Lalta Singh v. Patiraj Singh — 1982 DIGILAW 1238 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - Chandra Bali Singh Plaintiff, since deceased and substituted by present respondent Nos. 1 to 3, had filed the present suit for injunction restraining defendants from interfering in plaintiffs possession over trees situated on northern and south-western portion of Plot No. 528. It was alleged that there were 11 mango trees which were situated towards the north of plot No. 528 (which will hereinafter be referred to as bunch No. 1) and six mango trees and two jack fruit trees towards the south-western portion of plot No. 528 (which will hereinafter be referred to as bunch No. 2). The plaint case was that the trees of bunch No. 1 were planted by the plaintiff and that, he is owner and in possession of the same. As regards bunch No. 2 it was alleged that the same were planted by Ram Prasad, and his son Zahargaon. After the death of Ram Prasad, his son Zahargaon alias Jhaoo became owner. Jhaoo died about 15 years ago and his eldest son Munnoo Lal also died issueless. Thus his son Nanku, Chhotey Lal and Smt. Champa bacame owners of the said trees. Plaintiff claimed to have purchased these trees from Nanku and Chhotey through registered sale deed dated 17-8-1966. He also claimed to have purchased ?rd share in the trees from Smt. Champa as well through unregistered sale deed. The plaintiff thus, claimed to be owner in possession over the trees in suit and that the defendants have no concern with those trees. 2. Defendant Nos. 1 to 11 contested the suit asserting that they are the owners in possession over the trees and the plaintiff or their predecessors-in-interest have no right, title or interest therein. It was also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Courts and was barred by limitation. A plea was also taken to the effect that Chhotey Lal and Nanku were not the sons of Zahargaon alias Jhaoo. 3. The trial court, after taking evidence of the parties, held the suit to be maintainable and not barred by limitation and that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the trees in suit. It was also held that Chhotey Lal and Nanku were sons of Jahargaon alias Jhaoo. With these findings the plaintiffs suit was decreed restraining the defendants Nos. It was also held that Chhotey Lal and Nanku were sons of Jahargaon alias Jhaoo. With these findings the plaintiffs suit was decreed restraining the defendants Nos. 1 to 11 from interfering in plaintiffs possession over the trees mentioned in schedules A & B detailed at the foot of the plaint. 4. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 27-10-1967, passed by Munsif Pratapgarh, the defendants Nos. 1 to 11 preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 28.8.1976 by II Addl. District Judge Pratapgarh. 5. Aggrieved by these decisions dated 27-10-1967 passed by Munsif Pratapgarh and 28.8.76 passed by II Addl. District Judge, Pratapgarh, the defendant Nos. 10 to 12 have preferred this second appeal. Although before the trial court the suit was contested by defendant Nos. 1 to 11. but the present second appeal has been filed by defendants Nos. 10 to 12 and daughter of defendant No. 7. 6. Before the lower appellate court it was admitted by the parties that the trees situated on the northern portion of the said plot were about 30 or 33 years' old and those situated on south-western portion were not less than 85 years old. Plaintiff claimed to have planted trees of bunch No. 1 situated on the northern portion and the trees of bunch No. 2. situated on the south-western portion, to have been planted by his predecessors-in-interest, from whom he had purchased the same. The defendants, on the other, hand, claimed to have planted both sets of trees themselves. Plot No. 528 is a big plot and the defendants claim that they have also got trees situated on about 16 Biswas of land adjoining to trees of bunch No. 1 which are situated towards its north-west. The said trees are not in dispute in the present appeal. It is also not disputed that the trees of bunch No. 1, on northern portion of plot No. 528, are situated over an area of 9 biswas and trees of bunch No. 2, on south-western portion of plot No. 528, are situated over an area of 11 Biswas. Plot No. 528-M. area 9 - biswas, it noted in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and plot No. 528/2, area 11 Biswas and 5 Biswansis, is noted in the name of defendants as Bhumidhars during consolidation operations. Plot No. 528-M. area 9 - biswas, it noted in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and plot No. 528/2, area 11 Biswas and 5 Biswansis, is noted in the name of defendants as Bhumidhars during consolidation operations. Both the parties led evidence to establish their claim regarding plantation of trees in wit and possession over the same. As already observed above, a concurrent finding of fact has been recorded to the effect that plaintiff had planted trees of hunch No. 1 and he has been in possession over the same throughout, and, that trees of bunch No. 2 were planted by his predecessor-in-interest from whom the plaintiff had purchased them and that he is in possession over the same. The appellants' claim regarding plantation of the trees in suit was not accepted and it was further held that since the plaintiff is in possession, hence no question of limitation arises and thus the suit is not barred by time. It was also held that the suit for injunction and possession in respect of the trees in suit is cognizable by the civil courts. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has fairly conceded that the findings of fact, recorded by the courts below, to the effect that the trees in suit were planted by the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest, cannot be successfully assailed in the second appeal. He, however, raised certain legal questions worth consideration. 