Gurcharan Singh v. City Magistrate — 1982 DIGILAW 1296 (ALL)

JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. 1. These two applications under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 arise out of one proceeding under section 145 CrPC pending before the City Magistrate Dehradun. The proceeding under section 145 CrPC relates to a residential building, its garage and out houses called annexure No. 12, Pritam Road, police station Dalanwala, Dehradun. 2. In Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 810 of 1982, there is an application dated 22-4-1982 moved toy Gur Charan Singh for the release of movables. This application has also to be disposed of. To appreciate the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to set out facts at length. Gur Charan Singh will hereinafter be called the applicant. Birender Pal Singh will hereinafter be called the opposite party. 3. Pedigree of the family of Birender Pal Singh which is undisputed is given below : Kripal Singh Jagjit Singh Kartar singh Jaswant Singh Smt. Parsin (died in 1943) Kaur Birendra Pal =Smt. Harendra Kaur Singh (died in 1965) (O.P.) Smt. Bharpoor Kaur 4. It is undisputed that Smt. Harendra Kaur was the absolute owner of the premises no. 12, Pritam Road Smt. Bharpoor Kaur wife of the Opposite Party was living in these premises along with Smt. Harendra Kaur. On the death of Smt. Harendra Kaur, the premises devolved upon Jagjit Singh, Kartar Singh and Smt. Parsin Kaur. These heirs wanted to oust Smt. Bharpoor Kaur. Consequently Smt. Bharpoor Kaur moved an application for allotment of the premises and by order dated 22-6-1972, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the premises in her name Jagjit Singh and others filed an appeal before the District Judge against the order of allotment. Their appeal was dismissed on 4-3-1975. Jagjit Singh and others then field writ petition no. 7050 or (7051) of 1978 in the High Court. As Smt. Bharpoor Kaur was living in the premises from before the death of Smt. Harendra Kaur there was no vacancy on the date of allotment order. In view of this the writ petition was allowed on 28-8-1978 (or 28-2-78) and the order of allotment in favour of Smt. Bharpoor Kaur was set aside. Smt. Bharpoor Kaur then filed civil suit no. 369 of 1978 for injunction against Jagjit Singh and others in the court of the Civil Judge, Dehradun. In view of this the writ petition was allowed on 28-8-1978 (or 28-2-78) and the order of allotment in favour of Smt. Bharpoor Kaur was set aside. Smt. Bharpoor Kaur then filed civil suit no. 369 of 1978 for injunction against Jagjit Singh and others in the court of the Civil Judge, Dehradun. A Commissioner was appointed in this case to find out as to which person was in actual occupation of the premises. The Commissioner submitted his report on 27-10-1978 that; Smt. Bharpoor Kaur and the opposite party were in actual occupation of the premises. Consequently an ad interim injunction was passed by the Civil Judge in favour of Smt, Bharpoor Kaur. This order was later on vacated. Jagjit Singh and others filed suit no. 331 of 1979 for recovery of possession and mesne profits against the opposite party and his wife in the court of Civil Judge, Dehradun. 5. The opposite party is Labour Welfare Officer in Sugar Mills, Laksar. The opposite party keeps his motor can (Studebaker) in the garage of the premises in dispute at Dehradun. 6. On 25-8-1981 the applicant fifed civil suit no. 156 of 1981 in the court of Munsif Dehradun for permanent injunction against the opposite party, Jagjit Singh, Kartar Singh and Smt. Parsin Kaur with the allegation that he is living in the premises since 1-1-1976 and that he has been regularly paying rent of Rs. 175/- p. m. to the opposite party, that along with the house some articles of old furniture were also let out to him, that the opposite party was intending to sell the premises and as such threatened to vacate him by force. The applicant moved an application for ad interim injunction. ON 2-9-1981 the Munsif passed temporary injunction order restraining all the defendants from interfering and disturbing the possession of the applicant over the suit property until further orders. Before issuing this order notice of the application for temporary injunction was served by a Commissioner upon the opposite party. The Commissioner reported that the opposite party refused to take the notice. It is not clear from the order of the Munsif as to why the Commissioner did not effect service of the notice upon the other 3 persons impleaded as defendants. The Commissioner reported that the opposite party refused to take the notice. It is not clear from the order of the Munsif as to why the Commissioner did not effect service of the notice upon the other 3 persons impleaded as defendants. ON 4-9-1981 the opposite party made an application to the Superintendent of Police Dehradun saying that on and off he used to go to Dehradun and stay in the premises in dispute that for the last time he came on 22-8-1981 and stayed in the premises for 2 days, that thereafter he went away locking the premises as well as his car in the garage, that he came to Dehradun on 4-9-1981 and found the applicant in possession of the premises, that he asked the applicant about his goods, that the applicant not only refused to handover his goods but also threatened him, that he wanted to take out his motor car but the applicant took out a revolver and asked him to leave the premises atonce otherwise he would shoot him and that this incident gave rise to serious apprehension of breach of peace. On 11-9-1981 the applicant made an application to the District Magistrate Dehradun anticipating that on the application of the opposite party the Magistrate would commence proceedings under section 145 CrPC. In this application he made reference to his civil suit no. 156 of 1981 and also the order of temporary injunction dated 2-9-1981. On the basis of the application of the opposite party dated 4-9-1981 a case under section 380 etc. IPC was registered at police station Dalanwala. The police then went into action. The application of the applicant was sent bo the City Magistrate, Dehradun. By order dated 18-9-1981 the City Magistrate called upon the applicant to provide court fee stamp on the application. 7. On 15-9-1981 the opposite party made an application under section 145 CrPC before the City Magistrate reiterating his allegations made in his application to the Superintendent of Police and further alleging that he came to know that the applicant had taken forcible possession on 29-8-1981 by breaking open his locks. The City Magistrate called for a report from the police. The Station Officer, police station Dalanwala submitted his report on 18-9-1981. The City Magistrate called for a report from the police. The Station Officer, police station Dalanwala submitted his report on 18-9-1981. In this report it was stated that there was dispute between the parties in respect of the possession of Kothi, that the opposite party was adamant to take possession and ass such there is an imminent apprehension of breach of peace. The Station Officer suggested that the premises should be attached. ON 19-9-1981 the City Mlgistrate passed preliminary order under section 145 (1) CrPC. In this order the Magistrate clearly stated that he was satisfied with the report of the Station Officer, Dalanwala, that there was TANAV between the parties in respect of the possession of building no. 12, Prltam Road. The parties were called upon to file the written statements by 28-9-1981. ON 30-9-1981 the applicant filed an application under section 482 CrPC for quashing the preliminary order. But at the time of the admission of the application the applicant did not press the application. It was accordingly rejected (Vide no. 5920 of 1981). The opposite party came to know of the ex parte ad interim order passed by the Munsif on 5-9-1981. Then he filed objection. By order dated 1-10-1981 the Munsif vacated the order of injunction. The Munsif found that! the applicant could not show that he was in possession of the premises as tenant of the opposite party from 1-1-1976. He of course observed that the applicant was in occupation of the premises on the date of the order