JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - The petitioners, who are the defendants in a suit instituted by the opposite party as the plaintiff in the court of the Munsif, Dhenkanal, have come to this Court revision being aggrieved by the order rejecting an application made on their behalf for disposal of the suit on the ground that it had become infructuous as the period in respect of which the election of the office bearers of the Circle Executive Committee and the Zonal Executive Committee of the State Bank of India Officers Association, challenged as illegal and void, had expired. The opposite party, an Officer of Grade II of the State Bank of India and a member of the State Bank of India Officers Association of Orissa, instituted the suit against the petitioners nos. 1 to 6 for a declaration that the election of the Office-bearers to the Zonal Executive Committee and the Circle Executive Committee of the State Bank of India Officers' Association for the years 1980-1982 was null and void and for other reliefs. Evidence was led by both the sides, arguments were heard and the suit was posted for delivery of judgment, but before the judgment was delivered, an application made by the opposite party to implead the State Bank of India Officers Association as the defendant no. 7 was allowed and this order allowing the amendment was challenged, but confirmed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 592 of 1981. It was then that an application was made for the disposal of the suit on the ground that since the term of the election of the office bearers had expired, the suit suffered from lack of cause of action and consequently had become infructuous and inoperative in the changed circumstances. The opposite party objected to this and his stand was that the elected office-bearers were continuing even after the term of two years and therefore, it could not be said that no reliefs could be granted in his favour. The opposite party objected to this and his stand was that the elected office-bearers were continuing even after the term of two years and therefore, it could not be said that no reliefs could be granted in his favour. On a consideration of the contentions raised on behalf of both the parties, the learned Munsif has rejected the application by holding that even if the election of the office bearers of the Association is a bi-annual one, no further election having taken place after the expiry of two years, the office-bearers are still continuing and the Court is competent to grant relief to the opposite party as prayed for. The learned Munsif accordingly felt that this issue should be determined along with the other issues. 2. Mr. P.C. Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued that under Order VII, Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code ), a plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action and therefore, this would operate as a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force' within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XIV of the Code and the learned Munsif was wrong in rejecting the application made on behalf of the petitioners for disposal of the suit under Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code. Mr. M. M. Sahu, appearing for the opposite party, has contended that the operation of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code would be limited to the stage when the plaint is presented and would not operate at the stage in which the present suit out of which this revision arises stands at present. He has also submitted, placing reliance on the principles laid down in a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and another of the Rajasthan High Court, to be referred to hereinafter, that in view of the amendment to Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code by the Amendment Act of 1976, the learned Munsif was correct in rejecting the application as no ground had been made out for the disposal of the suit under this amended provision. 3. 3. Order XIV, Rule 2, as it stood prior to the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 104 of 1976, read thus: " Where the issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined." With regard to the difficulties in working this Rule, as it stood prior to the Amendment Act, the Law Commission, in its Fifty-fourth Report observed : " This rule has led to one difficulty Where a case can be disposed of on a preliminary point (issue) of law, often the courts do not inquire into the merits, with the result that when, on an appeal against the finding on the preliminary issue the decision of the Court on that issue is reversed, the case has to be remanded to the Court of first instance for trial on the other issues. This causes delay. It is considered that delay should be eliminated, by providing that a court must give judgment on all issues, excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or where the suit is barred on any law for the time being in force." This rule was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976 and as amended, it reads: " R. 2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues- (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues- (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision of that issue. " By amending this rule, the view of the Law Commission has been given effect to. The rule was amended with the under-noted object as would appear from the Notes on Clauses of the Amendment Bill: " Rule 2 is being substituted to provide that, although a suit can be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall ordinarily pronounce judgment on all issues, but where any issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar created by any law for the time being in force, the Court may postpone settlement of the other issues until the preliminary issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court or such bar has been determined and the Court may deal with the suit in accordance with the determination of such preliminary issue" 4. Interpreting the provision of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code, as it stood prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dhillon AIR 1964 S.C. 497 ., held thus : " Under Order 14, Rule 2 where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court : not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit." 5. In order to avoid harassment to the parties and protracted litigation by remanding the suit for fresh disposal because of misapplication of the provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2, as it then stood, and keeping in mind the observations of the Law Commission referred to above. the present provision has been made and it should be construed keeping in mind the intent of the legislature. An issue of fact or a mixed question of fact and law is not to be decided as a preliminary issue and is to be decided on merits along with the other issues. 