JUDGMENT O.P. Saxena, J. - There is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6.12.1965 passed by the learned I Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad decreeing the suit for partition and accounts. 2. Rai Bahadur B. Bindeshwari Saran Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He had five sons ; Maheshwari Saran Singh; Bhuneswari Saran Singh, Bisheswari Saran Singh, Jagdishwari Saran Singh and Jagdambika Saran Singh (defendant No.3). Bhuneshwari Saran Singh died in the year 1929 leaving behind his widow Smt. Rukmani Devi (defendant No. 10). Rai Bahadur B. Bindeshwari Saran Singh died on 27.10.1942 leaving behind four sons and the widow of a predeceased son who had only a right of maintenance. Bisheshwari Saran Singh died on 18.11.1943. DW 9 Smt. Lalita Devi is bis Widow. D.Ws. 7 and 8 Brijeshwari Saran Singh and Badreshwari Singh are his sons. Jagdishwari Saran Singh died on 1.3.1944. Smt. Annapurna Devi, plaintiff is his widow. Maheshwari Saran Singh died on 15.2.1950 leaving behind Smt. Ratneshwari Devi as his widow and Sureshwari Saran Singh (defendant No. 1) as his son. Smt. Ratneshwari Devi died during the pendency of the suit and her two daughters Smt. Uma Devi and Smt. Urmila Devi were brought on the record. Defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6, Shanker Prasad. Prakash Narain and Chandra Sheikhar are sons of Jagdambika Saran Singh. Rai Bahadur B. Bindeshwari Saran Singh possessed considerable immovable and movable properties detailed in Schedule A at the foot of the plaint. R.B. Bineshwari Saran Singh and B. Bhagwati Saran Singh jointly owned properties of Schedule B. Defendant No. 11 Smt. Chandra Kala Devi is the widow-of B. Bhagwati Saran Singh. Defendant No. 12 Visheshwari Pratap Narain Sahi claimed interest in only one of the properties given in Schedule B which is a house at Varanasi. Defendants Nos. 13 and 14 Baleshwar Lal and his son Kaushal Lai purchased a Chhaoni in village Garwar district Ballia. 3. There are various sale-deeds. Defendant No. 17 Smt. Bindo Devi claimed to have purchased the share of defendants Nos. 7 to 9 in some of the properties. Defendant No. 19 Smt. Manorma Devi is the wife of defendant No. 12 Visheshwar Pratap Narain Sahi. She claimed to have purchased one-fourth share in Baoli Bagh one of the properties mentioned in Schedule B from one Balbhaddar, Defendant Nos. 7 to 9 in some of the properties. Defendant No. 19 Smt. Manorma Devi is the wife of defendant No. 12 Visheshwar Pratap Narain Sahi. She claimed to have purchased one-fourth share in Baoli Bagh one of the properties mentioned in Schedule B from one Balbhaddar, Defendant Nos. 15, 16 and 18 Smt. Maheshwari Devi, Rameshwar Prasad and Bindo Devi are other formal defendants. 4. On 22.4.1958, the plaintiff filed the suit for partition of her one-fourth share in the properties of Schedule A and one eight share in the properties of Schedule B and also for rendition of accounts with the allegations that her husband Bindeshwari Saran Singh had one-fourth and one eighth share in the disputed properties, that she succeeded to the same on his death, that she remained under the care and protection of Maheshwari Saran Singh till the end of 1947, that when it became unbearable to pull on with him, she came to Allahabad and took up residence here, that as Maheshwari Saran Singh was not giving her any share in the profits, she began realising Zamindari dues separately since 1948, that she maintained status quo in respect of remaining properties, that Maheshwari Saran Singh and after his death the defendants stood in a fiduciary relationship vis-a-vis the plaintiff, that she gave a notice on 26/27.4.55 for separation of her interest in the joint family properties, that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 refused to comply with the same and that they are also liable to render account of the profits realised by them. 5. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 refused to comply with the same and that they are also liable to render account of the profits realised by them. 5. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 with the allegation that the family continued to be joint till the end of 1945, that in 1946 defendant No. 3 Jagdambika Saran Singh and defendant No. 9 Smt. Lalita Devi began living separately, that Jagdambika Saran Singh also initiated proceedings for removal of Maheshwari Saran Singh who had been appointed guardian of minors Brijeshwari Saran Singh and Badreshwari Saran Singh, that Jagdambika Saran Singh and Shrimati Lalita Devi began making separate collections of Zamindari dues and house rent, that plaintiffs' husband Jagdeshwari Saran Singh died as a member of the coparcenary family on 1.3.1944, that the plaintiff gave birth to a male child on 24.10.1944, that the child died on 5.7.1945 as a member of the joint coparcenary family leaving behind the plaintiff as bis mother, that the plaintiff returned to Annapur and began living with Maheshwari Saran Singh, who took