JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - Arjun Chaubey, the petitioner, has challenged the order dated 15th June, 1982, of the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent (C). N. Railway, Varanasi, terminating him from the post of senior clerk working in the O.C.S's office Varanasi. The termination order was passed under Rule 14 (ii) if the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The relevant portion of the termination order is as under : "I, the undersigned, having the powers to dismiss or remove you from service, am fully satisfied that for the reasons which have been recorded in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided under Rule 9 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules 1968 and in exercise of powers vested in me under Rule 14 (ii) of these rules read with proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Indian Constitution and considering the circumstances of your case, I have come to the conclusion that you are not fit to be retained in service and, therefore, have decided to dismiss you from service from the post of Senior clerk in scale 330-560 with effect from 15.6.1982 (afternoon)." 2. The relevant rules applicable to the petitioner are Railway servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rule 6 provides the penalties which may, for good and sufficient reasons be passed on railway servants. Rules 9 to 13 contain an elaborate procedure for holding enquiry of imposing major penalty. Rule 14 deals with the cases where the procedure prescribed by Rules 9 to 13 may be dispensed with. This rule since has an important bearing on the controversy in dispute, the same is being produced below ; "14. Special procedure in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13. Rule 14 deals with the cases where the procedure prescribed by Rules 9 to 13 may be dispensed with. This rule since has an important bearing on the controversy in dispute, the same is being produced below ; "14. Special procedure in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13. (i) where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably, practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules ; or (iii) where the president is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules ; the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit." 3. Challenging the dismissal order, the petitioner has raised three arguments. The first is that the reason recorded for dispensing with the enquiry on the ground that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in these rules, should be communicated to the employees concerned. According to the learned counsel, reasons are required to be communicated before the order terminating the service is made by the appointing authority. In the alternative, the submission made in this regard was that if the communication of reasons is not held to be necessary before the actual passing of the dismissal order, the same must accompany the order terminating or dismissing the employee. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner way that under Rule 14, not only the giving of reasons for dispensing with the enquiry is a condition precedent but also its communication separately to him within a reasonable time. In support of his submission, the petitioner has relied upon K.A. Subramaniam v. Union of India and others 1982 L.I.C. 1059, P.K. Choudhary and others v. Union of India 1977 L.I.C. 450, Ram Khilari v. Union of India A.I.R 1976 Raj. 219 and Bhola Nath v. Union of India 1975 S.L.R. 277 Guj. 4. In support of his submission, the petitioner has relied upon K.A. Subramaniam v. Union of India and others 1982 L.I.C. 1059, P.K. Choudhary and others v. Union of India 1977 L.I.C. 450, Ram Khilari v. Union of India A.I.R 1976 Raj. 219 and Bhola Nath v. Union of India 1975 S.L.R. 277 Guj. 4. Before discussing the requirement of communicating the reasons and its consequence in the event of failure in doing so, we may mention that there was no dispute between the parties that the requirement of giving reasons for dispensing with the enquiry under Rule 14 (ii) of the Rules is mandatory. Since the requirement of giving reasons is mandatory, failure to do so, is vitiated in the order of termination made against a railway employee. Not only the context but also the language used in Rule 14 (ii) makes it incumbent on the authority concerned to give or record reasons for dispensing with the holding of enquiry as is required by Rules 9 to 13 of the aforesaid rules. A mandatory provision in the statute is one, the omission of which renders the proceedings void. To terminate the service of an employee without holding any enquiry is a serious matter and might result in denying him to defend himself to the charges on the basis of which he is terminated. Giving of reasons is the essence of the thing required to be done. In case, therefore, the service of a railway employee is terminated under Rule 14 (ii) without giving reasons which induced him for not holding the enquiry, would be vitiated and would be liable to be quashed on that ground. 