KHIROD ALIAS KHIRODRA DEBATA v. STATE OF ORISSA — 1982 DIGILAW 130 (ORI)

B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED of offences punishable under Sections 402 and 477 A of the Indian Penal Code and aggrieved by the orders dated May 5, 1982, passed in three cases against hirn by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bargarh, framing charges in respect of the two offences under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the petitioner has corne up to this Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 and under Section 482 of the Code, in the three Revisions which, with the consent of the parties, have been heard together and will be governed by this common order, after deterrnining the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that without proper application of rnind and perusing the materials and without affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard, the irnpugned orders have been passed mechanically without just and reasonable grounds. Mr. Nayak, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has raised the question of maintainability of the Revisions on the grounds that an order framing a charge against an accused person is an interlocutory order and, therefore, as provided in Section 397 (2) of the Code, the Revisions are not cornpetent and in view of this statutory bar, the inherent powers of this Court under. Section 482 of the Code are not to be exercised and in support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the principles laid down in Amar Nath y. State of Haryana and others1, V. C. Shukla v. State through C. B. I. 2, Jayaprakash v. State3, and N. B. Rarnarnoorthi, In Re4. Mr. Section 482 of the Code are not to be exercised and in support of his contention, reliance has been placed on the principles laid down in Amar Nath y. State of Haryana and others1, V. C. Shukla v. State through C. B. I. 2, Jayaprakash v. State3, and N. B. Rarnarnoorthi, In Re4. Mr. , Misra, appearing for the petitioner, has, however, placing reliance on a nurnber of decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court including the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and others (supra); Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra5, V. C. Shukla v. State through C. B. I. (supra) ; Lalit Mohan Mandal and others v. Benovendra Nath Chatterjee6, and Aditya Kumar Samal and others v. State7, submitted that the objections raised by the learned Additional Governrnent Advocate cannot prevail as the framing of a charge is an intermediate, if not a final order and not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code and even assurning that Section 397 (2) is a bar to revise an order framing a charge, this Court, under Section 482 of the Code, can in fit and exceptional cases, exercise its powers and quash such orders passed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate frarning charges with a direction to hear the rnatters afresh with reference to the documents on which the prosecution seeks reliance. ( 2 ) PRIOR to the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, there was no statutory bar for revisions against orders framing charges. Section 397 (2) of the Code provides: The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The legislative intention in enacting the provision was not to limit the powers of the High Court sitting in revision and as a rnatter of fact, all the powers of the old Code have been retained subject to the exception provided in section 397 (2) of the Code and this new provision was introduced ill order to prevent vexatious litigation by rnaking applications in revision against interlocutory orders passed by the Magistrate with a view to delaying the proceedings and harassing the adversaries. The term interlocutory has not been defined in the Code and after the new Code carne into force, this has becorne a subject of controversy. What is an interlocutory order and what is a final order have been interpreted in a number of cases of this Court and now the controversy has been set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Lirnaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra ). ( 3 ) BEFORE any authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court relating to this controversial question was made for the guidance of the Courts, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhima Naik and nine others v. State8, observed that judicial pronouncement on Articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution of India and on Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure would point out the distinction between final and interlocutory orders and would render substantial assistance in defining the meaning of interlocutory order in Section 397 (2) of the Code. Reference was made to the case of S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King9, and it was observed that the meaning of interlocutory order was the same as in both civil and criminal proceedings. In this connection, a reference was also made to the cases of Mohammed Amin Brothers Ltd. and others v. The Dominion of India and others10, Firm Ram Chand Majimal and others v. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Tatanchand and others11, Abdul Rahaman v. Cassim and Sons12, Prem Chand v. State of Bihar13, State of U. P. v. Col. Sujau Singh and others14, Mohanlal Maganlal Thakur v. State of Gujarat,15 Suleman v. Warner,16 MIs. Tarapore and Co. Madras v. MIs. yb. Tractors Export, Moscow and another17, The United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. V. Chatterjee and others18, and Saryadhavan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another19, and it was ultimately held that the order caning upon the petitioner to execute interim bonds did not pm an end to the main proceeding under Section 107 or the Code though the impugned order purported to decide a vital issue as to the execution of interim bonds and it did not terminate the proceeding. ( 4 ) IN S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (supra), an objection was taken that sanction was necessary under Section 197 or the old Code. The contention was overruled by the Madras High Court. ( 4 ) IN S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (supra), an objection was taken that sanction was necessary under Section 197 or the old Code. The contention was overruled by the Madras High Court. On a certificate being granted for leave to appeal the question came up for consideration whether the impugned order was a final one and it was held to be an interlocutory and not a final order as the order was not on a point which would terminate the matter before the Court finally. The observations of Lord Esher, M. R. in Salaman v. Warner (supra) as to the meaning of the expression final order were as follows: - If their decision, whichever way it is given will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory. ( 5 ) THE meanings of the words interlocutory and final have to be considered separately in, elation to the particular purpose for which these words are required to be interpreted and no singular test can be applied to determine as to whether an order is final or interlocutory, as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR. 1968 S. C. 733 (supra) and it has been held that an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. The interpretation of the expression interlocutory order was also considered by the Supreme Court in Smt. Parmeshwari Govt. (sic.) v. The Slate and another20. In that case, the trial court had made an order summoning Smt. Parmeshwari Devi to attend the Court with some documents. The revisions preferred by her were dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court of Delhi. She preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by obtaining special leave. It was argued in the Supreme Court that the impugned order was an interlocutory one and the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Code could not be exercised in relation to the said order by virtue of subsection (2) of the section. She preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by obtaining special leave. It was argued in the Supreme Court that the impugned order was an interlocutory one and the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 of the Code could not be exercised in relation to the said order by virtue of subsection (2) of the section. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to with approval the observations of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1968 S. C. 733 and held thus: - It may thus be conclusive with reference to the state at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who is not a party to the inquiry or trial, against whom it is directed. As has been shown the order of the Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 was not according to law and it adversely affected the appellant, who was not a party to the enquiry or trial, as it was solely directed against her. As is obvious, she could have no opportunity to challenge it after the making of the final order, and such a belated challenge would have been purposeless for it would have given her no relief. So in so far as the appellant is concerned, the order of the Magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the Revisional Courts erred in raising the bar of subsection (2) of section 397 against it. ( 6 ) ON the principles laid down in the aforesaid two cases of the Supreme Court and distinguishing the case reported in 41 (1975) C. L. T. 674 (supra), this Court held in Chandrabhanu Gountia v. Durbadal Naik and three others21, that the remand order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge directing the trial Court for a fresh determination of the question of possession in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code was not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 7 ) IN the case Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others (supra), the interpretation of the expression interlocutory order came up for consideration and their Lordships, in paragraph G of the judgment, observed thus: - The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term interlocutory order as appearing in sub-section (2) or section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term interlocutory order is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Websters New World Dictionary interlocutory has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term interlocutory order in Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely donates orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights of the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 8 ) IN AIR. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 8 ) IN AIR. 1978 S. C. 47 (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have indicated the meaning of- the expression interlocutory order referred to in sub-section (21 of section 397 of the Code. The real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being converse to the expression final order. An order passed in the course of a criminal proceeding may not be final in the sense it was noticed in Kuppuswamis case (AIR. 1949 P. C. 1) (supra), but it may not necessarily be an interlocutory order. Some others may not be final and yet may not also be interlocutory. There may be intermediate orders to which the bar in sub-section (2) of section 397 would not apply. It would not be possible to make a catalogue of orders which may be purely interlocutory. ( 9 ) IN AIR. 1968 S. C. 733, some tests for determining a final order as distinct from interlocutory order were called out from some English decisions in the majority decision of Shelat, 3. (One of the tests is: If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on? In the instant cases, if the orders in question framing charges are reversed, the action against the present petitioner would not go on. In that view of the matter, an order framing charges may not be construed to be an interlocutory order barring a criminal revision to the High Court or the Court of Session. ( 10 ) REFERRING to and relying on the principles laid down in A. I. R 1968 S. C. 733 and AIR. 1978 S. C. 47, 5k. Ray, C. ]. of this court, in the case of P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M. K. C. G. Medical College, Berhampur and another22, HAS? IN CLEAR TERMS? DECIDED THAT AN ORDER FRAMING CHARGE against an accused person is not an interlocutory order and is a final order which can be revised by the superior court. 1978 S. C. 47, 5k. Ray, C. ]. of this court, in the case of P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M. K. C. G. Medical College, Berhampur and another22, HAS? IN CLEAR TERMS? DECIDED THAT AN ORDER FRAMING CHARGE against an accused person is not an interlocutory order and is a final order which can be revised by the superior court. The point raised on behalf of the State in the three revisions before- me was directly in issue in that case. No decision to the contrary of any Division Bench of this Court has been placed before me. The same question as to whether an order framing charge could be construed to be an interlocutory order came up for consideration before this Court in 1980 Cuttack Law Reports 256 (supra ). Although in the placitum, it has been noted that the decision of the Court is that an order directing framing of charge is not an interlocutory order, it would be noticed from the body of the judgment that an objection was raised on behalf of the State on the principles laid down in AIR. 1980 S. C. 962 (supra) that an order framing charge was an interlocutory order. This Court has observed that it is unnecessary to refer to that decision which is an authority for the scope of the expression interlocutory order as given in section 110) of the Special Courts Act, 1979. The reamed Judge has not expressed, in clear terms, that the order framing charge is not an interlocutory one, although such a conclusion may only be implied from the observations made therein. ( 11 ) I would at this stage refer to the divergent views of some of the High Courts in this regard. As already indicated by me, the view expressed by this Court in 47 (1979) C. L. T. 126 is that the order framing charge is a final order and not an interlocutory one. In the case of MIs. Mohanlal Devdanbhai Chokshi and others v. 3. 5. Wogh and another23, Mr. As already indicated by me, the view expressed by this Court in 47 (1979) C. L. T. 126 is that the order framing charge is a final order and not an interlocutory one. In the case of MIs. Mohanlal Devdanbhai Chokshi and others v. 3. 