JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This is defendant's appeal. 2. Facts relevant are not in dispute. A consignment of 173 packages of pies and fire-bars was booked from Barakar, Eastern Railway by M/s. Barakar Engineering and Foundry Works to the plaintiff at Baitalpur, N. E. Railway for carriage on January 24, 1957. Of these, 123 packages reached the destination on March 6, 1957. Open delivery in respect of 122 packages was given to the plaintiff by the Railway Administration in July 22, 1957. The rest of the Consignment arrived at the destination during December 27 and 30, 1957. There was delivery made of 28 packages to the plaintiff on September 13, 1958. The remaining 23 packages remained undelivered. A suit was instituted by the plaintiff on Nov. 12, 1959 for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 14,311.14 as damages for the non-delivery of 23 packages. This was after the plaintiff had given notice under S. 80, C. P. C. on April 23, 1959. 3. The defendants resisted the suit pleading, inter alia, that it was barred by limitation. 4. The trial Court held on May 20, 1963, that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation At, 1908. It was pointed out also that the suit would be barred by limitation even if Article 30 applied. In appeal filed by the plaintiff the lower appellate Court reversed this finding and expressed the view on Feb. 14, 1975 that the suit is within limitation in the light of Article 31. Accordingly, the suit has been decreed for the amount mentioned above. 5. The sole point raised in controversy is with regard to the limitation for the suit giving rise to this appeal. The relevant provisions in force were as under : "30. Against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods one year When the loss or injury occurs." "31. Against a carrier for compensation for non delivery or delay in delivering goods. one year When the goods ought to be delivered." 6. The provisions are the same under the new Lamination Act, 1963, but with this material difference that the period of limitation now provided is three years instead of one year only. Parties' counsel are agreed on the point that Article 30 is inapplicable to the instant case and rightly so. one year When the goods ought to be delivered." 6. The provisions are the same under the new Lamination Act, 1963, but with this material difference that the period of limitation now provided is three years instead of one year only. Parties' counsel are agreed on the point that Article 30 is inapplicable to the instant case and rightly so. The reason is that the case is of non- delivery of goods and not of damage to the goods at all. In Jetmull Bhojraj v. Darjeeling Himalaya Railway Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1962 SC 1879 ) it was pointed out that the appropriate Article applicable was Article 30 and not Article 31 because in that case what the appellant was claiming was compensation for the damage to the goods which were eventually delivered. In the instant case, on the contrary, the claim for compensation by the Plaintiff-respondent has been in respect of 23 packages not delivered to them at all and to such a case the appropriate Article applicable during the relevant period was Article 31. 7. In Article 31 the expression when the goods ought to be delivered' came up for judicial interpretation in various cases. In Boota Mal v. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 ) their Lordships held that these words contemplated that the time would begin to run after a reasonable period has elapsed on the expiry of which the delivery ought to have been made. These words, it was pointed out, could only mean the reasonable time taken in the absence of any terms in the contract from which the time can be inferred expressly or impliedly in the carriage of the goods from the place of dispatch to the place of destination. In other words, the expression denotes the reasonable time taken for the carriage of the goods from the place of dispatch to the place of destination. The subsequent correspondence between the railway and the consigner or the consignee cannot make any difference to the starting point of limitation where the correspondence only shows that the railway was trying to trace the goods. The reasonable time referred to above cannot generally be affected by the subsequent conduct of the parties. 8. Viewed in the light of the above, it will be recalled that in the instant case 123 packages did admittedly reach the destination on March 6, 1957. The reasonable time referred to above cannot generally be affected by the subsequent conduct of the parties. 8. Viewed in the light of the above, it will be recalled that in the instant case 123 packages did admittedly reach the destination on March 6, 1957. The contract entered into for carriage between the parties did not specify any time limit within which the goods were to reach the destination. There is no reason for assuming that March 6, 1957 does not represent the date when the goods ought to have reached the destination in the normal course. The bulk of the consignment having reached the destination on March 6, 1957 and the entire consignment having been booked simultaneously at Barakar, there is no basis for assuming that the rest of the consignment ought also not to have reached the destination on March 6, 1957. This thus represents the reasonable time for the carriage of the goods within which the goods ought to be delivered in the instant case. On May 3. 