S. G. DODDAKALE GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) THE order dt. 13 10-1981 made by the land Tribunal, Kolar, conferring occupancy right in favour of the third respondent is challenged in this writ petition on the ground that it is not a speaking order and also an order made without notice to the petitioner. After the demise of Kalyanamma, owner of the land, her daughter jayamma sold the property in favour of hayath Khan in the year 1975. The petitioner has purchased the property from hayath Khan. ( 2 ) SRI K. T. Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, did not make serious attempt to sustain the impugned order and on the other hand, he rightly conceded that the impugned order not being a speaking order be quashed and the matter be remitted to the land Tribunal for fresh disposal according to law. In this view, there is no difficulty to allow the writ petition. ( 3 ) SRI Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted, without prejudice to his other contentions, that during the life time of Narayanappa, the third respondent as his son, could not claim conferment occupancy right and his application is liable to be rejected in view of the principles enunciated by this court in Jahirodin v. L. T. , Srinivasapur (1); hence there is no necessity to remit the matter to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal according to law. ( 4 ) FOR proper appreciation of this contention it is necessary to refer to some salient provisions of the Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). As per the preamble of this Act, the Act intends to give effect to agrarian reforms, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling of land holdings and certain other matters referred to therein. " 'tenant' is defined to mean an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes. . "'family' means an individual who hass a pouse or spouses, such individual the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and unmarried daughters, if any. . . . (vide s 2 (12) of the Act ). " 'tenant' is defined to mean an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes. . "'family' means an individual who hass a pouse or spouses, such individual the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and unmarried daughters, if any. . . . (vide s 2 (12) of the Act ). 'joint family' means in the case of persons governed by Hindu law, an undivided Hindu family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate or residence (vide S. 2 (17) of the act ). 'to cultivate personally' means to cultivate land on one's own account- (i) by ones own labour or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family or (iii ). . . . Expln. II. In the case of a joint family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is cultivated by any member of such family. (Vide S. 2 (11) of the Act) (underlining (italics) is mine ). By S. 24 of the Act, the right of a tenant is heritable and also partible. All tenan ted lands vest with the Government (vide s. 44 ). S. 45 states every tenant who was a permanent tenant, protected tenant or other tenant is entitted to be registered as as an occupant in respect of the lands of which he was a tenant. S. 48a of the Act provides for procedure for holding an enquiry including filing of an application by a tenant. ( 5 ) RELYING on S. 48a which contemplates a tenant to file an application for conferment of occupancy right, an argument is advanced to the effect that the tenant alone can apply and none else. It is undisputed that a son is the member of the joint family. The question to be considered is what is the interest of a son in the leasehold right. ( 6 ) THE Supreme Court of India in municipal Corpn. of Greater, Bombay v. Balapunchani (2) has stated thus : a tenant has both under the Transfer of Property Act and under S. 12 of the bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947 an interest in the demised premises which squarely falls within the expression 'property' occurring in sub cl. (f) of Cl. of Greater, Bombay v. Balapunchani (2) has stated thus : a tenant has both under the Transfer of Property Act and under S. 12 of the bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947 an interest in the demised premises which squarely falls within the expression 'property' occurring in sub cl. (f) of Cl. (1) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The leasehold right in an agricultural land, if it constitutes joint family property/joint property, is partible just like any other property of the joint family. The object of including the labour of any member of one's family and deeming provision in Explanation II to the effect that the land shall be deemed to be personally cultivated, if it is cultivated by any member of such family, is to confer the benefit on all such persons and not on an individual alone. If the contention that the father, head or the kartha of the family alone must apply for registration and none else is competent to apply or claim conferment of occupancy right, is accepted, it will not merely render the provisions referred to above redundant, but also the very object of the Act would be defeated. For various reasons, the father may not be in a position to apply for registration of occupancy right for example, being physically disabled or mentally deranged. Whether such disability or the circumstance would defeat the rights of other members of the family? The word 'tenant' must be construed in the light of the other definitions such as to cultivate personally', 'family', and 'joint family'. If the definition of 'tenant' is read in isolation without attaching any importance to the words 'cultivates personally' as found in this definition there may be sustenance for the contention canvassed. The scope of S. 48a has to be considered in the light of the obiect intended to be achieved conjoint with other provisions of the Act. A provision should not be read in a narrow and pedantic manner so as to defeat the object. The scope of S. 48a has to be considered in the light of the obiect intended to be achieved conjoint with other provisions of the Act. A provision should not be read in a narrow and pedantic manner so as to defeat the object. Sarkar, j. , in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa (3) held thus:"it is however well established that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. . . . . . Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law. except, in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Nevertheless, the Courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a Statute, or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a repugnancy to good sense". See Maxwell on Statutes (10th Edn.) p. 229. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (4), denning, L. J. said,"when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. . . . and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature. . . . . . . . A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out. He must then do as they would have done. A judge roust not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". T. If the word'tenant' Is construed as suggested by the learned Advocate for petitioner, irrespective of the fact, whether the leasehold right belonged to the joint family or not, it would virtually defeat the very object of the Act. T. If the word'tenant' Is construed as suggested by the learned Advocate for petitioner, irrespective of the fact, whether the leasehold right belonged to the joint family or not, it would virtually defeat the very object of the Act. The plea that leasehold rights belonged to joint family appears to have beca neither canvassed not considered in the said case. That case did not deal with the rights of a member of a joini Hindu family. Hence, the principle onunciated in the said case is inapplicable. The view which I am taking is supported by a decislon of the Division Bench in mudakappa v. Rudrappa (5), Venkataramiah, J. , (as he then was) speaking for the bench stated thus :"we therefore hold that the Land tribunal is competent to decide for the purpose of disposing of the applications under S. 48a, the question whether the leasehold rights were held exclusively by the appellant or by the joint family consisting of the appellant and the respondents before the partition took place and thereafter by all of them as eo tenants tlil the appointed day. It is its duty to do so under the Act". ( 7 ) IN Rama Singh v. Nagesh Rao (6), Bhimiah, J. , has held that an employee of a Bank cultivating the lands with the assistance of his brother is entitled to conferment of occupancy rights. In the light of these principles, the petitioner as a member of the joint Hindu family is entitled to claim conferment of occupancy right by filing an application in the prescribed form. ( 8 ) THE last contention urged by Sri prabhakar is that the interim order made by this Court on 15-2-1982 must continue till he approaches the Tribunal for necessary relief under S. 48c of the Act. Mahendra, J, on 13-2 1982 has restrained both parties from cutting and removing the standing crop on the land in dispute. This interim order will not survive after the disposal of the writ petition on merits. The apprehension of Sri Prabhakar is that by the time he approaches the Tribunal, the contesting respondent is likely to remove the standing crop. Mahendra, J, on 13-2 1982 has restrained both parties from cutting and removing the standing crop on the land in dispute. This interim order will not survive after the disposal of the writ petition on merits. The apprehension of Sri Prabhakar is that by the time he approaches the Tribunal, the contesting respondent is likely to remove the standing crop. Sri Prabhakar quoting Instances where a single Judge or a division Bench stays the operation of the final order so as to enable an unsuccessful party to obtain an interim order at the bands of the appellate Court, the Division bench or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, pending presentation of an appeal, submitted that on the same principles the the order now pronounced must be stayed and the interim order referred to above must be continued. Order passed on merit will be stayed invoking the principles embodied in Or. 41, R. 5 (2) of CPC. Since the petitioner has succeeded in the writ petition, the question of staying the order may not arise. The Supreme Court of india in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal rungta (7) has held that after the disposal of the matter the Court cannot make an interim order so as to circumvent the provisions of S. 80 of CPC and grant stay for a certain period so as to enable the unsuccessful party to move the Civil Court for necessary redress. Applying the same principle it is not permissible for me to stay the order, now pronounced, so as to enable the petitioner to move the Land tribunal under S. 48c of the Act. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. The impugned order is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted to the land Tribunal, Kolar, for fresh disposal in accordance with law after affording an opportunity to both the parties of adducing evidence and of being heard. No costs. ( 10 ) SRI Indrajit Shah, learned High court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 within four weeks from to day. --- *** --- .