i. e.1-10-1981. He further observed that the applicant had not filed amy paper to show his possession prior to the year 1980. Suffice it to say a this stage that the Munsif did not find that the applicant was in actual possession of the premises since the year 1980. The applicant went in appeal to the District Judge, Dehradun. His Appeal no. 162 of 1981 was dismissed on 4-3-1982. The District Judge did not find that the applicant was in possession of the premises since the year 1980. He found that the documentary evidence prima facie revealed that the applicant was in possession of the disputed house on the date of the suit and that his possession was prima facia that of a trespasser. The District Judge then observed that illegal entry could not be legalised through discretionary measure of temporary injunction. He found that the documentary evidence prima facie revealed that the applicant was in possession of the disputed house on the date of the suit and that his possession was prima facia that of a trespasser. The District Judge then observed that illegal entry could not be legalised through discretionary measure of temporary injunction. According to the opposite party his wife Smt. Bharpoor Kaur went in early March 1981 to the place of their daughter Smt. Darshan Kaur who was going to deliver a child, that Smt. Darshan Kaur gave birth to a son in the last days of March, 1981 and that Smt. Bharpoor Kaur continued to stay there to look after the baby. 8. On 30-10-1981 the applicant filed written statement in the case under section 145 CrPC. It appears that the opposite party had filed written statement earlier. On 1-2-1982, the opposite party moved an application to the City Magistrate for attaching the property (copy annexure 4 to the affidavit of the applicant in Misc. Application No. 810 of 1982). In this application the opposite party stated that the case under section 145 was fixed for evidence on 2-2-1982, that therefore he came to the court to contact his counsel at about 2 P. M. (on 1-2-1982), that Gur Charan Singh met him and threatened him to kill him if he appeared for giving evidence, that Gur Charan Singh always used to threaten him to kill him, that the applicant had entered unlawfully in the property in dispute, that the applicant was arrested by the police and arms were recovered from his possession and that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace at 12 Prltam Road. The City Magistrate called upon the police to report. On getting the report of the Station Officer, the City Magistrate passed order for attachment of the premises under section 146 (i) (copy annexure 5). In this order the Magistrate stated that he was satisfied with the report of the Station Officer that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace in respect of possession of the premises 12, Pritam Road and that, therefore, the Station Officer, police station Dalanwala should attach the premises and give them in the custody of an independent person. On 3-2-1982 the police reached at the premises and attached the main building. On 3-2-1982 the police reached at the premises and attached the main building. The movables found in the house detailed in the report were kept in 3 locked looms which were sealed, as no independent person was willing to take the main building into (?) were deputed. In the meantime the applicant filed a revision before the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge passed an order of stay at about 4.30 P. M. The applicant's grievance is that even then the police officers continued the proceedings of attachment upto 7.10 F'. M. Later on, on 9-2-1982 the applicant got his revision dismissed by the Sessions Judge as not pressed. 9. On 10-2-1982 the applicant filed Misc. Case No. 810 of 1982 praying that the order of attachment dated 2-2-1982 be quashed and the attached goods (correctly speaking the goods of the applicant kept in sealed locked 3 rooms by the police) be released. ON the same day the Court (Hon'ble J. M. L. S., J.) passed order ; "Admit. Issue notice and call for a report from the court concerned in regard to paras 5,6, 7 and 9 of the application. Learned counsel for the applicant urged before me that pending disposal of this petition the movables inside the house attached by the Magistrate may be released. The petitioner shall move an application for that purpose before the Magistrate and the Magistrate himself shall dispose of the application after hearing both the parties within one week from the date of filing such application. If the petitioner feels aggrieved against the order to be passed by the Magistrate, it will be open to the petitioner to apply for an interim order, before this Court......... 10. This application was dismissed in default on 25-2-1981. THIS order of dismissal later on was vacated. The applicant then moved the City Magistrate on 12-2-1982. It is now undisputed that 7 articles only were returned to the applicant and the remaining articles have not yet been returned to the applicant. On 20-2-1982 the Judicial Magistrate passed an order on the application of the opposite party to get the movable indentified in theft case. On 24-2-1982 the applicant moved an application for setting aside the order dated 20-2-1982. The Judicial Magistrate vacated the order dated 20-2-1982 on 1-3-1982 because the movables were neither attached nor taken into custody by the police in connection with the theft case. On 24-2-1982 the applicant moved an application for setting aside the order dated 20-2-1982. The Judicial Magistrate vacated the order dated 20-2-1982 on 1-3-1982 because the movables were neither attached nor taken into custody by the police in connection with the theft case. On 8-4-1982 the City Magistrate passed order that in respect of the articles which had not been released there was dispute between the parties and that, therefore, the parties should give their proof in respect of their title. He further directed that the disputed premises be given in the custody of an independent person as desired by the parties. On 9-4-1982 the City Magistrate passed another order saying that the entire premises, 12 Pritam Road had been attached by the police on 3-2-1982 and that, therefore, the police should make full compliance of the order of attachment. Suffice it to say that on 3-2-1982 the police had attached the main building and had not attached its outhouses. Therefore, the City Magistrate passed the order dated 9-4-1982. On 22-4-1982 the applicant moved an application in this Court for the return of his remaining articles. 11. Reference may here be made to paras 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the application no. 810 of 1982. In para 5 the applicant alleged that he is a friend of the editor of local daily newspaper "Yamuna Kinara", that previously he himself was its editor, that at the instance of the applicant a news item was published in the said newspaper on 23-1-1982 exposing the high-handedness and arbitrariness of the City Magistrate. In para 6 it was stated that the City Magistrate got enraged by the news item and therefore he determined to victimise and harasss the applicant. In para 7 it was stated that the City Magistrate and the opposite party in collusion with each other fabricated some police report on the basis of which the order of attachment dated 2-2-1982 was passed, that copy of the application dated 1-2-1982 moved by the opposite party was not served upon him or his counsel, that there is no mention in the ordersheet of (toe file of such an application and that therefore the entire proceedings culminating in the order of attachment are fictitious, fabricated and collusive. In para 9 it was simply stated that the entire proceedings and the order of attachment are malafide, collusive and without jurisdiction because the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of section 145 were not complied with. 12. In compliance with the Court's order dated 10-2-1982, the City Magistrate sent his report in respect of paras 5, 6, 7 and 9 on 18-3-1982. He completely denied the allegations made by the applicant to the effect that the order of attachment was malafide and collusive. He asserted that the action taken by him which was published in "Yamuna Kinara" was in compliance with the orders of the District Magistrate, that he had no knowledge that applicant Gur Charan Singh bad got the news item published, that at the time he passed order of attachment both the parties were present before him, that the police had reported that the opposite party wanted to take possession of the premises at all costs and that Gur Charan Singh was not prepared to leave it at any cost, that applicant Gur Charan Singh had signed on the record on 2-2-1982, that on account of lapse of office, orders were not written out on the ordersheet on 1-2-1982 and 2-2-1982. On 13-5-1982 the applicant filed Misc. Application no. 2807 of 1982 for qaushing the preliminary order dated 19-9-1981. 