5. Wogh and another23, Mr. Justice Pratap, of the Bombay High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for both the sides, found that in view of the importance of the question as to whether the framing of charge would be construed to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code, felt that the matter should be referred to a Division Bench and it was so referred and Gadgil and Mehta, 3]. of the Bombay High Court took into consideration the principles laid down in AIR. 1980 S. C. 962 ; 1980 Cri. Li. 690 (supra), AIR. 1978 S. C. 47: 1978 Cri. Li. 165 (supra), AIR. 1977 S. C. 2185 (supra): 1917 Cri. Li. 1891, AIR. 1977 S. C. 1488: 1977 Cri. Li. 112; (State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others24), (Dhanraj Jam v. K. Biswas25), (Biswanath Agarwala v. B. K. Gurnani26), (Bhupinder Kumar v. State27), (Rajeswar Prasad Mishra v. State of Bengal28), (Mohandas Issardas v. A. N. Sattanathan29), and after a careful and detailed examination of the question, came to the following conclusion: We think that the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case as also in V. C. Shuklas case has specifically held that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order. In our opinion, this decision is an explicit decision and it will not be possible for Mr. Gandhi to contend that there was only an observation. Similarly, we are not able to accept the contention of Me. Gandhi by these decisions, the Supreme Court wanted to make any enactment. Mr. Tipnis rightly submitted that what has been done by the Supreme Court is that it has construed the term interlocutory order and Mr. Gandhi did not contend that the construction of the statute or the term used in a section would be equivalent to making any enactment. The result, therefore, is that we record our answer in the negative by holding that an order, framing a charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( 12 ) IN Husmukh 3. The result, therefore, is that we record our answer in the negative by holding that an order, framing a charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( 12 ) IN Husmukh 3. Jhaveri v. Sheila Dadlani and another30, Kotwal, 3. of the Bombay High Court considered the question as to whether an order passed under Sec. 146 of the Code directing attachment and scaling of the flat could be construed to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 (2) of the Code and referring to and relying on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, held that the impugned order could not be termed and styled as interlocutory order by an yardstick. The learned Judge has indicated the guidelines enuniciated in the ratio of various judicial pronouncements, the scheme of the Code in that behalf, the object for enacting or incorporating the said provision and the basic concept of the term in question and held that the following propositions would logically follow: 1. That the term interlocutory order has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or realistic sense. 2. That it merely denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature. The emphasis in this category is on the word purely, which would again highlight the concept that the nature of the order must be pure and simple, temporary or interim in character and ostensibly deceptive appearance of a temporary character should not be confused with the real and outright temporary nature. 3. Such orders pertaining to some matters in the proceeding which merely and purely assume the character of steps-in-aid of the proceeding can be embraced by the said technology, which again affords a pointer about the nature and categories of the orders that are purely temporary or interim without actually affecting or even touching substantially any right or material aspect of the proceeding. 4. Though a stamp of finality to the proceeding or termination of the proceeding may be quite a relevant and important consideration, yet it is not a sole criterion of the test in that behalf. 5. So also, the potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality is also not the only and conclusive criterion though it by itself is a relevant feature. 6. 5. So also, the potential capacity to terminate proceeding or to give it a label of finality is also not the only and conclusive criterion though it by itself is a relevant feature. 6. Therefore, the fact that the main proceeding is kept alive that does not ipso facto give a stamp to several such orders as interlocutory order. 7. Consequently it is not permissible to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being the converse of the term final order 8. An order of moment would obviously be lifted out of the sweep of the said terminology. 9. Irrespective of the order bearing stamp of finality, there may be an intervening stage which can be called as intermediate stage at which an order may be passed which in turn may be called as intermediate order, which neither gives the finality to the proceeding nor is purely interim or temporary and as such is not an interlocutory order, but would fall in between and in certain cases such order can be said to be not interlocutory. 10. An order which- (a) decides; or (b) even touches the important rights or liabilities of the parties; cannot be said to be interlocutory. 11 Another which- (a) substantially affects the rights of the parties; or (b) decides certain rights of the parties; cannot be termed as interlocutory. 12 So also, an order which- (a) adjudicates; or (b) even affects; (i) either the rights of the parties; (U) even any particular aspect of the trial or the also termed as interlocutory order , ( 13 ) THE question as to whether the order of framing a charge is an interlocutory one again came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Dattatraya Samant and others v. State of Maharashtra,31 and Bhonsala, 3. came to the following conclusion: This Court had an occasion to decide whether the order of framing of a charge was an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 297 of Criminal P. C. in Criminal Revn. Appln. No. 246 of 1979 (1981 Cri. L. J. 454), decided by Gadgil and Mehta, 33. , the reference made by Pratap 3. came to the following conclusion: This Court had an occasion to decide whether the order of framing of a charge was an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 297 of Criminal P. C. in Criminal Revn. Appln. No. 246 of 1979 (1981 Cri. L. J. 454), decided by Gadgil and Mehta, 33. , the reference made by Pratap 3. was answered by the Division Bench holding that the order of framing a charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Criminal P. C. In this judgment the learned Judges had referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Amarnaths cafe (supra), Madhu Limayes case (supra) and V. C. Shuklas case (supra ). After referring to all these cases, the final conclusion at which the Division Bench had arrived was: We think that the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case as also in V. C. Shuklas case has specifically held that an order of framing charge is not an interlocutory order. The learned Special Public Prosecutor in fairness did not argue that the order of framing charge of conspiracy by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the accused was an interlocutory order. He only submitted that in view