JUDGMENT HARI LAL AGRAWAL, J. 1. The dispute between the petitioners of this writ application, four in number and respondents 6 to 19 is the usual dispute of their inter se seniority. Whereas the petitioners were directly recruited as temporary Assistant Engineers by notifications dated 9th August and 12th August, 1966 (Annexure, 2 series) in the Bihar State Electricity Board (to be referred to as 'the Board') the respondents 6 to 18 were promoted as officiating Assistant Electrical Engineers on 10.4.1967 from the rank of Junior Engineers and respondent no. 19 from Engineer Assistant by notifications dated 10.4.1967 and 20.6.1967 respectively (vide Annexure 3 series). 2. In the year 1965 Eightynine vacancies in the rank of Assistant Electrical Engineer in the respondent Board were estimated for the year 1966. A panel of 142 suitable candidates was prepared and approved by the Board on 21.4.1966. This panel was valid for one year. There vacancies were to be filled up partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion on the basis of 'Quota Rule', the quota being 30% for the Junior Engineers and 25% for Engineer Assistants. The petitioners were appointed under the above proposal on the basis of an advertisement issued by the Board followed by the recommendations of the Selection Committee after regular interview held on different dates. However, it appears from Annexure F to the show cause of respondents 6 to 19 that the Board in its meeting dated 20.3.1967 (Vide Resolution No. 1419) decided to promote 16 Electrical Overseers to the rank of Assistant Electrical Engineers and in pursuance thereof respondents 6 to 18 were promoted vide notification dated 10.4.1967 just mentioned above. These respondents joined their new posts on different dates between 17.4.1967 to 9.8.1968, particulars whereof have been given by the petitioner in Annexure 7. From Annexure E it would also appear that the case for promotion of respondent no 19 (Shri Chittaranjan Prasad) was also recommended by virtue of the approval given on 7.3.1967. 3. From the facts stated above it is apparent that at the time when the petitioners were appointed and bad joined their posts, respondents 6 to 18 were working on the junior posts. 3. From the facts stated above it is apparent that at the time when the petitioners were appointed and bad joined their posts, respondents 6 to 18 were working on the junior posts. The Board by office order dated 5.7.1981 (Annexure 10 to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioners filed on 11.9.1981), while fixing the inter seniority of its officers placed the petitioners junior to respondents 6 to 19 on the ground that where officers are recruited by promotion and by direct appointment "at the same time" the promoted officers take precedence over the officers directly recruited, treating the respondents, although they went appointed later on as being appointees "in the same transaction". The petitioners have challenged this gradation list. They have also challenged the proceedings of the meeting of the Selection Committee held on 16.5.1981 when a panel for promotion to higher post, namely, Electrical Executive Engineer from the rank of Assistant Electrical Engineer in the general cadre, was prepared. This panel of the Selection Committee is Annexure 1 to the writ application. 4. The ground of attack to the above orders giving preference to the respondents 6 to 19, is that the petitioners having been appointed earlier, they should rank senior to those respondents and the reasons and grounds for treating the respondents senior to them on account of the principles mentioned above, were invalid as, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the main test for determining the interse seniority should be the length of continuous officiation to a post. The Board seems to have followed the principle laid down in the State Government's Circular No. 6509–A, dated 12.12.1934, commonly known as 'the 1934 Rules'. These Rules have fallen for consideration several times before this Court and recently a Full Bench, of which I also happened to be a Member, in the case of Bishundeo Mahto vs. State of Bihar & other, 1982 BBCJ 45 (F.B.), after considering at some length a large number of cases of our own Court and of the Supreme Court, has held that the 1934 Rules applied at the stage of temporary appointments also when the appointment is made On consideration of merits. A Bench of this Court in the case of Gaya Pd. A Bench of this Court in the case of Gaya Pd. Pandey vs. State of Bihar & other, 1972 P.L.J.R. 464, observed that seniority of a person In Government service does not depend how it is fixed by the authority concerned; rather it stands automatically determined according to the existing rules and its preparation is a mere formal matter. Although long counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 5 and 10 to 18 as well as 6 to 19, the facts that I have briefly stated above are undisputed. 