ORDER N.N. Sharma, J. - Both these petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment as they arise out on the same facts and can be disposed of simultaneously. 2. Dispute relates to plot nos. 397, 3990, 3904 and 4088, measuring 9 bighas 17 biswas situated in village Turra, Pergana Naraini, district Banda. These plots were the Sirdari plots of Mangalwa and Saua, who are own brothers, sons of Ram Charan, Mangalwa is the husband of Smt. Ratania. These plots were sold by the tenure-holders to Khilari and Bishambher for a sum of Rs. 1000/- through a registered instrument on 3-5-1965. The sale deed was registered on 20-5-1965. Petitioners Ramanuj and Kaushal are sons of Bishambher Dayal, vendee. Vendees are in possession over the disputed holdings and their names were recorded in the revenue papers as the vendors conceded in Mutation case No. 1608 / 1161 that they had already delivered possession of the holding to the vendees in pursuance of the sale deed, vide annexures RA-1 and RA-2 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980. Thus the names of vendees were mutated on the holding vide order dated 17-9-1965 of the revenue court. 3. In the revenue papers, the names of vendees were entered and they are also in actual possession over the sum from 3-5-1965. 4. It was after about four years in 1969, that Smt. Ratania, wife of Mangalwa vendor, initiated criminal proceedings under S. 145 Cr. P.C. asserting her possession over the disputed holding. Her contention was repelled and the possession of Vendees was upheld by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Naraini, district Banda on 17-7-1969. 5. Smt. Ratania along with her husband and brother-in-law and sons filed proceedings under S. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act No. I of 1951) in the revenue court against vendees for recovery of possession over the disputed holding. She also claimed damages from the defendants vendees alleging them as trespassers. She lost the case and possession of vendees was again upheld on 1-9-1969 vide annexures 1 and 2 of the Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980. 6. It appears that despite these reverses, Smt. Ratania did not lose courage and after nine years again tried her luck in the court of Munsif Banda by filing suit No. 235 of 1978 on 18-7-1978. 7. 6. It appears that despite these reverses, Smt. Ratania did not lose courage and after nine years again tried her luck in the court of Munsif Banda by filing suit No. 235 of 1978 on 18-7-1978. 7. It was alleged in the plaint, giving rise to these writ petitions that her husband and brother-in-law, who were Sirdars of the holdings, had no power of disposal of the holding in view of the verdict of village Panchayat. 8. She further averred that Mangalwa was a drunkard and Saua was lunatic and the alleged sale deed was a sham transaction and thus the relief sought was for cancellation of the said sale deed after adjudging it void. No further relief was sought. She claimed to have learnt about the sale deed for the first time on 7-7-1978 when she got the revenue papers inspected. 9. The vendees filed written statement vide annexure 4 of the writ petition No. 2795 of 1980 by which it was maintained that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and plaintiff had no right to bring an action. She was neither the Sirdar nor Bhumidhar of the holding. The aforesaid sale deed was unassailable. The claim was barred by limitation and res judicata and was not maintainable. The suit was also barred by estoppel. 10. Through an amendment, Smt. Ratania also impleaded both the vendors as plaintiffs. 11. A preliminary issue about jurisdiction was disposed of by learned Munsif on 18-12-1979. It was issue No.7 and the finding recorded is annexure No.5 of Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980. It was held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 12 The revision (Civil Revision No. 4 of 1980 ) preferred by petitioners failed on 18-2-1980 vide annexure 6 of Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980. 13. Thus the present writ petition No. 2795 of 1980 was filed alleging that these proceedings were liable to be quashed, These should have been abated under S. 4 (2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as the petitioners were recorded tenure holders. Consolidation operations are going on in that village and so abatement of the suit should be ordered under S. 5 of the aforesaid Act. 14. It was further prayed that these proceedings were clear abuse of the process of the court and such harassment of plaintiff of petitioners must be stopped. 15. Consolidation operations are going on in that village and so abatement of the suit should be ordered under S. 5 of the aforesaid Act. 14. It was further prayed that these proceedings were clear abuse of the process of the court and such harassment of plaintiff of petitioners must be stopped. 15. The reliefs sought were to quash the impugned orders annexures 6 and 5 and to dismiss the suit No. 235 of 1978 as abated and to issue any, other suitable order along with the costs of the suit. 16. Counter and rejoinder affidavits were filed by the parties. 