13. Parties have filed counter affidavits and rejoinder affidavits in both the cases. 14. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. It will be appropriate to dispose of Misc. Application no. 2807 of 1982 first. By means of this application the applicant prays that the preliminary order dated 19-9-1981 be quashed. Sri A. D. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the applicant has emphatically urged that the Magistrate was not competent and should not have passed preliminary order in the teeth of the ad interim injunction order passed by the Munsif of 2-9-1981 in civil suit no. 156 of 1981 specially when the ad interim order was passed after notice to the opposite party and the ad interim order was quite specific restraining the opposite party and other from interfering/disturbing with the possession of the applicant of the premises in dispute. Sri A. D. Prabhakar in this connection also urged that the order of temporary injunction was known to the City Magistrate from before the passing of the preliminary order. Sri A. D. Prabhakar in this connection also urged that the order of temporary injunction was known to the City Magistrate from before the passing of the preliminary order. The Magistrate had at-least come to know of it one day before i.e., 18-9-1981 because on that day he called upon the applicant to provide court fee stamps on his application submitted to the District Magistrate on 11-9-3981. The opposite parties, learned counsel contended that in the circumstances of the case the Magistrate could pass a preliminary order and it was not correct to say that the Magistrate was not competent to pass the preliminary order in the face of the ad interim order. 15. It has been pointed out that the notice of the application for temporary injunction was served by the Commissioner upon the opposite party. The Commissioner reported that the opposite party refused to take notice. The opposite party then moved the Munsif for vacating the stay order saying that the notice was not served upon him and that he came to know of the order of temporary injunction on 5-9-1981. He asserted that the ad-interim order had been obtained on false allegations. It is thus evident that the notice of the temporary injunction application was not served upon the opposite party. Therefore it is not correct to say that the ad interim order was passed after notice ' was actually served upon the opposite party. 16. The ad interim order was vacated by the Munslf on 1-10-1981. His order was confirmed in appeal preferred by the applicant by the District Judge on 4-3-1982. Both these courts held that the applicant had filed suit with wrong allegations that he came in possession of the premises as tenant of the opposite party in January, 1976. Sri A. D. Prabhakar pointed out that the Munsif found that the applicant was in possession from the year 1980. This contention is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Munslf has not recorded finding in his order dated 1-10-1981 that the applicant was not in possession of the premises from the year 1980. He has simply observed that the papers filed by the applicant did not show his possession prior to 1980. In other words the Munslf held that the applicant, according to his own papers, was wholly unable to show that he was in occupation since the year 1976. He has simply observed that the papers filed by the applicant did not show his possession prior to 1980. In other words the Munslf held that the applicant, according to his own papers, was wholly unable to show that he was in occupation since the year 1976. The District Judge did not find that the applicant was in possession since the year 1980. The order of the District Judge does not show that it was pressed on behalf of the applicant before him that in any case the applicant was in actual possession since the year 1980. The District Judge clearly held that the applicant was a trespasser. Parties' counsel have referred to various earlier decisions. Before dealing with those cases, it is appropriate to reproduce section 145 (l)CrPC. This clause reads; "145(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned In such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the facts of actual possession of the subject of dispute." It is evident from the above that before making an order under this clause, it is necessary that the Magistrate should be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. The Magistrate can have satisfaction either from a report of police officer or from any other Information. It means that the Magistrate can feel satisfied by an application of an aggrieved person or by a police report or both. The essential ingredient of this provision is that the satisfaction of the Magistrate should be that there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. This satisfaction of the Magistrate is a subjective one and is based on the information which he receives either through police or through an aggrieved person. 17. It may be indicated here that this provision is quite distinct from the provision contained in section 144 CrPC. 18. This satisfaction of the Magistrate is a subjective one and is based on the information which he receives either through police or through an aggrieved person. 17. It may be indicated here that this provision is quite distinct from the provision contained in section 144 CrPC. 18. Sri A. D. Prabhakar has referred to the case of Faqir Chand Sultani Ram v. Bhana Ram Mansa Earn, AIR 1957 Punjab 303. The relevant observations in this case read : "The intention of the provision is to provide a speedy remedy for the prevention of a breach of the peace arising out of dispute in respect of immovable property. Before making a preliminary order, the enquiry, which is contemplated may not be detailed. The enquiry contemplated is for purposes of satisfaction of the Magistrate, which may he either from a police report or other information suggesting the necessity for taking action. The purpose of section 145 and allied provisions is to prevent the immediately apprehended breach of the peace............Once there is Information placed before the Magistrate, the High Court would not go into the sufficiency of the information for purposes of the satisfaction of the Magistrate........................satisfaction for purposes of judicial determination must depend on sufficiency of facts placed before the Magistrate. No doubt the satisfaction is to be of the Magistrate resting on the discretion vested in him, but such discretion is not arbitrary and must be a sound judicial discretion and which should be regulated according to known rules of law..................Before passing the initiatory order and in order to confer jurisdiction there should be sufficient material justifying apprehension of a breach of the peace, which was the sole purpose before the mind of the Legislature. The intention underlying the procedure prescribed under this section is prevention of a breach of the peace." On the other side the learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the case of R. H. Bhutani v. Miss Marti J. Desai, 1968 AWR 59. The relevant observation in this case reads as follows :- "The satisfaction under sub-section (1) is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not, is, therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. The relevant observation in this case reads as follows :- "The satisfaction under sub-section (1) is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not, is, therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt, has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rule can, therefore be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his satisfaction. The language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or "from other information" which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate." 19. It is obvious from the above 2 cases that on the material before him the Magistrate has to feel satisfied that a dispute likely to cause apprehension of a breach of the peace exists. If he feels satisfied, he is within his jurisdiction in passing the order contemplated by clause (1) of section 145. 