Judgment 1. This application under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is for quashing the order of the Minister, Co-operation, respondent 2, dated 25-5-1981 as contained in Annexure-8, under S.65A of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). By this order, he has stayed the operation of the order of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, respondent 3, dated 5-5-1981; as contained in Annexure-7, and has, thereby, allowed the members of the managing committee of Bara Panchayat Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. (hereinafter to be called the society) which was elected on 20-12-1980 to function. 2. In order to appreciate the points some necessary facts have to be stated. Petitioner 2 is a society registered under the Act. The annual general meeting of the society was to be held on 25-11-1979 in spite of the fact that there was an order of restraint passed by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, on 24-11-1979. In that election respondent 6 and others were elected as office-bearers. A complaint was filed before the Assistant Registrar by some members of the society. The Assistant Registrar, by order dated 25-2-1980, held the election dated 25-11-1979 as null and void and further directed the Block Co-operative Extension Officer to convene the annual general meeting of the society. A copy of the order is Annexure-1. In pursuance of the direction, election was held on 29-3-1980 and petitioner 1 was elected as Chairman of the society. Respondent 6 filed a petition challenging the election of petitioner 1 before the Joint Registrar who stayed the functioning of the committee, which was elected on 29-3-1980, by his order dated 20-5-1980 (Annexure-2). As against that, petitioner 1 moved the Registrar, respondent 3, in revision, who directed by his order dated 7-7-1980, that the committee so elected will function till the matter is finally decided; a copy of the order is Annexure-3. The matter was finally heard by the Joint Registrar on 22-9-1980, who held both the meetings, namely, those held on 25-11-1979 and 29-3-1980 as invalid; a copy of the order dated 22-9-1980 is Annexure-4. Against the aforesaid order, petitioner 1 moved the Registrar who admitted the appeal on 16-12-1980 and further directed that till the hearing of the appeal no election of the society should be held; a copy of the order is Annexure-5. Against the aforesaid order, petitioner 1 moved the Registrar who admitted the appeal on 16-12-1980 and further directed that till the hearing of the appeal no election of the society should be held; a copy of the order is Annexure-5. On 20-12-1980 a meeting was held in which respondents 8 to 21 were elected as office-bearers of the society; a copy of the proceeding of the same is Annexure-6. Petitioner 1 filed another application before the Registrar that in spite of the direction some of the respondents had wrongly held the meeting and, therefore, proceeding for contempt of court should be started against them. The learned Registrar, by his order dated 5-5-1981, admitted the application and ordered that opposite parties 4 to 17 named in the application be restrained from functioning as members of managing committee in view of his earlier order dated 16-12-80 which is annexure-5. Against the aforesaid order, respondent 8 moved the Minister, Cooperation, respondent 2, who by his order dated 25-8-81, stayed the order of the Registrar passed on 5-5-81 (annexure-7) and further directed that the members of the managing committee, which was elected on 20-12-80, will function till the final hearing of the application and he fixed 23-9-81 as the next date. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioners have moved this Court. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have submitted that they had filed an application for initiating a proceeding for contempt of court, on which order was passed on 5-5-81 and the Minister, Co-operation, respondent 2 had no jurisdiction to interfere with the aforesaid order under Sec. 65A of the Act. He has further submitted that the prayer was for initiating proceeding for contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, which is a self-contained Act, and, therefore, the application, by no stretch of imagination, can be treated as a petition under the Act. Lastly, it has been submitted that respondent 2 has virtually allowed the application without hearing the petitioners, which is against the principles of natural justice, and in that view of the matter, the order is fit to be set aside. 4. Mr. Lastly, it has been submitted that respondent 2 has virtually allowed the application without hearing the petitioners, which is against the principles of natural justice, and in that view of the matter, the order is fit to be set aside. 4. Mr. Yogendra Mishra appearing on behalf of respondents 8 to 21 has submitted that the order of the Registrar as contained in annexure-7 was an order under Sec. 48(7) of the Act and the power conferred on the Minister under Sec. 65A of the Act has been rightly exercised in this case. Mr. Mishra has further submitted that no final order has been passed by the Minister who had fixed a date, meaning thereby that interim order was passed and final order will be passed only on the appearance of the other side and the principles of natural justice have not been violated. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has adopted the submissions made by Mr. Mishra and has submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 65A, the Minister had full authority to pass the impugned order. 