ORDER H.N. Seth, J. - Petitioner Smt. Ram Sumerni is landlady of House no.45,/E-16, Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad. A baithak and a kothari located in the said house were in the tenancy of Prabhu Dayal (since deceased and now represented by respondents 3/ 1 to 3/6). 2. On 27th October, 1972 petitioner moved an application under S. 21, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for release of the accommodation that was in possession of Prabhu Dayal. She inter alia pleaded that she needed the said accommodation for the use of her son Girish Chandra, who after completing his education wanted to set up his business therein. The application was contested by Prabhu Dayal, and the Prescribed Authority, vide its order dated 13th September, 1973 rejected the same. 3. Aggrieved, the Petitioner went up in appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Moradabad. The appellate court, after considering certain aspects of the case, came to the conclusion that Girish Chandra son of the petitioner was unemployed and that there was need to settle him in life. The need of the petitioner was accordingly genuine. However, in view of the provisions contained in R. 16 (2) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) this need of landlady's son could not be taken notice of. So far as Prabhu Dayal was concerned he had not been carrying on any business in the said accommodation which was being used as a godown for storing the goods of other persons. In the result, the court concluded that neither of the two parties had been able to establish that their need was greater than that of the other, and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner after making following observations : "If the applicant's son Greesh Chand had got further renewed his registration and had actually purchased the machinery shown in the Bills mentioned above then there could have been some independent justification and genuineness of the need of the landlady. Therefore, since the landlady could not make out a proper case within the provisions of this Act, 13 of 1972 I, therefore, have no other alternative but to uphold the dismissal of her application in this appeal. The defects in the evidence of the Opposite Party tenant would not entitle the landlady to get the appeal allowed. Therefore, since the landlady could not make out a proper case within the provisions of this Act, 13 of 1972 I, therefore, have no other alternative but to uphold the dismissal of her application in this appeal. The defects in the evidence of the Opposite Party tenant would not entitle the landlady to get the appeal allowed. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the parties shall bear their own costs." 4. A perusal of the judgment of the appellate court shows that even after finding that petitioner's son Girish Chandra was unemployed and that there was need for him to settle himself, it refused to take notice of the said genuine need merely for the reason that his case was not covered by R. 16 (2) (d) of the Rules. Rule 16 (2) (d) lays down that while considering an application made under cl. (a) of sub-s. (1), S. 21 of the Act for release of ah accommodation let out for purposes of business, the Prescribed Authority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall also have regard for the matters enumerated therein. One of such matters is enumerated in cl. (d) of R. 16 (2) which lays down that where a son of unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building is originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration. According to the appellate court as in the instant case it had not been shown that petitioner's son had completed any technical education the provision of R. 16 (2) (d) of the Rules were not applicable, and it was not possible to take the said need into account while considering petitioner's application for release of the accommodation. 5. In my opinion the judgment of the appellate court is apparently erroneous and cannot be sustained. 5. In my opinion the judgment of the appellate court is apparently erroneous and cannot be sustained. Relevant portion of S. 21 (1) of the Act runs thus : "The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is established that any of the following grounds exists, namely- (a) That the building is bona fide required ........... by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family ............ either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling or .............. (b) .................................. " Expression "family" has been defined in S. 3 (g) of the Act as including a male lineal descendant as well. It, therefore, follows that petitioner could move an application praying for eviction of Prabhu Dayal and for release of the accommodation in her favour pleaded the same was bona fide required for occupation by her son for purposes of his profession, trade or calling. This fact, on the findings recorded by the appellate court has been amply proved by the petitioner. Rule 16 (2) merely lays down certain yardsticks for comparing the respective needs of the landlord and the tenant so as to enable the prescribed authority to make up its mind as to whether or not it should, under S. 21 of the Act, exercise its discretion to direct eviction of the tenant. The yardsticks provided for the purpose in R. 16 (2) are not exhaustive. In my opinion, in a case where the landlord is able to establish that his need is genuine and bona fide and that the need of the tenant is not pressing, his prayer for eviction of the tenant and release of the accommodation in his favour cannot be turned down merely because the circumstances enumerated in various clauses of R. 16 (2) do not exist. I find that this is precisely what has happened in this case. The appellate court, after holding that the need of the landlady for occupation of the accommodation in question for the use of her son was genuine, did not take into account such need merely because her case did not fall within the ambit of Cl. (d) of R. 16 (2). 6. The appellate court, after holding that the need of the landlady for occupation of the accommodation in question for the use of her son was genuine, did not take into account such need merely because her case did not fall within the ambit of Cl. (d) of R. 16 (2). 6. It appears that the appellate court was also conscious of the fact that the provisions contained in R. 16 (2) are not exhaustive for it went on to observe that if the petitioner's son had got his registration renewed further and had he actually purchased the machinery shown in the bills mentioned above, there could have been some independent justification and genuineness of the need of the landlady, but as these two things had not been done by petitioner's son, she was not entitled to any relief. My attention has not been invited to any statutory provision where under it was obligatory upon petitioner's son to obtain registration or renewal before carrying on the business proposed by him. The petitioner has filed copies of the bills, referred to in the appellate court judgment as Annexures 6 and 7 which indicate that petitioner's son had in fact purchased the machineries covered by those bills and that they were being despatched to him. In this view of the matter, the appellate court was not justified in observing that petitioner had failed to show that the machineries indicated in the bills had not been purchased by her son. The material did indicate that the petitioner had purchased the said machineries and indeed this is the averment in paras 14 and 15 of the writ petition which has not been controverted by the respondents. 7. In my opinion, while making a prayer for release of the accommodation in her favour, the petitioner could rely upon the fact that the accommodation in question was needed for the carrying of a business by her son, who had to be settled in life. In the circumstances, the order passed by the Addl. District Judge, dated 29th January, 1975 cannot be sustained. 8. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order of the Addl. District Judge, dated 29th January, 1975 dismissing petitioner's appeal is set aside. The matter will now go back to the Addl. In the circumstances, the order passed by the Addl. District Judge, dated 29th January, 1975 cannot be sustained. 8. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order of the Addl. District Judge, dated 29th January, 1975 dismissing petitioner's appeal is set aside. The matter will now go back to the Addl. District Judge, Morababad for disposing of the petitioner's appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.