objection and that on the evidence led by the petitioners, their possession over the disputed land was with the consent of the land-holder. 7. 7. To my mind the petitioners have utterly failed to establish their claim based on adverse possession in the instant case. 8. It is well known that in a grove one could not acquire hereditary right under the provisions of Tenancy law before the enforcement of the Act I of 1951, hence the petitioners claim on the basis of hereditary right in the land is without any merit. 9. Regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the document relied upon by the consolidation authorities was not originally filed, hence it was not proved, and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in determining the claims of the parties on the basis of that document, it is well known that the technicalities of the Indian Evidence Act do not strictly apply to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities. In the present case the consolidation authorities have placed reliance upon the oral evidence led by the petitioners regarding their right in the disputed land, hence even if the documentary evidence is excluded from consideration, there is enough evidence to prove that the possession of the petitioners over the disputed land was with the consent of the land holder. Moreover, on the findings recorded by the consolidation authorities that there existed a grave on the disputed land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, it is doubtful that the petitioners can ever claim sirdari right in the disputed land in view of the provisions of section 21 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Since the petitioners have got almost half of the disputed plot no. 653 and in law if he could get only asami right in the disputed land being sub-tenant of grove land in view of the provisions of section 21 (b) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, he has got more than what he deserved in law. Hence in my opinion it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgments of the consolidation authorities. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.