all pains to maintain her property, that she subsequently came under the influence of her maternal relations Jagdambika Saran Singh and Smt. Lalita Devi and left the protection of Maheshwari Saran Singh, that she was permitted to make separate collections of Zamindari dues, but it did not confer any right on her, that on the death of Maheshwari Saran Singh, residential houses were sealed and an inventory of the articles kept therein was prepared, that the properties mentioned in Schedule A (ka) did not find any mention in the said inventory, that defendant No. 1 was a minor and defendant No. 2 was a pardanashin lady, that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any partition of the properties in suit, that there was no fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the other members of the joint Hindu Family, that she had only a right of maintenance, that she was permitted to make separate realisation of Zamindari dues due to love and affection and this could not confer any right on her, that while separating, the plaintiff was allowed to carry certain ornaments with her, that she filed a suit against her brother-in-law for recovery of the same, that she had no right to claim a partition of movable properties mentioned in Schedule A (ka), that if the movable properties had been misappropriated by Maheshwari Saran Singh, the dependants are not liable, that the suit is barred by time, that the suit as framed is not maintainable, that the suit is under-valued, and that the Count-fee paid is insufficient. 6. The suit was also contested by defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6, 7 to 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 19. No contest was made by defendants Nos. 3, 15, 16 and 18 and the suit proceeded ex parte against them. 7. The learned Civil Judge repelled the legal pleas raised by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. He held that the plaintiff had one fourth share in the properties given in Schedule A and one eighth share in the properties given in Schedule, B, that she is entitled to claim partition, that Maheshwari Saran Singh obtained possession over the disputed movable properties, except the properties said to be in the possession of Jagdambika Saran Singh and referred to as such in Ex. 14 that Maheshwari Saran Singh did not misappropriate or squander away these properties, that the plaintiff was not allowed to carry away any ornaments at the time she separated and the suit is not barred by time. He consequently decreed the suit for partition and accounting and hence this appeal. 8. No appeal has been filed against the decree for partition of plaintiff's one-fourth share in the immovable properties of Schedule A and one-eighth share in the immovable properties of Schedule B. 9. No appeal has been filed by Jagdambika Saran Singh in respect of decree for partition of one-fourth share in the movable properties in his possession. 10. The appeal has been filed only by the defendants appellants against the decree for partition of plaintiff's one-fourth share in the remaining movable properties which remained in the possession of Maheshwari Saran Singh and also against the decree for accounts. 11. The first point for determination in this appeal is as to whether the plaintiff has a right to claim partition. 12. The plaintiff's husband Jagdeshwari Saran Singh died on 1.3.1944. A posthumous child was born on 24.10.1944. The child died on 4.7.1945. It was said that the plaintiff was divested of her interest in the joint Hindu Family property on the birth of the posthumous child and after the death of the latter, the interest devolved on the surviving coparceners. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, it was submitted that under Section 3 (1) of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, a Hindu widow gets the same share as a son in the separate property of her husband. On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, it was submitted that under Section 3 (1) of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, a Hindu widow gets the same share as a son in the separate property of her husband. Section (2) of the Act provides that she will have the same interest which her husband had in the joint Hindu Family Property. Section 3 (3) of the Act provides that any interest devolving on the Hindu widow under Section 3 (2) shall be limited interest known as Hindu Widow's Estate, provided that she will have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. It was urged that the Act gave a death blow to the doctrine of survivorship and on the death of the male child, the interest of Jagdeshwari Saran Singh in the joint Hindu Family Property again reverted to his mother (plaintiff). 