20. Sri A. D. Prabhakar has in support of his contention that the Magistrate, in the instant case, should not have passed preliminary order in face of the ad interim injunction order passed by the Munsif, referred to the following cases :- (1) Usharani Bej v. Mongol Munda, 1970 Vol. II CrLJ 1298 Calcutta. In this case the proceeding was initiated under section 144 CrPC. Lateron the proceeding was converted into one under section 145 CrPC. The preliminary order was passed on a report in a previous enquiry and the orders made in 2 previous cases. In one of the orders there was no mention of a breach of the peace. The order related to harvesting of crop. In previous proceedings under section 144 CrPC there were two injunctions restraining the petitioners from interfering with the possession of the opposite party. The Court deprecated the proceeding under section 144. The Court further held that an order under section 144 cannot be made basis of the order under section 145. The dispute related to the share of the paddy of the land and not the land. Therefore, section 145 was not applicable. The Court deprecated the proceeding under section 144. The Court further held that an order under section 144 cannot be made basis of the order under section 145. The dispute related to the share of the paddy of the land and not the land. Therefore, section 145 was not applicable. The Court further held that as a civil suit was pending in which ad interim injunction order restraining the opposite parties from interfering with the petitioner's possession had been issued the Magistrate should not have proceeded under section 145. (2) Puran Singh v. Labhu Ram, 1976, CrLJ 571 H. P. There were two cross civil suits pending between the parties. Both parties obtained temporary injunction order against each other. It was held that because of the temporary injunctions issued against both the parties there was no fear of a breach of the peace and as such the Magistrate was not justified in proceeding under section 145 CrPC. The relevant observation reads as follows :- " The other point urged by the learned counsel for Puran Singh and others is that two civil suits inter-parties are pending. These seem to be cross suits and the questions of title and possession are the subject matter of dispute. Temporary injunctions, admittedly, have been obtained by the respective parties That being the position, either party is restrained from usurping possession and in such a situation it would hardly be necessary to invoke assistance of Section 145. It has to be understood that the essence behind a proceeding under Section 145 is the fear of breach of peace which is likely to result when one party attempts to dispossess the other. If the Civil Court is seized of the matter and temporary injunctions have been obtained, there is hardly any necessity for duplication of proceeding before the Criminal Court. If the Civil Court is seized of the matter and temporary injunctions have been obtained, there is hardly any necessity for duplication of proceeding before the Criminal Court. " (3) Sri Karori Mal v. Virendra Singh, 1964 AWR HC 46 : The relevant observation in this case reads as follows:- " In case the Munsif had taken cognizance of the civil suit before the Magistrate was moved or the Munsif had passed the interim injunction before the Magistrate took cognizance under section 145 CrPC it would be proper for the Magistrate to drop the proceeding under section 145 CrPC of course, with regard to the property in dispute in the civil suit, and to take action under section 107/117 CrPC against the party disregarding the Munsif's order. Matters in controversy shall be finally decided by the civil court and not by the Magistrate and where the civil court has already passed an order, it is necessary for the Magistrate to respect that order." (4) Multani v. Shah 'Abdu Turab Qadari, 1962 Vol. II CrLJ 709, Mysore : The relevant observations in this case read as follows:- ".........so in this case also one of the parties had already gone to the civil court with a suit for perpetual injunction and obtained an order of interim injunction. The injunction was also not one made ex parte but had been made absolute after notice to the defendant. Although it is stated that on an appeal preferred to the District Court the injunction granted by the trial court had been stayed or its operation suspended, such a stay does not amount to setting aside the finding of the trial court on the question of possession.........There is therefore in this case a decision of a Civil Court which the Magistrate is expected to respect and sustain without prejudice no doubt to his duty of preserving public peace. " (5) Mst. Hosnaki v. State, 1955 AWR 654 (DB) :The relevant observations in this case are reproduced below : " For a Magistrate to have jurisdiction to proceed under section 145, there must exist a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. " (5) Mst. Hosnaki v. State, 1955 AWR 654 (DB) :The relevant observations in this case are reproduced below : " For a Magistrate to have jurisdiction to proceed under section 145, there must exist a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. He is only concerned with the existence of a dispute, he is not concerned at all with the question how it arose, which party is on the aggressive or unreasonable, whether the dispute had been decided remotely or even recently by a Court of competent jurisdiction or whether an alternative remedy is open to the party that seeks his assistance. The law had not made his assumption of jurisdiction dependent on any of those matters. The use of the word " shall " in sub-section (1) makes it obligatory upon him to assume jurisdiction on being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. Neither is any other fact require to exist before he can assume jurisdiction nor is his jurisdiction barred by the existence of any fact. Every one does not submit himself to decision on title of a competent; Court and there are people who are prepared to take the law in their, own hands and disturb the public tranquility even though their rights have been negatived by a competent Court, Therefore a dispute like the one mentioned in sub-section (1) can exist not with standing a decision, howsoever recent, of a competent Court, if it does exist, the Magistrate has no option but to take cognizance of it and proceed under section 145. " The above observations clearly indicate 3 principles of law- (i) If there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to proceed under section 145. The Magistrate is concerned only with the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace. (ii) The Magistrate is not concerned whether the dispute has been decided remotely or recently by a competent Court, and (iii) Every person does not abide by the decision of a'1 competent Court on title. He is prepared to take the law into his own hands and disturb the public tranquility. Therefore a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace can exist notwithstanding a decision howsoever recent, of a competent Court. 21. He is prepared to take the law into his own hands and disturb the public tranquility. Therefore a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace can exist notwithstanding a decision howsoever recent, of a competent Court. 