Saikia J.:- In these seven wit pe'imns the petitioners impugn the sime Notice NX EX. 26/76/240 dated 7. 6. 80 for settlement of fcreign liquor shop, issued by the Dsputy Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excite Department uuder the provisions of A sam Liquor Prohibition Act. inviting application in prescribed form for the grant of wholesale/retail off licences for a period of 3 (three) years from 1.8.80/the date of settlement, whichever is later, in the places mentioned in the Notice. As the Notice Impugned and the questions of law involved are common, the petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The merit of legislation by incorporation by reference is brevity which is largely counter-balanced by difficulties and obscuri­ties which it is likely to create. Modern tendency to overdo legislation by referetce and to attempt brevity at the expenses lucidity is deprecated, when a prior general Act is incorporated into a subsequent special one, shoud the previsions of the latter prevail over any of the former with which they are inconsistent ? Will anundmert of the former be bicding on the latter ? These are precisely the questions tlat srise in thess applications. 3. As the individual facts will not be so much material for the purpose of adjudication of the common questions of law, thoss teed not be specifically described. In Civil Rule No. 315/80 the petitioner, M/S, B.N. Dey & Co., Gauhati is a regis­tered partnership firm and has been holding retail 'off' licence of India made foreign liquor as such for Less than 25 consecutive years. In Civil Rule 316/80 the petitiorer M/S. Khubchand & Sons, Gauhati is a Hindu Undivided Family firm of three copareners and has bscn hotting a retail India made foreign Hguor 'off' licence since 1956. In Civil Rule No. 318/80 the petitioner Shri Benoy Kumar Ghosh of Mifgaldoi has been holding a similar licence since 1960. The petitioner in Civil Rule No. 319/80 Shri Upendra Nath Paul of Kokrajhar has been holding a similar licence sicce 1962. The petitioner in Civil Rule No. 323 of 1980, M/S. Jagatbandhu Pharmacy & Stores is a regis­tered partneiship fiim of Tezpur town and has been holdicg a similar licence since 1969. The petitioner in Civil Rule No. 333/80 Shri Makhan Lai Das is the partner of M/S. Meghamall & Sons of Nowgong town and has been holding a similar licence since 1968. The petitioner in Civil Rule No. 333/80 Shri Makhan Lai Das is the partner of M/S. Meghamall & Sons of Nowgong town and has been holding a similar licence since 1968. The petitioner in Civil Rule No. 335/80 M/S. Doss & Co. of Nowgong is a registered partnership firm acd has been holding a similar licence since 1976. All the above seven petitioner are from prohibited area and been India made foreign liquor off the premises licenceholders are aggrieved by the Impugned notice which all have challenged. 4. The impugned notice has purportedly been issued under the provisions of the Assam Liquor prohibition Acf, 1952 (Act 1 of 1953) hereinafter referred to as "the Prohibition Act", which is an Act to prohibit possession, consumption and manufacture of liquor in and smuggling thereof into tin Barpeta Sub-division, and other prohibited areas of the State. It was first applied to the Barpeta Sub-Division aad was later extended to the Gauhati Sub-divisibn of Kamrup district and several other plains Districts of Assam. This Act, though a short one with only 23 Sections, has been envisaged as a self contained code for the prohib ted areas as the Assam Excise Act, his been envisaged for the areas other than the prohibited areas of the State. Tnis will be apparent from the different provisions of the Act. 5. As defined in sub- section (3) of Section-2 of the Prohibition Act, 'liquor' means any intoxicating liquor and includes all liquid consisting of or containing alcobal, also twi and pachwai in any form and any substance which the State Government miy, by notification, declare to be liquor for the purposes of the Act. Foreign liquor is a kind of liquor under this provisions. As defined in sub section (6) of section 2, "prohi­bited area" means the area where the Act is enforced. Section 3 provides: No person shall - (1) transport, import, or possess liquor; (2) sell or buy liquor; (3) consume liquor except on a permit granted under the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder; (4) manufacture liquor; and (5) use or keep any material, utensil or apparatus whatsoever for manufacture of liquor. Section 20 of the Prohibition Act deals with permits, and reads - "20. Section 20 of the Prohibition Act deals with permits, and reads - "20. Permits:- Notwithstanding anything hsreinbsfore contained the State Government may prescribs the condi­tions under which permits may be issusd for the use or consumption of foreign liquor to person on the following amongst other conditiens= (a) that such person is not a miner ; (b) that the health of such person shall be seriously and permanently affected if such person is not permitted to use or consume such liquor ; or (c) that such person was either born and brought up or domiciled in any country outside India where such liquor is being generally used or consumed ; or (d) that such person belongs to any of the armed forces of India," Under section 21 the State Government may prescribe the condi­tions under which licences may be issued for the manufacture, import, transport, sale or possession of liquor on the ground that such liquor is required by person for bona fide medical, scientific, industrial religious or such like purpose or for sale to permit holders under Section 20. Section 22 of tha Prohi­bition Act is as follows: 22. "Repeal. The provisions relating to liquor in the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 shall stand repealed in respect of the area or areas in which the Act be enforced." Under this provision in the prohibited areas the prohibition Act will wholly replace the Assam Excise Act, 1910. Section 23 of the prohibition Act provides power to make Rules. Under sub-section (1) thereof the State Government may, subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under sub-section (2) in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the feregoing power such rules may prescribe. As defined in section 2(5) ''prescribe" means prescribed by rules under the Act (prohibition Act). 6. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 23 ths Governor of Assam was pleased to make a set of Rules called the Assam Liquor prohintion Rules, 1953, hereinafter called "the prohibition Rules". Under these Rules the foreign liquot had the lame meaning as is assigned to it under the Eastern Bengal and Assim Excise Act, 1910 (now Assam Excise Act, 1910), excluding rectified and denatured spirits and absolute alcohol. Under these Rules the foreign liquot had the lame meaning as is assigned to it under the Eastern Bengal and Assim Excise Act, 1910 (now Assam Excise Act, 1910), excluding rectified and denatured spirits and absolute alcohol. The Rules were published on 28th February, 1953 and were later amended by Notification dated 10th February, 1956, whereby Rules 6, 7 and 11 of the Rules wers substitution. Under the substituted Rule 6 the permess under section 20 of the prohibition Act shall be issued in ths manner prescribed in Rule 7. Rule 7(1) deals with Health Permit. Rule 11 provides for issue of licences for the purposes enumerated in section 21 and reads; "11. Licences for the purposes enumerated in Section 21. shall be granted by the Deputy Commissioner/Sub-divisional Officer or any other officer authorised by him. The Issue of these licences shall be subject to all the conditions imposed by the Assam Excise Act, 1910 (Eastern Bengal and Assam Act 1 of 1910), and the Rules thereunder in respect of issue of similar kinds of licencst". 7. The impunged notice has been annexed to each of the petitions. The material paragraphs thereof read as follows : "Notice For Settlement Of Foreign Liquor Shops. 1. No. EX. 26/76/240 dated 7.6.80. Applications in pre­scribed form affixing court fee stamp of Rs. 8.25 paise in each case are invited under the provisions of Assam Liquor prohibition Act, from the intending bonafide local candidates for the grant of licence for wholesale/Retail 'off' licence on foreign liquor in the following place of Assam for a period of 3 (three) years from 1.8.80/the date of settlement, whichever is later. The application is to be addressed to the Secrecy to the Govt. of Assam, Excise Department through the Commissioner of Excise and be submitted on or before 30th June, 1980 to the Commissioner of Excise, Assam, Gaubati-3. 2. A sitting licences on the wholesale or Retail 'Off' business on foreign liquor in Assam may offer his can­didature and his case will be considered on merit by Govt. under law without any disqualification of his candidature on the ground of his having completed 25 years as licencee. 8. Govt. of Assam are not bound to accept any application and they may reject the same without assi­gning any reason." It is signed by the Deputy Secretary to the Gaverment of Assam, Excise Department. under law without any disqualification of his candidature on the ground of his having completed 25 years as licencee. 8. Govt. of Assam are not bound to accept any application and they may reject the same without assi­gning any reason." It is signed by the Deputy Secretary to the Gaverment of Assam, Excise Department. From the notice it is clear that the application is to be addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department through the Commissioner of Excise and be submitted to the Commissi­oner of Excise, Assam, Gauhati. The application will be consi­dered on merit by the Government under law and that the Government of Assam are not bound to accept any application and they may reject the same without assigning any reason. 8. Testing the impugned notice in the light of the pro­visions of Rule 11 of the Prohibition Rules Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned Advjcata General, Nagaland submite that the notice it bad in law inasmuch as uader Rule 11 of the prohibition Rules licences for the purposes enumerated in Sec­tion 21 of the prohibition Act shall be granted by the Deputy Commfesloner/Sub-Divisional Office or any other officer authori­sed by, him. The State Government, counsel submits, has not been authorised to receive, consider and accept or reject appli­cations for India made flreSgn liquor licence "off" the premises and the Government of Assam has no power, jurisdiction or authority to issue licence, nor has it any authority under the law to direct the Deputy Commissioner to accept or reject any such application. Mr. B. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents counters submitting that the impugned notice is good being in accordance with the provisions of the Excise Act and the relevant Rules framed thareu sdef, herein­after called 'the Excise Rules', Particularly Rules 272 and 273 as amended in 1974, which Inve been referred to in Rule 11 of the prohibition Rules, making these part of that Rule. His submission, in other wards, is that by virtus of the second part of Rule 11 of the prohibition Rules issuse of licences in prohibited areas shall be subject to all the conditions imposed by the Excise Act and the Rules made thereunder in respect of issue of similar kinds of licences in other areas. His submission, in other wards, is that by virtus of the second part of Rule 11 of the prohibition Rules issuse of licences in prohibited areas shall be subject to all the conditions imposed by the Excise Act and the Rules made thereunder in respect of issue of similar kinds of licences in other areas. This raises the next question as to what will be the extent of the conditions under the provisions of the Excise Rules applicable to issue of licences in the prohibited areas ; and whether the provisions of the Excise Act and the Excise Rules as were existing when Rule 11 was made will apply or those as amended from time to time will apply ? In other words, whether sub­sequent amendments in the Excise Act and the Excise Rules will be applicable to prohibited areas ? We have been that Section 22 of the prohibition Act has repealed all the provi­sions relating to liquor in the Excise Act in respect to the prohibited areas. The second part of Rule 11 seeks to bring in the relevant portion of the repsnled provisions. Again will the inconsistent provisions of the Excise Act and Rules prevail over those of the Prohibition Act and Prohibition Rules ? 9. As early as in 1886 Lord Esher, M. R. in Re Wood Estate Exp. Works and Building Commrs. (1886) 31 Ch. D. 607 at Page 615 observed : "If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference game of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had baen actually written in it with pan or printed in if." The result of such incor­poration, therefore, is to constitute the later Act along with the inc­orporated provisions of the earlier Act an independent legislation which is not modified or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act. In Clerk vs. Bradlaugh (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 63 Btett. In Clerk vs. Bradlaugh (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 63 Btett. J. ooserved: "when a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a Second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the Second." Similarly, Sir George Lowndes observed in Secretary of State vs. Hindustan Co - opertive Insurance Society Ltd. AIR 1931 P. C 149, that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition. Their Lordship', with reference to the facts of that cass and the question whether the amen­ded sub - section (2) of Sec. 26 was to be applied, observed that if the introduction into the local Act, namely, the Calcutta Inprovement Act of the new sub-Section 26 (2), Land Acquisi­tion Act, were to give the right of appeal, in their Lordship's opinion that would clearly be repugnant to the provisions of the former Act and on the well recogiised principle of "generalis specialibus non derogont", the provisions of tha local code must prevail. When a general Act is incorporated into a spe­cial one, the provisions of the latter would prevail over any of the former with which they were inconsistent, as was so laid down in Attorney General vs. G.E. Railway (1972) L. R. 7 CH. 475; L.R. 6 H.L. 367 and referred to it Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 176. But the question in a particular case would be as to what or how much has been so incorporated by reference? 