17. Thus. the main question to be admitted in mutation case that they had determined in this writ petition is about the given up their possession over the holding jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the on receipt of Rs. 1000/- in cash to the suit. 18. As regards writ Petition No. 11814 of 1981, the petitioners, pending the aforesaid suit, approached this Court and filed the aforesaid writ petition No. 2795 of 1980 and procured a stay order on 28-3-1980 by which the proceedings in that suit were stayed. However, the suit was not stayed by the learned Munsif on 5-4-1980 and the case was disposed of ex parte on 8-4-1980 vide annexure 6. 19. Petitioners prayed to get the ex parte decree set aside vide Civil Misc. Application No. 16/74 of 1980 in the court of Munsif, Banda (annexure 7) explaining the circumstance under which the stay order could not be timely filed in the court and alleging it as sufficient ground for setting aside the ex parte decree. That application was also rejected by learned Munsif vide order dated 22-9-1980 (Annexure 10). 20. An appeal preferred by petitioners against that order was dismissed by learned Civil Judge, Banda on 18-8-1981 vide judgment on Misc. Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1980 (Annexure-11). 21. Thus, the prayer in the present writ petition No.11814 of 1981 was to quash the impugned orders d/- 22-9-1980, 18-8-1981 and ex parte decree d/- 8-4-1980 and to issue further suitable orders along with the costs. 22. I have carefully perused counter and rejoinder affidavits filed by the parties and the records and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 23. 22. I have carefully perused counter and rejoinder affidavits filed by the parties and the records and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 23. On a careful perusal of the facts and material on records, both the writ petitions are being allowed for following reasons: (1) A resume of the aforesaid facts shall go to disclose the multiplicity of the proceedings initiated by Smt. Ratania with false allegations amounting to clear abuse of process of the Court. A registered sale deed d/ 3-5-1965 was executed in favour of petitioners Khilari and Bishambher Dayal by Saua and Mangalwa, who were admittedly the tenure-holders of the holding Saua and Mangalwa clearly vendees and so they conceded that the names of vendees must be entered on this land. Smt. Ratania was not in picture then. After these admissions of the vendors, who were sui juris, names of the vendees were recorded in revenue papers as Bhumidhars on the holding. Their possession also continued for four years or so. 24. It was after four years, when Smt. Ratania came in the picture and initiated proceedings under 5.145 Cr. P.C. and asserted her possession over the disputed property alleging the vendees as trespassers. However, she lost the case and possession of vendees was upheld by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Naraini, Banda on 17-7-1969. 25. Smt. Ratania again initiated another inning in the revenue court alleging vendees as trespassers and claiming damages. Copy of that plaint in Misc. Case No. 5 under section 209 of the Z. A. & L. R. Act (annexure 1 of writ petition no. 2795 of 1980) is on record. At that time she did not base her claim on the verdict of Panchayat when her father-in-law had disqualified his sons, the vendors, from transferring the holding and she was recognised as the tenure-holder of the disputed property. It was also not alleged at that time that the sale deed was executed as her husband was a drunkard and executed the sale deed while inebriate and her brother-in-law Saua was lunatic. She sought possession over the disputed holding along with damages and costs of that suit. It appears that the vendees set up the sale deed as a shield. That suit failed on 1-9-1969 vide annexure 2. She sought possession over the disputed holding along with damages and costs of that suit. It appears that the vendees set up the sale deed as a shield. That suit failed on 1-9-1969 vide annexure 2. Thereafter, there was a lull for nine long years and Smt. Ratania again woke up from the slumber and filed Civil Suit No.235 of 1978 in the court of Munsif Banda (annexure-3 of Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980) in which she alleged the sale deed as a sham transaction. She also falsely alleged for the first time that there was a verdict of Panchayat. She further asserted that the vendors, who were the Sirdars had no right to transfer the holding, she further alleged that she was not aware about the sale deed or possession of the vendees up to 7-7-78 and so she brought this suit for cancellation of the said sale deed on 18-7-1978. 