JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - These are two connected civil revisions arising out of the execution proceedings. , The relevant facts may be stated as under : 2. The opposite-party filed a suit against the revisionist for the recovery of Rs. 61,794 on the allegations that he, as Manager and Karta of the Joint family firm M/s. Nanak Chanel Om Prakash used to deal with the plaintiff Bank and in that connection used to receive money from the various co-operative societies on behalf of the bank. It was alleged that the defendant did hot account for the plaintiffs money and ultimately a sum of Rs. 1,53,216-8-3 became due against him. The defendant was prosecuted under Section 409, I.P.C. but he was acquitted on 30-8-1955 due to some technical snag. In the meanwhile the plaintiff also tried to refer the matter to arbitration under the Co-operative Societies Act, but the revisionist and his brothers filed suit No. 364 of 1954 and got the arbitration proceedings stayed. When pressed hard to pay the amount, the defendant petitioner executed a mortgage deed on 11-6-1953 in favour of the Bank mortgaging, his property to the extent of Rs. 80,000 Towards the balance amount of Rs. 73,171-8-3, the defendant only paid Rs. 19,171-8-3, thus, leaving a balance of Rs. 54,000 besides interest. This amount also swelled to Rs. 61,794 when suit No. 92 of 1952 was filed for its recovery. In this suit, a compromise was filed on 1-2-1957 which was also signed by all the other family members of the defendant and a decree in terms of compromise followed. On the basis of the mortgage dated 11-6-1953, which was executed for Rs. 80,000 also another suit No. 86 of 56 was filed which w as decreed in due course. Both these decrees were put into execution and in both of them the petitioner filed similar objections purporting to be under Order 21, Rule 66, C.P.C. read with Section 47, C.P.C. in which the main ground was that the decree was totally jurisdiction as he happened to be a member of the plaintiffs society and under the provisions of Co-operative Societies Act, no suit would lie against him as the dispute could only be referred to arbitration. It was, therefore, urged that since the decree was totally without jurisdiction and a mullite the same could not be executed. It was, therefore, urged that since the decree was totally without jurisdiction and a mullite the same could not be executed. The second ground of objection was that the decree was actually passed by the Additional Civil Judge, while the execution application was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, without obtaining any certificate of transfer from the Court of Additional Civil Judge. It is urged that in view of Section 38 C.P.C. the Court of First Additional Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. Both these, objections have been rejected by the Court below. Aggrieved, the defendant objector has filed these revisions and the same grounds have been urged before me also. 3. Since the matter relates to 1956 when the suit was filed we must necessary refer to the relevant provisions of the old Co-operative Societies Act. Section 43 of the old Act provides for the powers of the Government to frame There is no provisions similar to that of Section 70 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 in the old Act. Section 43 of the old Act provides for the powers of the Government to fraise rules under the Co-operative Societies Act for certain given purposes. One of these purposes is to rules regarding arbitration proceedings under which rule 115 had been framed. There is no provision in any of the rules or in any section of the old Co-operative Societies Act which may completely prohibit the filing of the suit in the Civil Court in regard to any matter which could be referred to arbitration under the Co-operative Societies Act. Even if the petitioner was a member of the plaintiffs society, it was not incumbent for the bank to refer any dispute with the petitioner to arbitration and, thus, filing of suit for the recovery of the money in a Civil Court was not barred. In view of Section 9, C.P.C. the bar of Jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be readily inferred unless it was either expressly or impliedly barred under any law (see A.I.R. 1976 Allahabad 349). Since I do not find any specific provision in the Act ousting jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such a matter, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted and I hold the Civil Court which passed the decree did not suffer from want of jurisdiction. 4. Since I do not find any specific provision in the Act ousting jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such a matter, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted and I hold the Civil Court which passed the decree did not suffer from want of jurisdiction. 4. Apart from this, it is now well settled that in execution proceedings, the Court cannot go behind the decree and must execute it. It is only in those limited class of cases in which the inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree in apparent on the face of the record that the executing Court can refuse to execute such a decree (See A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 352), A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1475 and A.I.R. 1974 All. 379). In this case the question of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree cannot be decided without taking fresh evidence into consideration as to whether or not the revisionist was a member of the plaintiffs society. These question cannot be gone into by the executing Court. In the circumstances, the first objection raised on behalf of the revisionist is devoid of substance and is hereby rejected. 