10. In Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. at p. 29 we read the following on the legislation by reference ; "Legislation by reference occurs where an earlier enactment is amended, applied, etc., by a mere specific reference to the section or part effected without any description of its subject-matter, necessitating in consequence resort to the enaciment cited to appreciate what the later enactment is effecting. at p. 29 we read the following on the legislation by reference ; "Legislation by reference occurs where an earlier enactment is amended, applied, etc., by a mere specific reference to the section or part effected without any description of its subject-matter, necessitating in consequence resort to the enaciment cited to appreciate what the later enactment is effecting. Legislation by reference, which was increasing in 1875, was described by the Select Committee of that year as makiig an Act so aubiguous, so obscure, and so difficult, that the judges themselves can hardly assign a meaning to it, and the ordinary citizan cannot understand it without legal advice. With this parlimentary criticism judicial opinion coincides, (Cf. the remirks of Lord Hewirt C. J. in Phillips vs. Parnaby (1934) 2 K.B. 299, 304 and of Salmon L. J. in R.V. Goswami (1969) 1 Q.B. 453). In Knill vs. Towse (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 186 and 697 (C.A.) the question for decision was whether, upon the construction of Section 75 of the Local Govornment Act 1888 and the enactments incorporated therein by reference, a county elector could vote in more than one electoral division of the sams country ? In deciding that he could not, the court (Lord Coleridge C. J. and Mathew J.) said, "We have arrived at this conclusion with difficulty, though without doubt. The difficulty has arisen, not for anything inhe­rent in the subject itself, which is simple enough, and might be quite simply treated, but from the mode of legislation now usual in these matters. Sometimes whole Acts of Parliament, some­times groups of clauses of Acts of Parliament, entirely or parti­ally, sometimes portions of clauses, are incorporated into later Acts, so that the interpresor has to keep under his eye, or, if he can, bear in his miad, large mases of bygons and not always consistent legislation in order to gather the meaning of recent legislation. There is vary often the further provision that these earlier statutes are not incorporated only so far as they are not inconsistent with the statutes with which they are incorpo­rated: so that you have first to ascertain the meaning of statute by reference to other statutes, and thei to ascertain whether the earlier Acts qualify only, or absolutely contradict the later ones, a task sometimes of great difficulty, always of great labour - a difficulty and labour, generally speaking, wholly unnecessary". As craises observed, legislation by reference was also a source of much administrative inconvenience, on the basis of the observa­tions of Field J. In R. V. Eaton, (1881) 8 Q, B. D. 158 whsre the inconvenience of this kind of legislation was pointed out. 11. It is necessary in this context to distinguish between a mere legislation by reference and legislation by incorporation. The distinction is important in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act. 1897, sub-section (1) of which corresponds to Sec. 8 of the Assam General Clauses Act. It reads : "8. Construction of references to repealed enactments- (1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts with or wichout modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. (2) Where before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, any Act of parliament of the United Kingdom repealed and re-enacted, with or without modification, any provi­sion of a former enactment, tnen references in any Central Act or in any Regulation or instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to tae provision so re-enacted". 12. 12. In the State of V. P. vs. M. P. Singh, AIR 1960 SC 569 where the definition of 'Commercial establishment' in Factories Act, 1934 was incorporated by reference, in the U. P. Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, applying Section 8 of the General Clauses Act the definition of a 'Commercial Establish­ment' in Section 2 (3) of the U. P. Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, the clerical and other establishments of a Factory to whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1934, did not apply, were included in the connotation of that expression, as the Factories Act 1948 was to be read in place of Factories Act of 1934 as the 1934 Act was repealed and re-enacted by the Act of 1948, Similarly in Collector of Cus­toms, Madras vs. Natholla Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316 ; Mohan Choudhury vs. Chief Commissioner, Union Terri­tory of Tripura, AIR 1964 SC 173 ; the State of Bihar vs. S. K. Ray, AIR 1966 SC 1995 , the applicability of Section 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act was considered. In New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1971 SC 454 , where the question was whether Sec. 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act did incorporate provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 as Integral part or that Act and whether on repeal of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and re-enact­ment of the Sea Customs Act 1962 it could be read in place of the repealed Act. It was contended tint Section 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 empowered incorporation of the provisions of Sea Customs Act 1878, in the Act itself and whenever a notification was issued under it, such provisions of the Sea Customs Act as had been applied, became incorpo­rated as an integral part of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of the General Clauses Act would not be applicable to a case with such incorporation and it could only apply if Section 12 could be regarded as containing only a reference to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. Section 12 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, did not bodily lift, as it were, certain proviiions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and incorporate them as an integral part of the Act. Section 12 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, did not bodily lift, as it were, certain proviiions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and incorporate them as an integral part of the Act. It only empo­wered the Central Government to apply the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, with certain modifications and altera­tions as might be considered necemry, or desirable, by the Central Government for the purpose of implementation and enforcement of Section 3 of the Act. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. The Union of India, AIR 1979 S. C. 798, relying on AIR 1981 P.C. 149; AIR 1962 S.C. 316 ; AIR 1963 S.C. 553 ; AIR 1971 S.C. 454 and AIR 1975 S.C. 17 It was laid down that where there is mere reference to or citation of one enactment in another without incorporation. S. 8(1) applies and the repeal and reenactment of the provision referred to or cited has the effect set out in that Section and the reference to the provision repe­aled is required to be construed as reference to the provinioa as re-enacted. 13. What then are the criteria to determine whether a particular piece of legislation by reference is one of mere refe­rence or of incorporation by reference ? According to Black's law dictionary "incorporation by reference means the method of making one document of any kind become a part of another separate document by referring to the former in the latter, and declaring that the former shall be taken and considered as part of the latter the same as if it were fully set out therein." If the one document is copied at lengthln the other. It is called actual incorporation. According to Mozley and waiter's to incorporate means to declare that one document shall be taken as part of the document in which the declaration is made as much as if it were set out at length therein. The object is to incorporate into the Act of which they are a part of tho provi­sions of other statutes by reference and adoption. 14. The language used in referring on Incorporation will always be instructive. The words used in sec. 20 of 53 and 54 Viet. The object is to incorporate into the Act of which they are a part of tho provi­sions of other statutes by reference and adoption. 14. The language used in referring on Incorporation will always be instructive. The words used in sec. 20 of 53 and 54 Viet. Ch, 70- Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890 were: "shall for that purpose, be deemed to form part of this Act in the same manner as if they were enacted in the body thereof". In 54 and 55 Viet. Ch. 19 Section 1(3) the language used was: "The provisions of Section 134 of the "aid Act (set out in the Schedule) shall apply as if they were here la enacted". The above language left no doubt that the legislature's intention was to incorporate and not merely to refer. But vary often the inten­tion is not so clear and his to be githered from thelegisla­tive purpose wMch may shed light upon the ligislativa intent. To ascettaia the intention the Court must consider all the rele­vant provfoions of the Act and not nurely on the referring provision. Court is to presume that legislature did not intend to excesd its pawer. All the principles for ascertaining the intention of the legislature in interpreting a statute shall have to be remembered and applied in this regard. In Hindustan Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra) the Judicial Committee observed that the deliberate exclusion of S. 54, Land Acquisition Act, from the Calcutta Improvement Act was an indication of the local legislature's intention that there was to be under the special code applicable to the Improvement Trust not only not unrestricted right of appeal to the High Court, but no appeal at all beyond the High Court. In Collector of Customs vs. Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316 , Sec. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 enacted : " the restrictions Imposed by sub-sec. (1)... of Section 8 ... shall be deemed to have been imposed under S. 19 of the Sea Cus­toms Act, 1878 and all the provisions of that Act should have effect accordingly .. (1)... of Section 8 ... shall be deemed to have been imposed under S. 19 of the Sea Cus­toms Act, 1878 and all the provisions of that Act should have effect accordingly .. " Supreme Court held that the effect of S. 23A was to treat the text of the notification by the Central Government under S. 8 (1) as if it had been issued under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act with the title and the recital of the source of power appropriate to it by the creation of a legal fistion. It was further held tbat it would be obvious that io the context snd on tiw language there employed, if S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act were repealed tbere would no longer be any "legal foundation for invoking the penal provisions of the Sea Customs Act to contravention of a notification under S, 8 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. In other words it could not have the effect of incorporating the relevant pro­visions of the San Customs Act, 1878 into the Act, of 1947 Further it was held that the amendments of the Act of 1878 as enacted after 1952 would apply to contravention of notifica­tion under S. 8 (1) of the Act of 1947, which took place in 1956, the rule as to the burden of proof enunciated in S. 178A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 which provision was introduced in 1955, was attracted to it. The contravention of the notifica­tion attracted to it each and every provision of the Sea Customs Act which was in force at the time of the contravention. 16. When only a definition or an expression from one enactment is incorporated into another, the repeal or amendment of the expression or definition in the former may not be bin­ding on the latter and S. 8 of the General Clauses Act may not apply. In Ram Sarup vs. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 S. 15 of the Punjab pre-emption Act, 1913, employed the words "in respect of agricultural land". "Agricultural Land" was defined in S. 3(1) of that Act thus : "Agricultural Land" shall mean land as defined in the Punjnb Aleination of Land Act, 1900 (as amended by Act 1 of 1907, but shall not include the rights of a mortgagee, whether usufractuary or not, in such land”. "Agricultural Land" was defined in S. 3(1) of that Act thus : "Agricultural Land" shall mean land as defined in the Punjnb Aleination of Land Act, 1900 (as amended by Act 1 of 1907, but shall not include the rights of a mortgagee, whether usufractuary or not, in such land”. It was held that the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 in 1951 had no effect on the continued operation of the Pre-emption Act as the expression "agricultural land'” in the latter Act had to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transpossed into it. (1881) 8 Q.E.D. was followed. Again in New Central Jute Mill Co. Ltd. vs. the Asst. Controller Central Excise, AIR 1911 S. C. 454 it was held that s. 