1957 the plaintiff also wrote to the Railway Administration vide Ex. 10, saying that in the ordinary course the consignment should have been received long before. The period of limitation would, therefore, commence to run under Article 31 from March 6, 1957 in my opinion. Leaving this aside, there is again no dispute on the point that the rest of the consignment arrived at the destination during Dec. 27/30, 1957. It cannot be disputed, therefore, by any means that Dec. 30, 1957 represents, in any event, the date within which the goods in question ought to have been delivered and even if the limitation is taken to commence from Dec. 30, 1957. the suit brought on Nov. 12, 1959 was beyond limitation even on excluding the period of two months taken for the notice under S. 80, C. P. C. Open delivery in respect of 122 packages was given to the plaintiff on July 22, 1957. In respect of 28 packages open delivery was given on Sept. 13, 1958. The plaintiff had written to the Railway Administration on 1-1-1958, 17-4-1958 and 11-9-1958 asking for open delivery in respect of the same. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent submitted that there was delay on the part of the Railway Administration in giving open delivery in respect of the 28 packages, mentioned above. 13, 1958. The plaintiff had written to the Railway Administration on 1-1-1958, 17-4-1958 and 11-9-1958 asking for open delivery in respect of the same. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent submitted that there was delay on the part of the Railway Administration in giving open delivery in respect of the 28 packages, mentioned above. It does not appear how may this contention be said to advance the case of the plaintiff-respondent in so far as the point of limitation is concerned. In the first place, the suit for compensation is in respect of 23 packages not at all delivered to the plaintiff. The suit is not in respect of any part of the 122 or 28 packages of which open delivery was given on July 22, 1957 and Sept. 13, 1958 respectively. Further, upon the rest of the consignment arriving at the destination during Dec. 27/30, 1957, it is plain enough that open delivery asked for by the plaintiff on Jan. 1, 1958 should have been made at the earliest. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent urged himself, as I mentioned above, that there was undue delay on the part of the Railway Administration in giving the open delivery. It cannot be said in the same breath by or on behalf of the plaintiff that the Railway Administration could take an year or so in giving open delivery even after Dec. 30, 1957. Certainly, this does not represent the reasonable period within which the goods ought to be delivered to the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court observed that in the instant case the reasonable time for delivery would be that within which the open delivery of the goods in suit should have been granted after their arrival at the destination. This is not in keeping with the interpretation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Boota Mal v. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 )(supra) and, consequently, even on this criterion the limitation is not postponed till Sept. 13, 1958. The reason is that even the lower appellate Court does not maintain that the open delivery ought not to have been given expeditiously in any case after the consignment had arrived at the destination during Dec. 27/30, 1957. 9. 13, 1958. The reason is that even the lower appellate Court does not maintain that the open delivery ought not to have been given expeditiously in any case after the consignment had arrived at the destination during Dec. 27/30, 1957. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent submitted also that the plaintiff has not been at fault in the matter and that the fault lay on the part of the Railway Administration is not giving delivery of the rest of the consignment. This cannot be a factor to be taken into consideration for the purpose of computation of limitation. The hardship resulting to the plaintiff, as in the instant case, or equitable consideration are out of place in so far as the point of limitation involved is concerned, see Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chand, ( AIR 1932 PC 165 ) and General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. J.A. Rahim ( AIR 1941 PC 6 ). 10. For the reasons given above, the suit giving rise to this appeal was clearly barred by limitation in view of Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. The view taken by the lower appellate court to the contrary cannot be sustained. 11. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The suit shall stand dismissed. Costs upon parties throughout.