13. The rule of Hindu law regarding divestment of estate of a Hindu widow on the birth of posthumous child stood modified on the enactment of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. The widow could not be divested of her entire interest on the birth of a posthumous child, as it would amount to putting the child in a better position than the one which would have prevailed if he was born in the life-time of his father. Where a coparcener dies leaving behind a son and a widow, his undivided coparcenary interest devolves on his widow and the son continues to enjoy the undivided interest which he got by virtue of his birth. Thus on the birth of a posthumous child, only half or the interest of Jagdeshwari Saran Singh in the joint Hindu Family property was divested from the plaintiff and vested in the-child, while the remaining half continued to vest in the plaintiff. 14. Another consequence of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act is that the rule of survivorship qua the undivided coparcenary interest of the deceased member is kept in abeyance. Case reported in Kanja Sahu v. Bhagebon Mohanty AIR 1951 Orissa 35, maybe referred to. As the rule of survivorship was kept in abeyance qua the undivided coparcenary interest of Jagdeshwari Saran Singh, the half interest which devolved on the posthumous child on his birth again reverted to the plaintiff on his death. Case reported in Kanja Sahu v. Bhagebon Mohanty AIR 1951 Orissa 35, maybe referred to. As the rule of survivorship was kept in abeyance qua the undivided coparcenary interest of Jagdeshwari Saran Singh, the half interest which devolved on the posthumous child on his birth again reverted to the plaintiff on his death. It could not go back to the other members of the coparcenary as it would defeat the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. 15. As mentioned earlier, the defendants-appellants submitted to the decree for partition of plaintiff's share in the immovable properties of Schedules A and B. The appeal is confined to the movable properties and accounting. As the appellants have conceded plaintiff's share in the joint Hindu Family immovable properties, they cannot be allowed to urge that the plaintiff has no interest in the movable properties. In Paragraph 13 of the written statement it was said that the child died on 4.7.1945 as a member of the coparcenary leaving the plaintiff as his mother, it was in fact suggested that the plaintiff succeeded to the interest of the child on his death and it was not said that the interest of the child devolved on the other coparceners. This plea has been raised for the first time before this Court. We find no merit in the same and hold that the plaintiff is entitled to a partition of her one-fourth share in the movable properties. 16. The second point for determination in this appeal is as to whether Maheshwari Saran Singh was possessed of the movable properties in respect of which the plaintiff's claim had been decreed by the trial Court. 17. Maheshwari Saran Singh was appointed guardian of minors, defendants Nos. 7 and 8 Brijeshwari Saran Singh and Badreshwari Saran Singh. Jagdambika Saran Singh filed an application in the Court of the District Judge, Allahabad for the removal of Maheshwari Saran Singh from the guardianship of the minors which was Miscellaneous Case No. 52 of 1947, Jagdambika Saran Singh v. Maheshwari Saran Singh. Maheshwari Saran Singh gave an application in the aforesaid case vide copy Ex. 13 giving details of property of the joint Hindu Family possessed by him. Ex. Maheshwari Saran Singh gave an application in the aforesaid case vide copy Ex. 13 giving details of property of the joint Hindu Family possessed by him. Ex. 14 is a copy of the valuation report filed by Maheshwari Saran Singh giving the valuation of the immovable and movable properties and also the details of the gold and silver ornaments, silver utensils and other articles. The articles kept in houses at 17, Thornhill Road and 11 Queens Road were also given, Ex. 62 is the original letter dated 12.12.1949 said to have been given by Maheshwari Saran Singh to the plaintiff. In this letter Maheshwari Saran Singh clearly admitted that he came in possession of the gold and silver ornaments, silver utensils and other articles after the death of his father Rai Bahadur B. Bindeshwari Saran Singh and the partition of the same could not take place, that proceedings for removal of guardian were pending in the Court of District Judge, that till the decision of the case, there was difficulty in the partition of the ornaments and other articles, that he had filed a list of ornaments and other articles (vide copy Ex. 14) in the Court of the District Judge, that there were some other ornaments with him which were not mentioned by him in the list, and that he would partition the same among the co-sharer after the decision of the case. The details of other ornaments were given in this letter. P.W. 1 Smt. Annapurna Devi plaintiff deposed regarding the circumstances in which Maheshwari Saran Singh gave the letter. P.W. 3 Bhola Nath proved it. The learned Civil Judge has given good reasons for disbelieving the statement of D.W. 3 Abdul Jabbarkhan, who denied that the letter bore the signature of Maheshwari Saran Singh. He