JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - In the year 1964 the plaintiff-appellant was posted as a second officer at the police station Saramir in the District of Azamgarh. He was charge-sheeted and after considering his explanation an order of reduction of pay was passed against him on 5th December, 1965. An appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed on 23rd December, 1966. After serving a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. the appellant instituted a suit inter alia for the following relief :- "That a declaratory decree to the effect that the order dated 5-12-65 and its merger into the order dated 23-12-66 is illegal, wrongful, null and void ; inoperative and ineffective and the plaintiff still continues as S.I. in service with the grade which the plaintiff had at the time of passing impugned order and entitled to all the benefits of the said grade be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants." It appears that an objection was raised by the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff did not contain a clear relief regarding pay affected by the order in question nor had the appropriate court fees paid thereon. On account of this objection the trial court passed an order on 12th November, 1968 directing the appellant to seek necessary amendments in his pleadings within fifteen days. Consequent upon the said order an application for amendment was made by the appellant which was allowed and the necessary amendments were incorporated in the plaint. In the relief quoted above which was relief (A) the words "other than remuneration" were added towards the end after the words "the said grade" and before the words "be passed". A separate relief being relief B was also added which was to the following effect:- "That a decree for Rs. 1864.06 as loss in salary, etc., with pendentelite and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the date of recovery be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants." After considering the evidence produced by the parties in respect of their respective cases the trial court decreed the suit both for reliefs A and B referred to above except for pendentelite and further interest. The defendants went up in appeal. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal in part and while maintaining the decree of the trial court in respect of relief. The defendants went up in appeal. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal in part and while maintaining the decree of the trial court in respect of relief. A reversed it in respect of relief B on the ground that the notice which was given by the appellant to the respondents under Section 80 C.P.C. did not specify that the appellant would claim arrears of salary from the State Government. Aggrieved the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 2. It was pointed out by counsel for the appellant the relief A as it stood initially was almost a verbatim copy of the proposed relief as mentioned in the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. It was urged that by making an amendment in the plaint consequent upon the order passed by the trial court referred to above what was implicit in relief A and in the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was only made explicit. According to counsel for the appellant this aspect of the matter escaped the notice of the lower appellate court in taking the view that the suit in so far as the amended relief B is concerned was barred for want of a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties and gone through the notice under Section 80 C.P.C., I find substance in this submission. The last paragraph of the said notice reads as follows :- "Therefore the proposed plaintiff requests you to declare the order dated 5-12-65 and its merger into order dated 23-12-66 illegal, wrongful, null and void, inoperative and ineffective and the proposed plaintiff, still continues in service with the grade which the proposed plaintiff had at the time of passing the impugned order in question and entitled to all the emoluments of the said grade." The reduction made in the pay of the appellant was in pursuance of the impugned orders dated 5-12-65 and 23-12-66. When it was mentioned in the notice that there two orders were illegal, wrongful, null and void, inoperative and ineffective and the proposed plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that he continues in the service with the grade which he held at the time of passing of the said orders and was further entitled to all the emoluments of the said grade it clearly meant that the appellant had given notice to the respondent that the relief which he was to claim in the suit was also for all the emoluments of the said grade calculated on the basis that the impugned orders had not been passed. This would obviously include the relief for a decree for that amount which had been deducted from his pay in pursuance of the impugned orders. The sum of Rs. 1864.06 which was the subject matter of relief B introduced by the amendment of the plaintiff represented this very amount. On a reasonable construction of the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. it is not possible to take the view that the appellant was not entitled to relief B aforesaid for want of a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. 4. In Dhiart Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 , it was held that though the terms of Section 80 are to be strictly complied with, it does not mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. The same view was reiterated in State of Madras v. C.D. Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 . 5. In Raghunath Das. v. Union of India, 1969 ALJ 570, this question against came up for consideration before the supreme Court and it was held that the object of the notice contemplated by Section 80 C.P.C. is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised within litigation. The legislative intention behind that section is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigation. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The legislative intention behind that section is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigation. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in Section 80, Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as booby traps against ignorant and illiterate persons. It was reiterated in this case also that while the terms of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code must be strictly complied with that does not mean that the terms oi the notice should be construed in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. 6. In Union of India v. Jeewan Ram, AIR 1958 SC 905 , in the notice under Section 80 C.P.C. the relief claimed was "That my said client is entitled to be reinstated on his former post, and to be paid the amount due to him on the basis of his being treated as if he was not discharged from the date of his discharge upto the date of reinstatement." In the plaint the main relief claimed was a declaration that the order of discharge or removal of the respondent is illegal and arbitrary. A plea was raised in defence that the relief claimed in the plaint could rot be granted for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C. It was held that there was no substantial difference in the relief mentioned in the notice and the plaint and the notice was not invalid on that ground. 7. In view of the forgoing discussion I am of opinion that the lower appellate court was clearly wrong in taking the view that the appellant was not entitled to relief B referred to above for want of notice under Section 80, C.P.C. 8. In the result the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the decree of the lower appellate court in so far as the suit of the appellant for relief B referred to above has been dismissed is set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial court are restored.