JUDGMENT K.C. Aggarwal,J. - This writ petition has been filed by Govind Saran Aeron for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 10-11-1979 passed in an appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 16-G of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. By this order the Deputy Director of Education upheld the decision of the District Inspector of Schools approving the proposal of the Committee of Management of the College, where the petitioner was appointed, for terminating his service. 2. This writ petition has a chequered history and the facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition may he briefly stated as follows :- "The petitioner was appointed as Principal of Munna Lal Inter College, Waziraganj, Badun on probation for one year on the 18th March 1973. According to the petitioner he was irrevocably confirmed though the resolution of that date passed by the committee of management carried a rider that within three months of the date of that resolution if any complaints were received against him, the committee of management would be free to reconsider that resolution. The petitioner has asserted that immediately on the expiry of the period of one year from the date of his appointment on probation, he became permanent on 17th March, 1974 though this position has been controverted in the counter-affidavit. But the counsel appearing for the contesting respondent did not challenge the claim of the petitioner for having become permanent due to the facts which will he narrated just now." 3. On 16th June, 1974 the Committee of Management passed a resolution constituting a sub-committee for inquiry into certain charges which had come to its notice against the petitioner. In pursuance of this resolution a subcommittee was constituted for enquiring into the charges. The sub-committee submitted its report dated 17th July, 1974 to the committee of management. Having found that the explanation offered by the petitioner to charges was not satisfactory, the committee of management passed a resolution terminating his service and thereafter further resolved to send the same to the District Inspector of Scoools for his approval. The sub-committee submitted its report dated 17th July, 1974 to the committee of management. Having found that the explanation offered by the petitioner to charges was not satisfactory, the committee of management passed a resolution terminating his service and thereafter further resolved to send the same to the District Inspector of Scoools for his approval. The District Inspector of Schools considered the report submitted by the enquiry committee the resolution of the committee of management and all other relevant papers sent to him and having found that the charges levelled against the petitioner had not been proved, he disapproved the proposal of the committee of management on 19th December, 1974. The Committee of management did not file any appeal against this disapproval of the order and as such it became final. On 6-1-1975 the committee accepted the decision dated 19-12-1974 and called upon the petitioner to resume his duty but with the new condition that he would be treated as fresh on probation of one year from the date of his joining duty. The petitioner represented to the committee of management that he should be treated as being in continuous service of the college and the condition that he should undergo a fresh period of probation for one year, be removed. The manager by his letter dated 31-1-1975 asked the petitioner to join the college without referring to the request made by him for removing the fresh condition imposed. Before this matter could be settled, the petitioner attended the college on 17th March, 1976 but he wish not handed over the charge by the acting Principal. On 2-7-1975, the petitioner was served with an order dated 26/30-6-19 75 whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated. The committee of management passed another resolution on the same effect on 17-8-1975. The District Inspector of Schools by his order dated 28-11-1975 approve the resolution terminating the petitioner's services but in appeal filed by the petitioner the order approving termination was set aside by the Deputy Director of Education on 28-2-1977. He however, directed that the petitioner would not be entitled to his salary during the period of his absence from January 21, 1975 to February 28, 1977. He however, directed that the petitioner would not be entitled to his salary during the period of his absence from January 21, 1975 to February 28, 1977. This order of the Deputy Director of Education in so far as it held that the petitioner was not entitled to get this salary for the period mentioned above, was challenged by means of Writ No. 650 of 1977. The writ was allowed on 16-10-1978 and the order of the Deputy Director of Education relating to the salary of the petitioner, was quashed. On 1st July, 1977 the petitioner joined services in the college as its Principal. Within few hours of his joining duty the petitioner was suspended from service and the inquiry committee was constituted by the committee of management framed as many as 10 charges against him. The charge-sheet was delivered to him. The petitioner challenged his suspension by means of letter dated 15-7-1977. On 27-7-1977 the District Inspector of Schools did not approve his suspension and called upon the management to permit the petitioner to join as Principal of