26. Even a casual look at the aforesaid facts shall go to disclose that all these allegations were simply a tissue of lies. Smt. Ratania had earlier litigated about the holding unsuccessfully in criminal court and in revenue court in 1969 and even at that time, defendants, who were petitioners, now, put forward the sale deed as their shield and asserted their continuous possession over the disputed holding. It does not appeal to commonsense that Smt. Ratania forgot all about that durable litigation and work up in 1978. It shall be credulous folly to believe that Sirdari which exclusively belonged to vendors became undisposable by them. There is nothing in the plaint to show as to when and how their power of disposal was cut down and as to how the oral verdict of Panchayat was not put forward by her in the revenue court which could have served as a good sword against the vendees in support of her claim. Her name was never recorded in the revenue papers nor she could ever get any title or possession on this holding to the exclusion of vendors nor the date, time, month of such verdict was laid in the plaint. 27. Under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, an action for cancellation of sale deed could have been filed within three years of the execution of the sale deed or acquisition of its knowledge. 27. Under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, an action for cancellation of sale deed could have been filed within three years of the execution of the sale deed or acquisition of its knowledge. So this hopelessly time barred claim of plaintiff was based on false and flimsy allegations and was clear harassment of the vendees. Such abuse of the process of Court cannot be countenanced by this Court. 28. Sr. M. A. Qadeer, learned Advocate for the respondents, pointed out that such relief in specific terms was not sought in writ petition No. 2795 of 1980. 29. It appears that in paras (iv) and (v) at page 8 of the said writ petition, it was averred by the petitioners that these proceedings before the civil court amount to a clear abuse of process of the court and the suit and proceedings therein are liable to be quashed. It was further averred in para(v) that if the impugned orders are not quashed then the petitioners shall unnecessarily be harassed. In relief (b), sought in this petition, there was a prayer to dismiss suit No. 235 of 1978 by issuing a direction in the nature of mandamus and holding the same to have abated. In relief (c), there was a prayer to issue such direction which the Court deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case. In Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1569 at page 1577 it was observed : "The same result is reached by reading into every application for eviction by a landlord a necessarily implied representation to court that for the reason of his being directed to get out he must be given possession of his own residence for his own occupation with the aid of the judicial process. If the finale is reached and possession obtained, the Court will not allow a party to reduce its process to a mere make-believe, or a clever parody, breaking faith with the judicial process itself. Such bathos can be interdicted by the use of the inherent power of the court. The re-letting to some one else of non-occupation, even after a reasonable time or without reasonable cause, will be regarded as an abuse of the process of the court and, at the instance of the affected tenant or otherwise, the eviction order cancelled and possession restored. The re-letting to some one else of non-occupation, even after a reasonable time or without reasonable cause, will be regarded as an abuse of the process of the court and, at the instance of the affected tenant or otherwise, the eviction order cancelled and possession restored. We affirm this legal position lest overly cute but qualm less landlords should hopefully hoax the court and reduce its decree to a joke. Every tribunal has the inherent power to prevent its machinery from being made a sham, there by running down the rule of law itself as an object of public ridicule. It will and must prove any stratagem self-defeating if a party indulges in making the law the laughing stock for the court will call him to order." 30. The aforesaid observation unmistakably go to show that inherent power in the court to prevent legal machinery from being made a sham. thereby running down the rule of law itself as an object of public ridicule. So such stratagem of the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to prevail. 31. (2) On merits, it was pointed out on behalf of respondents that the relief for declaration or cancellation was award able by a civil court and not by the revenue court. 32. A perusal of the finding recorded by the revisional court shall go to disclose that he found aforesaid sale deed as voidable and not void and under such circumstances, he came to the conclusion that the aforesaid We deed cannot be treated as void and if the sale deed had been treated as void, the matter could have been different. The relief has been couched in a language which makes it cognizable by a civil court. I do not subscribe to this view. Explanation appended to section 331 of U.P. Z. A. & L. R. Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) reads as below. "Explanation - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted." 33. Thus the contention for the petitioners was that it was the pith and substance of the plaint and cause of action which had to be looked into. Thus the contention for the petitioners was that it was the pith and substance of the plaint and cause of action which had to be looked into. Plaintiffs could not confer jurisdiction on a civil court by twisting the facts and couching the relief in a particular form when it is based on a cause of action cognizable by a revenue court which could have led to the ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court. 34. I have already referred to the fact that the present suit was instituted by Smt. Ratania who was no party to the impugned sale deed; the vendors were impleaded through a subsequent amendment. She alleged that the vendors had no power to execute the sale deed. Their power of disposal had been cut down by verdict of village Panchayat. Her father-in-law had also imposed a restraint on the vendors' power of disposal and had conferred rights on her and under such circumstances, the execution of the sale deed by the vendors was simply void and a sham transaction. 35. It is significant to note that under such circumstances when the character of transaction was itself assailed it was difficult to hold that the said sale deed was voidable and not void. The main relief which could have been sought by plaintiffs was the recovery of possession over the holding, that relief was within the exclusive competence of revenue court. Without possession, mere declaration or cancellation of sale deed could have been illusory and not an efficacious relief. As the plaintiffs failed in the revenue court so they invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court by circumvention of averments and in such circumstances it has to be held that the findings recorded by the courts below on issue No. 7 were erroneous. The point is well covered by Vijai Singh v. 2nd Addl. District & Sessions Judge Bulandshahr, reported in 1982 All LJ 725. It appears that in that case Ismail Khan respondent filed a suit, being Suit No. 46 of 1980, for cancellation of a sale deed dated 7-7-1979 purporting to have been executed by him in favour of Vijai Singh petitioner. It was in respect of an agricultural plot no.281, the area of which was 1 bigha 18 biswas 13 biswansis situated in village Bawanpur, pergana Ahar, District Bulandshahr. 36. It was in respect of an agricultural plot no.281, the area of which was 1 bigha 18 biswas 13 biswansis situated in village Bawanpur, pergana Ahar, District Bulandshahr. 36. It was averred that plaintiff had not actually executed the sale deed but some other person had impersonated for that purpose and that no consideration was paid for it. The said sale deed was a forged and fictitious sale deed and so the suit was filed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in his possession over the disputed plot. 37. Defendant resisted the suit by raising the plea of jurisdiction. Issue no.5, which related to the jurisdiction of the civil Court, was found in favour of plaintiff. Revision filed by the defendant failed and so the petition was filed in this Court which was allowed with the following observations at page 730 : "To conclude, therefore, the view taken by the trial court as also by the revisional court suffers from manifest error of law and cannot be sustained on the allegations made in the plaint, according to the plaintiff, the impugned transaction was a void transaction and that being so even though the relief claimed was of injunction the effective relief on the cause of action set out in the plaint was that of declaration which could be granted only by the revenue court. Such a suit was not cognizable by the civil court and the plaint is liable to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court." 38. In Dr. Ajodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad, reported in 1981 All LJ 647 facts were as below : "Where the plaintiff alleged that he was the son of the deceased landlord and claimed declaration of his sirdari in the disputed land and instituted a suit in civil court and claimed reliefs of cancellation of sale deed in respect of disputed land executed by his mother and for injunction, the jurisdiction of civil court would be barred as the plaintiff being a preferential heir under S. 171 and his mother being no heir the sale deed would not require cancellation by a civil court and in respect of cause of action of threatened invasion of plaintiffs right, relief could be given by a Revenue Court." 39. In Mohd. Umar Khan v. Idris Mohd. In Mohd. Umar Khan v. Idris Mohd. Ghani, AIR 1980 All 89 at p.92 it was observed: "Whether the Civil Court or Revenue Court has jurisdiction to try a particular suit cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the relief claimed in the suit. For this purpose the pith and substance of the allegations made in the plaint will have to be scrutinised and if on those allegations some adequate or satisfactory relief can be obtained from the revenue Court, notwithstanding that the relief has been so modulated that it falls outside the purview of the revenue Court. Where the pith and substance of the allegations made in the plaint is such in respect of which an adequate relief can be granted by a revenue Court, the suit would he cognizable by the revenue court and the Older directing that the plaint be returned for presentation to proper court is fully justified. Where the plaintiff has not specifically asked for it declaration of title but merely an injunction but the prayer for injunction depends upon the declaration of the plaintiffs title to the property in dispute, the suit be said to involve such declaration which would be the substantive relief, and the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to grant the declaration relief, the suit would be triable by the Revenue court even though the Revenue Court cannot grant the ancillary relief of injunction". 