of the various decisions of the Supreme Court in Amarnaths case, Madhu Limayes case and V. C. Shuklas case as also the interpretation adopted by the Division Bench of this Court, all those judgments are binding on all of us and in view of the ratio of this decision, he would not deem it necessary to argue this point and, in my opinion, rightly so. The decisions in these three cases leave no scope, except to hold, that an order of framing charge is a final order though there are certain observations by Desai, 3. in paragraph 110 of his judgment to the contrary. ( 14 ) THUS the view of the Bombay High Court is that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 15 ) IN 1981 Cri. Li. in paragraph 110 of his judgment to the contrary. ( 14 ) THUS the view of the Bombay High Court is that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 15 ) IN 1981 Cri. Li. 460 (supra), the same question came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court and Kumari P. Janaki Amma, J. observed and held thus: Even assuming that the Court has gone wrong in framing the charge without giving reasons thereto the order framing the charge is an interlocutory proceeding and as such no revision will lie in view of section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The framing of the charge does not put an end to the proceedings; the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is no doubt true, that if the Court had passed an order discharging the accused that would have been a final order. This is so because the order of discharge finally given an end to the prosecution and therefore there is a termination of the entire proceedings; that is not so in the case of a proceeding framing the charge. Therefore, even assuming that the Court committed an irregularity in omitting to pass a formal order leading to the framing of a charge the said proceeding is not open to revision in view of section 397 (2) of the Code. The position is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in V. C. Shukla v. State (supra ). ( 16 ) IN the case of N. H. Ramamoorthi, In Re, (supra), it has been held that an order framing charge is purely interlocutory and the powers of revision cannot be exercised by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 397 of the Code. Reliance has been placed on the principles laid down in V. C. Shuklas case. The full report is not available for my perusal. ( 17 ) THE Calcutta High Court in (1972) 2 Cri. L. J. 1297, held: Framing of charges is nothing- but written formulation of specific accusation and communicated to the accused so that he may defend himself. The controversy between the parties cannot be said to be finally set at rest by framing charges. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in (1976) 2 Cri. L. J. 1901. L. J. 1297, held: Framing of charges is nothing- but written formulation of specific accusation and communicated to the accused so that he may defend himself. The controversy between the parties cannot be said to be finally set at rest by framing charges. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in (1976) 2 Cri. L. J. 1901. ( 18 ) IN the case of United Flour Mills Co. Ltd. and others v. Corporation of Calcutta,32 the Calcutta High Court has held that the order which goes at the root of the proceeding can be revised and it cannot be said to been interlocutory order and that whether a proceeding should be quashed or not goes at the root of the proceeding. A reference has been made to the principles laid down in Amarnaths case and Madhu Limayes case. ( 19 ) THE Delhi High Court, in 1975 Cri. L. J. 1185, has held that an order framing a charge is not revisable in view of the provisions of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 20 ) IN (1975) ii Bom. L. R. 458, the following observation had been made by the Bombay High Court: Now, as already noted, it was after the coming into force of the new Code that the charge was framed in this case by passing an interlocutory order on April 9. 1974 and it is the corrrectness of that order that is challenged by the present revision petition. On a plain reading of section 397 (2), prima facie it does appear that this being an interlocutory order, this Court is prevented from exercising revisional powers in the present case. But as observed in 1981 Cri. L. J. 454 (supra), the question had net been argued before the Bench in the said case and the above observation had been made on the assumption that the order framing charge was an interlocutory order. ( 21 ) IT would thus be seen that the views of the Calcutta. High Court and the Delhi High Court and the earlier view of the Bombay High Court that an order framing charge would be construed to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) had been recorded prior to the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1978 S. C. 47 and AIR. 1980 S. C. 962. High Court and the Delhi High Court and the earlier view of the Bombay High Court that an order framing charge would be construed to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) had been recorded prior to the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1978 S. C. 47 and AIR. 1980 S. C. 962. The view of this Court holding that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code had been recorded after the decision reported in AIR. 1978 S. C. 47 to which reference had been made therein, but before the decision reported in AIR. 1980 S. C. 962. The views of the Bombay High Court in the two cases reported In 1981 Cri. L. J. 454 and 1982 Cri. L. J. 1025, holding that the framing of charge is not an interlocutory order and the views of the Madras and Kerala High Courts to the contrary in the two cases referred to above have been recorded after the decision reported in AIR. 1980 S. C. 962. I may state at the cost of repetition that V. C. Shuklas case was placed before the Court in 1980 Cuttack Law Reports, 256, but after V. C. Shuklas case was distinguished, no final and definite view had, in terms, been recorded by K. B. Panda, J. that an order framing charge was not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 22 ) THERE is a direct decision of this Court reported in 47 (1979) C. L. T. 126 by 5k. Ray, C. J. , referred to above, that the framing of charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. True, this view had been recorded prior to the decision in V. C. Shuklas case, but the observation of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case had been referred to and mainly on the principles laid down in that case, it has been held that the order framing charge is not an interlocutory order and, therefore, the bar under section 397 (2) would not apply. For the reasons to follow, I would adopt with respect the view recorded by S. K. Ray, C. J. in the aforesaid case and the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in 1981 Cri. For the reasons to follow, I would adopt with respect the view recorded by S. K. Ray, C. J. in the aforesaid case and the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court in 1981 Cri. L. J. 454 and 1982 Cri. L. J. 1205 holding that the framing of charge is not interlocutory order and, in my view, the aforesaid case of this Court had correctly been decided and the principle laid down therein remains unaffected by the decision of