was formerly Mukhtar-e am of Maheshwari Saran Singh and he had come forward to depose on account of the old association of master and servant. The learned Civil Judge rightly pointed out the D.W. I Sureshwari Singh (son), D.W. 3 Ratneshwari Devi (widow) and D.W. 4 Ramkathin Rai (son-in-law) had not the courage to deny the signature of Maheshwari Saran Singh on the letter (Ex. 62). No attempt was made to get the disputed signature compared with any admitted signature of Maheshwari Saran Singh. The learned Civil Judge rightly pointed out the D.W. I Sureshwari Singh (son), D.W. 3 Ratneshwari Devi (widow) and D.W. 4 Ramkathin Rai (son-in-law) had not the courage to deny the signature of Maheshwari Saran Singh on the letter (Ex. 62). No attempt was made to get the disputed signature compared with any admitted signature of Maheshwari Saran Singh. The letter appears on a printed pad bearing the name of Maheshwari Saran Singh as guardian of Maharani Saheb Bettiah. The letter is typed and the signature appears at the bottom. There is nothing to doubt the authenticity of the signature. Maheshwari Saran Singh admitted the existence of the movable properties in respect of which the plaintiff's claim had been decreed (Vide Exs. 13, 14 and 62). There is nothing to show that the admission was erroneous and is consequently not binding on the defendants-appellants. The case of Jagdish Prasad v. State of Madhya Bharat A.I.R 1961 S.C. 1070, is not of any help to the appellants as the admission in this case is unambiguous and not of a doubtful nature. 18. Ex. D. 1 and 17 were relied upon before me in support of the contention that Maheshwari Saran Singh was not possessed of the movable properties in respect of which the claim has been decreed. Exs. D. 1 bears the figure 5' at the top showing that it is the fifth page of a document. It was not filed on the first date of hearing. It was shown to the plaintiff during the course of her cross-examination. In this letter all that was said was that some properties were sent out on trucks, some were sold, some were squandered, some were given to the prostitutes and even clothes and ornaments were given away. This document cannot be of any help to the appellants. Firstly, it is not a complete document. It is not known as to why the defendants have withheld the remaining four pages of the document. Secondly, it is not known as to when it was put down. Thirdly, no names were mentioned. Fourthly, if Maheshwari Saran Singh removed the movable properties to deprive the other members of the joint Hindu Family of aright to claim a partition, it cannot be said that the properties did not remain within his domain. Secondly, it is not known as to when it was put down. Thirdly, no names were mentioned. Fourthly, if Maheshwari Saran Singh removed the movable properties to deprive the other members of the joint Hindu Family of aright to claim a partition, it cannot be said that the properties did not remain within his domain. Fifthly, the plaintiff explained that there was a reference to Jagdambika Saran Singh so far as giving of the property to prostitutes is concerned. Lastly, Maheshwari Saran Singh himself gave the list of movable properties over which he obtained possession on the death of his father in the guardinaship case (vide Ex. 14) and some more vide letter (Ex. 62). It cannot be said that on the basis of this letter that Maheshwari Saran Singh ceased to have domain over the movable properties. 19. Ex. 17 is the copy of the affidavit of Hanuman Prasad Mukhtare-e-am of Maheshwari Saran Singh filed in Miscellaneous Case No. 52 of 1947, (Jagdambika Saran Singh v. V.B. Maheshwari Saran Singh and others) of the Court of the District Judge, Allahabad. This affidavit was filed in reply to the interrogatories vide copy Ex. 12. The plaintiff has not claimed any interest in the silver, gold and guineas referred to in Paragraph II of the affidavit. In Paragraph 16 of the affidavit regarding movable properties, it was said that a correct list of movable properties had been filed by his master in the case. This affidavit also confirmed the correctness of Ex. 14 filed by Maheshwari Saran Singh in the guardianship case. There is nothing in the affidavit to suggest that Maheshwari Saran Singh ceased to have domain over the movable properties during the pendency of the guardianship case. 20. There is thus no force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and we hold that the learned Civil Judge rightly held that Maheshwari Saran Singh was possessed of the disputed movable properties which came in his possession on the death of his father and the plaintiff has a right to claim partition of one fourth share therein. 21. The third point for determination in this appeal is as to whether defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were possessed of the disputed movable properties on the date of suit, and if not, its effect ? 22. 