8. Firstly, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the present suit for injunction was not maintainable in civil court. He urged that since trees were situated on land, which forms part of his Bhumidhari holding, as such, the present suit which necessarily entails determination of title in respect of land over which trees are situated, would be barred under section 331 (1) of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. His contention was that since trees would go along with the land and so one who is Bhumidhari of the land will also be owner of the trees situated on the land of Bhumidhari holding. He thus urged that ownership of trees would be dependent upon the determination of question regarding title in the land itself and thus in the present suit primary question for determination will be as to who is tenure-holder/Bhumidar or Sirdar of the land on which the trees are situated. He thus urged that ownership of trees would be dependent upon the determination of question regarding title in the land itself and thus in the present suit primary question for determination will be as to who is tenure-holder/Bhumidar or Sirdar of the land on which the trees are situated. According to him such a declaration regarding title in land, over which trees are situated, could he made by the revenue court alone and civil court's jurisdiction was barred under section 331 (1) of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. 9. It is no doubt correct to say that the declaration of tenure-holder's right in land could be made by the revenue court alone under section 229-B of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act and a suit involving declaration of such a title in respect of the land concerning a holding would not be maintainable in civil court, being barred by section 331 (1) of the said Act, but it would not equally hold good in respect of a suit for injunction or for possession in respect of trees alone. The jurisdiction of civil court to entertain and decide such suit would not be barred under section 331 (1) of the said Act although trees in suit may be found to be situated on the land forming part of the Bhumidhari or Sirdari holding of the plaintiff or of the defendant or anyone else. In a suit for injunction or for possession in respect of trees alone, the question regarding title in land is not at all relevant because owner-ship of trees is different from ownership in land. The learned counsel in his argument overlooked the fact that the ownership in trees is not synonymous with rights of grove-holder/Bhumidar in the land over which the trees stand. Land Record Manual also does not contemplate entries regarding ownership in trees as the land records are concerned with those who own or hold land and the entries in revenue records are to be made concerning their rights in the land as tenure-holder thereof or with regard to possession or possessory right in the land alone. Land Record Manual also does not contemplate entries regarding ownership in trees as the land records are concerned with those who own or hold land and the entries in revenue records are to be made concerning their rights in the land as tenure-holder thereof or with regard to possession or possessory right in the land alone. No suit as contemplated for the declaration of ownership of trees under the provisions of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act and, as such, no suit for declaration, injunction or possession can be filed in respect of trees alone in the revenue court under any provision of the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act enumerated in IVth Schedule in the Act. Thus, in my opinion the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and decide the present suit would not be barred by section 331 (1) of the said Act. 10. Another point which has been canvassed with vehemence by the learned counsel for the appellants before me is that no one else can hold trees on the land belonging to another. His contention was that the trees would go along with the land and one who is a tenure-holder of land will be the owner of the trees as well. This argument could certainly gather some strength from rule 26-A, framed under the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act according to which the trees situated on the agricultural plot, forming part of the holding of a tenant, would be deemed to vest in the tenure-holder on the date of vesting and whosoever might be the owner of such trees would cease to be the owner thereof. 11. Rule-26A reads as follows : - "26-A-Trees planted by a person other than an intermediary on land other than land comprised in his holding shall be deemed to be settled with such person as owner thereof and trees in a holding shall be deemed to be settled with the Bhumidhar or sirdar of the holding along with the land." The validity of the said rule was considered by a Division Bench of this court in Aman Singh v. Shivadhari, 1967 All LJ 21 and it was held that: "The power given by section 26 is to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter. In the whole of this Chapter no provision has been made affecting the rights in trees standing on the holding of a tenant. It is significant to note that under section 4 only the rights of the intermediaries have been abolished from the date of vesting and under section 6 details have been given how that vesting is to affect certain rights. Under Cl. (a)(i) of Section 6 express provision has been made with regard to the abolition of rights of the intermediaries in trees other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove, so that the trees standing in abadi or in a holding or a grove have been exempted from the operation of this vesting. The intention of the Legislature is quite clear that the trees which are standing in abadi or in a holding of a tenant or in a grove will continue to belong to the person to whom they belonged at the date of vesting. This intention is made further clear by section 203 of the Act where it has been provided that upon ejectment of the tenant, if he is the owner of any trees in the land in his