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act (1944) did not incorporate provisions of the Sea Customs Act as integral part of that Act and that on repeal of 'the Sea Costoms Act the provisions of the Customs Act 1962 could be read in its place by virtue of S. 8. (1) of the General Clauses Act (1897) AIR 1962 S. C. 316 was relisd on. So also in State of Bihar vs. S. K. Roy AIR 1966 S. C. 199) the expression "employer" was defined in Coal Mines Provident Fund aid Boous Act, 1948. as "the owner of a Coal Mine as defined in clause (g) of Ssctlon 3 of the Indian Mines Act, 1923. The Indian Mines Act 1923 was repe­aled and substituted by the Mines Act, 1952. In the Act of 1952, the word owner was defined in clause (1) of S. 2. It was held that by virtue of S. 8 of the General Clauses Act, the definition of employer should be construed with reference to the definition of the word "owner" with reference to definition in clause (1) of S. 2 of the 1952 Act which repealed the earlier Act and re-enacted it. It is a well-recognised principle that in matters of constnicticn subsequent legislation nuy be looked at to see what would be theproper interpretation to be put upan the earlier Act which has become obscure or ambiguous or readily capable of more than one interpretation. (Cf. Ormound Investment Co. Ltd. vs. Belts, 1928 A. C. 143 (166). 17. It is a well-recognised principle that in matters of constnicticn subsequent legislation nuy be looked at to see what would be theproper interpretation to be put upan the earlier Act which has become obscure or ambiguous or readily capable of more than one interpretation. (Cf. Ormound Investment Co. Ltd. vs. Belts, 1928 A. C. 143 (166). 17. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (supra) Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (54 of 1969) provided that any parson aggrieved by an order made by the Commission under Section 13 may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on "one or mots of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908". At the time when S. 55 was enacted, inamely, 27th December, 1969, being the date of coming into force of the Act. S. 100 of the Code of Civil procedure, specified three grounds on which a second appeal could be brought to theHigh Court and one of those grounds was that thedecision appealed against was contrary to law. It was sufficient under Sec. 100 as it stood then that there should be a question of law in order to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court in Second appeal and, therefore, if the reference in S. 55 were to the grounds set out in the then existing S. 100 there could be no doubt that an appeal would lie to the Supreme Court under Section 55 on a question of law. But subsequent to the enactment of S. 55, Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was substituted by a new Section by Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1st February, 1977 and the new Section 100 providfs that a Second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the Case involves a substantial question of law. The three grounds on which a Second Appeal couid lie uuder the former S. 100 were abroga­ted and in their place only one ground was substituted which was a highly stringent ground, namely, that there should be a substantial question of law. The three grounds on which a Second Appeal couid lie uuder the former S. 100 were abroga­ted and in their place only one ground was substituted which was a highly stringent ground, namely, that there should be a substantial question of law. Rejecting the contention that by virtue of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act the reference in Sections 55 to 100 must be construed as reference to the new S. 100, Supreme Court observed that the argument ignored the distinction between a mere reference or citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means bodily lifting a provision of one enactment and making it a part of another. Legislation by incorporation is a common legislative devide employed by the legislature, where the legislature for convenience of drafting incorporates provisions from an existing statute by reference to that statute Instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it desires to adopt. Once the incorporation is made, the provision incor­porated becomes an integial part of the statute in which it is transposed and thereafter there is no need to refer to the statute from which the incorporation is made and any subsequent amend­ment made in it has no effect on the incorporating statute. From this it can be deduced that if the provision is actually incorporated into the incorporating statute. Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act will not apply. When there is no actual incorporation where the intention of the legislature was to effect such incorporation then also Section 8(1) may not apply. But if the intention was only to refer to another statute for the purpose of implementing the referring statute S. 8(1) shall apply. In Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1975) 2 SCR 138 AIR 1975 SC 17 the question arose in regard to the inter­pretation of S. 2 (c) of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930. This Section when enacted adopted the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' contained in Section 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Subsequently Sec. 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act was amended by Act 100 of 1956 but no corres­ponding amendment was made in the definition contained in S. 2 (c) of the Taxation Act. This Section when enacted adopted the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' contained in Section 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Subsequently Sec. 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act was amended by Act 100 of 1956 but no corres­ponding amendment was made in the definition contained in S. 2 (c) of the Taxation Act. It was held that this was a case of incorporation and not reference and the definition in S. 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as then existing was incorporated in Sec. 2(c) of the Bihar and Orrissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act Sec. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act would not apply. Both in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and Bolani Ores Ltd. the Supreme Court analysed the intention of the legislature. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. it was pointed out that it was obvious that the legislature did not want to confer an unlimited right of appeal, but wanted to restrict it and tur­ning to section 100, it found that the grounds there set out were appropriate for restricting theright of appeal and hence it incorporeted them In S. 55. The right of appeal was clearly inten­ded to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing S. 100. Those were the grounds which were before the legis­lature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. So also in Bolani Ores case (supra) the Court tried to ascertain the intention of the legis­lature with reference to the legislative list and general scheme of the Taxation Act and held that the Intention of the Parlia­ment for modifying the Motor Vehicles Act has no relevance in determining the intention of the Orissa Legislature In enacting the Taxation Act. Apart from this aspect the power of Taxa­tion was not in the Concurrent List III but in List-II and construed as a taxation measure its ambit could not be exten­ded by mere implication. It was also possible for both the Acts to co-exist even after the definition of 'motor vehicle' in the Act had been amended. It was, therefore, clear that the definition of 'motor vehicle' as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act. 18. It was also possible for both the Acts to co-exist even after the definition of 'motor vehicle' in the Act had been amended. It was, therefore, clear that the definition of 'motor vehicle' as existing prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act. 18. Thus the intention of the legislature has to be ascer­tained in the context of the setting whereunder the refe-rrirg or incorporating statute was enacted. The nature of the subject matter, the legislative power in relation to both the refe­rring and referred statutes and the warkability of the referring statute vis-a-vis the referred statute the practicability of the working of the referring statute by mere reference or by incorporation may be relevant considerations. Accordingly we find two extreme points, namely, actual incorporation on the one hand and mere reference without mentioning any particular provision or a group of provisions of the statute, i. e. without application of mind to the details. In between these two there may be a series of intermediary position from actual incorporation to incor­poration by indication aod then reference with details to refe­rence without indication of details. The former group will be called legislation by incorporation and the latter legislation by mere reference. In case of the former Sec. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act will not apply while to the latfer it will apply. To whicii categories a particular legislation by reference will belong will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each piece of legislation. By Notification No. MEX. 60/45/2 dated 11th April, 1945 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 36 of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 the Assam Excise Rules were framed in seven parts. Part I deals with foreign liquor and its import, export, transport and storage. Part-II deals with country spirit, its import, export and transport. Part-III deals with distillery and spirit warehouses. Part-IV provides miscellaneous rules regarding couatry liquor. Part-V deals with ganja, bharg or sidhi and charas. Part-VI deals with licencies, settlement and fees. This part is divided in several sub-heads. The first sub-head deals with duration and number of licencees. Next is procedure for settlement. Then comes prohibition of grant of retail licences to certain persons. The next is grant of licences and then fees in respect of licences, permits and passes. The next is foreign liquor. This part is divided in several sub-heads. The first sub-head deals with duration and number of licencees. Next is procedure for settlement. Then comes prohibition of grant of retail licences to certain persons. The next is grant of licences and then fees in respect of licences, permits and passes. The next is foreign liquor. Rules 272 to 286 deal with licences (by whom to be granted). Rules 272 and 273 were as under: "272. Wholesale licences Licences for wholesale vond of foreign liquor to retail venders of foreign liquor and to the public in excess of the limit of sale by retail shall be granted by the Collector with the previous sanction of the Excise Commissioner on fees prescribed in rule 243 supra. Such licences shall ordinarily be granted to vendors of a superior class". "273. Retail "on" and "off" licences. Licences for the retail sale of foreign liquor for consumption "on" or "off" the premises shall be granted by the Collector with the previous sanction of the Excise Commissioner on fees pres­cribed in rules 244 and 245 supra. Such licences shall ordinarily be granted in places wnere there is a proved demand on the part of a class of drinkers accustomed to foreign liquor, e.g., in large industrial centres or in towns where there is a population specially accustomed to drinking such liquor. A separate licence shall be required in each case for the privilege of selling liquor for consumption "on" or "off" the Vendor's premises". 19. When Prohibition Rule 11 was made in 1956 the above Rules 272 and 273 were holding the field. Rule 11 of the Prohi­bition Rules which provided that "Licences for the purposes enumerated in Section 21 shall be granted by the Deputy Commissioner/Sub-Divisional Officer or any other officer authorised by him" was abinitio inconsistent with Rule 273 of the Excise Rules which said that retail "off" and "on" licences shall be granted "by the Collector with previous sanction of the Excise Commi­ssioner". We have learnt that when a general Act is incorpo­rated into a special one, the provisions of the latter would prevail over any of the former with which they are inconsistent. We have learnt that when a general Act is incorpo­rated into a special one, the provisions of the latter would prevail over any of the former with which they are inconsistent. Again, as was laid down in Bird vs. Adcock (1878) 474 J. M.C. 123, when an Act on one subject incorporates some of the provi­sions comprised in another relating to a different subject, it does not thereby incorporate the modifications of these provisions which are subsequently made in the latter Act. The provision of the first part of Prohibition Rule 11 must, therefore, rave prevailed ab initio. It is also submitted by petitioner's counsel that licences in prohibited areas have always been granted by the Collector. The Second parts of Rule 11, namely, "The issue of these licences shall be subject to all the conditions imposed by the Assam Excise Act, 1910 (Eastern Bengal and Assam Act-1 of 1910), and the Rules thereunder in respect of issue of similar kinds of licences", shall not have the effect of prescribing an authority other than that prescribed in the first part of Rule 11. Provisions, if any, In the Excise Rules to that extent cannot prevail. The result is that Deputy CommJssloner/Sub-Divisional Officer or any other officer authorised by him remains the licen­sing authority in prohibited areas. 