JUDGMENT This appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff whose suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction was dismissed by the learned courts below. The suit property comprises 80 decimals of land recorded in c.s. plot no. 1367 of mouza Gopkhanji, P.S. Katwa. In the c.s. record the suit property was recorded in the name of Golap Sundari appertaining to the Jama of Rs. 14-10 annas. In the r. s. record the suit property was recorded in the name of the plaintiff under one Jitendra Lal Hazra. A new Jama of Rs. 3-10 annas came to be created in respect of the disputed plot. The plaintiff's case was that one Golap Sundari Dassi had absolute interest in the suit property along with other properties. One Nalini Kanta Bhattacharya purchased the suit property by a registered kobala dated March 20, 1932 from Golap Sundari and after his death his daughter Bijali Bala became the owner. The plaintiff purchased the suit property from Bijali Bata by a registered kobala dated June 20, 1949. After her purchase the plaintiff obtained possession and cultivated the same sometime through bargadar and sometimes in khas. There were several criminal cases with the defendant no. 1 who had been trying to disturb the plaintiff's possession on the basis of a fictitious kobala from one Radha Pada Mondal who claimed to be the reversioner in respect of the suit property. Radhapada had no interest at any time and the defendant no. 1 did not acquire any title. The suit was contented by the defendant nos. 1 and 2 by filing a joint written statement. Their contentions were that the suit property originally belonged to one Tarachand Gharami appertaining to a Jama of Rs. 14-10 annas. Tarachand died leaving his widow Barada Sundari and two daughters Golap Sundari and Nistarini. Nistarni died during the lifetime of her mother leaving her son Radhapada Mondal, vendor of defendant no. 1. After the death of Galop Sundari, the suit properly devolved upon Radhapada who obtained possession and thereafter he sold the same to the defendant no. 1. 2. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiff could not acquire any right, title and interest by her purchase from Bijolibala as her vendor's interest in the suit land ended after Golap Sundari's death. The plaintiff preferred Appeal no. 39 of 1962 against the said decision. 1. 2. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiff could not acquire any right, title and interest by her purchase from Bijolibala as her vendor's interest in the suit land ended after Golap Sundari's death. The plaintiff preferred Appeal no. 39 of 1962 against the said decision. The learned Additional District Judge upheld the finding of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff has challenged the said decision in the present second appeal. 3. Mr. Chandrnath Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the appellants, has contended that the learned courts below did not properly consider the evidence on record. They have, also failed to take into account the document (Ext. 3) the dakhila which shows that the Jama of Rs. 14-10 as was purchased by Barada Sundari. It has been contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the c. s. record was in favour of Golap Sundari and the r. s. record was in favour of the plaintiff. The presumption of correctness of these documents has not been rebutted and the learned court below have failed to take into consideration the inference of law that would arise from these documents. He argues that the mere fact that a widow is in possession does not necessarily lead to the inference that she was in possession as a limited owner. The contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the learned lower appellate court based its judgment on conjectures and surmises. The learned Judge completely misdirected himself when he based his conclusions upon recitals of some documents. Kobala (Ext. A2) was executed by Golap Sundari on June 23, 1951, that is, a few days before her death. This kobala was long after the plaintiff's purchase. The alleged admission made by Golap Sundari in Ext. A-2 cannot under the law affect the plaintiff's interest derived under the documents (Exts. 4 (a) and 4.) He has further argued that the learned appellate court did not consider that before the question of legal necessity for alienation by a woman can be raised, it must be shown that she was in possession of the property holding the limited interest of a Hindu woman. The learned lower appellate court thus committed errors on questions of law and the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title. 4. Mr. Pritibhusan Burman, learned Advocate for the respondents, has argued that there was lama of Rs. The learned lower appellate court thus committed errors on questions of law and the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title. 4. Mr. Pritibhusan Burman, learned Advocate for the respondents, has argued that there was lama of Rs. 14-10 as and it was in respect of different plots including the disputed plot. The said Jama belonged to Tarachand who left his widow Barada Sundari and two daughters Golap Sundari and Nistarini. Mr. Burman argues that there is a concurrent finding of fact that Harada Sundari had limited interest and Golap Sundari also had limited interest. It is also the finding of fact that Radhapada was the reversioner and he sold to the defendant. He argues that there is also the finding of fact that the deed of gift executed by Harada Sundari in favour of Golap Sundari was not acted upon and the transfer by Golap Sundari in favour of Nalini Kanta Bhattacharya was not for legal necessity. These findings of fact cannot be challenged before this Court in second appeal. As Golap Sundari had limited interest, the right of the plaintiff could not endure after the death of Golap Sundari as there was no legal necessity for the execution of the Kobala (Ext. 4 (a) Mr. Burman has thus argued that the suit was rightly dismissed by the learned courts below. 