holding, he is entitled to compensation for it and if that compensation is not paid by the purchaser or the landlord who ejects him he will then continue to have a right to tend that tree and to take the fruits of that tree and to use that tree till that tree dies. Section 228 further provides with regards to trees standing on boundaries and states that such trees shall belong jointly to the Bhumidhars and the sirdars of the two adjoining plots. This also gives an idea that the trees which stand inside holdings have not been affected and continue to belong to the owners thereof as before the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Thus the intention of the Act being not to affect the that of the owners of the trees standing in agricultural plots. Rule 26-A, which defeated the rights of the owners of the trees and vested all the trees in the tenure-holder was obviously ultra vires." (Emphasis supplied) 12. Thus the intention of the Act being not to affect the that of the owners of the trees standing in agricultural plots. Rule 26-A, which defeated the rights of the owners of the trees and vested all the trees in the tenure-holder was obviously ultra vires." (Emphasis supplied) 12. It is, thus, well-settled that the rights of the owners of the trees, standing on any agricultural plot forming part of a holding of tenure-holder, could not be defeated and the owner of the trees would not cease to be owner thereof on the strength of aforesaid rule 26-A, which was also held to be ultra vires in the case of Aman Singh v. Shivadhari, 1967 All LJ 21 (Supra). In this view of the matter the appellants cannot claim to be owners of the trees in suit merely because they have rights as a tenure-holder in the land on which the trees are situated. Thus, the contention of the appellants that they become owners of the trees on the date of vesting, on the strength of the said rule and on account of their being tenure-holders Bhumidhars of the land in dispute, cannot be sustained. The ownership in trees and the ownership in the land, on which they are situate, are two distinct and separate matters. There was nothing in the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act, nor one is found in U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act, providing that the tenure-holder would be the owner of the trees situated thereon although the same were not planted or held by him as owner thereof. In my opinion, one could very well hold trees situated on the holding of another person, Rule 26-A had provided that the trees situated on holding of a tenant would be deemed to have vested in such tenant, meaning thereby, that the person, other than such tenant who was the owner of such trees situated on the land in the tenancy of others, will cease to be owner of such trees. This rule 26-A was, however, deleted on March, 25, 1963, and it was also held to be ultra vires in the aforesaid Aman Singh's case (Supra). Thus in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act the owner of the trees, situated on the land of another tenant, would continue to remain owner thereof. Thus in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act the owner of the trees, situated on the land of another tenant, would continue to remain owner thereof. In this view of the matter the contention of the appellants to the effect that since they are tenure-holders of the land, on which the trees are situated, they would be deemed to be owners of the trees as well is clearly unfounded. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants next contended that it would be incongruous to hold that one can own and possess trees on the tenancy land belonging to another, because holding of trees by one could be destructive of the rights of the tenant as tenure-holder in such land. His contention was that a Bhumidhar or Sirdar has got right to bring the land under cultivation and if it be held that the trees, situated thereon, belonged to someone else, it would cause obstruction in bringing the land under cultivation because he cannot ask the owner of the trees to remove such trees situated on his land. He thus, urged that the genesis of rule 26-A, although deleted, would govern the rights in such trees situated on his holding on the date of vesting. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. In view of what has been stated above, it is manifest that merely because the trees stood on the holding of a tenant, he will not be deemed to be owner of the trees as well, nor the trees would be deemed to have vested in him as was envisaged in rule 26-A, which was held to be ultra vires. If the trees have not been planted by the tenant himself on the land of his holding, he would not be deemed to be owner of trees situated on such land. The trees will continue to belong to a person who had, in fact, planted those trees or had held them as such. If the trees have not been planted by the tenant himself on the land of his holding, he would not be deemed to be owner of trees situated on such land. The trees will continue to belong to a person who had, in fact, planted those trees or had held them as such. The owner of the trees and his transferee would not get a right in the land itself, but he will have a right to maintain the trees which he has planted or of which he becomes the owner by transfer, Merely 'because the trees, situated on the land in question will preclude the land or portion thereof from being used for cultivation or for any other purpose, will not operate to extinguish the rights of the owners of the trees situated on the holding belonging to another. 