21. The third point for determination in this appeal is as to whether defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were possessed of the disputed movable properties on the date of suit, and if not, its effect ? 22. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the plaintiff had lo prove the existence of ornaments on the date of suit before she could claim a decree for partition. Reliance was placed on case reported in Ram Samujh Singh v. Bikarmajit Singh and others AIR 1919 Oudh 208, and Gangadhar v. Subhashni AIR 1955 Orissa 135. 23. The learned counsel for plaintiff respondent submitted that Maheshwari Saran Singh obtained domain over the disputed movable properties after the death of his father. He admitted that existence of the disputed properties as late as 12.12. 1944 vide Ex. 62. He died about two months thereafter on 15.2.1950. It is for his heirs to explain as to what happened to the properties. A half heated plea was raised in Paragraph 62 of the written statement when it was said that if any of the properties had been misappropriated by Maheshwari Saran Singh, the suit is barred and the contesting defendants are net liable for the same. It was not pleaded that Maheshwari Saran Singh misappropriated the properties or that he was a person of immoral habits and he squandered away the properties on wine and woman. No evidence was adduced before the learned Civil Judge regarding the alleged misappropriation of the properties by Maheshwari Saran Singh. The witnesses examined by the defendants did not also say that Maheshwari Saran Singh had any immoral habits of that he squandered away the properties for immoral purposes. The mere fact that there was a debt of Rs. 15000/- at the time of his death cannot go to show that he squandered away the properties. Maheshwari Saran Singh was the karta of a prominent Taluqdar family of Allahabad and used to pay Rs. 10,000/- as land revenue. The existence of a debt of Rs. 10003/- to Rs. 15000/- could only show that he spent lavishly. There is no evidence to show that Maheshwari Saran Singh misappropriated or squandered away the movable properties. The learned Civil Judge has considered the argument built in this regard on the basis of Ex. D1 and has rightly rejected the same. The existence of a debt of Rs. 10003/- to Rs. 15000/- could only show that he spent lavishly. There is no evidence to show that Maheshwari Saran Singh misappropriated or squandered away the movable properties. The learned Civil Judge has considered the argument built in this regard on the basis of Ex. D1 and has rightly rejected the same. If Maheshwari Saran Singh obtained possession over the disputed movable properties of the joint Hindu Family on the death of his father, the members of the family are entitled to claim partition of the said movable properties to the extent of their shares unless it is shown that Maheshwari Saran Singh disposed of the properties in due course of management as Karta of the joint Hindu Family. It was not possible for the plaintiff to prove affirmatively the existence of the aforesaid properties on the date of suit. She could only prove that Maheshwari Saran Singh obtained domain over the said properties as Karta of the joint Hindu Family and this she has duly done. After this the burden shifted on the defendants-appellants to show as to how the properties were disposed of. 24. The learned Civil Judge has rightly refused to accept the denial of the witnesses examined by the defendants that they did not obtain possession over the disputed properties. He has rightly pointed out that the denial is much too interested to be believed. The defence has miserably failed to account for the properties and the plaintiff is entitled to claim partition of one-fourth share. As the case of the defendants is that the properties do not exist, the plaintiff can get a money decree according to her share. All that can be done is that the estate of Maheshwari Saran Singh in the hands of the defendants-appellants can be made liable for the said amount. We decide the point accordingly. 25. The fourth point for determination in this appeal is as to whether the suit for partition of movable properties and accounting is barred by time. 26. As far as the suit for accounting is concerned, reliance was placed on the case of Naganna v. Venkatarayulu AIR 1951 Mad. 234 . The plea appears to be misconceived. The suit was filed on 22.4.1958. The trial Court decreed the claim for accounts from 22.4.1955 onwards. 26. As far as the suit for accounting is concerned, reliance was placed on the case of Naganna v. Venkatarayulu AIR 1951 Mad. 234 . The plea appears to be misconceived. The suit was filed on 22.4.1958. The trial Court decreed the claim for accounts from 22.4.1955 onwards. If Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied, the suit could not have been decreed for a period of six years prior to the date of the institution i.e., for the period from 22.4.1952 onwards. It was, however, decreed for only three years prior to the institution and no valid objection can be taken by the appellants. 