JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This is a tenant's petition. It arises out of a suit filed by the Plaintiffs-Respondents No. 3 to 5 for ejectment of the Petitioner as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and damages. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit filed by the Plaintiff-Respondents, both for the ejectment of the Petitioner from the disputed shop as well as for recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 194/-for the period from 11-3-1977 to 9-4-1978 as well as pendentelite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month. 2. Shortly stated, the plaint case was that the Defendant was a tenant of the disputed shop being shop No. 50, Khirkhi Bazar, Hapur, in the district of Ghaziabad. The Plaintiffs purchased the disputed shop under three sale deeds in March, 1977 from the previous owners of the shop and they became the owners and landlords of the disputed shop. The Plaintiffs informed the Defendant of the transfer of the shop. The Defendant did not pay any rent to the Plaintiff from 11-3-1977. Consequently a composite notice of demand and termination of the tenancy was served on the Defendant. The Defendant neither paid the arrears of rent demanded nor vacated the shop. Hence the suit. 3. The defence of the Petitioner was that he was a tenant of one Husain All, who was the original owner of the disputed shop. Husain Ali had five sons, namely, Ahsan Ali, Asghar Ali, Ashraf Ali, Aman Ali and Raza Ali out of whom Ahsan Ali, AsgharAli and Ashraf Ali created Waqf-alal-aulad of their 3/5th shares which included the shop in dispute The shop was thus a waqf property. In June, 1977 the Defendant received a notice from one Shaukat Ali daughter's son of Asghar Ali aforesaid, who asked the Defendant not to pay rent to any one else. He claimed to have inherited 1/5th share in the properties, including the shop. In this notice he further asserted that any purported will of the waqf properties in favour of the Plaintiff was null and void as the vendors had no authority to sell the properties vesting in the waqf. He claimed to have inherited 1/5th share in the properties, including the shop. In this notice he further asserted that any purported will of the waqf properties in favour of the Plaintiff was null and void as the vendors had no authority to sell the properties vesting in the waqf. In view of this a bonafide doubt arose in the mind of the Defendant as to the person entitled to receive the rent in respect of the shop and consequently the Defendant started depositing rent u/s 30(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Defendant was hence not in arrears of rent as the entire rent demanded had already been duly deposited u/s 30. Moreover, the suit involved determination of a disputed question of title and having regard to the nature of the controversies involved the same was not triable by a small cause Court. 4. On the pleading of the parties relevant issues were framed by the trial Court, namely. Small Cause Court Hapur (Ghaziabad). 5. The trial Court held that by virtue of the sale deeds in their favour the Plaintiffs had become owners and landlords of the disputed shop. The Defendant was liable to pay rent to the Plaintiffs on the same being demanded from him. It rejected the plea of the Defendant that their existed any bonafide doubt or dispute as regards the persons entitled to receive the rent. Consequently the deposits made by the Defendant u/s 30 were of no avail. It also rejected the plea of jurisdiction raised on behalf of the Defendant. The result was that the suit of the Plaintiffs-Respondents was decreed. 6. Aggrieved, the Petitioner filed a revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act but without any success. Hence this petition. 7. Two points in the main were urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. These were: (1) The relief claimed by the Plaintiffs depended upon the proof or dis-proof of a title to an immovable property which a small cause Court could not effectively and finally determine, having regard to the complexity of the points at issue and consequently the Courts below should have exercised their discretion u/s 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and returned the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the title. (2) The Defendant was clearly entitled on the facts existing on the record to the benefit of the deposits made by him u/s 30(2) read with Sub-section (6) of Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the finding of the Courts below to the contrary, is manifestly unsustainable in law, and at any rate, preverse. 8. I shall take the second point first. 9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length on this point, I am clearly of the opinion that the decision of the Courts below on the validity of the deposits made by the Petitioner u/s 30(2), is manifestly unsustainable in law and is perverse. Section 30(2) reads as follows: 30(2). Where any bonafide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building. Sub-section (6) of Section 30 says: 30(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such - deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in Sub-section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in Sub-section (2). 