the college at once. Before this could be done, the petitioner was sent a communication dated 1-8-1977 to appear before the inquiry committee on 9-8-1977. On that date, it is not disputed, that the petitioner did not appear before the inquiry committee. By means of a telegram dated 3rd September 1977 the petitioner was again required to appear on 7-9-1977 at 4. P.M. The petitioner absented himself and did 'not participate in the proceedings In the meantime on 15-8-1977 the committee prepared its report upholding the charges and forwarded the same to the committee of management On 10th September, 1977 the committee of management called upon the petitioner to appear before it on 15th September 1977, The petitioner did not appear before the committee of management on that date. Thereafter the committee passed a resolution seeking approval of the District Inspector of Schools for dismissing the petitioner. 4. The District Inspector of Schools added one more charges against the petitioner and after recording the findings on the various charges levelled he accorded approval to the proposed dismissal of the petitioner with effect from 1-7-1977. Against this order, the petitioner went up in appeal to the Deputy Director of Education. The Deputy Director of Education dismissed the appeal on 9th November, 1979. Challenging these orders, the present writ petition has been filed. Against this order, the petitioner went up in appeal to the Deputy Director of Education. The Deputy Director of Education dismissed the appeal on 9th November, 1979. Challenging these orders, the present writ petition has been filed. 5. The first argument raised by Sri Govind Saran Aeron, who appeared before us in person, was that the petitioner having been exonerated of all the charges in the first Disciplinary Proceedings which culminated by the order of District Inspector of Schools disapproving his dismissal. No fresh proceedings of termination on these very charges could either be started or could be taken. Consequently his dismissal on those charges is illegal. 6. For appreciating the facts stated above, it may be pointed out that on 19-12-1974 the District Inspector of Schools found that the charges levelled against the petitioner for terminating him had not been proved or established. As a result of this order the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement and the proposal of the committee to terminate him would be deemed to have been nullified. In respect of these very charges the third proceeding of termination was started by means of the show cause notice dated 1-7-1977. It is common case of the parties that the charges against the petitioner levelled by the notice dated 1-7-1977 were the same on which proceedings had been initiated against him by the charge sheet dated 22-6-1974. The question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner could be terminated on the same charges when he had once been exonerated of the same and they have been found to be unsustainable. It is settled law that whether the dismissal, termination or removal order is set aside on the ground that the Government servant was not afforded reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, he can again be proceeded against by the departmental authorities for the charges levelled against him on the same set of facts after affording reasonable opportunity. Similarly if termination order is set aside on technical grounds the re-entry into the same charges on the same set of facts after affording opportunity to the employee can be made (See Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1921. 7. Similarly if termination order is set aside on technical grounds the re-entry into the same charges on the same set of facts after affording opportunity to the employee can be made (See Anand Narain Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1921. 7. In Union of India v. M. B. Patnaik AIR 1981 Supreme Court 858., the Supreme Court agreed with the view taken in Anand Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), and held that when the earlier order of revision was quashed on a technical ground, a second inquiry on merits could be held and that order of reinstatement pursuant to the quashing of an earlier order on a technical ground is not a bar. 8. In the instant case, the question that arises for consideration is whether the earlier order of the District Inspector of Schools disapproving the proposal was on merits or that the proposal had not been accorded approval due to a technical ground. The order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 17-12-1974 disapproving the proposal of the committee has been filed as Annexure III to the Supplementary affidavit of the petitioner. Reading this as a whole it appears that the District Inspector of Schools was not satisfied on the evidence adduced before the inquiry committee and relied upon by the committee of management for dismissing from service the petitioner. The relevant portion of the order which may throw light on the controversy in question is being quoted below : " Jh ,sju ds fo:) vU; dksbZ eq[; vkjksi brus xEHkhj ugha ik;s x;s vkSj u gh os fl) gh gks ldsA vr% Jh ,sju dh lsokvksa dks lekIr djus lEcU/kh izcU/k lfefr ds fnukad 31&7&74 ds izLrko dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha gSA Qyr% bl izLrko dks vukuqeksfnr fd;k tkrk gSA d`i;k vfoyEc jftLVMZ i= }kjk Jh ,sju dks viuk dk;Z Hkkj xzg.k djus gsrq fy[ks rFkk d`r dk;Zokgh ls bl