14. It has been held by the courts below that the trees in suit of bunch No.1 belonged to the plaintiff and the trees of bunch No. 2 belonged to plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest from whom the plaintiff had purchased the same and that he is in possession over the same. The said finding does not suffer from any error so as to call for interference by this court in second appeal. A finding has also been recorded by the courts below to the effect that the defendants have not been able to prove that the trees in question were planted by them or their predecessors-in interest. nor they have been able to prove their possession. In view of this finding, which does not suffer from any manifest error. I am unable to hold the appellants to be owners of the trees in question merely on the ground that the same are situated on the land over which they have been recovered as Bhumidhar during the consolidation operations without any objection having been raised on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents in those proceedings. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants next contended that the present suit as well as appeal abates as the village was brought under consolidation operations. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. It is well-settled that the ownership of trees could not be determined by the Consolidation authorities if the trees are situated on the land which is outside consolidation scheme. The land in question is admittedly situated outside consolidation scheme. 16. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. It is well-settled that the ownership of trees could not be determined by the Consolidation authorities if the trees are situated on the land which is outside consolidation scheme. The land in question is admittedly situated outside consolidation scheme. 16. Section 9 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that notices are to be issued for inviting objections against entries in relevant extracts prepared under sections 8 and 8A of the Act. 17. Section 9 of the Act reads as follows : "9-Issue of extracts from records and statements and publication of records mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections-(1) Upon the preparation of the records and the statements mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall- (a) correct the clerical mistakes, if any, and send, or cause to be sent, to the tenure-holders concerned and other persons interested, notices containing relevant extracts from the current annual register and such other records as may be prescribed showing- "(i) their rights in and liabilities in relation to the land, (ii) mistakes and disputes discovered under section 8 in respect thereof, (iii) specific shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holding for the purpose of effecting partitions, where necessary, to ensure proper consolidation, (iv) valuation of the plots, and (b) valuation of trees, wells and other improvements for calculating compensation thereof and its apportionment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one, (c) publish in the unit the current Khasra and the current annual register, the 'khasra chak bandi' the Statement of Principle prepared under section 8-A, and any other records that may be prescribed to show, inter alia, the particulars referred to in clause (a). (2) Any person to whom a notice under sub-section (1) has been sent or any other interested person may, within 21 days of the receipt of notice or of the publication under sub-section (1), as the case may be file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, objections in respect thereof disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles, or the need for partition." 18. In the aforesaid clause (b) of Section 9 of the Act, the valuation of trees, wells and other improvements is to be made for calculating compensation thereof and its apportionment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one. A perusal of C. H Form No. 5-B would indicate that only those trees, not constituting the grove in the plot, will be valued. This is required to be done apparently with a view to direct compensation to be paid to the owners of the trees by the allottee in whose chak they happen to be situated. It is thus evident that the valuation of only those trees is to be made which are situated on the land which has been brought within consolidation scheme and not on the land which is outside consolidation scheme. Under section 9 (2) an objection can be filed before the Assistant Consolidation Officer disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the records or the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles. or the need for partition. Under section 9-A the Assistant Consolidation Officer is vested with the power to decide objections in respect of claim to land or partition of joint holding by conciliation between the parties. He is required to refer objections for being decided on merits by the Consolidation Officer. Under sub-section (2) of section 9-A of the Act, the Consolidation Officer is vested with the power to decide all cases relating to valuation of plots and all cases relating to valuation of trees, wells or other improvements, for calculating compensation therefor and its apportionment amongst co-owners, if there be more owners than one. Thus under sub-section (2) of section 9-A of the Act objections could be raised in respect of those trees of which valuation was determined. No objections are contemplated, nor could they be filed regarding trees situated on the land outside the consolidation scheme of which no valuation was determined in the proceedings under section 8 of the Act. The consolidation authorities had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the question of ownership with regard to trees in suit which were admittedly situated on the land outside the consolidation scheme. The consolidation authorities had, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the question of ownership with regard to trees in suit which were admittedly situated on the land outside the consolidation scheme. The plaintiff, therefore, was not obliged to file an objection under section 9 (2) of the Act for determination of his rights as owner of the trees, situated on the land in question which was recorded in the name of the defendants as Bhumidhars thereof. Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act would therefore, be not applicable to the present suit because with regard to the claim in respect of the trees as owner thereof, plaintiff could not file an objection under the provisions of the said Act and, as such, Civil Court's jurisdiction could not be held to be barred in entertaining and deciding the suit involving determination of title in respect of the trees situated on the land in suit. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants then contended that the trees, before they are cut, form part of the land and, as such, rights in it are parts of the Bhumidhari rights. He, thus contended that since the appellants are recorded as Bhumidhars in the revenue records, they would be deemed to be the owners of the trees as well. In support of the contention, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Amber Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1552 in which it was held that at pp. 1552-53) : "Section 18 (1) (a) of the Act provides that an 'intermediary's grove' is Bhumidhari property. Rights in it are parts of Bhumidhari rights. After those clear words of the enactment, we think it is not necessary even to consider previous definitions or to make out specious - or unrealistic distinctions between standing uncut trees, which are parts of groves, and groves and grove land. The proposition is well settled under the general law, that trees, before they are cut, form parts of 'land'. And, an inseparable part is always included in the whole." In the aforesaid decision facts of the case are not mentioned. It appears that the appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the decision in execution proceedings by which trees. The proposition is well settled under the general law, that trees, before they are cut, form parts of 'land'. And, an inseparable part is always included in the whole." In the aforesaid decision facts of the case are not mentioned. It appears that the appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against the decision in execution proceedings by which trees. situated in the intermediary's grove, were directed to be sold on the ground that the trees in the intermediary's grove did not vest in the State and, as such, rights in the trees are not parts of the Bhumidhari rights. Indisputably, judgment debtor Rana Sheo Ambar Singh was the intermediary of the grove and he was also owner of the trees situated on the Bhumidhari land. The intermediary grove was thus held to be Bhumidhari property of the judgment-debtor. In view of these facts, the trees situated on grove land were held to be parts of Bhumidhari rights, for the sale of which pending execution application was rejected. The aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the appellants in the present case, because in the said case ownership of the land and the trees situated thereon admittedly vested in one and the same person, namely, Rana Sheo Amber Singh, against whom money decree was sought to be executed. This case does not lay down that if uncut trees are situated on the land, belonging to others, those trees would become the property of the owner/tenure-holder of such land and that the owner of the trees would cease to be owner thereof. As already observed above, such vesting could be sustained under rule 26-A and not otherwise. The said rule was held to be ultra vires and deleted and, as such, it cannot be said that the trees situated on the land in Question which formed dart of the appellants Bhumidhari land, would be deemed to be Bhumidhari property of the appellants and the plaintiff, who has been held to be owner of the trees in suit, would cease to have title in such trees merely on the ground that those trees are situated on the land forming part of the holding of the appellants which was also recorded in their names during consolidation operations. The decision of Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Amber Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. (Supra) in my opinion, does not lay down that the owners of the trees situated on Bhumidhari land of other tenure-holders would cease to be owners thereof from the date of vesting and the same would vest in tenure-holder of such land although he did not plant those trees, nor he had held the same as owner thereof. The trees situated in the grove land of a grove-holder, belonging to another person, would, in my opinion. not become Bhumidhari property of the grove-holder in face of the evidence to the effect that those trees were, in fact, planted by someone else and not by the grove-holder himself and that he had never been in possession over those trees nor had held the same as owner thereof. Hon'ble Supreme Court in an earlier decision in Mst. Jamshed Jahan Begam v. Lakhan Lal, 1969 Rev. Dec. 447 : AIR 1971 SC 1678 considered the decision of Rana Sheo Amber Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1790 and held that (at p. 1686 of AIR SC) : "From the above, it will be seen that 'grove' is something different from 'grove-land' because the definition says that the trees on such land, viz., 'grove-land' constitute a `grove'. Section 6 of the Abolition Act, dealing with the consequences of the vesting of an estate in the State, among other things, states in clause (a) "6 (a) all rights, title and interest of the intermediaries ((1) in every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests (other than trees in village Abadi. holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels ferries, pathways, Abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of section 18 apply, and, (ii) in all sub-soil in such estates including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State of-Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances." Clause (a), referred to above, deals with grove lands and trees, separately. The grove-land referred to above, will be the grove-land defined in section 3 (G) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Clause (a) also refer