10. It is thus clear that if it is found that the deposit made by the Defendant in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 was lawful and valid, the Defendant cannot be said to have committed any default in view of Sub-section (6) of Section 30. 11. In order that a tenant might be held entitled to make a deposit in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 what is required is that there should be a bonafide doubt or dispute as regards the person who is entitled to receive the rent. The doubt or dispute must be bonafide and not a mere pretence of doubt or a dispute. In order that a tenant might be held entitled to make a deposit in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 what is required is that there should be a bonafide doubt or dispute as regards the person who is entitled to receive the rent. The doubt or dispute must be bonafide and not a mere pretence of doubt or a dispute. In my judgment if there is material on the record on the basis of which a person might reasonably entertain a bonafide doubt or dispute as regards the person who may be entitled to receive the rent, that would be sufficient compliance with Sub-section (2) of Section 30. The fact that subsequently the Court might come to an affirmative conclusion that the rival claimant was not the landlord of the Defendant upon a consideration of the evidence on the record, that would not by itself lead to the conclusion that the tenant could not have entertained a bonafide doubt or dispute within the meaning of Section 30(2). The provision does not contemplate that the tenant must be able to decide positively and finally as to who may legally be entitled to receive the rent before he can claim the right to decide the rent u/s 30(2). In my opinion the provisions would be attracted if the doubt or dispute which the tenant alleges as having arisen at the relevant time was not a mere pretence of doubt. The doubt must be one which a reasonable person could in the circumstances in which the tenant was placed entertain. 12. In the present case, however, I find that both the Courts below having first decided the question as to who was the landlord of the disputed accommodation proceeded to determine whether the tenant could bonafide entertain any doubt. The approach was wrong. What they should have considered was whether faced with the notice of Shaukat Ali and in view of the past history, there was a reasonable possibility of a doubt or dispute. The tenant may have erred in his judgment, but the question was whether the Defendant, who was not well versed in law, could legitimately entertain the doubt. That ought to have been the approach of the Courts below, but it unfortunately was not. 13. The tenant may have erred in his judgment, but the question was whether the Defendant, who was not well versed in law, could legitimately entertain the doubt. That ought to have been the approach of the Courts below, but it unfortunately was not. 13. The revisional Court brushed aside the notice received by the Defendant from Shaukat Ali as being of no avail to the Defendant on the ground that the Defendant's previous landlords had not given any such notice to him. The trial Court dismissed this plea of the Defendant on another ground, namely, that Shaukat Ali had never realised any rent from the Defendant. 14. It is difficult to see how the question of doubt would have arisen if Shaukat Ali had realised rent from the Defendant at any time before giving the notice. The dispute can legitimately arise also if some one different from one who may upto a point of time have been realising rent comes forward and asks the Defendant to pay rent to him in the future on assertion that legally it Is he who is entitled to receive the rent on a basis which cannot be rejected out of hand. The mere fact therefore that Shaukat Ali had not been realising rent from before could not be a valid ground for dismissing the claim of the Defendant that a bonafide doubt had arisen. For the same reason the fact that the previous landlords had not given any notice prohibiting the Defendant from paying the rent to the Plaintiff was wholly irrelevant to decide the question whether there was room for doubt in the mind of the Defendant. 15. In my opinion, on the material existing on the record the conclusion is inescapable that a bonafide doubt or dispute could arise in the mind of the Defendant as regards the person who was entitled to receive the rent. 16. The Defendant had filed waqf deed whereby the waqf in question was created. He had filed several receipts to show that the rents were beings realised from him by Mohsin Ali and Ifteqar Ali who described themselves as Mutwallis of the waqf owning the shop in dispute. The Plaintiffs purchased the property only in March, 1977. 