5. We have quoted above the order by which the petitioner had been dismissed. This order was passed both under Rule 14 (ii) and Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution. Before making the order dismissing the petitioner, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent recorded his satisfaction in writing that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry contemplated by Rule 18 to 13. The reasons recorded by him are being reproduced below : "(1) Sri Arjun Chaubey, in order to show his supremacy and with mala fide intentions to overpower the new Dy. C. C.S. who took over charge recently on 4.5.1982 shouted and threatened officers in office repeatedly on 11.5.1982 and 19.5.1982 on one pretext or other in order to gain undue advantage. C. C.S. who took over charge recently on 4.5.1982 shouted and threatened officers in office repeatedly on 11.5.1982 and 19.5.1982 on one pretext or other in order to gain undue advantage. By shouting and creating chaotic conditions in the office he paralysed working of the office and thus causing colossal loss of many hours to the Railway Administration. (2) On 11.5.1982 and again on 19.5.1982, Sri Arjun Chaubey forced his entry in the chamber of Dy. C.C.S.C. and shouted on him repeatedly, Dy. C.C.S.C. tried to pacify him and advised him to go to his seat in the section. He did not pay any heed and became more furious and challenged him with threats of dire consequence. (3) Sri Arjun Chaubey in furtherance of his sinister motive deployed miscreants who chased Dy. C.C.S. after start from office for residence at 5.30 P.M. on 20.5.1982. He also employed Vikram the bungalow peon of Dy. C.C.S. to harass him and his family with the assistance of miscreants. He has thus created serious security problem for Dy. C.C.S. and his family members. Dy. C.C.S. immediately lodged complaints with D.M. and S.P. in this regard on 21.5.1982. He also lodged complaints with ASO/R.P.F. SO/GRP and S.H.O. Sigra. (4) Faced with repeated acts of indiscipline and intimidation's Sri Arjun Chaubey was served with a notice dated 22.5.1982 to show cause why stern action should not be taken against him for his undesirable activities due to which running of administration was becoming impossible. Instead of mending and giving his explanation to the show cause notice he took an offence and served a threatening notice dated 2.6.1982 to the senior officers through his lawyer demanding withdrawal of the show cause notice failing which he threatened to launch criminal and civil proceedings. Later, on 9.6.1982 he submitted his reply to the show cause notice evading the main charges and the same is not at all convincing. (5) Due to serious threat from Sri Arjun Chaube to the discipline and working of office, an emergent meeting of officers was called on 14.6.1982 by the Dy. CCSC to decide the course of action by the Administration to meet the situation. (5) Due to serious threat from Sri Arjun Chaube to the discipline and working of office, an emergent meeting of officers was called on 14.6.1982 by the Dy. CCSC to decide the course of action by the Administration to meet the situation. The officers narrated their experience and tale of woes in dealing with Sri Arjun Chaube in the past as well as present and expressed their inability to conduct any enquiry as Sri Arjun Chaube was capable of going to any extent including threat to their security after office hours. Officers also feel strongly that due to turbulent mood and intimidatory tactics of Sri Arjun Chaube there is no possibility that any member of staff will come forward to give evidence against him for fear of violence from him." 6. From the reasons it is clear that the reasons given are not entirely subjective but are based on materials against the petitioner. On the materials, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent was satisfied that no enquiry could possibly be held against the petitioner and with that view he dispensed with the same. Apart from the fact that a Court has limited power in these matters to interfere, we find that the reasons recorded were relevant for determining the question of dispensing with the enquiry. The petitioner was found to be a troublesome employee and the finding recorded against him that he had created such a situation on that no officer was even prepared to hold enquiry in respect of the charges which had been levelled against him. In view of the finding about conduct of the petitioner, the dispensation of enquiry was fully justified. For utilising the power of dispensing with the enquiry by the law required to be established is that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry. 7. The condition precedent for dispensation of not holding enquiry as submitted by the petitioner's learned counsel is not that it was utterly impracticable to do so. The sufficiency of the material on which satisfaction has been recorded is not to be judged or considered by this Court. It can only interfere when the satisfaction is found to be mala fide. Neither was any allegation of mala fide made nor are we satisfied that the dispensation of enquiry was actuated by mala fide motive. The sufficiency of the material on which satisfaction has been recorded is not to be judged or considered by this Court. It can only interfere when the satisfaction is found to be mala fide. Neither was any allegation of mala fide made nor are we satisfied that the dispensation of enquiry was actuated by mala fide motive. The other ground on which the reason given for dispensing with the enquiry could be found to be sustainable was that the same were wholly irrelevant or extraneous to the issue. This requirement also has been established. 