to the right, title and interest of intermediaries in trees ceasing and vesting in the State. The grove-land referred to above, will be the grove-land defined in section 3 (G) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Clause (a) also refer to the right, title and interest of intermediaries in trees ceasing and vesting in the State. From among the trees, such of the trees as constitute a grove, have been excluded from the operation of clause (a) of section 6. Therefore, the excluded category of trees forming the grove cannot be considered to have vested in the State on the abolition of the estates. Section 18, which creates Bhumidhari rights deals, among other items with intermediary's grove. The expression 'Intermediary's grove' as defined in section 3 (13) of the Abolition Act, was grove-land held or occupied by an intermediary as such. We do not find any material on record to draw an inference that the appellants raised any contention that the "trees constituted an 'intermediary's grove'. From what is stated above, it will be seen that the trees constituting the grove, have not vested in the State and therefore they could not have formed the subject of creation of Bhumidhari rights under section 18. Therefore the trees constituting the grove, being the debtor's property, are liable to be proceeded with in execution under section 24 of the Encumbered Estates Act. Even if it is to be held that the appellants have got Bhumidhari rights over the trees constituting the grove, as already held by us, those rights can be proceeded with under section 24 of the Encumbered Estates Act. Therefore, from either point of view, the trees constituting the grove are liable to be proceeded against for realisation of the decree by the respondents". In the aforesaid decision the judgment-debtor was intermediary grove-holder and he was owner of the trees as well as of the grove land on which the trees were situated. In that context it was held that even if the appellants had got Bhumidhari rights over the trees constituting the grove, those rights can be proceeded against under section 24 of the Encumbered Estates Act and the trees constituting the grove were, therefore, liable to be proceeded against for realisation of the decree-holder. 20. In that context it was held that even if the appellants had got Bhumidhari rights over the trees constituting the grove, those rights can be proceeded against under section 24 of the Encumbered Estates Act and the trees constituting the grove were, therefore, liable to be proceeded against for realisation of the decree-holder. 20. In none of these two decisions Hon'ble Supreme Court was required to consider the question whether owner of the trees, situated on the land of the holding of another person, would or would not cease to be owner thereof from the date of vesting and whether the tenure-holder, on whose land the trees belonging to another person are situated, would become onwer/Bhumidhar of such trees or not. As already observed above, rule 26-A earlier had provided such vesting of ownership in the tenure-holder of the trees, belonging to other persons situated in his holding. The said rule, as already referred to above, has been held to be ultra vires and was also deleted. In this view of the matter, I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants became owners of the trees in suit merely on the ground that they were tenure-holders of the land, although these trees were not planted by them and they had never been in possession over the same. 21. In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's case ( AIR 1961 SC 1790 ) (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court did not consider the provision of Section 24 Encumbered Estates Act which was referred to in Smt. Jamshed Jehan's case (supra) ( AIR 1971 SC 1678 ) for holding that the decree could be executed against the trees situated on the intermediary's grove-land. This question is, however, not relevant in the present case and, as such, I need not dilate any further on this point. 22. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents urged that the defendant-appellant's claim regarding their being tenure-holders of the land in question, over which trees in suit are situated, is absolutely wrong and unfounded and the same be repelled. In support of his contention he pointed out that plot No. 528 is a very big plot and the entries in favour of defendant-appellants, over certain portion of said plot, do not relate to land in question over which trees in suit are situated. In support of his contention he pointed out that plot No. 528 is a very big plot and the entries in favour of defendant-appellants, over certain portion of said plot, do not relate to land in question over which trees in suit are situated. Be that as it may, since in the present case we are not concerned as to who is tenure-holder of the land on which the trees in suit are situated, I do not find it relevant to consider the aforesaid submission on its merit. 23. In the present case, the only relevant question for consideration is as to who is owner and in possession of the trees in suit. In view of what has been said above, the owner of trees, situated on the land belonging to and forming part of a holding of another person, will not lose his rights in trees, and as such the question as to who is tenure-holder of land, on which trees in suit are situated, is altogether irrelevant, Hence, in this view of the matter I do not express any opinion on the merit of aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. 24. In the present case, as already observed above, a finding has been recorded that the trees in suit belonged to the plaintiff and to his predecessors-in-interest and that the appellants had not planted the same, nor they were in possession thereof. The said findings do not suffer from any main fest error so as to call for interference by this court in second appeal. 25. In the result, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.