5. Coining now to the second ground, reliance is placed mainly on the wordings of Section 37, C.P.C. This section defines the "Court which passed the decree"in the following words: - The Expression Court which passed a decree or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of the decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include : - (a) Whether the decree to be executed has been passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance, and (b) Where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute, it the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution the decree, would have, jurisdiction to try such suit. Explanation. Explanation. - The Court of first instance does not cease to have jurisdiction to execute a decree merely on the ground that after the institution of the suit wherein the decree was passed or after passing of the decree, any area has been transferred from the jurisdiction of that court to the jurisdiction of another Court, but, in every such case such other Courts shall have also jurisdiction to execute the decree, if at the time' of making the for execution of the decree, it would have jurisdiction to try the suit. The explanation to Section 37, C.P.C. was introduced in 1976 and should be ignored from consideration for the present purpose, otherwise also it has no significance in the context of the present dispute. Under Section 37, C.P.C. the use of words be deemed to include only creates a legal fiction and it shows the intention of the legislature, that the definition is not exhaustive. 6. A reference in this connection may be made to the case of Masrab Khan v. Bebnath Mall, AIR 1942 Cal 321 where it was held that the definition of Section 37, C.P.C. partly enlarges the scope and partly restricts the scope of the expression of the Court which passed the decree."The scope is restricted only under clauses (a) and (b) while it is enlarged as regards the initial part which cannot remain; confine to mean only the Court which had actually passed the decree. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant then referred to the case of Mohd Mehdi v. Jain Uddin, A.I.R. 1957 Pat 654, where a Division Bench of Patna High Court was considering the same question. In that case, the suit had been decreed by Purnea Subordinate Judge, Purnea and the decree was sent for execution to the District Judge Patna. However, the execution application was filed, before the Sub, Judge, Patna and there an objection was taken about the jurisdiction of the Court. I was held that the jurisdiction to executed the decree vests either in the subordinate Judge, Purnea or in the District Judge, Patna, to whom the decree had been transferred for execution and not with Sub Judge at Patna. That case is clearly distinguishable. I was held that the jurisdiction to executed the decree vests either in the subordinate Judge, Purnea or in the District Judge, Patna, to whom the decree had been transferred for execution and not with Sub Judge at Patna. That case is clearly distinguishable. In that case the decree had been passed by the Subordinate judge at Purnea and could be executed at Patna only on the basis of the transfer (Certificate given By the Court which actually passed the decree. This transfer certificate was given in favour of the District Judge, Patna and not in favour of Sub Judge Patna. The objection was, therefore, right)v sustained by the High' Court on the facts of that case which are quite distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. 8. A reference was also made to the case of Ramnath Chettiar arid others v. A.M.R. Muthayyan Chettiar, AIR 1935 Mad 849. There the Court was established for one year but it continued to f unction even thereafter. It was observed in that case that the mere fact that a temporary Court is established for one year and is thereafter continued cannot deprive that Court of its character of the Court which passed the decree. If it is the Court which passed the decree, then clearly execution must be bad in that Court. This case does not lay down that the execution could not be started in any other Court having the same jurisdiction and, therefore, is not helpful for the decision of the present controversy. 9. In Pratap Udai Nath Sahi v. Bararik Lal Sahi, AIR 1936 Pat 615. the decree had not been passed by the Civil Court at all but by a tribunal. It was held in these circumstances that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree which had neither passed by it nor sent to it for execution. This case also is distinguishable. 10. In Gowraumal v. Liggappa Gowder, AIR 1968 Mad 99 , a money decree had been passed. It was held that if the executing Court is not the decreeing Court, the decree must be transferred to it by proper transmission of the decreeing Court before if can be executed. This case also is distinguishable. 10. In Gowraumal v. Liggappa Gowder, AIR 1968 Mad 99 , a money decree had been passed. It was held that if the executing Court is not the decreeing Court, the decree must be transferred to it by proper transmission of the decreeing Court before if can be executed. For, so long as the decreeing Court continues to exist, it has jurisdiction over the decree it has passed and hence a transfer of the decree is necessary before it can be executed by the executing Court. This case certainly supports the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. 11. Another case which lends support to the contention of the appellant is Banwari Lal v. Municipal Board of Cawnpore, AIR 1925 All 276 where a Division Bench of this Court held. : "If where the suit is filed in Court A and Court B decides it, the execution application can be filed only in Court 'B and not Court A unless it is transferred to it." 12. In both these cases, however, the Court did not have occasion to consider as to how the two Courts, one which actually passed the decree and the other were execution proceedings were launched, were established, and whether both these Courts had the same territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. This position I will consider presently. 13. Way back, in the case reported in K.S. Srinivasa Pillay and another v. Vasudeva Mudaliar and another, 4 Indian Cases 501. Division Bench of Madras High Court held that if the local jurisdiction, is assigned to two or more sub Judges and the District Judge does not make any order under Section 13 of the Act No. 12 of 1887 assigning to each of them separate jurisdiction, one of them is entitled to deal with the execution of the decree passed by another. This case was a case based entirely on the principles of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887 with which the Courts in this State are governed. 