6. The question as to in what circumstances the Minister can exercise his power under Sec. 65A of the Act is no longer in controversy and has been well settled by a series of decisions. But before referring to some of those decisions, it will be useful to quote here Sec. 65A of the Act :- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the State Government may, of its own motion or on an application made to it by any party aggrieved by the constitution or reconstitution, amalgamation, election, supersession, liquidation or any other matter concerning working of the society, call for any record of inspection or enquiry made under this Act or proceedings of any matter pending before the Registrar or his subordinate or any person acting under his authority and examine and pass such orders as it may deem fit." Reading the aforesaid section, it is crystal clear that the Minister has been given ample powers to interfere with the orders passed by his subordinates in a number of matters which have been mentioned therein. I may now refer to Hare Krishna Upadhyay V/s. State of Bihar, (1979 BBCJ (HC) 109) where it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the Minister has the full authority to interfere and pass order under this provision, provided there is a proceeding pending before the subordinate Court. A similar view has been expressed in the case of Saryug Singh V/s. State of Bihar, (1982 BBCJ (HC) 122) where their Lordships, on a consideration of the aforesaid case and also other cases, have held that such powers can be exercised only if a matter is pending but if a dispute has been finally considered and decided then the provisions of this section cannot be applicable. 7 Now it has to be seen whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case, the Minister was justified in interfering with the order of the Registrar. In this connection, it may be necessary to refer to the nature of the order passed by the Registrar on 5-5-81. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners placed a copy of the petition in order to show that it was a petition pure and simple for taking action for contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act. Much stress has been laid on this petition to show that the petitioner only wanted the persons. who had flouted the order of the Registrar passed earlier, to be proceeded against for committing contempt of court. But from the order it is clear that no action in this regard was taken by the Registrar. The order runs as follows:- "Heard, call for a report from the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Patna Circle, Patna, on the points raised in the petition. In the meantime, the opposite party Nos. 4 to 17 are restrained from functioning in the office of the Managing Committee of the Bara PACS in view of the orders passed by this Court on 16-12-1980." He called for a report from the Assistant Registrar where the society was located and at the same time he restrained the opposite parties mentioned in the said petition from functioning as members of the managing committee. This power could only be exercised under the provisions of the Act and not under the Contempt of Courts Act as submitted on behalf of the petitioners. This power could only be exercised under the provisions of the Act and not under the Contempt of Courts Act as submitted on behalf of the petitioners. Thus, I am of the considered opinion that even if the application was filed on behalf of the petitioners for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, the Registrar has passed the order under the provisions of the Act and not under the Contempt of Courts Act, as will be clear from the order which has been quoted above. Mr. Mishra has drawn my attention to Sec. 48(7) of the Act, which reads as follows :- "The Registrar, in the case of dispute under this section, shall have the power of review vested in a Civil Court under Sec.114 and under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and shall also have the inherent jurisdiction specified in Sec.151 of the said Code." and has submitted that the Registrar be clothed with some of the powers given under the Code of Civil Procedure, including the power under Sec.151 of the Code. He, therefore, urged that the Registrar, suo motu also without the application of any party, could have dealt with the matter under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is not necessary to decide the point in this case as I have already held that the order passed by the Registrar, as contained in annexure-7, was under the provisions of the Act. 8 That being the position, the Minister, in my opinion and according to the decisions referred to above, had full authority to interfere with the pending proceedings in the purported exercise of his power under Sec. 65A of the Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the Minister could not interfere in this case is without any substance and must be rejected. 9. The next contention on behalf of the petitioners that a final order has been passed without hearing the petitioners is also fit to be rejected. Reading the order, it is absolutely clear that an interim order was passed by him and a date was fixed for final hearing. That could not have been done if the intention of respondent 2 was to pass a final order in this case. Reading the order, it is absolutely clear that an interim order was passed by him and a date was fixed for final hearing. That could not have been done if the intention of respondent 2 was to pass a final order in this case. And, such orders are also passed in such proceedings, which is clear from annexure-7 too, and the learned Registrar also passed that order without giving notice to the other side. For passing interim orders it is not necessary to give notice to the persons concerned and it is the discretion of the court. But, of course for final hearing a notice has to be given and that stage has not come in the instant case. Thus I am of the opinion that the order passed on 25-8-81; as contained in annexure-8, was an interim order not finally deciding the controversy between the parties. Therefore, on a careful consideration of the points which have been raised in this application and after going through the case laws referred to above, I am of the view that no ground for interference has been made out on behalf of the petitioners. The application is dismissed but, in the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. 10. At the time of admission, the order of the Minister was stayed. The order of stay stands vacated and it is hoped that the proceeding will be disposed of expeditiously. Order accordingly