40. Sri M. A. Qadeer, learned Advocate for respondents relied upon Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hirekurabar, reported in AIR 1968 SC 950 which laid down :- "A contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and interests in the matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character with reference to the former, the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable." 41. He further relied upon Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, reported in 1976 All WC 412 (FB). He further relied upon Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, reported in 1976 All WC 412 (FB). It appears that it was a suit brought for cancellation of a voidable sale deed relating to an agricultural plot and thus it was held that such a suit was not cognizable by revenue Court and could not abate under S. 5 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act after issue of notification under S. 4 of that Act. 42 It was further pointed out that no application was given by the petitioners in the Court for abatement of the aforesaid suit seeking the benefit of S. 5(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and so such relief, as sought by them in this petition No. 2795 of 1980 was not awardable. 43. Present suit is for cancellation of sale deed of agricultural holdings. The sale deed was alleged to be a sham transaction, Under such circumstances the suit is not cognizable by Civil Court as was held in Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya, reported in 1979 AII LJ 800 which posited : "In a plaint the plaintiff sought the cancellation of sale deed of agricultural plots on the ground that it was the result of fraud and misrepresentation played upon her by the defendants inasmuch as her thumb impressions were taken on blank papers for the purpose of obtaining ration card but were actually used for execution of sale deed and no consideration was given. These allegations clearly indicated that according to the plaintiff the sale deed was in fact a void document. Therefore, in order to obtain possession or cancellation of sale deed and to obtain declaration of her status as sirdar she has to sue in the revenue Court. The suit was not essentially for adjudging the sale deed void on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation but the character of the document itself was challenged. Therefore, Civil Courts would have no jurisdiction to try the suit for cancellation of sale deed." In Summary of Cases reported in 1981 All LR (SOC) No. 113 page 122: (1981 UPLT NOC 149), it was observed : "Where the allegation is that the document has been executed by impersonation, it would be clearly a case of a void document as it would be a case where the document was never executed. The suit, therefore, seeking cancellation of a void document would abate under S. 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The view to the contrary taken in the impugned orders is manifestly erroneous." 44. It is correct that the petitioners did not file a copy of the application under which they claimed abatement of these proceedings under S. 5 (4) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act nor such plea was raised in their written statement specifically but they put forward the plea that the suit was not cognizable by Civil Court and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue Court. It has been shown above that the allegations laid in the plaint were to the effect that the sale deed was a sham transaction and was void. It has further been shown that the relief has been deliberately couched in a language to confer jurisdiction on Civil Court as the plaintiffs failed to seek relief from the revenue Court. The plots being agricultural holdings and the transaction being alleged as void, the pith and substance of the plaint unmistakably led to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could not get any efficacious relief merely by seeking cancellation of the sale deed when they were out of possession for more than 13 years and claim was hopelessly barred by time. The main plaintiff Smt. Ratania was not party to the sale deed and could not have assailed the same except by assailing the character of the sale deed not merely as voidable but void. Under such circumstances, the findings recorded on preliminary issue no. 7 are liable to be quashed and are quashed accordingly. 