21. ON the other side the learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the case of Kalap Din v. State, 1970 AWR 410 (DB). The Court disposed of two criminal references and 3 revisions. Two points were involved for decision (i) Whether proceeding under section 145 CrPC can be initiated or continued when a civil salt between the same parties and relating to the same property is pending in a. court of competent jurisdiction, and (ii) When the rights relating to he property forming the subject matter of the proceedings under section 145 CrPC' have been adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction, whether the decision of that court is binding on the Magistrate and should the Magistrate drop the proceedings to give effect to that decision or he should proceed to conclude the proceedings under, section 145. 22. The court not only considered' the decisions in the cases of Karori Mal and Hosnaki (supra) but also cases decided by the other High Courts including the case of Chairman Municipal Board Bhadra v. State, ILR 1961 (11 Rajasthan), 1180. The following observation in the case of Chairman, Municipal Board, Bhadra, was reproduced :- "The next ground on which the Additional Sessions Judge has made the reference is that the Munsif Magistrate, Bhadra having already passed an injunction order in favour of the Mahila Kendra in a civil suit instituted for the purpose and having directed removal of wooden stalls from the Chabutras the "Magistrate should lave dismissed the application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Judge appears to ignore the fact that inspite of order of the civil court, there could still be an apprehension of breach of the peace. In such a case it is the duty of the Magistrate to take preventive action under section 145 of the Code, and then if necessary to proceed against the party seeking to disturb lawful possession and commit breach of the peace under section 107 of the Code ". In such a case it is the duty of the Magistrate to take preventive action under section 145 of the Code, and then if necessary to proceed against the party seeking to disturb lawful possession and commit breach of the peace under section 107 of the Code ". The Court then held that if a Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute relating to immovable property giving rise to apprehension of a breach of the peace exists he can take action under section 145 CrPC even when a civil suit relating to the same property and between the same parties is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction, that the decision of a civil Court does not oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under section 145 CrPC that such a decision is not binding on the Magistrate and that it is necessary for the Magistrate to conclude the proceedings under section 145 CrPC in accordance with the procedure contained therein and that the judgment of the civil or revenue court if produced before him should be considered by him only as an evidence in the case. 23. At the time the civil court passes an interim injunction order in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff, the civil court assumes that the allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint are correct and the plaintiff prima facie is In actual possession of the property. In other words by passing ad interim injunction, the civil court finds or declares the plaintiff to be in possession. In the instant case the Munsif undisputedly vacated the ad interim injunction. the applicant went up in appeal and the District Judge dismissed the appeal. Both the courts clearly found that the applicant had filed civil suit with wholly incorrect allegations. In other words the applicant had not sought the help of the competent civil court by making correct allegations. The District Judge clearly held that the applicant was a trespasser. Sri A. D. Prabhakar urged that the events/facts subsequent to the passing of the preliminary order cannot be taken into consideration. By this he means to say that this Court could not uphold the preliminary order on the ground that the ad interim injunction order had been vacated after the passing of the preliminary order. Sri A. D. Prabhakar urged that the events/facts subsequent to the passing of the preliminary order cannot be taken into consideration. By this he means to say that this Court could not uphold the preliminary order on the ground that the ad interim injunction order had been vacated after the passing of the preliminary order. He referred to the case of Ali Bagban v. Ghulam Mohiuddin, AIR 1965 Jammu and Kashmir 69. In this case the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1). He passed order for the attachment of the subject of dispute also. Parties evidence was recorded. The Sessions Judge recommended to the High Court that the entire proceedings be quashed. In his order the Sessions Judge made reference to some execution file and other probabilities of the case. The Court observed: "The reference shall succeed or fail only if the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate is either vacated or upheld. The events subsequent to the preliminary order of 14-1-1963 cannot be taken into consideration in disposing of this reference." 24. On the otherside the learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to the case of Ram Charan Das v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1975 Alld. 280. It was a case of ejectment under the provisions of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The District Magistrate had allowed the plaintiff landlord to eject the defendant. The defendant filed a revision before the Commissioner and the Commissioner stayed the order. Thereafter the plaintiff filed civil suit. Later on the Commissioner dismissed the revision. Representation by the defendant to the State Government failed. The suit filed during the period of stay was held good. The' Court observed :- "In the instant case the Commissioner as well as the State Government having upheld the permission during the proceedings of the suit, a valid permission was in existence at the time the decree for ejectment was passed. The stay order merged in the final order passed in the revision and became non-est". It means that the subsequent order dismissing the revision could be taken into consideration and no effect could be given to the stay order. The opposite party's counsel urged that where an order of temporary injunction was vacated, it meant that the order never existed. 25. The applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. It means that the subsequent order dismissing the revision could be taken into consideration and no effect could be given to the stay order. The opposite party's counsel urged that where an order of temporary injunction was vacated, it meant that the order never existed. 25. The applicant has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. This Court is not hearing an appeal or revision against the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate under section 482 CrPC the Court can interfere in 3 conditions- (i) to give effect to any order under this Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, and (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is evident that the first 2 conditions in the instant case are not applicable. This Court can only interfere if It considers necessary to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case it is patently clear that the opposite party's wife Smt. Bharpoor Kaur was living in the disputed house. Jagjit Singh and others were trying to dispossess her. Two suits undisputedly nos.369 of 1978 and 331 of 1979 were pending between them. Therefore, it is not easily conceivable that the opposite party would have allowed the applicant to come in possession of the entire premises. On the very face the applicant approached the civil court with a patently false allegation that he was in occupation of the premises since January, 1976. It means that he obtained ad Interim injunction on deliberately making false allegations in the plaint. Moreover, the applicant who is a lawyer made the Commissioner to give wrong report that the notice of temporary injunction application was refused by the opposite party. The order of temporary injunction was passed on 2-9-1981. Just 2 days later (on 4-9-1981) the opposite party came to the premises and found the applicant in illegal possession. On the same day he gave an