P. A. KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision petition is directed against the order dated September 25, 1981 made by the District judge, Dharwar, in C. R. P. No. 46 of 1977 confirming the order of the Munsiff, hubli, in H. R. C. No. 173 of 1971 dated January 20, 1977. ( 2 ) THE respondent is the petitioner in H. R. C. No, 173 of 1971 on the file of the Munsiff, Hubli. For the purpose of proper understanding, the position of the parties in the court below would be referred to hereafter in this order. ( 3 ) THE petitioner-landlord filed an eviction petition under S. 21 (1) (h) read with (1) of the Karnataka Rent control Act, contending that he required the petition premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to him if the eviction is refused and that no comparative hardship would be caused to the respondent-tenant if eviction is ordered. ( 4 ) THE respondent resisted the petition by denying all the petition averments. ( 5 ) THE trial court recorded the evidence of the petitioner and of two witnesses on behalf of the respondent-tenant and marked the documents Ex p-1 to P-6 and Ex D-1 to D-5 and ultimately concluded that the petitioner-landlord had proved that he required the petition premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner. landlord if eviction was refused and that no comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant if the eviction was ordered. These conclusions of the trial court came to be affirmed in c. R. P. No. 46 of 1977 by the District judge at Dharwar by his order dated sep 25, 1981. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, the findings recorded by the courts below that the petitioner-landlord required the petition premises bona fide for his own use and occupation, and that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner-landlord if eviction was refused and that no comparative hard shin would be caused to the tenant if eviction was ordered, are pure questions of fact. In view of the concurrent findings of facts, It is neither feasible nor proper for this Court in revision to interfere with those concurrent findings of facts. In view of the concurrent findings of facts, It is neither feasible nor proper for this Court in revision to interfere with those concurrent findings of facts. Even on a consideration of the evidence, I am satisfied that the petitioner-landlord has proved that he requires the petition premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation and that greater hardship would be caused to him if eviction is refused, and that no comparative hardship would be caused to the tenant if eviction is ordered. ( 7 ) SHRI. M. Sulaiman Sait, learned counsel for the tanant, relied on Section 5 (1) and (2) and Section 7 (3) of the Esso (Acquisition of Undertaknigs in India) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Esso Act' ). The said Act received the assent of the President on March. 13, 1974 and it was published in the Gazette of India extry dated July 15, 1974. Therefore, the said Esso Act came into force with effect from July 15, 1974. ( 8 ) THE material facts are that the petition site was taken on lease by standard Vaccum Oil Co on Sept 14, 1951 for the first time from the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner-landlord. It is undisputed that under the said lease, an option to continue the lease for another 9 years had been given to the Company. It is undisputed that the successor of the said Company exercised that option and continued in possession of the petition property for 9 years, Thus, it is undisputed that them was a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the successor of the said company till Sept, 1969. It is undsputed that the contractual relationship of landlord and tenant came to an and in Sept 1969. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, a quit notice was issued by the landlord to the tenant i. e. , successor of the said Company in 1969 terminating the tenancy. Whether the issuance of quit notice was necessary at all is not of much importance at this stage. At that time, it was rather an established principle of law that before initiating the proceedings under the karnatak. Rent Control Act, the quit notice war necessary. That principle did not receive the approval of the supreme Court in. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal. At that time, it was rather an established principle of law that before initiating the proceedings under the karnatak. Rent Control Act, the quit notice war necessary. That principle did not receive the approval of the supreme Court in. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal. (1) But, however, the fact remains that there was no contractual relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties after the efflux of time which took place in September, 1969. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Shri M. Sulaiman sait, learned counsel for the tenant, the alleged tenant continued to be in possession of the property by virtue of the protection given to him under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent control. Act. ( 11 ) IT is undisputed that the tenant who took the site on lease, has constructed a building on the petition site for the purpose of running the petrol bunk and sale of petroleum products. It is also undisputed that the contract between the parties provided that the tenant on the expiry of the lease, should demolish the building constructed by him and hand over the vacant possession of the site to the landlord. It is undisputed that Hindustan Petroleum corporation Ltdl which is a Government Company, took over the rights liabilities and the business of the esso Company and thus became - the successor of the Esso Compajny. Learned counsel Shri. M. Sulaiman Sait quoted S. 5 of the Esso Act which reads thus:-"5 (1) : Where