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1982 DIGILAW 126 (KER)

K. A. JOHN v. DIRECTOR OF COLLEGIATE EDUCATION

1982-05-26

P.SUBRAMONIAN POTI, T.CHANDRASEKHARA MENON

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Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a Second Grade Professor (Non-Cadre) in the St. Thomas College, Palai which is affiliated to the Kerala University. The question in this Writ Appeal is whether the petitioner is entitled to remain in office till he attains the age of 60. That was the question before the learned single judge also and the learned judge found that he is bound to retire at the age of 55 and that he has no option to continue till the age of 60. The claim for retirement at the age of superannuation at the age of 60 is made by invoking Statute 4A of the First Statutes of the Kerala University relating to Pension, Provident Fund, Gratuity, Insurance and Age of retirement etc. That Statute reads: "4. Age of Superannuation, etc. of teachers who entered service before 1-4-1958: (a) Teachers of Private Colleges who have entered service prior to 1-4-1958 shall have the right to retire at the age of sixty and be governed by the provisions of Chapter III or to opt for the provisions contained in Chapter II. "Those who have entered service prior to 1-4-1953 and who have completed 55 years on the date of commencement of these statutes but who opt for the age of retirement at 55, shall retire only with effect from the date on which they exercise their option. Those who have entered service on or after 1-4-1958 and completed 55 years at the commencement of these statutes shall retire on 1-4-1976 forenoon." " In order to apply Statute 4A it is necessary that the petitioner must show that he is a teacher of a private college who had entered service prior to 1-4-1958. He claims that he entered service prior to 1-4-1958 as a tutor in the Layola College, Madras on 1-7-1955. He worked there till 18-5-1961. Then he obtained appointment as Lecturer in the St. Thomas College, Palai. On 19-6-1961 he joined that post. Ever since that time he was in the St. Thomas College, Palai and earned his promotions there. It is not and it cannot be disputed that his appointment as Tutor in the Layola College at Madras was terminated and a different Management appointed him at Palai. It is not as if his appointment as Tutor in Madras continued. Ever since that time he was in the St. Thomas College, Palai and earned his promotions there. It is not and it cannot be disputed that his appointment as Tutor in the Layola College at Madras was terminated and a different Management appointed him at Palai. It is not as if his appointment as Tutor in Madras continued. The post that he now occupies is the post which is so occupied in continuation of his appointment on 19-6-1961 and not the appointment at Madras on 1-7-1955. When once the earlier appointment at Madras was terminated and a fresh appointment made it is the latter that continues. No doubt the service need not be continuous. There may be break by reason of taking of extraordinary leave or being thrown out for want of vacancy and re-appointed later or by reason of being deputed for studies or otherwise. It is one thing to say that he continued in service and another to say that his service is continuous. In the case of the petitioner he continued in service from 19-6-1961 and it cannot be said that he continued in service from 1-7-1955. That continuity was broken by termination of his service as Tutor in Layola College and the fresh appointment in the St. Thomas College, Palai. The learned single judge therefore found no reason to grant relief to the petitioner. 2. The decision of this Court in Sundararaju Iyer v. State of Kerala (1980 (1) I. L. R. Ker.181) does not lay down any proposition which would be of assistance to the appellant here. The Division Bench rightly stated the principles in Para.7 of the judgment. The learned single judge therefore found no reason to grant relief to the petitioner. 2. The decision of this Court in Sundararaju Iyer v. State of Kerala (1980 (1) I. L. R. Ker.181) does not lay down any proposition which would be of assistance to the appellant here. The Division Bench rightly stated the principles in Para.7 of the judgment. We may enumerate those principles here: "The principles that emerge from the decisions discussed above are: (i) the service prior to the relevant date need not necessarily be continuous service; (ii) break or breaks in the service one has prior to the material date would not affect the concerned teacher's right to continue is service till he attains the age of sixty; (iii) what matters is service as a teacher (in any aided school so far as R.8 in Chapter XXVIIA of the Kerala Education R.1959 is concerned, and in any private college so far as statute 4 (a) in Chapter I of the Kerala University First Statutes, 1976 is concerned) and not service under the same management both before and after the relevant date; and (iv) where there is a complete severance of the teacher's service-relationship with the management he was serving prior to the relevant date, and he re-enters service as a teacher only after that date, his prior service would not be of any assistance to him to claim that he is entitled to remain in service till he attains the age of sixty". Learned counsel for the appellant points out that on the facts of that case even service in an entirely different institution was considered to be continuous. We are not called upon to decide whether the principles stated in that case were correctly applied or not. With the statement of the principles we take no exception. Where there is severance of the teacher's service-relationship with the management he was serving prior to the relevant date and he re-enters service as a teacher only after that date, his prior service would not be of any assistance to him. (Though the word complete severance is used in that judgment we take it that it is only to emphasise the fact of severance). In these circumstances we see no reason to interfere. 3. (Though the word complete severance is used in that judgment we take it that it is only to emphasise the fact of severance). In these circumstances we see no reason to interfere. 3. The learned counsel urged a contention that there has been a subsequent amendment to Statute 4(a) which amendment enabled even teachers in aided and Government schools to opt for the advantage of the retirement age of 60 and if that be so there is no reason why the same benefit should be denied to a person like the appellant whose prior service stands on a better footing than that of a teacher in a school. Ext. P3 is relied on as the amendment in question. The Original Petition is not sought to be amended. It is not for this Court to consider such amendment urged at the hearing. Of course if there is any such amendment and a class of people whose claims are not as good as the petitioner's have been treated preferentially by an amendment it is open to the petitioner to seek the same treatment by representing to the Government. This decision need not stand in the way of such representation. We are only indicating that we are not going into it while at the same time this need not be taken to conclude the fact of any representation that the petitioner may make to the Government. Subject to this the Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.