the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case. ( 23 ) SECTION 397 empowers the High Court or any-Sessions Judge to call for and examine the records of an inferior court to find out the legality or regularity of any proceeding or order made therein. When any illegality or irregularity which justifies rectification is found upon an examination of the record, the machinery for exercise of the power is provided in sections 398 to 402 of the Code. The object evidently is to set right the patent defect or error. As a broad proposition, revisional interference may be justified where (a) the decision is grossly erroneous, (b) there is no compliance with the provisions of law, (c) the finding of fact affecting the decision is not based on evidence, (d) material evidence of the parties is not considered and (e) judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These instances are, however, illustrative and not exhaustive. Keeping these aspects in mind, one may have to judge as to whether an order is an interlocutory one or it is an intermediate or a final order calling for interference in revision. ( 24 ) IN AIR. 1968 S. C. 733 (supra), some tests to determine a final order as distinct from interlocutory order have been indicated and one of the tests is If the order In question is reversed, would the action have to go on? This court, in 47 (1979) c. L. T. 126, referred to this test indicated by the Supreme court and held: Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the plea of the petitioner succeeds and the order of the Magistrate framing charges is reversed or quashed, the criminal proceeding initiated against him cannot go on. The finality of an order is not to he judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint-, viz. The finality of an order is not to he judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint-, viz. , whether the petitioner committed the offences charged against him therein. The fact that the controversy still remained alive is irrelevant. Applying the above principle to the present case, the order of the Magistrate is a final order, as opposed to an interlocutory order. ( 25 ) IN Madhu Limayes case, a complaint was filed against the accused under section 199 (2) of the Code with an allegation that he had committed an offence of defamation against Mr. A. R. Antulay, the then Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra. The accused-appellant raised certain contention in the Sessions Court and one of the contentions was the defamatory statements were not in respect of the conduct of the complainant in the discharge of his public functions and, as such, the Sessions Judge was not entitled to take cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the contention raised by the appellant and framed a charge under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged this order in the High Court at Bombay. A preliminary objection was raised that the said order was an interlocutory order and, as such, could not be revised. This contention was accepted. The accused-appellant took tile matter before the Supreme Court in appeal. The Supreme Court held thus: Ordinarily and generally the expression interlocutory order has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term final order. In Volume 22 of the third edition of Halsburys Laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1606 a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. In para 1607 it is said: In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. In para 1607 it is said: In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. In para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declaration of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out is termed interlocutory. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals ( 26 ) IN Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, Kania C. ]. , delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pages 185 and 186 (of FCR): (at p. 3 of AIR ). Lord Esher M. R. said in Sulaman v. Warner, If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these ruler it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory. To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgment of Fry Li. and Lopes Li. Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court (at that time there) was no bar like section 397 (2) was not a final order within the meaning of section 205 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of -the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to the final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of -the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to the final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words interlocutory order occurring in section 297 (2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing we have a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by section 397 (1 ). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders will be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or propriety on an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior criminal Court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide for example, The River near (sic) Commissioners v. William Adamson331 and R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India,34 that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being converse of the words final order. There maybe an - order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswamis case (supra), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure and simple. Some kind of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). It is neither advisable, not possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be called out from many decided cases. We may, however indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. ( 27 ) IN AIR. 1968 S. C. 733, after an enquiry under section 476 of the old Code, an order was passed directing the filing of a complaint against the appellant which was affirmed by the High Court. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, the question arose as to whether the order was final order. Shelat, 3. delivering the judgment on behalf of himself and two other learned Judges, said that it was a final order. The dissenting judgment was given by Bachawat, 3. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, the question arose as to whether the order was final order. Shelat, 3. delivering the judgment on behalf of himself and two other learned Judges, said that it was a final order. The dissenting judgment was given by Bachawat, 3. on behalf of himself and one other learned Judge. In the majority decision, four tests were called out as indicated earlier, from some English decisions which have been enumerated at page 737 of the report (AIR. 1968 S. C. 733 ). One of the tests is, If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on? In 1978 S. C. 47, the Supreme Court observed: Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the plea of the appellant succeeds and the order of the Sessions Judge is reversed, the criminal proceeding as initiated and instituted against him cannot go on. If, however, he loses on the merits of the preliminary point the proceeding will go on. Applying the test of Kuppuswamis case such an order will not be a final order. But applying the fourth test noted at page 688 in Mohan Lals case it-would be a final order. The real point of distinction, however, is to be found at page 693 (of SCR): (at p. 738 of AIR) in the judgment of Shelat 3. The passage runs thus: As observed in Ramesh v. Patni,35 the finality of that order was not to be judged by correlating that order with the controversy in the complaint, viz. , whether the appellant had committed the offence charged against, him therein. The fact that the controversy still remained alive is irrelevant. The majority view is based upon the distinction pointed out in the above passage and concluding that it is a final order within the meaning of Art. 134 (1) (c ). . . ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court has held in AIR 1978 S. C. 47, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point, which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). . . ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court has held in AIR 1978 S. C. 47, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point, which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). Referring to the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 403 (supra), the Supreme Court observed: We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Parmeshwari Devi v. State, that an order made in a criminal proceeding against a person who is not a party to the enquiry or trial and which adversely affected him is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). Referring to a passage from the decision of this Court in Mohan Lals case the passage which is to be found in Halsburys Laws of England, Volume 22, it has been said by Shinghal 3. , delivering the judgment of the Court at page 164 (of SCR) (at p. 406 of AIR) It may thus be conclusive with reference to the stage at which it is made, and it may also be conclusive as to a person, who-is not a party to the enquiry or trial, against whom it is directed. Referring to the principles laid down in Kuppuswamis case (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: Before we conclude we may point out an obvious almost insurmountable, difficulty in the way of applying literally the test laid down in Kuppuswami Raos case and in holding that an order of the kind under consideration being not a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one. If a complaint is dismissed under section 203 or under section 204 (4), or the Court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make section 398 of the new Code otiose. Does it stand to reason, then, that an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complaint or otherwise and Which is fit to be quashed on the face of it? The legislature left the power to order further enquiry intact in section 398. The legislature left the power to order further enquiry intact in section 398. Is it not then in consonance with the sense of justice to leave intact the remedy of the accused to move the High Court for setting aside the order adversely made against him in similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding? The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above. ( 29 ) THE law laid down in Madhu Limayes case is the same as laid down in Y. C. Shuklas case. In the latter case, the Supreme Court has affirmed, as has rightly been observed by the Bombay High Court in 1981 Cr. L. 3. 454, its earlier view that the framing of a charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2 ). The decision of the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case had been based upon the construction of section 11 of the Special Court Act and, in particular, upon the existence of the non obstante clause in section 11 of the said Act. The Supreme Court held: On a true construction of section 11 (1) of the Act and taking into consideration the natural meaning of the expression interlocutory order there can be no doubt that the order framing charges against the appellant under the Act was merely an interlocutory order which neither terminated the proceedings nor finally decided the rights of the parties. According to the test laid down in Kuppuswamis case (supra) the order impugned was undoubtedly an interlocutory order. Taking into consideration, therefore, the natural meaning of interlocutory order and applying the non obstante clause, the position is that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstante clause and therefore section 397 (2) of the Code cannot be called a into aid in order to hold that the order impugned is not an interlocutory order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye and Amarnath v. State of Haryana, were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly section 307 (2), they were correctly decided and would have no application to the interpretation of section 11 (1) of the Act, which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause. The Supreme Court also observed: A Division Bench consisting of three Judges (i. e. judgment in Madhu Limayes case) held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a revision against such an order was competent before the Sessions Judge or the High Court. xx xx xx Even so, the ratio decidendi in the aforesaid case was, in our opinion, absolutely correct and we are entirely in agreement with the learned Judges constituting the Bench that the order of the Sessions judge framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, as not merely an interlocutory order but partook of the nature of a final order or, at any rate, an intermediate order so as to be taken out of the bar contained in section 397 (2) of the Code. xx xx xx We find ourselves in complete agreement with the exposition of the law by the learned Judge who decided the said case. We will deal with a broader and a wider aspect of the matter in a later part of our judgment when we deal with the scope and ambit of the Act. We might reiterate here even at the risk or repetition that the term interlocutory order used it the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liable construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in section 397 (2) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases coming up before the Courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four comers of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Session Judge, could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four comers of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Session Judge, could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi-final. The same, however, in our opinion, could not be said of the Special Courts Act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and speediest disposal xx xxxx We may, however, point out that we are in complete agreement with the principle, involved in the cases discussed above, that an order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial and it is the duty of the Court to apply its judicial mind to the materials and come to clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out on the basis of which it could be justified in framing charges. xx xx xx To sum up, the essential attributes of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia, J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. ( 30 ) THE ultimate decision of the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case