any property is held in India by Esso under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central Government shall, or and from the appointed day, be deemed to have become the lesssee or tenant as the case may be, in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central government, and thereupon ail the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deamed to have been transferred to and vested in the central Government. " (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in subsection (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central government, be renewed on the same terms andi conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by the esso immediately before the appointed day. ", (underlining (italics) is mine ). " (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in subsection (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central government, be renewed on the same terms andi conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by the esso immediately before the appointed day. ", (underlining (italics) is mine ). Therefore, it becomes clear that in order to attract the operation of S. 5 (1) of the Esso Act, (i) the Esso Company must hold the- property under any lease or under any right of tenancy; (ii) the Central Government shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed: to have become the lessee or tenant in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central Government; and (iii) such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Esso immediately before the appointed day, on the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-sec. (1) , ( 12 ) IT is undisputed that the Esso had held the property under a lease or under a right of tenancy till September, 1969, The lease came to an end in Sept, 1969. The "contractual tenancy also came to an end in September, 1969. ( 13 ) SHRI. M. Sulaiman Sait, learned counsel for the tenant, argued that even after the expiry of the contractual tenancy, the Esso Company had the right of tenancy in the sense that it was protected from being evicted and thus it had a right to continue in occupation of the premises. As already stated above, the contractual lease contemplated by Sec. 5 (1) of the Esso act had come to an end in Sept, 1969. The only ground under which Shri. Sulaiman, Sait tried to come in, was under the heading of right of tenancy. As indicated above, the contractual tenancy, had come to an end in Sept, 1969. Thus, the alleged tenant had no right of tenancy as such when the lease stood determinedi by ,efflux of time in Sept, 1969. The only ground under which Shri. Sulaiman, Sait tried to come in, was under the heading of right of tenancy. As indicated above, the contractual tenancy, had come to an end in Sept, 1969. Thus, the alleged tenant had no right of tenancy as such when the lease stood determinedi by ,efflux of time in Sept, 1969. ( 14 ) WHETHER the so called tenant, continued to have a right of tenancy under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent control Act only remains to be seen. Under the Karnataka Rent Control act, the landlord does not get any right to evict the tepant from the premises immediately after the efflux of time. He will have to pursue his remedy, if possible under S. 21 of the Karnataka rent Control Act. The word 'tenant' is used in a sense different in the Rent contorl Act from that found in the transfer of Property Act or under the general law of the land. That concept of a statutory tenancy has been defined for a purpose and it is generally described as a statutory tenancy. In order to appreciate this rather artificial, arbitrary and queer concept of statutory tenancy, it is important to remember the connotation of the word 'tenant' as found in the Transfer of Property Act. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the word lease. Sec. 106 speaks of the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or legal usage. Sec. 107 describes the mode as to how leases are made or are to be madie. Sec. 1. 08 gives the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. Sec. 109 speaks of the rights of the lessor-transferee. Sec. 111 gives the various modes of the determination of lease. Sec. 112 and 113 speak about the waiver of forfeiture and the notice to quit. Sec. 114 and 114a provide relief against forfeiture. Sec. 115 speaks of the effect of holding over. All these Sections are to be found in Chap V of the Transfer of Property Act which, deals exclusively with leases of immovable propety. The statutory tenancy steps in only when the contractual tenancy comes to an end or is determined. A lease under the Transfer of Property act is not merely a contract between the lessor and the lessee. All these Sections are to be found in Chap V of the Transfer of Property Act which, deals exclusively with leases of immovable propety. The statutory tenancy steps in only when the contractual tenancy comes to an end or is determined. A lease under the Transfer of Property act is not merely a contract between the lessor and the lessee. The word 'lease' as defined by Sec. 105 of the transfer of Property Act is a transfer of an interest in the land and it creates a right in rem and vests the same in the lessee. In the case of statutory tenancy however, there is no estate or interest in land vested in the tenant. It is merely a' personal right to retain possession of the property which is an immunity from eviction except under certain circumstances. The Supreme court in Anand Nivas Pvt Ltd. , v. Anandji Pedhi (2) dealing with the case arising under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, stated thus: -"a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premie es occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if, any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal : it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. " (underlining (italics) is mine ). The Supreme Court again, in Calcutta credit Corpn Ltd. , v. Happy homes (3) quoted with approval the observations of Denning L. J , in the case solomon v. Orwell (4) which reads: - "when a statutory tenant sublets a part of the premises, he does not thereby confer any estate or interest on the sub-tenants. A statutory tenant has no estate or interest himself, and he cannot carve something out of nothing. A subtenant, like the statutory tenant, has only a personal right or privilege. A statutory tenant has no estate or interest himself, and he cannot carve something out of nothing. A subtenant, like the statutory tenant, has only a personal right or privilege. The question is, what is the, position of the sub-tenant when the statutory tenancy comes to an, end? A statutory tenancy may, of course, come to an end without a notice to quit, e. g. , by dieath (if there are no entitled relatives) or by the delivering up of the premises to the landlord. When the statutory tenancy comes to an end, the subtenants' right automatically comes to an end unless there is some statutory protection afforded to him. " thus it clearly follows that a statutory tenant has no estate or right in the property. The Rent Act gives him only a right to continue in possession of the building or the premises so long as he goes on paying the standard rent and permitted increases. ' Thus, there is no right of tenancy vested in the statutory tenant. If I may say so he has no right of tenancy at all. The only right that he has got is the immunity from being evicted from the petition premises if at all it can be called a rght. The immunity from eviction does not amount to a right of tenancy at all. Apart from the immunity running the petrol bunk and sale of petroleum products. It is also undisputed that the contract between the parties provided that the tenant on the expiry of the lease, should demolish the building constructed by him and hand over the vacant possession of the site to the landlord. It is undisputed that Hindustan Petroleum corporation Ltdl which is a Government Company, took over the rights liabilities and the business of the esso Company and thus became - the successor of the Esso Compajny. It is undisputed that Hindustan Petroleum corporation Ltdl which is a Government Company, took over the rights liabilities and the business of the esso Company and thus became - the successor of the Esso Compajny. Learned counsel Shri. M. Sulaiman Sait quoted S. 5 of the Esso Act which reads thus:-"5 (1) : Where any property is held in India by Esso under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central Government shall, or and from the appointed day, be deemed to have become the lesssee or tenant as the case may be, in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central government, and thereupon ail the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deamed to have been transferred to and vested in the central Government. " (2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in subsection (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central government, be renewed on the same terms andi conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by the esso immediately before the appointed day. ", (underlining (italics) is mine ). Therefore, it becomes clear that in order to attract the operation of S. 5 (1) of the Esso Act, (i) the Esso Company must hold the- property under any lease or under any right of tenancy; (ii) the Central Government shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed: to have become the lessee or tenant in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central Government; and (iii) such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Esso immediately before the appointed day, on the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-sec. (1) , ( 12 ) IT is undisputed that the Esso had held the property under a lease or under a right of tenancy till September, 1969, The lease came to an end in Sept, 1969. The "contractual tenancy also came to an end in September, 1969. ( 13 ) SHRI. (1) , ( 12 ) IT is undisputed that the Esso had held the property under a lease or under a right of tenancy till September, 1969, The lease came to an end in Sept, 1969. The "contractual tenancy also came to an end in September, 1969. ( 13 ) SHRI. M. Sulaiman Sait, learned counsel for the tenant, argued that even after the expiry of the contractual tenancy, the Esso Company had the right of tenancy in the sense that it was protected from being evicted and thus it had a right to continue in occupation of the premises. As already stated above, the contractual lease contemplated by Sec. 5 (1) of the Esso act had come to an end in Sept, 1969. The only ground under which Shri. Sulaiman, Sait tried to come in, was under the heading of right of tenancy. As indicated above, the contractual tenancy, had come to an end in Sept, 1969. Thus, the alleged tenant had no right of tenancy as such when the lease stood determinedi by ,efflux of time in Sept, 1969. ( 14 ) WHETHER the so called tenant, continued to have a right of tenancy under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent control Act only remains to be seen. Under the Karnataka Rent Control act, the landlord does not get any right to evict the tepant from the premises immediately after the efflux of time. He will have to pursue his remedy, if possible under S. 21 of the Karnataka rent Control Act. The word 'tenant' is used in a sense different in the Rent contorl Act from that found in the transfer of Property Act or under the general law of the land. That concept of a statutory tenancy has been defined for a purpose and it is generally described as a statutory tenancy. In order to appreciate this rather artificial, arbitrary and queer concept of statutory tenancy, it is important to remember the connotation of the word 'tenant' as found in the Transfer of Property Act. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the word lease. Sec. 106 speaks of the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or legal usage. Sec. 107 describes the mode as to how leases are made or are to be madie. Sec. 1. 08 gives the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the word lease. Sec. 106 speaks of the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or legal usage. Sec. 107 describes the mode as to how leases are made or are to be madie. Sec. 1. 08 gives the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. Sec. 109 speaks of the rights of the lessor-transferee. Sec. 111 gives the various modes of the determination of lease. Sec. 112 and 113 speak about the waiver of forfeiture and the notice to quit. Sec. 114 and 114a provide relief against forfeiture. Sec. 115 speaks of the effect of holding over. All these Sections are to be found in Chap V of the Transfer of Property Act which, deals exclusively with leases of immovable propety. The statutory tenancy steps in only when the contractual tenancy comes to an end or is determined. A lease under the Transfer of Property act is not merely a contract between the lessor and the lessee. The word 'lease' as defined by Sec. 105 of the transfer of Property Act is a transfer of an interest in the land and it creates a right in rem and vests the same in the lessee. In the case of statutory tenancy however, there is no estate or interest in land vested in the tenant. It is merely a' personal right to retain possession of the property which is an immunity from eviction except under certain circumstances. The Supreme court in Anand Nivas Pvt Ltd. , v. Anandji Pedhi (2) dealing with the case arising under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, stated thus: -"a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premie es occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if, any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premie es occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if, any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal : it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. " (underlining (italics) is mine ). The Supreme Court again, in Calcutta credit Corpn Ltd. , v. Happy homes (3) quoted with approval the observations of Denning L. J , in the case solomon v. Orwell (4) which reads: - "when a statutory tenant sublets a part of the premises, he does not thereby confer any estate or interest on the sub-tenants. A statutory tenant has no estate or interest himself, and he cannot carve something out of nothing. A subtenant, like the statutory tenant, has only a personal right or privilege. The question is, what is the, position of the sub-tenant when the statutory tenancy comes to an, end? A statutory tenancy may, of course, come to an end without a notice to quit, e. g. , by dieath (if there are no entitled relatives) or by the delivering up of the premises to the landlord. When the statutory tenancy comes to an end, the subtenants' right automatically comes to an end unless there is some statutory protection afforded to him. " thus it clearly follows that a statutory tenant has no estate or right in the property. The Rent Act gives him only a right to continue in possession of the building or the premises so long as he goes on paying the standard rent and permitted increases. ' Thus, there is no right of tenancy vested in the statutory tenant. If I may say so he has no right of tenancy at all. The only right that he has got is the immunity from being evicted from the petition premises if at all it can be called a rght. The immunity from eviction does not amount to a right of tenancy at all. If I may say so he has no right of tenancy at all. The only right that he has got is the immunity from being evicted from the petition premises if at all it can be called a rght. The immunity from eviction does not amount to a right of tenancy at all. Apart from the immunity can end in Sept, 1969 the right of tenancy came to an end in Sept, 1969. Admittedly, no such desire of renewal was expressed by the Central Government or the Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. before the expiry of the lease in Sept, 1969. As already shown above such a contention was raised for the first time only when C. R. P. No. 46 of 1977 was filed in the District Court, Dharwar. Therefore, in my opinion, Sec 5 (2) also will not come to the rescue of the revision petitioner-tenant: in this case. ( 18 ) LEARNED) counsel Shri. Sulaiman Sait argued that the very fact ihat the Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. contested the eviction petition in the Munsiff Court was sufficient to indicate that the Central Government or the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation limited expressed its desire to renew. The simple contest of the. eviction petition does not amount to a renewal of the lease. The contest as can be seen from the records was only in respect of the bona fide and reasonable requirement of the landlord and only in respect; of the comparative hardship. The eviction petition was contested in order to controvert the claim of the landlord for possession under s. 21 (1) (h) read with (1) of the karnalaka Rent Control Act. Therefore, such a contest, in my opinion, does not amount to an expression of a desire to renew the lease. ( 19 ) THE Esso Act would govern only such leases or tenancies which were in existence or subsisting on the day when the Esso Act came into force. As no lease or tenancy was in existence or subsisting in the case on hand, where the Esso Act came into operation, the question of renewal of lease or tenancy does not arise in this case. ( 20 ) THE right to possession had become