JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal , J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal. 2. The suit giving rise to this appeal was instituted on August 26, 1963 by Mata Badal with the allegation that plot 26 is part of his Sehan appurtenant to his residential house. Since long he has had his STET on this land. For nearly 17 or 18 years prior to the suit he claims to have had one mango tree also planted on this land. It was further urged that plots 23 and 24 are also comprised in his Sehan. In plot 23 he has had mango trees for nearly 17-18 years planted by him. The house of the defendants is situate on plot 25. In or about June 1963 the defendants encroached upon the portion shown by letters ABCDEF in the sketch map appended to the plaint without having any authority for the same. The land thus encroached forms part of plots 24 and 26 above mentioned. The relief sought is mandatory injunction for a direction to the defendants to remove the encroachment made by them and for restoration of possession to the plaintiff. 2-A. In defence it was pleaded that the defendants have had ancestral house in the village. The Sehan belonging to the defendants is situated to the north of the house. The defendants have had one mango tree belonging to them. The plaintiff has no concern with plots 23 and 24. Plot 26 was Parti. The defendants were in possession of it. In part thereof towards the north the plaintiff used to install his Kolhu during crushing season but at the end of the season the Kolhu used to be removed and the land retained in possession of the defendants. The construction raised by the defendants is on the foundation of the old structure vesting in them tinder S. 9. U.P. Act I of 1951. 3. The learned Munsif, Basti, decreed the suit on July 26, 1965, being of the view that the plaintiff had established his title and possession over the land involved in dispute and claimed as Sehan. The trees in question were also found to belong to the plaintiff. The defendants preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court which was allowed by the then Civil Judge, Basti, on March 25. 1968. The trees in question were also found to belong to the plaintiff. The defendants preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court which was allowed by the then Civil Judge, Basti, on March 25. 1968. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred Second Appeal No. 1970 of 1968, which was decided by this Court on January 9, 1974. The case was remanded to the lower appellate court with a direction that the appeal be decided afresh according to law upon merit on considering the material placed on the record. 4. The lower appellate court held on April 21, 1975 that the plaintiff has had his Sehan to the west of his house. Plot 26 is situate to the north of the house of the defendant. Plot 24 is to the east of the defendant's house and plot 23 is to the south of plot 24. According to the partition map drawn in 1924. the house of the defendants situated on plot 25 has had its opening towards the north on plot 26. The finding arrived at thus is that the land comprised on plot No. 24 is not appurtenant to the building held by the plaintiff, who was the Zamindar of the area. Considering the oral evidence on the record including the testimony of P.W. Virendra Kumar and the relevant topography, the lower appellate court held that plot 26 constitutes the Sehan of the defendants. It was then observed that merely due to keeping his Kolhu on a part of plot 26, the plaintiff could not claim to be the owner of the entire plot 26. There is no finding recorded, however, in relation to the trees. The appeal was allowed in the result and the plaintiffs suit was dismissed in toto. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submitted in reference to para 4 of the written statement filed by the defendants before the trial court that the user of the plaintiff on a portion of plot 26 is admitted. In para 4 of the written statement it is stated that plot 26 has been parti and it has been in possession of the defendants as a part of their Sehan. It is further specified that in part of this plot towards the north the plaintiff used to instal his Kolhu which used to be removed after crushing season. The learned Civil Judge. It is further specified that in part of this plot towards the north the plaintiff used to instal his Kolhu which used to be removed after crushing season. The learned Civil Judge. who decided appeal on April 21,1975, observed that on this account the plaintiff cannot claim to have become the owner of the entire plot 26. It was further stated by the lower appellate court that the controversy in the case is with respect to that part of plot 26 on which the disputed construction stands, and not in relation to the rest of that plot. This appears to proceed on a misreading of the pleadings. A perusal of Paras 1, 3 and 4 particularly as contained in the plaint shows that the dispute raised is in respect of the entire plot 26. The relief sought also is with respect to that entire plot besides plot 24. Reliance for the plaintiff-appellant is placed on S. 7(aa) U.P. Act I of l")1951, which reads as under : "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way affect the right of any person being it bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi or asami or any land to continue to enjoy any easement or any similar right of the more beneficial enjoyment of the land as he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting." It was argued by the appellant's learned counsel on the strength of S. 7(aa) that the land in question on which the plaintiff appellant has had his Kolhu shall not be deemed settled with the defendants. I am unable to agree with this line of reasoning. It is true that the Kolhu belonging to the plaintiff-appellant has been of long standing. In the Qura Abadi of the year 1924 (Ex. 1) also there is a mention made of Kolhar belonging to Mata Badal, the appellant, but this would mean only that the plaintiff-appellant has been in the enjoyment of this right to keep the Kolhu on the said land. There is no inconsistency, in my opinion, as between the title to plot 26 vesting in the defendants by virtue of S. 9, U.P. Act I of 1951, and the enjoyment of the plaintiff over it part of this plot in the form of having had a Kolhu as also admitted in para 4 of the written statement. There is no inconsistency, in my opinion, as between the title to plot 26 vesting in the defendants by virtue of S. 9, U.P. Act I of 1951, and the enjoyment of the plaintiff over it part of this plot in the form of having had a Kolhu as also admitted in para 4 of the written statement. The land is to be deemed settled with the defendant-respondents for the reason that it is appurtenant to the building held by them being situate to the immediate north of the defendant's house and due to the defendants having had possession over this land for more beneficial enjoyment of that building. Due to the long user traced prior to July 1, 1982, in the form of having had Kolhu during the crushing season, as stated in para 4 of the written statement relied upon for the appellant, the appellant may claim the right referable to S. 7(aa) without prejudice, however, to the title vesting in the defendant-respondent. 