6. In the case of Dhirendranath Chandra v. Apurba Krishna Chandra and others AIR 1979 Pat.34., G.B. Misra, J., held thus : "A plain reading of R. 2 will show that ordinarily even if the case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court is bound to pronounce judgment on all issues. The ordinary rule is subject to only one exception which has been provided in sub-rule (2) according to which if the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on issue of law only and if that issue of law relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force the court may try such issue first. It is, therefore, clear that a departure from the ordinary rule provided in sub-rule (1) of R. 2 can be made by the Court only in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule (2) and even in these circumstances the Court has only a discretion that it may try an issue of law relating to the points mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (2) as a preliminary issue before framing other issues. There is, however, nothing in sub-rule (2) which in my opinion makes it obligatory for the Court to try such an issue first in all cases. If, therefore, the Court is of opinion that in any particular case it will be more expedient to try all the issues together and therefore, if it refuses to try and decide any issue of law even on the points referred to in cls. (a) and (b) of sub-rule (2) as a preliminary issue before taking up other issues. I do not think it has committed an error touching jurisdiction. In the impugned order the court below is of opinion that it is more expedient to try the issue regarding bar under Section 66(1) of the Code along with other issues and the suit is also likely to be disposed of within a short period. It appears from the facts placed before me at the time of argument that for deciding either the point whether the suit is barred under S 66(1) of the Code or the point whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition as prayed more or less the very same facts and circumstances have to be considered according to the averments in the pleadings and it may be more convenient to decide both these points together. At any rate, however, I am not satisfied that in refusing to decide the issue regarding bar under S. 66(1) of the Code as a preliminary issue the Court below has committed any error of jurisdiction which may justify interference of this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction." 7. A comparative reading of the provision prior to and after the amendment would indicate that the consideration of an issue and its disposal as a preliminary issue has been circumscribed and made permissible only in limited cases. A comparative reading of the provision prior to and after the amendment would indicate that the consideration of an issue and its disposal as a preliminary issue has been circumscribed and made permissible only in limited cases. While previously the categorisation was only between issues of law and of fact and it was mandatory for the Court to try the issues of law in the first instance and to postpone settlement of issues of fact, under the amended provision, there is a mandate that notwithstanding the fact that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court has to pronounce a judgment of all the issues, the only exception having been contained in sub-rule (2) which relaxes the mandate by conferring a discretion upon the Court that if the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of "on an issue of law only", it may try that issue first. The exercise of this discretion has further been limited to the contingency that the issue to be so tried must either relate to the jurisdiction of the Court or be a bar to the suit created by any law in force. The use of the words "an issue of law only" has to be given its due meaning and import in the context. If every controversy with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court, whether dependent upon consideration of facts or otherwise, is to be deemed to be an issue of law, the use of the words "an issue of law only" would be without purpose and this could not be the intention of the Legislature. The amendment has changed the notion with regard to the consideration of some of the issues as preliminary ones for being tried on preferential basis and the scope in this behalf has now considerably been restricted. (See Hardwari Lal v. Pobkar Mal and others AIR 1978 Punj & Hary 230.) 8. The interpretation of the amended provision was considered in the case of Cheni Ram and another v. Shanti Devi & another AIR 1980 Raj. 192 ., and the learned Judge held : "5. (See Hardwari Lal v. Pobkar Mal and others AIR 1978 Punj & Hary 230.) 8. The interpretation of the amended provision was considered in the case of Cheni Ram and another v. Shanti Devi & another AIR 1980 Raj. 192 ., and the learned Judge held : "5. In view of the clear and unambiguous language of sub clause (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14, an issue can be considered and decided as a preliminary issue if it is an isssue of law only and on the case or part of it can be disposed of. 6. There is no provision that even though issue about limitation or jurisdiction is to be considered on disputed facts, then also evidence should be recorded on it first and it must be decided as a preliminary issue. Since the provision is not there, I cannot provide it by legislation, as a Court can only interpret and not legislate. 7. Admittedly the issue regarding jurisdiction in the instant case being based on disputed questions of fact, cannot be termed as purely legal issue. The lower court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to decide it as a preliminary issue, and therefore, impugned order is perfectly just and legal." 9. Keeping in mind the intent and purpose of the legislature in making the new provision and the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it cannot be said that in the instant case, the learned Munsif went legally wrong by not allowing the application made for the disposal of the suit on the ground that the suit bad become infructuous and in view of the respective cases of the parties, the fact that the elected office-bearers had been continuing and the controversial questions involved, the learned Munsif was correct in making an order to proceed with the suit. As submitted on behalf of the opposite party, the provision of Order VII relates to a stage of the admission of the plaint. It could not be said that the suit was barred by any law for the time being in force. 10. I would now come to the question as to whether it is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. 11. Prior to the amendment by the Amendment Act of 1976, Section 115 of the Code stood thus: "115. 10. I would now come to the question as to whether it is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. 