Judgment.- Aggrieved by the order of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Tiruchirapalli in S.T.C. No. 392 of 1977 acquitting the Respondent-accused for an offence under section 33 of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, for contravening rules 26 (1) , 36 (1) and 36 (3) of the Rules framed under the Act, the State has preferred this Criminal Appeal.) 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows: P.W. 1 the Assistant Inspector of Labour, V. Circle, Tiruchirapalli Inspector Uriyadi Mark Cigar Company, situated at 65, Varaganeri Bazaar, Tiruchirapalli, which is a “cigar industrial premises” as defined under section 2 (i) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act. ‘The accused is the “employer” as defined under section 2 (g) of the Act. On inspection at 1-15 p.m. on 8th June, 1977, P.W. 1 found: (i) there was no exhibition in the cigar industrial premises of a notice in Form No. IV specifying clearly the daily hours of work, intervals for rest and weekly holiday to the employees employed in a cigar industrial premises; (ii) failure to maintain a register “muster roll” in form No XIII in respect of the employees employed in the said premises; and (iii) failure to maintain a home-workers’ employment register in Form No. XV containing the names and particulars of all the home-workers employed and to keep it up to date on the basis of the entries in the home-workers’ log books. -These contraventions of Rules are against the provisions of rules 26 (1) 36 (1) and 36 (2), (3). P.W. 1 further found 20 workers who were bringing cigars made out of the tobacco taken form the said premises. On the contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, a show cause notice Exhibit P-2 was sent to the accused. Exhibit P-1 is the inspection report of P.W. 1. Exhibit P-3 is the reply of the accused to the show cause notice Exhibit P-2. The prosecution has also has filed Exhibit 4 wherein the accused has attempted to get a licencee under the Act. According to P.W. 1preparation for “cigar” M.O. 1 is different from that of cheroot () M.O. 2. Exhibit P-3 is the reply of the accused to the show cause notice Exhibit P-2. The prosecution has also has filed Exhibit 4 wherein the accused has attempted to get a licencee under the Act. According to P.W. 1preparation for “cigar” M.O. 1 is different from that of cheroot () M.O. 2. P.W. 1 in Exhibit P-1 has mentioned the names of workers who were actually employed at the time of the inspection and also the names of 13 persons out of the 20 who were engaged in bringing cigars made out of the tobacco taken from the premises. 3. When the accused was examined, he denied that there were any workers with him working in the premises. He admits he has applied for a licence under the Act but says it was because of pressure. He examined one witness on his behalf. According to D.W. 1, he was the Officer in-charge of Tobacco Research Station, Vedasandur. There is different variety of tobacco for cigar. There are different kinds of leaves of tobacco used for chewing, cheroot and cigar. Cheroot and cigar are not one and the same. In the case of cheroot, a filler is rolled around with a binder. In the case of cigar, there is also a wrapper over ‘he binder. He further states that when the accused wanted some clarification and wrote to him, he had replied in Exhibit D-1 to more or less the same effect as he has deposed to in the witness box. 4. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that apart from P.W. 1's inspection report, there is nothing to show that the workers who were working in the premises of the accused were employed by the accused. He was not prepared to accept the evidence of P.W. 1 that 20 persons were taking tobacco from the premises of the accused and bringing them back as cigars. He felt the need of corroboration of P.W. 1's evidence. Further, he was inclined to accept the defence evidence that cigar is different from cheroot. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that cheroot is not different from cigar. Cigar is the genus and cheroot is one of the species. P.W. 1's (Assistant Inspector of Labour) evidence can be accepted without corroboration for a conviction. Further, he was inclined to accept the defence evidence that cigar is different from cheroot. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that cheroot is not different from cigar. Cigar is the genus and cheroot is one of the species. P.W. 1's (Assistant Inspector of Labour) evidence can be accepted without corroboration for a conviction. He further submitted that under section 2 (k) of the Act “manufacturing process” means even packing or otherwise treating any article with a view to the use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal of cigar. On the admission of the accused in Exhibit P-3 the reply to the show cause notice issued by the accused that labels were being affixed for the cheroots in the premises, offences under the Act have been committed. 6. The t1rial Court has erred in holding that P.W. 1's evidence is not acceptable without corroboration. P.W. 1's is a responsible officer and there is no reason why his evidence should be viewed as if it is that of an accomplice. When he inspected the place of accused on 8th June, i977, at X-15 p.m. he saw four persons working there. The inspection report makes it abundantly clear that the employees in all were 24 and out of them 20 were engaged in bringing cigar made out of the tobacco taken out of the accused's premises. The accused contended that the packing of the cigars are being packed by some of his relations in the premises and that would not be contravention of any of the provisions. But as the learned Public Prosecutor has rightly pointed out, this would clearly fall under section 2 (A) of the Act as it is a “manufacturing process”. Exhibit P-3 states that his relations are engaged in the affixing of labels in the premises which also is a process of manufacturing as contemplated under the Act. Another circumstance to be considered in this case is the accused, long before prosecution was launched against him, knowing fully well that what he was doing in. the premises needed a licence, applied for the same as Exhibit P-4 shows. But an application has to be accompanied by a plain in accordance with section 4 (2) of the Act and hence he was not successful in obtaining the licence. 7. the premises needed a licence, applied for the same as Exhibit P-4 shows. But an application has to be accompanied by a plain in accordance with section 4 (2) of the Act and hence he was not successful in obtaining the licence. 7. Regarding the contention that cigar is different from cheroot and so the Act is not applicable to what the accused was doing in the premises, an unreported decision of Suryamurthy, J., in Crl. M.P. Nos. 2173, 2177, 2466, 2475 and 2478 of 1978 dated 14th February, 1979, was brought to my notice. The learned Judge after dealing with the nature of these two items held that the word “cigar” is more comprehensive than ‘cheroot’ and ‘cheroot’ is a species and cigar is the genus and that the Legislature has used the word ‘cigar’ in its comprehensive sense as inclusive of cheroot.” Therefore, ‘cigar’ used in the Act includes the cheroot also. I am in respectful agreement with the above decision and hold that the Act applies to cheroot as well. The learned Counsel for the accused cited before a few decisions under the Factories Act where a worker has been defined. Apart from the fact that these decisions were before the definition of “worker” was amended under the said Act in 1976, I do not think it is necessary for me to refer to the definition of a “worker”, as in the instant case we are dealing with “employees” as defined in section 2 (f) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions and Employment) Act. 8. Net result of the analysis is, that the trial Court has erred in not accepting the evidence of P.W. 1 on the ground that it needed corroboration; secondly, that cigar is different from cheroot and that the Act is not applicable. In the result, the appeal against acquittal by the State is allowed and the accused, for contravening rules 26 (1) , 36 (1) and 36 (3) of the Rules framed under the Act is liable to be punished under section 33 of the Act; Consequently, for contravening the said rules, the respondent accused is convicted under section 33 of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100 in default to undergo one week simple imprisonment. Time for payment of fine is 15 days from the date of receipt of the order by the lower Court. 100 in default to undergo one week simple imprisonment. Time for payment of fine is 15 days from the date of receipt of the order by the lower Court. R.S.R. ----- Appeal allowed; accused convicted and sentenced.