6. In Ram Diva v. Gram Samaj, 1963 Rev Dec 34 cited for the appellant it was held that the right mentioned in S. 7(aa) is different from a right of easement and, consequently, the right of a bhumidhar or a sirdar to use a particular parcel of land for agricultural purposes is governed by this provision. In that case the plaintiffs were held entitled to the benefit of S. 9, U.P. Act 1 of 1951, because it was found that they had a gher on the land in question and it was held that the gher is a 'building' within the meaning of that section. It was pointed out at page 36 that the land in dispute was used for agricultural purposes from before the vesting and, consequently, the plaintiffs' right was in no way affected by the abolition of zamindari. They were entitled to protection of S. 7(aa). 7. So far as the vesting is concerned, it is complete including in relation to such land in view of S. 4(1) read with S. 6(a)(i). U.P. Act I of 1951. I am unable to subscribe for this reason to the contention of the appellant's learned counsel that in respect of such land the abolition of zamindari be considered as ineffective. So far as the vesting is concerned, it is complete including in relation to such land in view of S. 4(1) read with S. 6(a)(i). U.P. Act I of 1951. I am unable to subscribe for this reason to the contention of the appellant's learned counsel that in respect of such land the abolition of zamindari be considered as ineffective. The true position is that the zamindari stands abolished in relation to such land as well, in the event of the requisite conditions of S. 9 being fulfilled, the land is to be deemed settled with the person eligible to the benefit thereof and protection is accorded also under S. 7(aa) to a person who has enjoyed any easement or any similar right for the more beneficial enjoyment of some land by him as bhumidhar or sirdar. This protection is available also to the plaintiff-appellant in the instant case in view of the finding that he has enjoyed the right of having Kolhu during the crushing season in part of plot 26 since before the memory can go and there being no dispute that he is bhumidhar having land as such in the village where he resides. This does not in any manner affect, however, the title of the defendant-respondents in relation to the entire plot 26 by virtue of S. 9. In Ambika Pd. Major v. Ramzani, 1966 All LJ 554 and Raja Ram v. State of U.P., 1964 All LJ 307 also it was affirmed that the phrase "any similar right" appearing in S. 7(aa) denotes a right different in nature and character from the right of easement. The right which-the plaintiff-appellant has in relation to the said land is, therefore, not that of easement so to say but a statutory right conferred in view of the provision contained in S. 7(aa) itself. 8. The question further arises whether the impugned construction raised by the defendant-respondents covers that part of plot 26 in respect of which the plaintiff-appellant has the right of enjoyment under S. 7(aa). If the answer to this is in the affirmative, the plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the removal of such construction, the plaintiff may not seek the exclusive possession over that part of plot 26, but certainly he can injunct the defendants from interfering with his user or the exercise of the right under the aforesaid provision. If the answer to this is in the affirmative, the plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the removal of such construction, the plaintiff may not seek the exclusive possession over that part of plot 26, but certainly he can injunct the defendants from interfering with his user or the exercise of the right under the aforesaid provision. In case there is no construction raised by the defendant-respondents over that part of plot 26 on which the plaintiff instals his Kolhu during the crushing season, then no question of removal of any construction will arise. This necessitates, in other words, a demarcation on local inspection that may be made at the spot by the Court Amin or an Advocate appointed as Commissioner, as the case may be. The specific portion of plot 26 in relation to which the plaintiff-appellant has exercised the said right has to be denoted and a map prepared for the purpose so that the decree passed on the basis thereof may remain executable and is not vague. 9. The other question raised for the appellant is relation to the trees. In para 1 of the plaint it was asserted that the plaintiff had one mango tree in plot 26 for nearly 17-18 years prior to the suit. In para 2 it was said that he planted certain mango trees in plot 23 about 17 or 18 years ago. The defendants have refuted this contention of the plaintiff. An issue was also drawn by the trial court on the spot and there was a finding recorded. but the appellate court is completely silent in relation to this part of the controversy. Nothing has been said by the learned Civil Judge in his judgment dated April 21, 1975, under appeal in relation to the title or possession over these mango trees. The learned counsel for the appellant is right, therefore, in contending that the question of title and possession over these trees also requires adjudication by the lower appellate court. 10. Nothing has been said by the learned Civil Judge in his judgment dated April 21, 1975, under appeal in relation to the title or possession over these mango trees. The learned counsel for the appellant is right, therefore, in contending that the question of title and possession over these trees also requires adjudication by the lower appellate court. 10. For the above, I find that the land comprised in plots 24 and 26 is to be deemed settled with the defendant-respondents in view of S. 9, U.P. Act I of 1951, subject however to the exercise of the right under S. 7(aa) of the Act by the plaintiff-appellant in respect of Kolhar over a portion of plot 26 and the adjudication to be made by the lower appellate court in relation to the trees in dispute. 11. The appeal is accordingly, allowed in part. The case is remanded to the lower appellate court which shall get the relevant portion of plot 26 demarcated by deputing the Court Amin or an Advocate Commissioner for the purpose and decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment including in relation to the trees in dispute. Costs of this Court on parties.