27. As far as the suit for partition of movable properties is concerned, there is a presumption under the Hindu Law that a property which was admittedly joint continues to be joint unless it is shown that a partition took place. The disputed movable properties were admittedly joint family properties and the plaintiff has a right to claim partition of one-fourth share therein The mere fact that some members of the joint Hindu Family began living separately or began realising zamindari dues to the extent of their shares separately would at the best indicate a partial partition. There was neither definement of shares which is technically called "division in status" nor actual division among the members by allotment of specific property to each one of them which is described as division by'metes and bounds.' Pukmabai v. Laxminarayan AIR 1965 S.C. 335, may be referred to, Most of the immovable properties and the disputed movable properties were never partitioned and shall be deemed to have continued to remain joint family properties. 28. The plaintiff gave a notice on 26/27.4.1955 claiming partition of her share and the suit was filed on 22.4.1958. It was not alleged in the written statement that the plaintiff asked for partition in the year 19:0 and the same refused by Smt. Ratneshwari Devi (D-1). The learned civil Judge rightly refused to place reliance on the statements of D.W. 3 Smt. Ratneshwari Devi and D.W.4 Ram Kathin Rai in this regard. He rightly pointed out that no question was ever put to the plaintiff while she was in the witness box. The cause of action fort the suit arose when partition was refused and the suit is within time. 29. He rightly pointed out that no question was ever put to the plaintiff while she was in the witness box. The cause of action fort the suit arose when partition was refused and the suit is within time. 29. In the case Yerukola alias Pent a Jogulu v. Yerukola alias Pent a Tatayya 45 I.L.R. Mad. 648, arbitrators were appointed to divide some of the properties by metes and bounds and the remaining properties remained in the hands of different members who collected dues from debtors and rents from tenants. It was held that Article 120 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable to a case for partition and accounts. In the present case, there was no partition of any property by metes and bounds and there is no satisfactory evidence to show that defendants Nos 1 and 2 or their predecessor denied the plaintiff's interest in the movable properties at any time prior to the notice given by her. 30. In the case Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand and another AIR 1958 S.C. 827 , it was held that the suit by an heir against other heirs to recover his share of movable estate of a deceased person, is not one for specific movable property wrongfully taken such as is contemplated by Article 49 Limitation Act but is governed by Article 120, The present suit is not one for recovery of share of movable estate of a deceased person. It is a suit for recovery of share in joint Hindu Family movable properties. 31. In Rukhmabai v. Laxminarayan and others AIR 1960 S.C. 335 , it was held that there can be no 'right to sue' until there was accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. In the present case, the right to sue accrued on the failure of the defendants to partition the plaintiffs' share in the immovable properties in pursuance of a notice given on 26/27.4.1955. The right to sue did not accrue earlier. 32. In the case Mst. Manbhari v. Bishun Prasad 1958 A.L.J. 357, the expression 'separate property' under Section 3 (i) of the Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937, was interpreted and it has no bearing to the facts of the present case. 33. The right to sue did not accrue earlier. 32. In the case Mst. Manbhari v. Bishun Prasad 1958 A.L.J. 357, the expression 'separate property' under Section 3 (i) of the Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937, was interpreted and it has no bearing to the facts of the present case. 33. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that the suit for partition of movable properties is barred by time. We hold that the learned Civil Judge rightly held that the suit is within time. 34. No other point was pressed before us. 35. The result is that the appeal succeeds partly and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge are modified to the extent that as the movable properties specified in Schedule A (ka) of the plaint for merely in possession of Maheshwari Siraa Singh are not available for partition, the plaintiff will get one fourth share in the value thereof as given in the plaint along with interest of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of payment and the said amount shall be recovered from the estate of Maheshwari Saran Singh in the hands of defendants' No. 1 and 2. The rest of the judgment and decree are confirmed. The plaintiff-respondent shall however, get the cost of the anneal from the defendants-appellants.