8. There is a difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the requirement of communicating reasons to the delinquent which are recorded for dispensing with the enquiry. We have already referred to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his submission. Apart from those decisions, two others, which are of our own High Court and may be noticed, are reported in R.K.S. Bhatnagar v. The Divisional Superintendent North Eastern Railway and another, 1978 L.I.C. 193, and Indra Deo Singh v. Union of India 1977 (1) L.I.C. 105. This latter decision of a learned Single Judge had been upheld in Special appeal No.288 of 1976. Union of India v. Indra Deo Singh decided on 14.2.1977. 9. For the petitioner reliance had also been placed on a full bench decision reported in Maksudan Patak v. The Executive Officer 1981 A.W.C. 385, and K.A. Subramanian v. Union of India 1982 L.I.C. 1059. 10. There is no doubt that most of these decisions support the petitioner's contention that the reasons recorded were required to be communicated to the delinquent and non communication of the same was fatal resulting in vitiating the termination order. 11. On the other hand some of those cases which took the view that no communication of reasons is required to be made are reported in Jayanti Lal Patel v. Mahendra Singh (1977) (1) S.L.R. 10 (Guj.). Chief Mechanical Engineer E. Rly. v. Jyoti Prasad Banerji, 1975 (2) S.L.R. 437 (Cal.), R.K. Misra v. The General Manager, Northern Rly. New Delhi 1977 (2) S.L.R. 127 , and Ram Khilari v. Union of India 1976 (2) S.L.R. 27. 12. Chief Justice Pathak, in Manik Ranjan Sen Gupta v. General Manager North East Frontier Rly. Chief Mechanical Engineer E. Rly. v. Jyoti Prasad Banerji, 1975 (2) S.L.R. 437 (Cal.), R.K. Misra v. The General Manager, Northern Rly. New Delhi 1977 (2) S.L.R. 127 , and Ram Khilari v. Union of India 1976 (2) S.L.R. 27. 12. Chief Justice Pathak, in Manik Ranjan Sen Gupta v. General Manager North East Frontier Rly. Malingaon, 1975 (2) L.I.C. 1530, held that it was not necessary that the reasons for dispensing with the enquiry should be incorporated in the order of removal and it was apparently found sufficient if they existed on the record. In Jayant Kumar Rao and others v. Union of India, C.R. 1388 of 1981, Sabyasachi Mukherjee J. of Calcutta High Court observed : "On consideration of these materials and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, it appears to me that Rule 14 (ii) enjoins that the authority concerned must act reasonably, fairly and not arbitrarily and there must be materials upon which a person can reasonably arrive at a conclusion that an employee covered by Rule 14 had to be imposed penalty and secondly there must be materials to come to the conclusion that enquiry in the manner contemplated under Rules 5 to 9 of the aforesaid rules was not practicable. Upon these materials the reasons must be recorded." 13. From the decisions noticed above, two lines can be clearly found. The High Courts of Calcutta, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Assam and Delhi held that the delivery of copy of the reasons is not the requirement of a law nor any fatal consequence flow therefrom. We are inclined to agree with the view taken by these Courts, but in the instant case we do not wish to express any concluded opinion. In the instant case, the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service had not been made exclusively under Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. It was made under Article 311 (2)(b)of the Constitution also. In the instant case, the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service had not been made exclusively under Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. It was made under Article 311 (2)(b)of the Constitution also. Article 311 (2) (b) runs as under : - "Provided further that this clause shall not apply- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on criminal charges ; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for same reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry ; or (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) if, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in Clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." 