dk;kZy; dks Hkh voxr djk;sA" 9. From the above it would appear that the adjudication made in the earlier proceedings was on the rights of the parties. The District Inspector of Schools had not refused to accord termination due to any technical defect found either in the inquiry proceedings or in the proposal submitted by the committee. From the above it would appear that the adjudication made in the earlier proceedings was on the rights of the parties. The District Inspector of Schools had not refused to accord termination due to any technical defect found either in the inquiry proceedings or in the proposal submitted by the committee. Had the termination order been disapproved on a technical ground it could safely be said that the same could not affect the substantial rights of the parties. In this case the committee of management had appointed an inquiry committee for investigating into the charges to which the petitioner had submitted a reply and thereafter recommendation had been made for termination by the committee. On the basis of evidence the finding arrived at was that no case for approving termination of the petitioner had been made out. 10. In this case, therefore, to us it appears that as the District Inspector of Schools had found on merits that no charges against the petitioner had been made out, the committee of management had no jurisdiction once again to conduct the inquiry on the same set of facts which, in our view, was binding on both the parties on the application of principal of res judicata or the rule of finality. In R T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1973 PC 27. the Privy Counsel made the following observations : "In a case in which after Government officials duly competent and duly authorised in that behalf have arrived honestly at one decision, their successor in office, after the decision has been acted upon and is in effective operation, cannot purport to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision." 11. In the State of Assam and another v. J.N. Roy Biswas AIR. 1975. S.C. 2277,. the Supreme Court ruled, "that no rule of double jeopardy bars but absence of power under a rule prohibits a second inquiry by the Disciplinary inquiry after the delinquent official had once been absolved. Once a Disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated presumably on full exoneration, chagrined Government cannot re-start the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise vested by rules under some authority. The basic of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier inquiry. 12. Once a Disciplinary case has closed and the official reinstated presumably on full exoneration, chagrined Government cannot re-start the exercise in the absence of specific power to review or revise vested by rules under some authority. The basic of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factor invalidating the earlier inquiry. 12. From the above the position is clear that in case of decision on merits on a certain charge-sheet in favour of a Government servant or employee no second proceeding can be started for taking action against him unless the same is specifically permitted by an enactment or rule made by a competent authority. In the instant case no such rule was cited. We have already held above that the petitioner had been exonerated earlier on merits and not on any technical ground and therefore the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel made to that effect is not acceptable to us. The respondents had relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Champak LaL v. Union of India. AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1854. The decision is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the present was a case of a decision by District Inspector of Schools on merits and not on any technical ground. 13. Sri H. P. Gupta the learned counsel for the contesting respondent urged that the earlier action was based on entirely different provision of law and did not partake the character of Disciplinary Proceedings against the petitioner. For this purpose counsel placed reliance on the resolution dated 31-7-1974 stating that the petitioner's services were being terminated in exercise of powers under Regulation 25 of Chapter 13 of the Regulations on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. He urged that termination of service by means of a notice or on payment of salary in lieu of notice was not based on any Disciplinary Proceedings. We find no merits in this submission. 14. For appreciating the submission of the Respondent's learned counsel it is not only the resolution dated 31-7-1974 that was required to be seen but the whole of the background behind it so to be considered in order to find out the correct natures of the earlier proceedings. 