16. The Defendant had filed waqf deed whereby the waqf in question was created. He had filed several receipts to show that the rents were beings realised from him by Mohsin Ali and Ifteqar Ali who described themselves as Mutwallis of the waqf owning the shop in dispute. The Plaintiffs purchased the property only in March, 1977. Within three months of the purchase of the property by the Plaintiffs the Defendant received a notice from Shaukat Ali in June, 1977, the contents of which may be summarised as they have an important bearing on the issue of bonafide need. 17. In this notice Shaukat Ali asserted that the disputed shop was a waqf property which originally belonged to five brothers mentioned above, namely, Asghar Ali and others. Asghar Ali and two of his brothers had created a waqf in respect of their properties, including the disputed shop. Shaukat Ali was the son of Asghari Begum who was the deceased daughter of Asghar Ali. Shukat Ali had 1/5th share in the disputed shop and was hence entitled to receive rent to the extent of his 1/5th share therein. He was a Mutwalli and beneficiary of the said waqf. In connection with his employment he remained outside Hapur and, in his absence, his younger brother Ifteqar Ali aforesaid was realising rent from the Defendant. However, for the past 6ome time relations between him and Ifteqar * Ali had become strained and with the intention of causing harm to him, Ifteqar Ali had without any right or title executed a fictitious sale deed in respect of his (Shaukat Ali's) share. In any case, the property being waqf property could not legally be sold and the sale deed if any, was entirely null and void, having no effect on his right. 18. A similar notice was also given to Ifteqar Ali by Shaukat Ali. 19. The aforesaid notice coupled with the fact that the rent receipts were issued over a period of time in favour of the Defendant by persons describing themselves as Mutwallis of the aforesaid waqf could legitimately give rise to a bonafide doubt, justifying deposit of rent u/s 30(2). Shaukat Ali who gave that notice was not an utter stranger but a daughter's son of one of the persons who had created the waqf. The notice was given barely three months after the purchase of the property. Shaukat Ali who gave that notice was not an utter stranger but a daughter's son of one of the persons who had created the waqf. The notice was given barely three months after the purchase of the property. It was not suggested that the notice which was served on the. Defendant was a fictitious notice procured by him for the purpose of litigation. As mentioned above, a similar notice was given to Ifteqar Ali himself. On the aforesaid material it does not seem possible to take the view that there could not exist any bonafide doubt or dispute in the mind of the Defendant so as to entitle him to deposit rent u/s 30(2). It is impossible to reach the conclusion that the dispute or doubt expressed by the Defendant was imaginary or feigned of that it was entirely without any basis. The mere fact that the Plaintiffs had purchased the property from some of the heirs of the three persons who had created the waqf would not per se exclude the possibility of the existence of a bonafide doubt or a dispute. The Defendant was not a habitual defaulter at least it was not suggested so. Consequently it could not be said that the deposit made by him u/s 30(2) was mala fide or actuated by any improper consideration or motive. 20. The revisional Court dismissed the claim of the Defendant u/s 30(6) rather summarily on the ground mentioned above, namely, that Mohsin Ali and Ifteqar Ali had not given the notice to the Defendant demanding the rent. The fact that Mohsin Ali and Ifteqar Ali had not given the notice to the Defendant could not derrogate from the bonafides of the Defendant, in the circumstances of the present case. The doubt arose because the own brother of Ifteqar Ali, namely, Shaukat Ali had given a notice that it was he who was Mutwalli entitled to receive the rent, and, as mentioned above, Ifteqar Ali was also the daughter's son of Asghar Ali. 21. Another observation made by the revisional Court is that where the transferor informs the tenant of the of fact of transfer, the tenant would not be justified in depositing the rent u/s section 30. This is oversimplifying matters. It would depend upon the facts of each case whether there was any scope for doubt or dispute. 21. Another observation made by the revisional Court is that where the transferor informs the tenant of the of fact of transfer, the tenant would not be justified in depositing the rent u/s section 30. This is oversimplifying matters. It would depend upon the facts of each case whether there was any scope for doubt or dispute. For the same reason the case relied on by the trial Court Munshi Lal Niyaria v. Lal Kedar Nath 1970 AWR 803 , is distinguishable. In the present case the distinguishing features have been pointed out above which, in my opinion, clearly point to the conclusion that a bonafide dispute or a doubt could arise in the mind of the Defendant. In the present case, on the material which was in possession of the Defendant, it could not be said that the doubt expressed by the Defendant was imaginery and not a real and genuine doubt. 22. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents relying on a decision if this Court reported in Mohd. Bashir v. Azizul Qadar 1966 AWR 442 , submitted that the question whether a bona fide doubt as to person entitled to receive rent existed or not, was a question of fact which could not be interferred with in a writ petition. 23. I am unable to accept the above contention. While it is true that the question whether there existed a bonafide doubt or dispute in the mind of the tenant so as to entitle it to deposit the rent u/s 30(2) would be one of fact, where, as here, the Court fails to comprehend the true scope of Section 30(2) and decides the controversy on irrelevant considerations as well as omits to consider the true legal effect of such important documents as the notice and the rent receipts referred to above, the finding recorded by the Court of fact cannot be said to be immune from being challenged by way of writ petition. In the present case, as observed above, both the Courts below have dismissed the claim of the Defendant on a misconception of law as to the scope and requirements of Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. They wrongly thought that as the persons who had let out the premises had not raised any dispute as regards the transfer of the property, there could not be any possibility of a doubt. They wrongly thought that as the persons who had let out the premises had not raised any dispute as regards the transfer of the property, there could not be any possibility of a doubt. They further failed to notice the fact that Shaukat Ali was also claiming to be a Mutwalli and not only as beneficiary and that he was not a stranger, being the own brother of Ifteqar Ali. 24. Learned Counsel also placed reliance on two other decisions of this Court reported in Dharam Pal Gupta v. Asta Nand 1966 AWR 170 (paragraph 11) and Ramayan Ram v. Bharat Ram 1964 AWR 590. I have examined these two cases but neither of them seems to be of much assistance. On the facts of those cases this Court held that the tenant was not justified in making the deposit, in one case u/s 7-C(1) and in the other case u/s 7-C(2) of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947. 25. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents also submitted that the Courts below have round that the disputed shop is not a waqf property. It was urged, in that view the Defendant could not claim the right to make the deposit u/s 30(2). 26. I am unable to accept this contention. In the first place, the question whether the disputed shop is waqf property or not could not appropriately be decided in summary suit. Such a question could appropriately be decided only by means of a suit on the regular side. Secondly, the Defendant had filed rent receipts in respect of this very shop issued by Mohsin Ali and lfteqar Ali, both of whom described themselves as the Mutwallis of the trust. In this view, the Defendant could reasonably entertain a bonafide doubt for the reasons stated above, irrespective of whether upon a determination of the question of title, it may have been subsequently found that the shop was not a waqf property. We are concerned herewith a limited question only, namely, whether there was a reasonable possibility of doubt. 27. The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that in my judgment both the Courts below have committed a manifest error in disregarding the deposits made by the Petitioner u/s 30(2). We are concerned herewith a limited question only, namely, whether there was a reasonable possibility of doubt. 27. The result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that in my judgment both the Courts below have committed a manifest error in disregarding the deposits made by the Petitioner u/s 30(2). It was not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents before me or even before the Courts below that if those deposits are taken into account there would be no default on the part of the Petitioner. 28. Coming to the second point urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it does not seems necessary to dwell on it at length in the view I have expressed on the first point. I may, however, point out that Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act merely vests a discretion in a small cause Court to return the plaint in appropriate cases to the Court having the jurisdiction to determine the question of title arising in a suit. I am not satisfied that in the present case, on the whole, the Courts below have exercised their discretion improperly or illegally. In any case, no prejudice appears to have been caused to the Petitioner by the trial of the suit on the small cause Court side. 29. The result, therefore, is that the decree of the Courts below for ejectment is unsustainable in law. As no other findings recorded by the Courts below were assailed in the arguments, the decree for recovery of arrears of rent is affirmed. 30. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below in so far as the relief for ejectment is concerned, are quashed. The decrees passed by the Courts below for recovery of arrears of rent are, however, maintained. The suit for all other reliefs is dismissed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs through out in view of their divided success.