14. Review of the authorities in support of the proposition of communicating the reasons to the delinquent was mainly based on the reason that its non-communication would result in depriving him from exercising his right of appeal effectively. So far as Article 311 (2) (b) is concerned, we may point out that Article 311 (3) lays down in clear terms that whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in Clause (2), would be final, which would, in our view, mean that the reasons recorded would not be open to challenge. Accordingly, when the order of dismissal is also under Article 311 (2) (b) non-communication of the reasons is not of any consequence. Difference between Rule 14 (ii) and Article 311 has been noticed in Bata Ram v. State of Punjab 1980 L.I.C. 489, and Jayanti Lal Patel v. Mahendra Singh ( supra ). As in our opinion, in the instant case, the order dismissing the petitioner had been passed also under Article 311 (2) (b) non-communication of reasons to the petitioner did not vitiate the same. 15. As in our opinion, in the instant case, the order dismissing the petitioner had been passed also under Article 311 (2) (b) non-communication of reasons to the petitioner did not vitiate the same. 15. The other argument advanced before us was about opportunity to be given to the petitioner before dispensing with the inquiry and imposing punishment on the petitioner. For this proposition, the learned counsel relied on the last portion of Rule 14 which requires the disciplinary authority "may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders the reason as it deems fit." The argument was that the requirement of considering the circumstances laid down makes it incumbent on the authority to hear the delinquent in support of the explanation given to the charges. For this proposition, reliance had been placed on the decisions which have already been pointed out above. We are not called upon to decide this controversy in this petition inasmuch as the impugned order had been passed under Article 311 (2) (b) of the constitution. Article 311 does not talk of consideration of circumstances before passing a valid order of dismissal, removal or discharge. It entitles the disciplinary authority to take action against the delinquent concerned if he is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold inquiry and the charges of which he is guilty are found to have been established from the record. In special appeal No. 288 of 1976 Union of India v. Indra Deo Singh, the Division Bench while laying down the requirement of giving the opportunity of hearing to a case of Rule 14 (ii) on account of the requirement of considering the circumstances, made a distinction between such a case and a case of Article 311 (2) (b) it held : "It has to be noted that the last part of Rule 14 is not to be found in the proviso to Article 311(2). We are mainly concerned with the interpretation of the last part of Rule 14 and the determination of its effect. We have held on a true construction of that part that the employee concerned is entitled to an opportunity of representation of hearing." 16. The petitioner's learned counsel did not cite any authority of Article 311 (2) (b) where giving of opportunity is a condition precedent. 17. We have held on a true construction of that part that the employee concerned is entitled to an opportunity of representation of hearing." 16. The petitioner's learned counsel did not cite any authority of Article 311 (2) (b) where giving of opportunity is a condition precedent. 17. Strong reliance had been placed by petitioner's learned counsel on a full bench decision of Maksudan Pathak v. The Security Officer ( supra ) I this full bench two arguments were made. The first was that the order passed by the Security Officer dispensing with the inquiry was manifestly erroneous and the second submission was that even if the inquiry was dispensed with, it was mandatory to have given notice to the petitioner against the proposed punishment. The full bench held that as the petition was entitled to succeed on the first submission, it did not decide the second. The decision of this full bench was that the order dispensing with the inquiry was arbitrary. This decision, therefore, is not helpful to the petitioner. 18. From the facts noted above, it would be found that petitioner had been given the charge sheet and had been called upon to submit reply to the same. He submitted an explanation and denied the charges. This explanation was considered by the disciplinary authority while dismissing him from service. This is being noted to show that the disciplinary authority had the explanation of the petitioner before it while passing the impugned order. The explanation had been elaborately considered and the decision was then taken that the petitioner was liable to be dismissed. 19. On behalf of the respondents, argument further suggested was that Clause 14 was in conflict with Article 311 (2). The said clause was ultra vires the Constitution and non-compliance of 14 (ii) did not render the order invalid. In the present case, we do not consider it necessary to decide this controversy. 20. For what we have said above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.