15. On 16-6-1974 the Committee had passed resolution deciding to constitute such committee for inquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner. 15. On 16-6-1974 the Committee had passed resolution deciding to constitute such committee for inquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner. The inquiry committee was consequently constituted and explanation by the petitioner before the same had been submitted. After submission of the explanation the committee sent its recommendation upholding the charges and recommended for termination of the petitioner. All of these papers were considered by the committee of management and a decision was arrived at by it that the explanation offered was since unsatisfactory the services of the petitioner were required to be terminated. It may be true that this resolution dated 31-7-1974 has made a reference to Regulation 25 of Chapter 3 of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act but that by itself is not conclusive of the controversy. For terminating service of a probationer no charges were required to be levelled under Regulation 13 of Chapter 3. The only thing relevant was for the manager to prepare a report and to place the same before the committee. The committee of management then in its turn would have forwarded it to the District Inspector of School for his approval. In the instant case, the intention was not to obtain termination of the petitioner by giving him one months notice or one month's pay in lieu thereof. Termination of the service of probationer also under Section 16-G (3) of the act is subject to approval of the District Inspector of Schools. This provision is calculated to safeguard the interest of the teachers resulting in security of tenure. In other words the objects of obtaining the approval is to keep a check on the administration of the college. In order to obtain the approval, the committee of management is required to satisfy the District Inspector of Schools that its proposed action of termination is just and proper. Termination of a probationer could be a simple one or also on the basis of charges with a view to punish him in the instant case the committee of management levelled as many as 10 charges against the petitioner. Termination of a probationer could be a simple one or also on the basis of charges with a view to punish him in the instant case the committee of management levelled as many as 10 charges against the petitioner. It is mentioned in the charge-sheet that: izcU/kd egksn; us vkidks 13&4&1974 dks iqu% vkidks vuq'kklu ghurk ,oa vkKk dh vogsyuk ds vkjksi yxkdj i= fy[kk fd vkidh lsok;sa lekIr djus dks ck/; gSaA vkius ck/; gS 'kCn dk euekuk vFkZ yxkdj fo|ky; ds }kj Lo;a gh cUn dj fn;sA izcU/kd egksn; }kjk 'kCn dks Li"V dj nsus ij Hkh vkius fo|yk; ds vkus dk d"V ugha mBk;k vkSj lc lekIr dj fn;kA vkids mijksDr izdkj ds O;ogkj ls fo|ky; dks fcuk vf/kdkjh ds ,d vfuf'pr yEch vof/k esa xqtjuk iM+k gS ftlls mls i;kZIr {kfr igqWaph gS vr% vkids fo:) fuEu xEHkhj fl) gksrs gSaA budk Li"Vhdj.k d`i;k rhu lIrkg ds vUnj Hkstus dk d"V djsaA 16. Seeing the facts of the present case in the background stated above, the termination of the petitioner's service was by way of punishment. It is settled that a private employer is entitled to terminate the services of is probationer during or at the end of the period of I- probation and similar the position with regard to a Government servant. Such a termination will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the Government servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer, is entitled to do so. But if termination of service is founded or misconduct, negligence, or other disqualification, then it is a punishment in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 Supreme Court 2192..The Supreme Court observed as under: "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstance of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution." 17. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution." 17. Examining the law laid down in the above case and the principles applicable to the termination of a probationer we have no doubt that the petitioner was intended to be dismissed from service and that merely because that the resolution had made a mention of Regulation 25 of Chapter 3. That could not change the nature of the proceedings. The proceedings had not been taken by the committee for considering whether the work of the petitioner was satisfactory or whether he was suitable for the post. 18. For what we have said above we find that the termination of the petitioner's service on the same charges was unjustified and therefore, the approval accorded by the District Inspector of Schools on 24-12-1977 which was sub sequent maintained by the Deputy Director of Education on 10-11-1979 are liable to be quashed. 19. There is a difference as to the nature or depth of the enquiry to he held for determination of service of a probationer to continue in service. In such a case, the enquiry is confined to determination whether a probationer should be continued in service. No formal charges are required to be drawn up against him for the said purpose, whereas in the case of removal or dismissal the procedure to be followed is altogether different. Where therefore the intention behind the enquiry against a probationer is not to punish him but only to determine his suitability to continue his service and no penal consequences are added to the termination, no full fledged enquiry is required to take place. But where the probationer is sought to be discharged on the ground of misconduct or some similar reasons or the order terminating his service casts a stigma it should require a charge and full fledged enquiry. In the instant case, from the very beginning we find that the intention was to terminate the petitioner on the ground of misconduct and for that reason formal charges were framed and the inquiry committee was appointed. Before this enquiry committee the petitioner filed due explanation and parties led evidence. In the instant case, from the very beginning we find that the intention was to terminate the petitioner on the ground of misconduct and for that reason formal charges were framed and the inquiry committee was appointed. Before this enquiry committee the petitioner filed due explanation and parties led evidence. On the evidence produced the inquiry committee found the charges to be established but the District Inspector of Schools disagreed with the same and held that the evidence did not make out the charges levelled against the petitioner. In this view of the matter, it is not correct to ray that the nature or depth of the enquiry initiated in 1974 was confined to consider the suit- ability of the petitioner and was not Meant for dismissing him from service. 