application to the Superintendent of Police in which he stated that the applicant threatened him and took out revolver and asked him to leave the premises otherwise he would be slot dead. The applicant did not even allow the opposite party to take out his motor car. This application gave rise to a criminal case under section 380 IPC against the applicant. Then on 15-9-1981 the opposite party rnoved application under section 145 CrPC before the City Magistrate. The applicant did not even allow the opposite party to take out his motor car. This application gave rise to a criminal case under section 380 IPC against the applicant. Then on 15-9-1981 the opposite party rnoved application under section 145 CrPC before the City Magistrate. In this application he clearly stated that he was in occupation of the house, that for the last time he left the premises locked on 24-8-1981, that when he came to the premises on 4-9-1981, he found the applicant in Illegal possession, that the applicant threatened him, that he did not allow him to take away his car and took out a revolver, that the applicant had taken forcible possession of the premises by breaking open his locks and removing his goods and that in the circumstances, there was serious apprehension of a breach of the peace. The allegations of the opposite party were supported by the police. The Magistrate felt satisfied by the allegations of the opposite party and the police. These allegations were sufficient to rebut the presumption of possession on the basis of the alleged order of temporary injunction. There is no absolute rule that the Magistrate has to follow the order passed by a civil court blindly. The Magistrate has to exercise his discretion and if he is satisfied that there is apprehension of a breach of the peace, he is well within his jurisdiction to pass a preliminary order under section 145 (1). The observations made by this Court in the case of Mst. Hosnaki (supra) and the observations made by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Chairman, Municipal Board, Bhadra (supra) make it abundantly clear that the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion on the facts of each case. An order of injunction passed by the civil court does not necessarily take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. At the most, the Magistrate has to respect it. If the Magistrate finds that there is a dispute between the parties which is likely to cause a breach of the peace, he is well justified in passing the preliminary order. 26. Leaving aside what has been stated above, there is one glaring fact which needs mention. Copy of tie plaint of civil suit no. If the Magistrate finds that there is a dispute between the parties which is likely to cause a breach of the peace, he is well justified in passing the preliminary order. 26. Leaving aside what has been stated above, there is one glaring fact which needs mention. Copy of tie plaint of civil suit no. 156 of 1981 filed by the applicant shows that the cause of action for the suit arose on 22nd and 23rd of August, 1981, when the defendants (opposite party, Jagjit Singh, Kartar Singh and Smt. Parsin Kaur) and their hired agents attempted to take possession of the premises This cause of action in my opinion is incorrect and imaginary. Firstly, because there were cross civil suits between the opposite party and his wife Bharpoor Kaur on one side and Jagjit Singh, Kartar Singh and Smt. Parsin Kaur on the other side. Therefore it is not easily believable that all the defendants would have joined together in ousting the applicant. Secondly, the opposite party clearly alleged in his application dated 4-9-1981 that he stayed in the premises on 22nd 23rd August, 1981, that he went away on 24-8-1981 after locking the premises as well as his car in the garage, that thereafter he came to the premises on 4-9-1981 and found the applicant in illegal possession of the premises. The opposite party was then threatened and he was not even allowed to take away his motor car. In the application under section 145 CrPC filed on 5-9-1981, the opposite party reiterated the said allegations. These facts clearly show that the applicant came in illegal possession of the premises at any time between 24-8-1981 and 4-9-1981. The order of temporary injunction was issued on 2-9-1981. The cause of action for the proceeding under section 145 arose on 4-9-1981 because of the conduct of the parties. It is thus patent that the reason for initiating proceedings under section 145 arose about 2 days subsequent to the passing of the ad interim injunction. In case, after the issue of ad interim injunction the parties show such conduct as it became necessary for the Magistrate to proceed under section 145 CrPC, I am of the opinion that the Magistrate would be well justified in proceeding under section 145. In case, after the issue of ad interim injunction the parties show such conduct as it became necessary for the Magistrate to proceed under section 145 CrPC, I am of the opinion that the Magistrate would be well justified in proceeding under section 145. Precisely speaking it is the conduct of the parties, which is likely to cause breach of the peace, is the foundation of an order under section 145 (1). Taking into account the allegations of the opposite party in his application dated 15-9-1981, the i Magistrate could in the facts of the order of the temporary injunction dated 2-9-1981, initiate proceeding under section 145 (1) by making an order thereunder. 27. Taking into consideration all that has been discussed above, I am of the opinion that the interest of justice do not require that this Court should interfere with the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate and as such the preliminary order dated 19-9-1981 cannot be quashed. 28. SRI A. D. Prabhakar then raised a technical objection that the Magistrate did not state in his preliminary order that there was danger of breach of peace, that he simply stated there was "Tanao" between the parties, that the word 'Tanao' meant tension and that, therefore, the preliminary order was bad in law. The opposite party's counsel contended that the Magistrate clearly said in his order that he was satisfied with the report of the police and that as such there should be equiry under section 145, that in the police report dated 18-9-1981, it was clearly stated that there was apprehension of breach of peace and that the order of the Magistrate should be read along with the police report. On a consideration of the entire material which has been discussed above, I am of the opinion that the; contention of the applicant's counsel is too technical to be accepted and that there is considerable force in the contention of the opposite party's counsel. Hence, on the technical point raised the preliminary order could not be held illegal. 29. CRIMINAL Misc. Application No. 810 of 1982 may now be taken up. The order of attachment was passed by the Magistrate on 2-2-1982 under section 146 (1) CrPC. Hence, on the technical point raised the preliminary order could not be held illegal. 29. CRIMINAL Misc. Application No. 810 of 1982 may now be taken up. The order of attachment was passed by the Magistrate on 2-2-1982 under section 146 (1) CrPC. This section lays down that if the Magistrate at any time after the making of the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court had determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. In the present case the Magistrate has not attached the premises in dispute under the last two contingencies and that he has passed order of attachment under the first contingency viz., the case is one of emergency. 