14. The same view was expressed in Prabhakar Rao v. Hyderabad State Bank, AIR 1964 AP 101 where the decree passed by II Judge. City, Civil Court, Hyderabad was sought to be executed before the First Additional Civil Judge of the City Civil Court who had the some pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction it was held that the execution was valid. 15. The same view was expressed in Prabhakar Rao v. Hyderabad State Bank, AIR 1964 AP 101 where the decree passed by II Judge. City, Civil Court, Hyderabad was sought to be executed before the First Additional Civil Judge of the City Civil Court who had the some pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction it was held that the execution was valid. 15. In Merla Ramanna v. Nallaparaju and others, AIR 1956 SC 87 . The Supreme Court observed as under : "It is settled law that the Court which passed the decree does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it by reason of the subject-matter there of being transferred subsequently to the jurisdiction of another Court. The transferee Court acquires inherent jurisdiction by reason of transfer and if directly entertains the execution with reference thereof, it would at worse be an irregular exercise of jurisdiction and not a total absence of it." In this case, there was no dispute as to whether the Court passing the decree and the Court where, the execution had been started had the. same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction. On the contrary the case before the Supreme Court was of transferee Court having jurisdiction to which territorial jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree had been transferred subsequent to the passing the decree. However, this case is helpful to the extent that transferee Court acquires inherent jurisdiction to execute the decree even though the decree has not been duly transferred to it. 16. The true nature and scope of these provisions came to be decided in Mehar Singh and another v. Kasturi Ram and others, AIR 1962 Punj 364, where a Full Bench of the said High Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 37, 38, 39 and 151, C.P.C. observed as under : - "The object and purpose of Sections 37 to 39 alongwith other provisions occurring in Part II is to facilitate execution of decrees. Besides the fact that a decree-holder should be able to recover what has been held to be due to him by Court it is the duty of the Courts of law to see that their orders and decrees are enforced and that these orders do not become ineffective on some technical ground if at all possible. Besides the fact that a decree-holder should be able to recover what has been held to be due to him by Court it is the duty of the Courts of law to see that their orders and decrees are enforced and that these orders do not become ineffective on some technical ground if at all possible. The procedure laid down in the Civil P.C. for executing decrees is intended to facilitates and not to obstruct their execution provided that the judgment doubt is not put to undue and unnecessary harassment. Therefore, these provisions should not be so construed as to impede execution of decrees or . as to raise obstructions in the way of their execution and if it is possible these provisions should be construed to make it convenient to the decree-holders to execute their decrees. Sections 37 and 38 when construed according to the language used therein empowers the decree-holder to file an execution application either to the Court that actually passed the decree or to the Court that can effectively, execute it and in the latter case it is not necessary to comply with the provisions of Section 39 of the Code. 17. The point that presents before me in this appeal is slightly different from the cases cited earlier. The decree in this case had been passed by the Additional Civil Judge after the suit filed in the Court of Civil Judge was transferred to it. Execution of this decree, however, was started in the Court of Civil Judge which also had the same territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. It is contended that the execution ought to have been first filed in the Court of Additional Civil Judge which was the Court which passed the decree and then it should have been transferred to the court of the first Civil Judge. The argument of the appellant is that it is the court which actually passed the decree which alone had the jurisdiction to execute the decree. The fact that the court which actually passed the decree has jurisdiction to execute cannot be disputed. The question, however, is whether that alone is the court competent to execute the decree or whether even without seeking transfer of the execution to the court of Civil Judge directly an application for execution could be filed before the Civil Judge. The fact that the court which actually passed the decree has jurisdiction to execute cannot be disputed. The question, however, is whether that alone is the court competent to execute the decree or whether even without seeking transfer of the execution to the court of Civil Judge directly an application for execution could be filed before the Civil Judge. As we have seen earlier in 1962 Punjab case (supra) the relevant Sections 37 to 39 read with Section 150, C.P.C. and the rules which are to be found in Chapter II are really meant to help the execution of the decree and are not intended to impede the execution. The question is whether the jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge and. that of the Additional Civil Judge is concurrent where they have the same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction. An answer to this question can be found only with reference to the provisions of Bengal, Agra and Assam Act, 1887. 