is that an order framing charge is an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 11 of the Special Courts Act and while so deciding, the Supreme Court has held that the nature of the order framing charge under the Code would be different from the nature of similar order under the Special Courts Act. I have quoted the relevant extract from the decision of the Supreme Court in the foregoing paragraph. I have quoted the relevant extract from the decision of the Supreme Court in the foregoing paragraph. As would clearly appear from the observations made therein, a line of distinction has been drawn between an order framing charge in a criminal case governed by the Code and an order framing charge coming within the purview of section 11 of the Special Courts Act. It has been held in no uncertain terms that as the decisions of the Supreme Court in Amar Naths case and Madhu Limayes case were with regard to the orders made in accordance with the provisions of the Code, the principles had correctly been laid down and those principles would have no application while interpreting section 11 (1) of the Special Courts Act which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code by virtue of the non obstante clause. The ratio decidendi in Madhu Limayes case was absolutely correct, as observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court who were in agreement with the learned Judges that the order framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, was not merely an interlocutory one, but was of the nature of a final order, or at any rate, an intermediate order, not coming within the purview of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 31 ) IN view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, the submissions raised by the learned Additional Government Advocate that it has been decided in V. C. Shukias case that an order framing charge is an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code cannot prevail. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in that case is a direct authority for the proposition that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 32 ) THE order framing a charge is not a matter of mere formality. It affects a persons liberty and it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the materials warrant the framing of a charge. This part of the trial does contemplate the application of a judicial mind to the materials placed before the Court against an accused person. It affects a persons liberty and it is the duty of the Court to consider judicially whether the materials warrant the framing of a charge. This part of the trial does contemplate the application of a judicial mind to the materials placed before the Court against an accused person. If in the instant case, the charges had not been framed after proper application of mind, the three cases would have been put to an end to and the trials could not have gone on. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on a careful examination of this question with reference to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court including the cases reported in AIR. 1978 S. C. 47 and AIR. 1980 S. C. 962, has come to the conclusion that the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case as also in V. C. Shuklas case has specifically held that the order framing charge is not an interlocutory order. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, therefore, have answered the reference by holding that an order framing a charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 33 ) I would with respect adopt the view of the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case which was reiterated in yet another decision of the same court in 1982 Cri. [. 3. 1025 (supra ). The view of this Court in 47 (1979) C. [. T. 126 (supra) that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order and that, therefore, a revision is not barred under section 397 (2) of the Code thus finds support not only from Madhu Limayes case, but also in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case. I would respectfully adopt the view, of this Court and that of the Bombay High Court in this regard based on the principles laid down in Madhu Limayes case and agreeing with the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limiyes case has been reiterated in V. C. Shuklas case to the effect that on order framing under the Code is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2) of the Code. ( 34 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that an order framing charge under the Code is not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a criminal revision lies against such an order. The objection raised on behalf of the State that the three revisions are not competent under section 397 (2) of the Code cannot prevail. ( 35 ) EVEN assuming that section 397 (2) would be a bar in the instant cases with reference to the three impugned orders, as decided by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case with reference to the ambit and scope of section 482 of the Code for the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court, this Court can set at naught the impugned orders by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, if it is found to be necessary in the interests of justice. The Supreme Court observed thus: Under section 435 or the 1898 Code the High Court had the power to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the law engrafted in any of the sections following section 435. Apart from the revisional powers, the High Court possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex debito justifies to do the real and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists. In express language this power was recognised and saved in section 561a of the old Code. Under section 397 (1) of the 1978 Code revisional power has been conferred on the High Court in terms which are identical to those found in section 435 of the 1898 Code. Similar is the position approves the inherent powers of the High Court. We may read the language of section 482 (corresponding to section 561a of the old Code) of the 1973 Code. It says: or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It says: or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed Ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: (1) That the power is not to he resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provisions of the Code. 9. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegation made or the evidence adduced in Court. In the background aforesaid, we proceed to examine as to, what is the, correct position of law after the introduction of a provision like sub-section (2) of section 397 in the 1973 Code. ( 36 ) REFERRING to Amar Naths case, the Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case held: As pointed out in Amar Naths case (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally, More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing subsection (2) in section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1892 Code. On a plain reading of section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of section 397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in subsection (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principle enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance, of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397 (2) can limit or effect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. On such cases would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. On such cases would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. Thus if a situation arises calling for exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court, Section 397 (2) of the Code would not bar the exercise of such jurisdiction for the ends of justice in fills and appropriate cases to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court although such powers should be exercised sparingly and in cases where it is desirable that a criminal proceeding initiated vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction should be quashed. I am fortified in my view further by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Mohan Mondal and others v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed and held thus: We agree with the High Court that against an order passed in appeal under section 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the order would not be revisable by the High Court under section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. . . , but there can be no doubt that the Court is entitled to examine the matter under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code which expressly overrules the bar contained in Section 341 of the Code. In the instant case, the High Court has merely indicated that this is not a fit case for invoking the inherent power without at all applying its mind whether or not in the circumstances, it was a fit case for filing a complaint, particularly when the matter rested merely on oath against oath. Assuming that section 397 (2) would be a bar three Revisions before me, this Court can, by exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, set aside the impugned orders in case there be necessity to quash the orders to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and for the ends of justice. ( 37 ) I would now come to the question of legality and propriety of framing the charges after rejecting the applications made on behalf of the petitioner for adjudication. Section 240 of the Code provides: 240. Framing of charge- (1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. Before a Magistrate frames a charge against an accused person, he must apply his mind to the facts of the case and to the materials produced before him and if upon such consideration, he is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he is to frame a charge against him. A charge is not automatically to be framed merely because the prosecution, by relying on the documents referred to in section 173 of the Code, considers it proper to institute the case. The Court is to be satisfied before framing a charge that there is a prima facie case against an accused person. As provided in section 240 of the Code, the parties are to be heard before charge is framed and therefore, a reasonable opportunity to the parties of being heard is to be given before any charge is framed. In the cases before the learned Magistrate which are the subject-matters of these three criminal revisions, a bare reading of any of the impugned order which are on the same lines would indicate that no reasonable opportunity had been afforded to the petitioner of being heard on the question of framing of charges against him and the learned Magistrate had not even perused the materials in the form of documents on which reliance had been placed by the prosecution. I would quote below the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate in CR. Case No. 824 of 1979. The accused is present. The Advocates Mr. C. N. Dash, D. K. Dash and T. Tripathy along with Mr. S. C. Mohapatra filed joint power in favour of the accused. The defence counsel files a petition for time for argument in respect of charge which is rejected. The special Public Prosecutor Sri S. K. Acharya filed hazira. Heard both the parties. Charge under section 409 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code is framed against the accused. It was read over and explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The special Public Prosecutor Sri S. K. Acharya filed hazira. Heard both the parties. Charge under section 409 and 477a of the Indian Penal Code is framed against the accused. It was read over and explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Issued W. T. message to Sri B. C. Patra, Inspector of Vigilence, Cuttack through A. I. C. Vigilance, Cuttack who has sealed the documents which are voluminous and which an kept under his seal to be opened in his presence and to be present during inspection of documents by the defence lawyers and to hand over the same in detail to the Court Malkhans clerk fixing the case to 10-5-1982 for record inspection and summon the Auditor L. N. Khuntia through Audit Officer, Co-operative Societies, Cuttack II (Dhobilan Chhak ). There is nothing in the order quoted above indicating that the petitioner had been guilty of laches in the past or that he had the intention of protracting the proceeding or had asked for adjournments on previous occasions for the hearing on the question of framing charges. An application was made on his behalf for some time for hearing arguments on the question of charges, but the application was rejected without recording any reasons whatsoever. This was certainly not proper. The learned Magistrate has then recorded that he heard the parties and framed charges. Although reasons in details may not necessarily be given while framing the charges, the order should indicate that the learned Magistrate has applied his mind to the facts and materials placed before him. The learned Magistrate did not even record in the order that he had been satisfied from the materials that there was a prima facie case against the petitioner under sections 409 and 477 A of the Indian Penal Code. As the order itself would show, the documents had been kept sealed and, therefore, orders had been passed for production of the documents for inspection. Thus the fact remains that the learned Magistrate had not and, indeed, could not have gone through the documents before framing the charges. For all these reasons, I would accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the orders framing charges should be quashed and that the learned Magistrate should be directed to afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner for being heard in the three cases. 38. For all these reasons, I would accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the orders framing charges should be quashed and that the learned Magistrate should be directed to afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner for being heard in the three cases. 38. In the result, therefore, the three criminal revisions are allowed and the impugned orders in the three cases are set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to hear both the sides on the question of framing charges afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of being heard and then decide, upon consideration of the materials on which the prosecution seeks reliance including the documents kept sealed, as to whether charges are to be framed. Revisions allowed.