30. Word 'emergency' literally means, "pressing necessity". Why this power of attachment has been given to the Magistrate may be briefly indicated. The object of attachment is to keep the property in castodia legis so as to prevent the disputants from causing a breach of the peace while attempting to obtain actual possession of the property. In other words the attachment is made with a view to prevent; breach of the peace. The order of attachment can be made only after a preliminary order under sub-section (I) of section 145 has been made. It means that the order under section 145 (1) alone is not sufficient to prevent breach of the peace. In the present case the opposite party made no prayer for attachment of the premises in his original application dated 15-9-1981. In this application the opposite party simply prayed that the proceedings under section 143 be taken. The police in its report dated 18-9-1981 suggested to the Magistrate that the premises be attached. It appears that as there was no such prayer in the application of the opposite party the Magistrate did not pass an order of attachment. In this application the opposite party simply prayed that the proceedings under section 143 be taken. The police in its report dated 18-9-1981 suggested to the Magistrate that the premises be attached. It appears that as there was no such prayer in the application of the opposite party the Magistrate did not pass an order of attachment. About 4-1/2 months later on 1-2-1982 the opposite party moved an application for the attachment of the premises alleging that the case under section 145 was fixed for evidence on 2-2-1982, that on 1-1-1982 he came to the court to contact his counsel, that the applicant met him and threatened him to kill him If he appeared for giving evidence and that the applicant always used to threaten him to till Mm. The opposite party further alleged that the applicant was arrested by the police and fire arms were recovered from his possession and as such there was immediate apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate then called upon a report from the police. The police submitted report that there was apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate then passed order on 2-2-1982 for the attachment of the property. In this order the Magistrate dearly stated that there is immediate apprehension of breach of the peace in respect of the possession of the premises in dispute. 33. Sri A. D. Prabhakar these urged that the applicant had already put in appearance in the case, that copy of the application dated 1-2-1982 moved by the opposite party was not given to him, hat the order was passed by the Magistrate surreptitiously because there was no mention of the application dated 1-2-1982 on the order sheet and that there was no mention of the passing of the order of attachment dated 2-2-1982 on the order sheet. The Magistrate has reported that it was lapse on the part of the office not to have written out order sheet on 1-2-1982 and 2-2-1982. The Magistrate has further reported that at the time the order of attachment was passed both the parties were present in his court It may be recalled that the case was fixed for hearing on 2-2-1982. Hence it is highly probable that the applicant was present in the court on that day. The Magistrate has also reported that the applicant signed on the record on 2-2-1982. Hence it is highly probable that the applicant was present in the court on that day. The Magistrate has also reported that the applicant signed on the record on 2-2-1982. The applicant is not able to controvert this fact. 34. Learned counsel for the opposite party urged that it was not necessary for the opposite party to have given copy of the application dated 1-2-1982 to the applicant and that it was not necessary for the Magistrate to have heard the applicant before passing order of attachment. The applicant's counsel urged in reply that the principle of natural justice requires that the applicant should have been heard before the passing of the order of attachment. The applicant's counsel referred to the case of Mahendra Bhagwan Das v. Suggan, 1965 Vol. II Criminal Law Journal 282, Rajasthan. In this case order of attachment was not passed after the passing of the preliminary order because of the opposition on behalf of the opposite party. 5 days later the Magistrate passed order of attachment without further material. It was held that the Magistrate was not justified in passing the order of attachment as it did not indicate that there was such an emergency as to justify ex-parte order. Facts of this case are quite distinct from the facts of the case before me. In the present case there was an application by the opposite party on 1-2-1982 complaining against the conduct of the applicant exhibited on 1-2-1982 and that them there was another police report. Hence the case of Mahendra Bhagwan Das is not of any help to the applicant. 35. The applicant's counsel then referred to the case of Parab Hans Pandey v. Sheo Darshan Singh, ATR: 1926 Allahabad 685. This case is not of any help to the applicant Facts of this case are also quite distinct from the facts of the case before me. 36. On the other side the opposite party's counsel referred to the case of Gaya Singh v. Doman Singh, AIR 1979 NOC 120 (Patna) (F. B.). There is just heading of this case. The haading says "attachment without hearing parties permissible". Full report of this case is to be found in AIR 1979 Patna at page 246. 36. On the other side the opposite party's counsel referred to the case of Gaya Singh v. Doman Singh, AIR 1979 NOC 120 (Patna) (F. B.). There is just heading of this case. The haading says "attachment without hearing parties permissible". Full report of this case is to be found in AIR 1979 Patna at page 246. In this case reference was made to he case of Chandu Naik v. Sitarma B. Naik, AIR 1978 SC 333 and then it was observed : "In view of this pronouncement, it has to be held that even under the new Code it is open to the Magistrate while initiating a proceeding under section 145 to attach the subject matter in dispute without hearing the other side and this attachment is to last till the proceeding under section 145 is decided in favour of one party or the other." The position that follows from the above is that before passing an order of attachment, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to hear the other party. Its necessary corollary is that it is not necessary for the person moving the Magistrate to take action under section 145 or under section 146 CrPC to give copy of his application to the other side. 37. Learned counsel for the opposite party then referred to the case of Inder Dev Pandey v. Smt. Bhagwati Devi, 1981 AWC 314 (D. B ) in which 2 principles of law were laid down-(1) An order of attachment under section 146 (1) is purely an interlocutory order and the High Court and the Court of Session cannot interfere with it in revisional jurisdiction and (2) when the satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate for attaching the property does not appear to be malafide or motivated, it cannot be said that the process of court is abused by any authority and merely because the Magistrate attaches the property during the pendency of the proceedings under section 145 to prevent breach of the peace being committed by the parties and to preserve the same for the benefit of the person who may be entitled to it does not lead to any miscarriage of justice and consequently the order cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of power under section 482. In an earlier case of Smt., Premlata v. Ram Lubhaya, 1978 Alld. Cr. In an earlier case of Smt., Premlata v. Ram Lubhaya, 1978 Alld. Cr. Rulings 343 also principle of law at No. (1) above was laid down if the attachment was made on the ground of emergency. 38. In the case of Govind Prasad v. Bissu Mal, 1979 AWC 229 cited by the applicant's counsel, it was held that an order of attachment under section 146 passed on the ground of emergency enures for such period as the evidence has been recorded and a final decision given by the Magistrate. It has been found by me above that the Magistrate did not pass order of attachment on account of any malice towards the applicant, that there was fresh material before the Magistrate to pass the order, In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order of attachment dated 2-2-1982 cannot be Interfered with by this Court under section 482 CrPC. Omission in the ordersheet is a lapse on the part of the office and no inference can be drawn from this fact against the Magistrate. 39. In this connection the applicant's counsel urged that the Magistrate even attached the movables of the applicant. He referred to the case of Kanhaiya v. Hari Mohan, 1974 ALJ 56. In this case it was held that section 145 concerned itself with the disputes regarding immovable property and that it did not empower the Magistrate to pass orders with respect to movable property. 