20. Let us now see if the position was changed by subse­quent amendments of the Excise Rules. By notification No. Ex. 144/72 dated 1st August, 1974 the Assam Excise Rules, 1945 were amended. Rules 178 to 227, 238 to 239, 241 to 242 to 292, 298, 301, 302, 317, 323, 327 and 339 to 345 ware substituted. Rules 272 and 379 were substituted as follows;- "272. (1) Licences for wholesale vend of foreign liquor to retail vendors and to public in excess of the limit sale by retail shall be granted by the District Collector with the previous sanction of the State Government. (2) Subject to Rule 189, Licences for retail sale of foreign liquor for consumption "on" or "off" the Vendof's premisei shall be granted by the District Collector with the previous sanction of the State Government." "273. (2) Subject to Rule 189, Licences for retail sale of foreign liquor for consumption "on" or "off" the Vendof's premisei shall be granted by the District Collector with the previous sanction of the State Government." "273. (1) Applications for wholesale or for retail vend of foreign liquor shall be made to the State Government in prescribed form." (2) Licences for the wholesale vend of foreign liquor or retail sale of foreign liquor "off" the premises be granted for a period of three consecutive years:- Provided that no person who held any such licence for a period of twenty-five consecutive years or more shall be eligible to get any such licence. Provided further that Government may renew such licence for another term of three years subject to a maximum of two such renewals. (3). Licences for retail vend of foreign liquor "on” the vendor's premises shall always be for one year subject to renewal on year to year basis if there is nothing adverse against the licences. (4). Application for any foreign liquor licence shall be in the prescribed form. (5). Sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 206, sub-rules (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) of Rule 208, Rule 219, sub-rules (1) (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Rule 223, Rules 233 and rule 234 supra shall apply mutatis mutandis, in the matter of grant of all foreign liquor licences." These Rules were published on 5th August. 1974. 21. Will it be permissible to read the amended Rules 272 and 273 into the provision of Rule 11 of the Prohibition Rules? This, we have learnt, we depend on another the legislation by reference in Rule 11 has been by incorporation or by mere reference and that to the former S. 8 of the General Clauses Act will, while to the litter will not apply. To ascertain this we have to take into consideration all the factors discussed above. First, by the words of language used, it cannot be said to be an actual incorporation. It is also not a case of incor­poration of a certain expression or definition. We also do not find any clear mention of the provisions referred to. It refers to a group of provisions rather then to any specific provision or provisions. First, by the words of language used, it cannot be said to be an actual incorporation. It is also not a case of incor­poration of a certain expression or definition. We also do not find any clear mention of the provisions referred to. It refers to a group of provisions rather then to any specific provision or provisions. It ipeaks of "all the conditions Imposed by the Assam Excise Act, 1910 (Eastern Bengal and Assam Act 1 of 1910) and the Rules thereunder in respect of issue of similar kinds of licences." The numbers, contents and other specific particulars of the sections of the Excise Act and the Rules there­under have not been stated. There is no difference in powers of the rule making authority in respect of making the Prohibition Rules and the Excise Rules. Though the former requires previous publication, white the latter does not, legal fiction may permit the amended Excise Rules to be read into Rule 11 despite there being no previous publication. Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act also leads to the same conclusion. Under these facts and circumstances, applying the principles and guidelines discussed herein above, we would hold that it is a case of mere reference and not of incorporation by reference. The corollary is that S. 8 of the Assam General Clauses Act S. 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act will apply and construction of Rule 11 with resort to amended Excise RuJes 272 and 273 will be in accordance with law. However, to the extent provisions of the amended Rules are inconsistent. The Prohibition Rule 11 will prevail. As a result the State Government does not become, and the Deputy Commlssioner/Sub-divisional Officer or any other officer authorised by him remains the licensing authority. 22. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandan Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 , the Respondent wanting to build a cinema house obtained the necessary permission from the Commissioner of Police on whom the dffcreticn to grant a licence was vested under S. 25 of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902. Shortly after, however, the Comrcissicner tent the following communication: "I am directed by the Government to inform you that the permission to crect a cinema granted to you is hereby cancelled". Shortly after, however, the Comrcissicner tent the following communication: "I am directed by the Government to inform you that the permission to crect a cinema granted to you is hereby cancelled". The respondent applied foi an order in the nature of a mandamus under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the Commissioner of Police. It was held that under the Rules framed under Section 22, City of Bombay Police Act, the only person vested with authority to grant OF refuse licence for the erection of a building to be used for puiposes of public amusement was the Commissioner of Police. Under Rule 250 he had been vested with the absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any licence which had bsen graated under the rules. But the power to do so was vested in him and not in the State Government and could only be exercised by him at his discretion. It was further held that the order of cancellation was not an order by the Commissi­oner but merely Intimation by him of an order passed by another authority, namely, the Government of Bombay. As the only person who could effect the cancellation was the Commi­ssioner of Police, there was no valid order of cancellation. In this view the licence still held good. Similarly in Messrs. Chaio Mal & Sons vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1959 SC 65 whereunder the Punjab Excise Act (1 of 1914), Section 59, Delhi Liquor Licence Rules, 1935, Rule 1. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was competent authority to grant E-2 licence in Delhi for whole­sale and retail vend of foreign liquor to the public, it was held that the letter of the Under Secretary, Finance, was an inter­departmental communication and did not constitute a valid order granting L-2 Licence. This has also been the ratio in the State of Punjab and another vs. Hari Krishan Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1081 where under Section 4 of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act (11 of 1952) the District Magistrate is the licencing authority, it has been held that the State Govern­ment is not justified in assuming jurisdiction which has been conferred on the licencing authority by Section 5 (1) and (2) of the Punjab Cinemas (Regulation) Act. In Orient Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 48 , a case under the Central Excise and Salt Act (1944), the Collector was the autho­rity to hear the appeal for the purposes of deciding whether "M. G. Poster paper" was "Backing and wrapping paper" charg­eable under item 17 (4) of "printing paper" chargeable under item 17 (3) of the first Schedule and while hearing appeal under Section 35 of that Act the Collector acted quasi-judicially, the direction issued by the Central Board of Revenue, which were not in Rule 238, it was held, could mt be binding on the Collector. It was further held that the directions completely vitiated the proceedings before the Collector as well as the Government. Rule 238 of the Rules framed under that Act, it may be noted, provided that the Board and the Collectors may issue written instructions providing for any supplemental matters urging out of these Rules. It was held that the only instruction that the Board could issue was that relating to administrative matters; otherwise that rule will have to be consi­dered as ultra vires Section 35 of that Act. 23. The power to grant licence has been held to be a quasi-judicial power in State of Gujarat vs. Mis. Krishna Cinema, AIR 1971 S. C. 1650. Under the Bombay Cinemas (Regulation) Act (11 of 1953) the District Magistrate is in places where there is no Commissioner of Police, constituted the Licensing Authority. By Section 5 the power of the Licen­sing Authority is subject to the Control of the State Government. Authority to license a Cinenatogcaph thaatre is therefore vested in the Licensing Authority subject to the overriding control of the State Government. It has further been hold that power to issue, revoke or suspend a licence conferred upon the District Magistrate is exercisable on satisfaction of that officer on certain objective conditions and is plainly quasi-judicial. But exercise of power by the Licensing Authority under the Act to grant a licence is still made subject to the control of the State Govern­ment. Taeir Lordships considered it unnecessary for the purpose of that case to express any opinion on this propriety or validity of provisions making exercise of quasi-judicial power subject to the control at the stage whsa it is exercised, of the executive. Taeir Lordships considered it unnecessary for the purpose of that case to express any opinion on this propriety or validity of provisions making exercise of quasi-judicial power subject to the control at the stage whsa it is exercised, of the executive. It has further been observed that the power to control the licen­sing authority under Sec. 5 was not the power to supplant the Licensing Authority and that the power to grant licence under the Act is quasi-judicial, and by the use of the expression “abso­lute discretion" It was not intended to invest the Licensing Autho­rity with arbitrary power so as to destroy the limitations to which it was subject by its inherent nature, in Hukumchand Shyamlal vs. Union of India, AIR 1976 S C 789 it has been ruled that it is well settled that whera a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way it should be exercised. In that manner or not at all and all other kinds of exercise are necessarily forbidden and that It is all the more neceisary to observe this Rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violatlve of the fundamental principles and natural juitice. 24. In the instant case, we find, that while the Deputy Commissioner/Sub-divisional Officer or any other officer autho­rised by him is the licencing authority, and there is no question of previous sanction of the State Government, in the impugned notice the State Government has invited the application to be addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Excise Department through the Commissioner of Excise, Assam, Gauhati and the Government of Assam are not bound to accept any application and they may reject the same without assigning any reason. This amounts to usurpation of the quasi-judicial func­tions of the licencing authority by the State Governmsnt, on the face of the impugned notice. 25. Mr. Sarma submits that the State Govt. has only invited the applications but the licences will be issued by the Deputy Commissioner. This submission is not reasonable in view of the apparent tenor of the notice. This amounts to usurpation of the quasi-judicial func­tions of the licencing authority by the State Governmsnt, on the face of the impugned notice. 25. Mr. Sarma submits that the State Govt. has only invited the applications but the licences will be issued by the Deputy Commissioner. This submission is not reasonable in view of the apparent tenor of the notice. There can be no dispute as to the proposition laid down in Commissioner of Police Bombay vs. Gordhandas Ehanji (supra) and reiterated in Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (supra), that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be cons­trued in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public order made by public authorities are meant to have public affect and are intended to effect the actings and conduct thoie to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself, and that public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them, and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exactly what authority is making the order. 26. Mr. Sarma also submitted that the petitioners have no fundamental right to liguor business, and that they having applied for licences are estopped from questioning the notice. We find both the submissions not tenable in law and on facts. 27. In the result the impugned Notice No. EX. 26/76/240 dated 7.6.80 is quashed and the Government of Assam is restrained from making any settlement pursuant thereto. The petitions are allowed and the Rules nude absolute. We, how­ever, make no order as to costs.