18. Four kinds of Civil Courts in this State were established under the provisions of Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. These were the courts of the District Judge, the 'Additional Judge, the Sub Ordinate Judge and the Munsif. The third category of Civil courts, after the amendment of 1936 are now known as the Court of the Civil Judge. There is no provisions for establishing the Courts of an Additional Civil Judge as such, Section 4 of the Act, however, empowers that State Government to alter the number of District Judges, Civil Judges and Munsifs. This can be done looking to the exigencies of the situation if the number of pending cases increases. When more than one Civil Judges Court is to be established then this can be done by the State Government under the provisions of this Act. Such Additional number of Civil Judge are commonly known as Additional Civil Judge. They do not normally have a separate or distinct territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction unless the District Judge by a general or special order directs to that effect. Normally, all cases of Civil nature coming within the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Judges Court established under Act XII of 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the parent Court) are filed in such Court and some cases out of them may then be transferred for disposal only to the court of an Additional Civil Judge. Normally, all cases of Civil nature coming within the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Judges Court established under Act XII of 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the parent Court) are filed in such Court and some cases out of them may then be transferred for disposal only to the court of an Additional Civil Judge. Legally, therefore, when a Civil Judges Court is establishing it, has got a particular territorial jurisdiction in the district and when the work load in that Court increases, the additional work load is usually transferred to the court of the Additional Civil Judge who also exercise the same territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction as the parent Civil Judges Court. It appears that in the present case also, at the relevant time, there were two Courts of civil Judges at Moradabad one of which was parent civil Judges Court. The suit out of which the present revision arises had been initially filed in the Court of the Civil Judge and was then transferred for disposal to the Court of Additional Civil Judge. After the suit was decree, the execution application was, however, filed straight in the Court of the Civil Judge. An objection was raised there that court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree as the same had actually been passed by the Additional Civil Judge. It was urged that unless the execution application was first filed before the same court which had actually passed the decree and the same was then administratively transferred to the court of the Civil Judge the same could not be executed by the Civil Judge in view of Section 37 read with Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As already observed earlier, the Court of Additional Civil Judge is nothing but the Court of Civil Judge, itself. Though it may not be the parent Court established under the provisions of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, yet it is the Court of the Civil Judge established for the purposes the work load of the parent Court even when the decree is passed by the Additional Civil Judge, it is, in fact, a decree of the Civil Judge which can certainly be executed by it. The various cases cited at the bar merely shown that the Court which actually passed the decree is certainly included in the expression court which passed the decree, but this does not lead to the conclusion that the Court of Civil Judge or the parent court of Civil Judge shall have no jurisdiction at all to execute such a decree. The decree in any case remains to be a decree passed by the Court of Civil Judge, whether ;by an Additional Civil Judge or by the parent Court of Civil Judge. 19. A situation similar to this arose in Badri Prasad Rastogi v. Suraj Narain Dubey, AIR 1969 Alld. 551 also. There the decree had been passed by the Additional Civil Judge and the same was put into execution before the parent Court of Civil Judge, from there it was transferred administratively to the court of Additional Civil Judge. When the execution application came up before the Additional Civil Judge, an objection was raised that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution of the decree and the execution application was returned for presentation to the proper Court. The execution application was, therefore, taken back by the decree-holder and was again filed in the court of Additional Civil Judge. At that stage the judgment-debtor took an objection that the execution application was beyond time. This objection was turned down by the executing court against which an appeal came up before this Court and was disposed of by a learned Single Judge (vide AIR 1969 All. 551 ). It was held in this case that Section 38 of the Code merely directs that the decree can be executed either by the court which passed it or by the court to which it is sent for execution: 20. In this case also the only question is whether the present court of the Civil Judge could also be included in the expression court which passed the decree. My answer to it is in the affirmative. The decree in this case must be deemed to be a decree passed by the Civil Judge though the decree was actually passed by the Additional Civil Judge and is capable of being executed by either of the two courts. My answer to it is in the affirmative. The decree in this case must be deemed to be a decree passed by the Civil Judge though the decree was actually passed by the Additional Civil Judge and is capable of being executed by either of the two courts. Even when the decree was sought to be executed by the Civil Judges court it must be regarded for the purposes of Sections 37 and 38, C.P.C. to be the court which passed the decree and as such it can legally execute the decree even though the same was actually passed by the Additional Civil Judge. At worst it may be said to be irregular exercise of jurisdiction but certainly it is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the executing court so as to invite interference by this court. Even if the execution proceedings were initiated before the Civil Judge, no harm or prejudice is likely to be caused to the appellant and no case justifying any interference has been made out in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. I do not find any substance in the submission made on behalf of the revisionist. 21. There is, thus, no merit in these two revisions which are accordingly dismissed with costs.