40. The learned counsel for the opposite party pointed out that in the instant case the Magistrate did no passs any order for the attachment of movables. He further contended that along with the building in dispute the movables can also be attached. Fe referred to the case of Gurudwara Shri Guru Singh Sabha, New Delhi v. State, 1.982 Criminal Law Journal, NOC 187. In this case it was observed: "The object of attachment under section 146 is quite distinct viz. to keep the property in custodia legis so as to prevent the contesting parties from creating a breach of peace in their attempt to obtain actual possession of the property. In other words the principal object of effecting attachment is preservation of peace and not determination of rights and title of the parties. to keep the property in custodia legis so as to prevent the contesting parties from creating a breach of peace in their attempt to obtain actual possession of the property. In other words the principal object of effecting attachment is preservation of peace and not determination of rights and title of the parties. As a natural corollary, therefore, while effecting attachment of land or other property which is subject of dispute even moveable properties which exist on or are included in the land immovable property sought to be attached would also be covered by the order of attachment and the Magistrate will have jurisdiction to pass a proper order in respect thereof under section 146." It may be stated here that in the present case the Magistrate passed order for the attachment: of the premises 12 Pritam Road. He did not pass an order for the attachment of movables found therein. The police went to attach the premises The police attached the main building and found movables therein. For the sake of safety, the movables were kept by the police in 3 locked rooms. It is thus patent that in the instant case the movables were not attached under the order of the Magistrate and that the police just kept them safely in 3 locked rooms. In this aspect of the matter, there is absolutely no force in the contention of the applicant's counsel and, therefore, the applicant is not justified in blaming the Magistrate. 41. No other point was raised by the parties counsel in respect of the order of attachment. For what has been discussed above, the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate on 2-2-1982 cannot be interfered with by this Court. It is noticeable that the applicant wants this Court to set aside interlocutory order of attachment without first moving the Magistrate. 42. Application dated 22-4-1982 moved by the applicant for the return of his remaining articles may now be dealt with. On 10-2-1982 the Court directed that the applicant should move the Magistrate for the return/release of his movables. In the case of theft pending before the judicial Magistrate, the opposite party moved an application that the movables be got identified. Assertion of the opposite party was that the movables seized by the police belong to him. The judicial Magistrate passed order for the identification of the said articles The applicant then filed objection. In the case of theft pending before the judicial Magistrate, the opposite party moved an application that the movables be got identified. Assertion of the opposite party was that the movables seized by the police belong to him. The judicial Magistrate passed order for the identification of the said articles The applicant then filed objection. The Judicial Magistrate vacated his order on the ground that the said articles were neither attached nor seized by the police in connection with the offence of theft. It is thus obvious that the movables which the police kept in 3 locked rooms were not attached by the Magistrate either in proceedings under section 145 nor in criminal case for theft. 43. The Magistrate has not released the other moveables because the opposite party is alleging that the seized movables belong to him. A perusal of the original application dated 15-9-1981 moved by the opposite party for taking action under section 145 shows that in para 10 the opposite party clearly alleged that the applicant had forcibly broken open his locks, removed his goods, took forcible possession and thereby dispossessed him. This goes to show that the articles of the opposite party were not in the premises (main building) at the time the police went to attach the premises. The Magistrate cannot, in the circumstances of this 'case go into the question as to the ownership of the movables. Prima facie it appears that the movables of the applicant were kept by the police. Therefore, the applicant has a right to get them back. During arguments the opposite party's counsel conceded that the applicant is entitled to the said movables. 44. The application of the applicant has therefore, to be allowed and the Magistrate has to be directed to see that the movables kept by the police in 3 locked rooms are returned to the applicant. Sri A. D. Prabhakar then urged that on 9-4-1982 the Magistrate directed the police to make full compliance with the order of attachment dated 2-2-1982 and that the police would now attach the annexe, in which the applicant is living. He urged that this order of the Magistrate should be set aside. There is absolutely no force in this contention. The Magistrate passed order for the attachment of the entire premises, 12 Pritam Road. The police attached main building only on 3-2-1982. He urged that this order of the Magistrate should be set aside. There is absolutely no force in this contention. The Magistrate passed order for the attachment of the entire premises, 12 Pritam Road. The police attached main building only on 3-2-1982. The police should have also attached the annexe on that day. As the police did not attach the annexe, there is nothing illegal in this order. 45. At the end I may give reference to the cases which were cited by the applicant's counsel and which are not of any help :- (i) Mst. Gyan Devi v. Rex, AIR. 1949 Alld. 144. In this case it was held that if a rank trespasser is in possession for more than 2 months before the date of the preliminary order his possession has to be maintained under section 145 CrPC. There is no dispute to this principle. In the present case the Magistrate has yet to decide as to which party was in possession within 2 months of the date of the preliminary order. The case of the opposite party is that the applicant took illegal possession between 24-8-1981 and 4-9-1981. (ii) Dulla v. State, AIR 195.3 Alld. 341. In this case there was nothing on record to suggest hat there was any danger of a breach of peace. (iii) B. Lakshminaryana v. S.S. Appara, 1959 CrLJ 1134 A. P. It was a case under sections 378 and 380 IPC. It has no relevance whatsoever. (iv) Smt. Kaniz Fatma v. State of U. P., AIR 1963 Allahabad 148. In this it was held that on cancellation of proceedings the property attached should be delivered to the person from whose custody it was attached. This question will arise when the Magistrate decides the proceedings under section 145. (v) Yad Ram v. State and Revti, Criminal Misc. Application no. 784 of 1981 decided by this Court on 19-11-1981. The point involved in this case was different. 46. No other point was urged by the parties counsel. For what has been fouad above : (i) Criminal Misc. Application No. 810 of 1982 is dismissed. (ii) Applicant's application dated 22-4-1982 is allowed and the Magistrate is directed to sec that the movables kept by the police in 3 locked rooms on 3-2-1982 are relumed to the applicant, Gur Charan Singh, at the earliest. (iii) Criminal Misc. Application no. 2807 of 1982 is dismissed. Application No. 810 of 1982 is dismissed. (ii) Applicant's application dated 22-4-1982 is allowed and the Magistrate is directed to sec that the movables kept by the police in 3 locked rooms on 3-2-1982 are relumed to the applicant, Gur Charan Singh, at the earliest. (iii) Criminal Misc. Application no. 2807 of 1982 is dismissed. Stay order dated 13-5-1982 has already been vacated (vide order dated 16-8-1982).