20. In this regard we may point out that after the first inquiry was over and the petitioner was exonerated the committee of Management which had taken to its head to terminate petitioner started another Disciplinary Proceeding on a fresh charge. This did not succeed and the Deputy Director of Education disagreed with the District Inspector of School: and found that the dismissal order was invalid. The Committee of management had no alternative left but to accept the petitioner and reinstate him. Since the committee did not want to do so it started the third proceeding on the same charges on which the first had been taken. 21. Considering all the facts it appears to us that the action of the committee of management was mala fide and was calculated to harm the petitioner. This is a writ large on the face of the matter and it is surprising that the District Inspector of Schools and the Deputy Director of Education lost sight of this aspect and accorded approval to the petitioner's termination. 22. The petitioner also attempted to argue that the charges on merits were not made out It is not within our jurisdiction to examine this aspect of the matter. Hence we refrain from giving any finding thereon. 23. The other two points raised in this writ petition were that although the petitioner had not been charge-sheeted for misappropriation but the District Inspector of Schools accorded approval to his terminate on that charge also. Hence we refrain from giving any finding thereon. 23. The other two points raised in this writ petition were that although the petitioner had not been charge-sheeted for misappropriation but the District Inspector of Schools accorded approval to his terminate on that charge also. The argument raised was that the District Inspector of Schools had no power to frame new charge against the petitioner and to accord approval to the proposed termination in that ground along with others. The submission is not required to he examined in the instant case inasmuch as the Deputy Director of Education has clearly stated in the order 'that while affirming the decision of the District Inspector of Schools he had not taken that charge into account. For the charges other than misappropriation, the order had been justified. As noted above since we have quashed the order on the first ground no detailed discussion is required on this point. 24. The third argument of the petitioner was that he had not been afforded opportunity by the committee of management in the proceedings which led to his termination. He appointed out that the inquiry committee had prepared its report on 15-8-1977 and, therefore, sending intimation to him to appear on 7-9-1977 was only an eye wash. This argument even if it would have been accepted would not be of any use to the petitioner inasmuch as after the enquiry report the petitioner had been called by the committee of management to appear before it which considered the report of the enquiry and took a decision to pass the resolution terminating him. Even if the petitioner had no opportunity to appear before the inquiry committee be should have appeared before the Committee of management. For non-appearance before the committee no adequate explanation was given. From the facts, it appears to us, however, that the petitioner had the notice of the proceedings before the enquiry committee for appearance on 7-9-1977 He did not avail the same. Having not availed it he is not entitled to any relief being given on this ground in the present proceedings. From the facts, it appears to us, however, that the petitioner had the notice of the proceedings before the enquiry committee for appearance on 7-9-1977 He did not avail the same. Having not availed it he is not entitled to any relief being given on this ground in the present proceedings. So far as the report dated 15-8-1977 is concerned it may suffice to mention that the case of the respondent worth acceptance appears to he that when the petitioner did not appear on 7-9-1977 the said committee agreed with his earlier report and submitted the same to the committee of management for consideration of the petitioner would have appeared on 7-9-1977, there could have something to say. He did not do so. Therefore, there was no occasion for the petitioner either to make any complaint about it nor for the committee to change its opinion which had been formulated. On this ground also the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. For the reasons given 'above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the orders dated 14-12-1977 and 10-11-1979 and the resolutions passed by the committee in management dated 6-1-1978 in consequence thereof are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from the contesting respondent No 3.