11. Prior to the amendment by the Amendment Act of 1976, Section 115 of the Code stood thus: "115. The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit." By Clause 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1974, (No. 27 of 1974), Section 115 of the Code was proposed to be omitted. Reasons for omission were given in the Notes on Clauses thus : "Section 115 confers powers of revision on the High Court in a case not subject to appeal thereto. It empowers the High Court to call for the records of a case decided by an inferior court and to interfere if the inferior court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in it or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. There are series of decisions of the Privy Council to the effect that the section applies to the irregular exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction or illegal assumption of jurisdiction and is not directed against the erroneous conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. In spite of these decisions, the High Courts have continued to exercise a very wide and extensive jurisdiction under this section. The result is that the High Courts are flooded with applications for revision, most of which are frivolous and are filed with a view to delaying the conclusion of the litigation. The provisions of this section are particularly misused in the case of revision applications against interlocutory orders. The result is that the High Courts are flooded with applications for revision, most of which are frivolous and are filed with a view to delaying the conclusion of the litigation. The provisions of this section are particularly misused in the case of revision applications against interlocutory orders. Experience shows that often the cause of delay in the trial of suits is the entertainment of applications for revision against interlocutory orders, which invariably result in stay of proceedings. In fact, in many cases, the object of parties in moving the High Court for revision is to delay the progress of the proceedings. In view of the fact that adequate remedy is provided for in Article 227 of the Constitution for correcting cases of excess of jurisdiction, or non-exercise of jurisdiction or illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, the section is no longer necessary and is, therefore, being omitted." The Joint Committee carefully considered as to whether it would be necessary to retain Section 115 of the Code and felt that the remedy provided for in Article 227 of the Constitution was likely to cause more delay and involve more expenditure while the remedy provided in Section 115 of the Code would be cheap and easy. The Committee, therefore, felt that Section 115 of the Code which would serve a useful purpose need not altogether be omitted, but in addition to the restrictions contained in Section 115, an over-all restriction on the scope of applications for revision against interlocutory orders should be imposed. Having regard to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh Reports, the Committee recommended that Section 115 of the Code should be retained subject to the modification that no revision application would lie against an interlocutory order unless it satisfied either of the two conditions, namely, (i) that if the orders were made in favour of the applicant, it would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding ; or (ii) that the order, if allowed to stand, was likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury. The Committee felt that the expression "case decided" should be defined so that the doubt as to whether Section 115 applied to an interlocutory order might be set at rest. The Committee felt that the expression "case decided" should be defined so that the doubt as to whether Section 115 applied to an interlocutory order might be set at rest. Accordingly, a proviso and an explanation to Section 115 were added by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Section 115 of the Code, as amended, reads : "115. (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding issue, in the court of a suit or other proceeding, except where- (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. Explanation-In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding". 12. After the amendment to Section 115 of the Code by the Amendment Act of 1976, the High Court is debarred to vary and reverse any order passed in the course of a suit unless it finds that the said order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made. In the instant case, the terms of the elected office-bearers had not expired at the time of the institution of the suit. Besides the issue as to whether the suit had become infructuous, other issues have been framed. For the reasons recorded by the learned Munsif, the suit should continue and be disposed of finally on merits along with the other issues. The trial of the suit on a preliminary issue is discretionary and it cannot be said that the learned Munsif exercised her discretion, while rejecting the application to dispose of the suit on the ground that the suit had become infructuous, illegally or arbitrarily. No conclusion can reasonably be drawn that the impugned order has caused a failure of justice. 13. In the case reported in Maitreyee Banerjee v. Prabir Kumar Mukherjee AIR 1982 S.C. 17 ., the order of the District Judge allowing the amendment of the plaint had been set aside by the High Court. Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the Court, observed and held : "We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the order of the High Court by which the order of the District Judge allowing the amendment of the plaint has been set aside. After going through the amendment prayed for, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the appellant by virtue of the amendment sought, has altered the entire nature of the case or substituted a new cause of action. The High Court has given a number of reasons which relate to the merits of the case and would have to be considered by the trial Court after the evidence is concluded. Hence, we refrain from making any observations on the aspects of the matter which have been highlighted by the High Court. We are satisfied that this is not a case where the amendment would work serious injustice to the respondent. The High Court in its power of revision ought not to have interfered in a case like this as no jurisdictional error was involved. This was not a case where the amendment sought was clearly barred by limitation so as to cause an irreparable injury to the respondent " 14. In the instant case, as earlier indicated, the suit was not one which could be disposed of by the application of sub-rule (2)(b) of Rule 2 of Order XIV of the Code. This was not a case where the amendment sought was clearly barred by limitation so as to cause an irreparable injury to the respondent " 14. In the instant case, as earlier indicated, the suit was not one which could be disposed of by the application of sub-rule (2)(b) of Rule 2 of Order XIV of the Code. No jurisdictional error has been committed by the learned Munsif. It could not be said that an irreparable injury had been caused to the petitioners by the impugned order. It could not also be said that the Court, by refusing to dispose of the suit on the preliminary issue raised by the petitioners, had acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. I thus find that the revision is not competent and there is no just or reasonable ground calling for interference by this Court in revision. 15. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs of this revision. Final Result : Dismissed