JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. - This petition is directed against concurrent decree passed by the courts below decreeing the suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 3 against the petitioner. 2. The suit was filed on the assertion that the petitioner was a tenant of the plaintiff-trust in the disputed house. Despite a notice of demand the defendant did not pay the arrears of rent demanded nor vacated the accommodation. Hence the suit. The defence was that the defendant was regularly paying rent to one Gopal Das with whom the tenancy was settled and consequently, there was no default. Another plea raised in the defence was that the notice served by the plaintiff seeking to determine the tenancy of the defendant was invalid. The defendant also appears to have contested the claim of the plaintiff that the premises in question were constructed in the year 1972. According to the defendant, he was entitled to the protection of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, as the building was an old one. 3. On the pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed. 1. Whether the defendant has committed default in paying the rent even after getting the notice of demand as alleged by the plaintiff ? 2. Whether the notice is illegal ? 3. Whether the defendant is entitled to get the benefit of the alleged deposit of the rent and the costs of it etc. as alleged by him? 4. Whether the premises in question was constructed in the year 1972 or before ? 5. To what relief, if any is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. It is pertinent to mention at this stage that no issue was framed as regards whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. The petitioner allowed the suit to be tried on the issues framed above without any objection. 5. The trial court held that the defendant was in default. If further held that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. With these findings, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act which has been dismissed Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. With these findings, the suit of the plaintiff-respondent was decreed. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner filed a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act which has been dismissed Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Shri I.H. Khan learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a number of points in support of this petition, which I shall deal with seriatim. 8. The first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that an issue ought to have been framed by the trial court on the question whether or not relationship of landlord and the tenant existed between the defendant and the plaintiff. This was an issue which arose directly from the pleadings of the parties and the omission to frame an issue on this point has resulted in failure of justice. I am unable to accept the above contention. The first objection to this contention is that the petitioner did not press for framing of any issue on the aforesaid point. Indeed, in a Small Cause Court suit the court is not required to frame issues. It is only required to set out points for determination. In any case, of the petitioner wanted that the pleas raised by him in the written statement. which according to him amounted to plea that the plaintiff was not his landlord, he should have pressed for an issue on this point also when issues were being struck off in the suit. 9. Further on the question whether the plaintiff was the defendant's landlord, the parties appear to have led evidence. The defendant was cross- examined also on the point. Thus, it would appear that the petitioner has not in any way been prejudiced on account of the omission of the trial court to frame an issue on this points till further, I find from a perusal of the written statement of the defendant that having admitted that the defendant was a tenant in the disputed accommodation in his additional pleas, the defendant did not specifically and categorically assert that Mahant Gopal Das was his lessor. He contended himself with saying that the tenancy was settled with Mahant Gopal Das. It is not disputed that Gopal Das is one of the Mahants of the plaintiff-trust. He contended himself with saying that the tenancy was settled with Mahant Gopal Das. It is not disputed that Gopal Das is one of the Mahants of the plaintiff-trust. The mere fact, therefore, that the talks of tenancy took place with Mahant Gopal Das did not automatically lead to raising a plea that Mahant Gopal Das was the defendant's lessor. 10. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the revisional Court's finding on the issue whether the plaintiff was the landlord of the defendant or Mahant Gopal Das is vitiated in law as the question was essentially one of fact and the same not having been made the subject of issue by the trial Court. The revisional court in the exercise of its limited powers under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act ought not to have given a finding on that question itself. 11. I am not impressed by the above submission. The issue which the revisional Court took up for consideration was whether the notice served by the plaintiff on the defendant was invalid. Such an issue could certainly be disposed of by the revisional court itself on the material existing on the record as the same was one purely of law and upon a decision of the same the entire suit could be disposed of. Further, as regards the complaint of the petitioner that the issue should not have been decided by the revisional court itself in the absence of any specific issue on this point. I have already made my comments. The parties had led evidence on the validity.of notice and the revisional court was, therefore, justified in considering that question for itself. 12. Moreover, I have examined the finding of the revisional Court on that issue and I am clearly of the opinion that on the evidence existing on the record, the conclusion reached by the revisional court is perfectly sound. On behalf of the plaintiff, a categorical statement had been made that the defendant was the tenant of the plaintiff and that being a religious trust its affairs were being managed by the Mahanths including Gopal Das. In the cross- examination, the defendant was unable to state whether Gopal Dass was realising rent in his own right or on behalf of the plaintiff. In the cross- examination, the defendant was unable to state whether Gopal Dass was realising rent in his own right or on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant also admitted in his statement that Gopal Das was the Mahant of the plaintiff-trust. Coupled with this as mentioned above, there was the significant fact. That the defendant did not take up any specific plea in his written statement that Mahant Gopal Das was his landlord. The defendant also did not get any issue framed on this point. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the revisional court is sound and it ought not to be interfered with by this court. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the revisional court misread the evidence on the record. The defendant had not admitted that he was a tenant of the plaintiff trust. This point too has no merit. The revisional court has not said that the defendant has admitted in his written statement that he was a tenant of the plaintiff. What the revisional court has said is that the defendant has admitted his capacity as a tenant in the disputed building. The further fact that the property belongs to the plaintiff trust also stood admitted to the defendant. It was in this back ground that the pleas of the defendant in his written statement were considered by the revisional court in the light of the evidence on the record. There was thus no misreading of evidence on the record by the revisional Court. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. The execution of the decree for ejectment of the petitioner shall, however, remain stayed until the 31st of March, 1983 provided that the petitioner shall handover vacant possession of the disputed accommodation to the plaintiff-respondent on or before that date and he shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person over the disputed accommodation. The petitioner shall also deposit in the trial Court the entire arrears of rent and damages together with the costs decreed by the trial court within a period of two months from today. Any amount which the petitioner has already deposited shall be liable to be adjusted. The petitioner shall also deposit in the trial Court the entire arrears of rent and damages together with the costs decreed by the trial court within a period of two months from today. Any amount which the petitioner has already deposited shall be liable to be adjusted. The petitioner shall further deposit damages for the use and occupation in the trial court within a period of two months from today, for the period ending.