ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - On facts found that opposite party No. 1 was mortgagee of Sir and Khudkast land before date of vesting, it is obvious that consolidation authorities committed an error of law in directing his name to be recorded as asami. Under cl. (d) of sub-s. (1) of S. 21 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act 1 of 1951, only, those mortgagees became Asamis who were in actual possession from persons belonging to any of the classes mentioned in els. (b) to (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 18 of els. (i) to (vii) and (be) of S. 19. These classes are of persons who were tenants before the date of vesting. A Sir or Khudkast hold is not mentioned in it. In other words only tenants mortgagees became Asamis. Faced with this the learned counsel for opposite party argued that they being in possession from before the date of vesting acquired sirdari rights under section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, I of 1951. Learned counsel maintained that as the possession of opposite party was contrary to the provisions of law, it shall be deemed that he acquired rights of Sirdar. This controversy, however, stands concluded by a Full Bench decision in the case of Balwant Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, ( AIR 1975 All 295 FB). It has been held that the possession of mortgagee whose rights have been extinguished under section 14(1) on or after the date of vesting is not per se adverse but is permissive. 2. The learned counsel then argued that accepting that the possession was permissive the licence shall be deemed to have come to an end, the moment petitioner purchased the land. According to him the petitioner shall be deemed to have been put in possession by the vendor and as such the possession of the opposite party shall be deemed to have been against him. As a matter of fact the inspiration for this had been derived from the Full Bench decision wherein it has been observed that the period of limitation for a suit under section 209 would commence to run not from the date of vesting but from the date of demand for possession. As a matter of fact the inspiration for this had been derived from the Full Bench decision wherein it has been observed that the period of limitation for a suit under section 209 would commence to run not from the date of vesting but from the date of demand for possession. Without going into the controversy whether the argument advanced has any merit or not even if it is assumed to be correct it would not benefit petitioner, as admittedly the land was purchased on 20-5-1969 and notification under section 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act must have been issued in that year or before as the order of Consolidation Officer was passed in 1969. Therefore, the limitation to file the suit under section 209 had not expired. 3. Learned counsel then urged that the entries recording opposite party as a mortgagee were incorrect. In other words the attempt was to challenge the finding of mortgage as erroneous. The learned counsel urged that although the opposite party has not filed any writ petition yet he could support the order. The submission is based on misconception of the extent to which a respondent is entitled to support the order. It is open to get the petition dismissed on grounds other than those found in favour of opposite party but he cannot be permitted to challenge the finding as a respondent. Moreover entries are not conclusive. They are rebuttable. As evidence was led and consolidation authorities found that the possession of opposite party was of mortgagee the finding is not liable to be set aside. 4. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order passed by the three Consolidation Authorities is maintained to the extent that petitioner is bhumidhar but that the opposite party be entered as Asami is quashed. The petitioner shall approach the consolidation authorities for necessary correction in the revenue records. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.