5. The disputed property is 80 decimals c. s. plot no. 1367 of c. s. khatinn no. 70, mauza Gophkhanji P.S. Katwa. The said khatian was recorded in the name of Golap Sundari. The appellant's case was that Golap Sundari obtained the property from her mother Harada Sundari by virtue of the deed of gift (Ext. 2) dated 24th Pous 1380 B.S. The appellant's further case was that Golap Sundari was the owner of the property and she sold the same to Nalini Kanta Bhattacharyya by a registered kobala Ext. 4(a) dated March 30, 1932. The plaintiff purchased from Bijoli Bala daughter of Nalini Kanta by the kobala (Ext. 4) dated June 20, 1949. According to the plaintiff the Jama was split up and the disputed plot was recorded in the name of the plaintiff in the r. s. record-of-right (Ext 7(a). Mr. Mukherjee has contended that the c. s. record was in the name of Golap Sundari and the r.s. record was in the name of the plaintiff. 4) dated June 20, 1949. According to the plaintiff the Jama was split up and the disputed plot was recorded in the name of the plaintiff in the r. s. record-of-right (Ext 7(a). Mr. Mukherjee has contended that the c. s. record was in the name of Golap Sundari and the r.s. record was in the name of the plaintiff. The presumption arising out of the entries in the record-of-rights is in favour of the appellant and the learned lower appellate court was wrong in not considering the said presumption. He argues that there was misplacement of onus by the learned lower appellate court. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the entries in the record-of-rights were correct. It was for the defendant to establish by reliable evidence that the entries in the record-of-rights were wrong. He has further argued that the learned lower appellate court misdirected itself when it based its conclusions upon the recitals of some documents which were made subsequent to the purchase of the plaintiff. He has further contended that simply because a Hindu woman was in possession of the property there can be no presumption that she was in possession as a limited owner. In support of his contention he has referred to several decisions. In 26 IA 226 (Diwan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh & Indarpal Singh) it has been held that when a widow is found in possession of property of the acquisition of which no account was given but there is evidence that her husband died possessed of considerable property, there could be no presumption that the properly found in the widow's possession was originally that of her husband. It has been further laid down that he who claims a property through some other person must show the property to have been vested in that person. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to the case of Mt. Balo v. Mt. Parbati, AIR 1940 All 386 and has argued that the learned lower appellate court has completely failed to consider the principle of law that before the point of legal necessity for alienation by a woman can be raised, it must be shown that she was in possession of the property holding the limited interest of a Hindu woman. 6. Parbati, AIR 1940 All 386 and has argued that the learned lower appellate court has completely failed to consider the principle of law that before the point of legal necessity for alienation by a woman can be raised, it must be shown that she was in possession of the property holding the limited interest of a Hindu woman. 6. It appears that the learned lower appellate court has mainly based its conclusions upon the recital, in some documents which were executed after the plaintiff's purchase. The learned lower appellate court has not placed reliance upon the deed of gift (Ext. 2) executed by Barada Sundari, mother of Golap Sundari. The reason which weighed with the learned Judge was that the tenor of the deed of gift would show that Harada Sundari was making a gift for her widowed daughter as her husband and son were already dead. The learned Judge has observed that if there was no issue by the other daughter there was no point in Harada Sundari's making this deed of gift in favour of the widowed daughter who would otherwise have inherited the property in due course. The learned Judge appears to have committed error in the matter of appreciation of evidence as the presumption of the record-of-rights was not given proper weight. Moreover, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that Golap Sundari had absolute interest unless the other party was able to show that the entries in the record-of-rights were incorrect. The learned Judge has not also considered the dakhila (Ext 3) in the name of Barada Sundari, Simply because a Hindu woman was in possession of a property there could he no presumption that she was in possession as a limited owner. He has found that Barada Sundari had another daughter Nistarini who died during the life time of her mother leaving her son Radhapada. This finding, however, is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that Radhapada was the reversioner. 