vested in the landlord immediately on the determination of the lease in sept, 1969. As no lease or tenancy was in existence or subsisting in the case on hand, where the Esso Act came into operation, the question of renewal of lease or tenancy does not arise in this case. ( 20 ) THE right to possession had become vested in the landlord immediately on the determination of the lease in sept, 1969. Such a vested right cannot be taken away by the artificial imposition of S. 5 (1) and (2) of the Esso act. S. 5 (1) and (2) of the Esso Act would come into play if the desire to renewal was exercised before the expiry of the lease or before the tenancy came to an end. It is no doubt true that this Esso Act has been held to be valid by the A. P. High Court in Mustafa Hussain v. Union of India (5) On a perusal of all the provisions of the said Esso Act, I do not and that the restriction imposed is an unreasonable one. The said Act is sought to be placed on the anvil only in public interest. If the object behind the said Act is considered, the restriction imposed cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. As held bv the Andhra pradesh High Court, S. 5 (2) and 7 (3) do not create perpetual leases. They only lay down that if the Corporations in certain cases exercise their option then the lessor has to renew his lease. To that extent there is some statutory compulsion resulting in the restriction in the rights of the lessors. The Supreme Court has also held in Dwaraka Prasad v. State of u. P. (6) thus:-"the phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right should not be armitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of public. "in the light of the enunciation of the principle by the Supreme Court, the restriction imposed by the Esso Act is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. It is not an exercise of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel Shri. Sulaiman sait then drew my attention to the preamble of the Esso Act to show that such a restriction was in the public interest and was not an unreasonable one. It is not an exercise of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel Shri. Sulaiman sait then drew my attention to the preamble of the Esso Act to show that such a restriction was in the public interest and was not an unreasonable one. I have already stated by referring to the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruling and the Supreme Court ruling that the Esso Act in question does not impose any unreasonable restriction and it is in the public interest and the act is intra vires. ( 22 ) SHRI. T. S. Ramachandra, learen counsel for the landlord, contended that the Karnataka Rent Control Act applied only to a building and not to a vacant site. The preamble to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, reads thus: -"an Act to provide for the control ' of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters in the State of Karnataka. ", The word 'building' has been defined in Sec. 3 (a) of the Karnataka Rent control Act thus: -"3 (a): 'building' means any building or hut or part of a building or hut other than a farm house, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and) includes: - (i) the garden, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building"or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut or part of building or hut; (II) any furniture supplied by the landlord for the use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut; (III) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house;"the word 'premises' has been defined in Sec. 3 (n) as: - " (n) 'premises' means- (i) a building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes;" therefore, the separate use of premises' and 'building' in the Karnataka rent Control Act has given rise to only serious arguments by the learned counsel Shri. T. S. Ramachandra before, me. It becomes clear that the word 'premises' includes building. It becomes clear that the word 'premises' includes building. Thus in order to avoid such contentions and the resultant confusion it would be better if the word 'premise's' is used in the Karnataka Rent Control Act. I am sure that the Legislature in order to put an end to the controversy and confusion would step in to remedy the anomaly in the matter. ( 23 ) IN the result, this" revision petition fails and it is dismissed. ( 24 ) IN view of the fact that the revision petition has failed mostly on the interpretation of the provisions of the Esso Act, I think that the interest of justice would be met if all the parties are ordered to bear their own costs in this revision petitions. ( 25 ) LEARNED counsel Shri. Sulaiman sait at this stage sought for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134a of the Constitution. Article 134a applies to cases coming within the ambit of clause, (1) of art. 132, or clause (1) of Art. 133 or clause (D of Art. 134'of the Constitution. Art. 132 (1) would apply to matters involving a substantial question of. law as to interpretation of the Constitution. There is no question, of the interpretation of the Constitution involved in this case. Art 133 (1) of the Constitution does not govern the case of judgment of a single judge of the High Court. Art 134 of the constitution applies only to criminal matters. Therefore, the certificate prayed for by the learned counsel shri. Sulaiman Sait cannot be granted. But, however, it involves a substantial question of the interpretation of s. 5 (1) and (2) of the Esso Act. This case is of substantial importance or relevance to the Hindustan Petroleum corporation Ltd. as it has got various business premises in different parts of the Country. Therefore the interest of justice demands that the order passed by me should be stayed for 3 months from today and it is accordingly stayed for 3 months from today. --- *** --- .