45. (3) As regards Writ Petition No. 11814 of 1981, the ex parte decree drawn by learned Munsif on the basis of judgment d/ 8-4-1980 does not disclose as to how he got over the bar of limitation and res judicata and maintainability etc. It has been shown that in Article 59 of the Limitation Act such an action could have plain within three years of the execution of the document of the date of knowledge of plaintiff. That period of three years had expired long ago and bar of limitation under S. 3 of the Limitation Act (Act No. 36 of 1963) shall operate although limitation might not have been set up as a defence. That period of three years had expired long ago and bar of limitation under S. 3 of the Limitation Act (Act No. 36 of 1963) shall operate although limitation might not have been set up as a defence. The plaint was liable to rejection on that score under O. VII, R. 11 (d) of the C.P.C. 46. This ex parte judgment was drawn on 8-4-1980 when the case was not listed for hearing. Stay order had already been issued in that case by this Court on 28-3-1980. In their affidavits, applicant Bishambher Dayal and Subhakaran Singh s/o. Kedar Singh clerk of Sri Ram Swaroop Tiwari explained the circumstance under which the stay order of this Court-could not be filed on 8-4-1980. However, the application for setting aside ex parte decree was filed within time. Both the lower Courts did not go into the question as to whether the petitioners had sufficient ground for absence on 8-4-1980, they also did not go into the matter as to 'what was the effect of the stay order issued by this Court and whether it justified the setting aside of ex parte decree? 47. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed upon Ram Samujh v. State, AIR 1962 All 80 where it was observed (Para 5) : "A stay order should be deemed to take effect as soon as it is passed, quite irrespective of whether it is communicated or not. Injunctions, which are addressed to individual litigants, require to be communicated to the persons concerned before they can operate for it would obviously be unfair to expect a person to obey an order of which he is unaware. But stay orders are meant for the Court, not for the litigants, and no unfairness is involved in their being treated as immediately effective, without communication to the Court concerned. If the Court proceeds with the case in ignorance of the stay order, it will not render itself liable to any kind of penalty the only result will be that whatever proceedings are taken after the stay has been granted will be deemed to he without jurisdiction and a nullity." 48. If the Court proceeds with the case in ignorance of the stay order, it will not render itself liable to any kind of penalty the only result will be that whatever proceedings are taken after the stay has been granted will be deemed to he without jurisdiction and a nullity." 48. Sri M. A. Qadeer, learned Advocate for the respondents pointed out that the aforesaid authority is no longer binding in view of the Supreme Court decision reported in Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1386 which posited:- "Civil P. C. (1908), O.41, R. 5, O. 39, R. 1, Sections 24 and 151 - U.P. )Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947). S. 3 (1) - Order of stay with reference to execution proceedings - Order is as much prohibitory order as order of injunction except with difference that order of stay is addressed to Court while that of injunction is passed against party - Therefore, in case of stay order, as opposed to order of injunction, Court to which stay order is addressed does not lose jurisdiction to deal with execution unless it had knowledge of stay - Even after stay is brought to its notice, it had power to set aside proceedings taken between time when stay order was issued and time when it was brought to its notice, if it is asked to do so and it considers that it is necessary in interest of justice that interim proceedings should be set aside - Where - no steps are taken to set them aside, they remain good." 49. However, the aforesaid authority also lays down that such stay order was a good ground for setting aside the steps taken between time when stay order was issued and time when it was brought to the notice of the Court. In view of this authority, the ex parte decree cannot be permitted to stand and is liable to be set aside. 50. Thus, in view of what has gone above, the impugned orders contained in Annexures 6 and 5 of Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980 and orders dated 22-9-1980 and 18-8-1981 (Annexures 10 and 11) and ex parte decree dated 8-4-1980 (Annexure 6) of Writ Petition No. 11814 of 1981, are quashed. 50. Thus, in view of what has gone above, the impugned orders contained in Annexures 6 and 5 of Writ Petition No. 2795 of 1980 and orders dated 22-9-1980 and 18-8-1981 (Annexures 10 and 11) and ex parte decree dated 8-4-1980 (Annexure 6) of Writ Petition No. 11814 of 1981, are quashed. It is further held that suit No. 235 of 1978 is simply an abuse of the process of court and must fall through and all its proceedings are quashed herewith. Having regard to the fact that the main plaintiff Smt. Ratania is a lady of backward caste, I make no order as to costs. Thus, both the petitions are allowed.