JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - Two small Causes Court Suit Nos. 22 of 1979 and 1 of 1980 were filed by respondent Radhey Shyam against Keshav Prasad and Rama Shanker Gupta respectively. Both the suits were dismissed by the Judge, Small Causes Court by separate judgments dated 18.2.1981. Two revisions i.e., Civil Revision No. 50 of 1981 and 51 of 1981 were filed by the petitioners of the two writ petitions, which have been allowed and the two suits filed by the landlord-respondent Radhey Shyam have been decreed. In these two connected writ petition it is these two judgments of the IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Mirzapur dated 3.9.1982 which have been challenged. 2. At the admission stage of these writ petitions the contesting respondent put in appearance through their counsel and filed counter-affidavit to which rejoinder affidavits were filed by the petitioners. Both these writ petitions have been heard together and the learned counsel for the parties have made a statement that they may be decided together as the questions involved in the two petitions are exactly the same. In these circumstances, these two writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment, after hearing the arguments of the parties. 3. The brief facts for the purposes of deciding the present writ petitions are that the suits were filed on the basis that the plaintiff-respondent Radhey Shyam had let out the shops in dispute to the petitioners on 19.7.71. It was also alleged that an agreement was executed between the parties under which tenancy was created in favour of the petitioners. The suit was filed on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant. In the plaint it was also stated that the tenancy of the petitioners have been duly terminated by a notice. The relief was for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. 4. The suits were mainly, contested by the petitioners on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent Radhey Shyam was not the owner of the property in dispute and the owner was the mother Shrimati Nanka who had let out the shops to the petitioners. 5. The Judge, Small Causes Court accepted the plea raised by the petitioners in the two suits and held that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 5. The Judge, Small Causes Court accepted the plea raised by the petitioners in the two suits and held that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In the revisions which were filed by the plaintiff-respondent, the decision given by the Judge, Small Causes Court has been reversed and it has been held that the plaintiff-respondent has been able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant and was thus entitled to get the reliefs prayed in the suit. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in these two writ petitions has challenged the impugned judgments passed in revisions, firstly on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent could succeed only when the lease deed, which had been put forth by him had been proved. It has been argued that a bare perusal of the plaint would show that the plaintiff was claiming relationship of landlord and tenant on the basis of a written lease-deed and as the lease-deed was inadmissible in evidence, having not been registered as required by law, the finding that the petitioner was a tenant of the plaintiff-respondent is erroneous in law. In this connection it has also been argued that the plaintiff having no title to the property in dispute, no lease could be created in view of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the bar of Section 116 of the Evidence Act could not operate against the petitioners. Reliance has been placed on an unreported decision of a Division on Bench of this Court in Yarif Ahmad and another v. Satish Kumar and another, 1983(1) Rent Control Reporter 255 : 1983 All. Rent Cases 422. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, urged that even though the lease deed is not taken into account, the plaintiff-respondent had from other evidence proved the relationship of landlord and tenant which existed between the parties and thus the plaintiff's suit had rightly been decreed by the revisional Court. 8. There can be no doubt that the lease-deed being an unregistered lease-deed could not be admitted to prove the terms and conditions of the lease. 8. There can be no doubt that the lease-deed being an unregistered lease-deed could not be admitted to prove the terms and conditions of the lease. In the unreported decision of Zarif Ahmad (supra) it has been laid down that such an unregistered lease deed can be looked into for collateral purposes, which according to the Bench was not for creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. In the aforesaid decision a case of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Kumar Dass v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 23. has been noticed in which it has been held : "In such case the duration has to be determined by reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. The rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance other circumstance ........ The Bench after noticing the aforesaid case held : "In accordance with the law laid down in the aforesaid decision, in relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the parties, a monthly tenancy can be presumed under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, if the lease had not taken for manufacturing or agriculture purpose." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the extent that the unregistered lease-deed could not be taken into account for the purposes of establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant in my opinion, is correct. However, as has been held in the case of Zarif Ahmad and another (supra) the aforesaid unregistered document can be looked into for collateral purposes. It has thus to be seen as to whether there was justification for the revisional Court to have come to the conclusion that relationship of landlord and tenant existed if the unregistered document had been except for collateral purpose ignored. A bare perusal of the judgment would indicate that the revisional Court had also passed his finding on other evidence, which had been led in this case. A bare perusal of the judgment would indicate that the revisional Court had also passed his finding on other evidence, which had been led in this case. However, for examining this question is some detail as to whether the finding on the aforesaid question recorded by the revisional Court suffers from an error or law apparent on the face of the record, requiring interference under Article 226 of the Constitutions, other arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners also requires consideration. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the revisional Court erred in relying on Section 3(j) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as on the own showing of the plaintiff-respondent the provisions of that Act were not applicable to the case. The argument, which the learned counsel for the petitioners raised was that a lease can be created by a person who has title to the property. It was contended that the Judge Small Causes Court had recorded a finding that the plaintiff had no title to the property. It was held that the revisional Court had not gone into the question of title at all and that, in fact, the suit was not cognizable by the Judge, Small Causes Court as it involved complicated question of title. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel has no force. A bare perusal of the plaint would show that in para 6 it has been clearly mentioned that relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence between the parties and the petitioners have always been paying rent and house tax to the plaintiff. From the reading of the plaint in the two suits it is clear that the suit was based on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that for determination as to whether the plaintiff was landlord it was necessary to have determined the question of ownership, in my opinion, is not correct. If such an interpretation is given the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act creating and estoppel would lose all its meaning. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that for determination as to whether the plaintiff was landlord it was necessary to have determined the question of ownership, in my opinion, is not correct. If such an interpretation is given the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act creating and estoppel would lose all its meaning. In case the plaintiff is able to establish that relationships of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, and it is in pursuance of that relationship that the tenant was given possession of the property in dispute, the tenant shall not be permitted to deny that the person giving possession to him had no title to immovable property. In case the plaintiff fails to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, the suit is bound to fail. However, in case the plaintiff succeeds in proving the relationship of landlord and tenant, the question as to whether he had title to the immovable property would not arise in view of the estoppel which will operate against the defendant in view of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 10. The crucial question which thus arise for consideration in this case is as to whether despite the fact that the unregistered lease deed could not be pressed into service, by the plaintiff for proving the relationship of landlord and tenant, the finding recorded by the revisional Court in favour of the plaintiff could sustained. As has been observed above, the judgment indicates that finding is based on the other evidence led in the case. In these two writ petitions the parties have filed practically all the documents comprising the record. The written statement filed by the petitioners clearly shows that they admit that they are tenants and came into possession on the date on which the unregistered lease deed was executed. The unregistered lease deed can be looked into for collateral purposes and from that it can be found that the possession of the property as given to the petitioners by the petition on the date of which the deed was executed. Of course the unregistered lease deed cannot be looked into the purposes of finding out as to what rights were created between the parties on that date. Of course the unregistered lease deed cannot be looked into the purposes of finding out as to what rights were created between the parties on that date. However, if there is other evidence on the record which has been led by the plaintiff to prove that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties after the plaintiff of the two suits had come in possession, a month to month tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would came into existence in view of what has been held in Supreme Court case Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chander Deo (supra), as the lease even according to the petitioner had not been taken for manufacturing and agricultural purposes. Along with the counter-affidavit in the Writ Petition No. 10944 and also in the other affidavit various document have been filed. The most important document is Annexure C.A. 2, which is an application moved by the petitioner Ram Shanker under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In the aforesaid application the name of the landlord which has been mentioned is Radhey Shyam Vaish i.e. the plaintiff. Annexure 5 to the counter affidavit in writ No. 10944 shows that Ram Shanker had given a notice to Radhey Shyam through his Advocate which also clearly indicated that Rahdey Shyam through his Advocate which also clearly indicates Radhey Shyam was being treated as the landlord. Annexure 6 contains the extract of the receipts and various other payments made between the parties in connection with rent and other expenses incurred in connection with repair of the shop. It may be pertinent to note that in the rejoinder affidavit all these documents have been admitted but the petitioners have given in explanation that the rent was paid to Radhey Shyam as he was Karkun of his mother Shrimati Aanki. I am not prepared to believe this. The notice which had been given is through an Advocate. The application which has been filed under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and all the rent receipts would shows that the petitioners have been themselves accepting Radhey Shyam as landlord of the premises in dispute. The learned counsel for the respondent had tried to show me certain documents from which it appears that Radhey Shyam has admitted that his mother is the owner of the shop in dispute. The learned counsel for the respondent had tried to show me certain documents from which it appears that Radhey Shyam has admitted that his mother is the owner of the shop in dispute. In my opinion, those document will have no bearing for the deciding the question as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties as they will be document pertinent to the question relation to owner ship of the shop. The admissions contained in all the documents i.e. the application under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the notice given by the Advocate of the petitioner Ram Shanker and the rent receipts clearly established that the petitioner themselves have admitted the plaintiff Radhey Shyam as landlord of the premises in dispute and had been paying monthly rent after having obtained the possession of the shop in dispute from him. The finding thus recorded by the revisional Court on this question. In my opinion, does not call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the end has alleged that the suit has been decreed after taking into account the terms of the lease i.e., non-payment of three months rent. In my opinion, this argument will make no difference in the result of the suit. Admittedly, a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on the petitioners. As has been held above, a month to month tenancy would be deemed to have came into existence as the relationship of landlord and tenant was established. This month to month tenancy stood terminated by giving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This plaintiff was thus entitled to get relied of ejectment of the petitioners. 12. No other point has been pressed before me. For the reasons stated above the present writ petitions fail and are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.