5. The whole argument of Mr. Basudeva Prasad, appearing for the Board and Mr. Radha Raman appearing for the private respondents, is based upon the principle laid down in Government Circular No. 15784, dated 26.8.1972, commonly known as the 1972 Rules', where a note has been appended to paragraph 3 of the Rules explaining the expression "at the same time". It was also contended by Mr. Basudeva Prasad that the petitioners and the respondents were all confirmed simultaneously on 25.7.1977 with effect from 23.7.1977 (Vide Annexure 5 to the writ application) and therefore, it must be deemed that the petitioners and the respondents were substantively appointed on the date of their confirmation, i.e., 25.7.1977 and in that view of the matter, according to the rules governing their service conditions, the promo tees would rank senior. He also argued that the Board for the first time made rules for determining the seniority of its officers in the year 1976 which are known as Bihar State Electricity Board Electrical Engineers (General Cadre) Rules, 1976. Rule 15 (i) of these Rules reads as follows:– "Inter-se seniority of the officers of the cadre shall be fixed in the following manner (1) direct recruit shall rank junior to promotes of the same year." Earlier to this rule the 1934 Seniority Rule of the Government servants was followed by the Board. The 1934 Rules provided as follows:– "Where officers are recruited by promotion and by direct appointment at the same time, the promoted officers shall take precedence over the officers directly recruited." Mr. The 1934 Rules provided as follows:– "Where officers are recruited by promotion and by direct appointment at the same time, the promoted officers shall take precedence over the officers directly recruited." Mr. Basudeva Prasad also tried to wriggle out of the ratio of the Full Bench case of this Court (supra) on the plea that the appointment of the petitioners until they were confirmed was not substantive and until they were confirmed in the service they had no lien or right in the service. 6. The reply of Mr. S. Mukherji, learned counsel for the petitioners, was that the inter se seniority of the incumbents must be determined with reference to the date of their entry in the service and once that is determined which, according to him, stood determined automatically, there was no question of disturbing the same by the 1976 Rules. 7. It is difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Basudeva Prasad as in the case of Baleshwar Dass & other vs. State of U.P. & other, AIR 1981 S.C. 41 , the Supreme Court has set this controversy at rest and I may repeat the quotation extracted in Bishundeo Mahto's case (supra) from the above decision:– "Substantive capacity refers to the capacity in which a person holds the post and not necessarily to the nature or character of the post. To approximate to the official decision used in this connection we may well say that a person is said to hold a post in a substantive capacity when he holds it for an indefinite period especially of long duration in contradiction to a person who holds it for a definite or temporary period or holds it on probation subject to confirmation." The condition indicated in Baleshwar Dass's case that appointments to a temporary post must have been made after fulfillment of all the tests for regular appointment, is fulfilled in the present case. As already stated earlier, the petitioners were interviewed by the Selection Committee and were recommended for appointment. In that view of the matter, following the principle laid down in the above cases, there does not appear to be any reason to hold that the petitioners were not appointed in the substantive capacity. As already stated earlier, the petitioners were interviewed by the Selection Committee and were recommended for appointment. In that view of the matter, following the principle laid down in the above cases, there does not appear to be any reason to hold that the petitioners were not appointed in the substantive capacity. In another often quoted case of the Supreme Court, namely, S.B. Patwardhan vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 S.C. 2051 , it was held that the valuable right of seniority cannot depend upon the mere confirmation and that it would depend on continuous officiation. 8. For the view that I have taken, the instance of confirmation of the petitioners and the private respondents on the same date becomes irrelevant and the act of confirmation can have no reflection on the question of substantive appointment of the incumbents. The act of confirmation may give more stability in some cases to an employee, but for the question with which we are faced in the present case, in my view, it has got no bearing. The question is very simple as to whether the promotes who admittedly had joined their higher post later than the petitioners could be reckoned senior to them simply on the ground that the question of promotion was taken up by the employer at the same time when certain number of posts had fallen vacant and it was decided to fill some of them by direct recruitment and some by promotion. In view of several decisions already noticed above on the point, the answer must be given in favour of the petitioners. I would accordingly allow the application and hold that the petitioners must be reckoned senior to respondents 6 to 19. I would accordingly quash the impugned orders contained in Annexure 1 and 10 in so far as they adversely affect the petitioners. Let an appropriate writ issue accordingly. In the circumstances, however, I shall leave the parties to bear their own costs. I agree. Application allowed.