7. He has found that Barada Sundari had another daughter Nistarini who died during the life time of her mother leaving her son Radhapada. This finding, however, is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that Radhapada was the reversioner. 7. Jogeswar Gorain v Akhoy Ghose & Ors reported in 19 CLJ 1, it has been laid down that in order to be a relevant admission it is necessary to show that the person who made the statement had an interest at the time when he made the statement, In AIR 1942 PC 67 (Bank of Upper India Ltd. v, Robert Hercules Skinner & Ors.) it has been held that an acknowledgment by a transferor after the transfer of title does not bind the transferee. It has been further held that admissions are binding if made by persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest but only if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the person on making statement. In this case Their Lordships of the Privy Council came to the conclusion that the acknowledgements made by the mortgagors after they have parted with their interest to the purchaser do not bind the purchaser. In the case of Sm. Savitri Devi & ors. v. Ram Ran Binoy Prasad Singh & ors AIR 1950 PC 1 it was held that the principle upon which hearsay evidence was admitted under S. 32(3) of the Evidence Act was that a man was not likely to mike a statement against his own interest unless true but this sanction does not arise unless the party knows the statement to be against him. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to Sutherland's Weekly Reporter 267 and has argued that it was a well-known principle of the law of evidence that the admission of a former owner of property made after he has ceased to have any interest are not evidence against the party in possession. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to Sutherland's Weekly Reporter 267 and has argued that it was a well-known principle of the law of evidence that the admission of a former owner of property made after he has ceased to have any interest are not evidence against the party in possession. 8. The learned first appellate court has referred to certain recitals in document, Ext A(2), a kobala by Golap Sundari in favour of Nemai Chandra Mondal on 23rd January, 1951 and has observed that if Golap Sundari made a statement in the kobala executed by herself at a time when there was no dispute between the parties that the lands appertaining to the Jama were inherited by her from her father then plaintiff could not say that the property belonged to Golap Sundari or to her mother Barada Sundari. The learned Judge has also placed reliance upon the recitals in another document, Ext. A(3), executed by Radhapada in favour of the daughter-in-law of Golap Sundari dated March 2l, 1951 where there was a recital that Radhapada got the property as reversioner of his maternal grandmother. The learned Judge has come to the conclusion that because the daughter-in-law of Golap Sundari purchased from Radhapada, the defendant's vendor, it would go to show that Radhapada had some relationship with Tarachand. It would appear that the learned Judge has also placed reliance upon kobala, Ext. A(1) executed by Radhapada in favour of the wife of defence witness Benoy Kumar Sengupta on February 26, 1951. The learned Judge has not considered the proposition of law that the recitals in the documents executed by Radhapada after the death of Golap Sundari could not in any way affect the plaintiff's interest as the plaintiff's purchase was earlier. Moreover, these were in respect of different plots. Similarly, the alleged admission of Golap Sundari in the document, Ext. A(2), executed by her shortly before her death in favour of Nemai in respect of other plots would not be binding upon the plaintiff or her predecessors-in-title in respect of the disputed plot as Golap Sundari had transferred the disputed plot tong ago and she had no longer any interest in the same. The learned Judge has held that the case of legal necessity contained in the kobala, Ext. 4(a), has not been established. The learned Judge has held that the case of legal necessity contained in the kobala, Ext. 4(a), has not been established. The principle of law is that before any question of legal necessity was to be considered it was necessary on the part of the defendants of the suit to show that Golap Sundari had the limited interest of a Hindu woman. There has thus been misplacement of onus and no proper appreciation of the evidence. The existence of Golap Sundari's sister Nistarini and the fact that she died during her mother's lifetime leaving her son Radhapada will not lead to the inference that Golap Sundari was a limited owner in respect of the property which she transferred to Nalini Kanta. The learned Judge has also observed that Radhapada began to assert his title and right to the property since Golap Sundari died and if Golap Sundari had really absolute right it was difficult to conceive that Anil, grandson of Golap Sundari, would have been a silent spectator to the disposal of the property. These questions are not at all material for the purpose of decision of the dispute in the present case. In the present case the question is in respect of plot no. 1367 which was transferred long ago by Gotap Sundari and in the said transfer to Nalini Kanti by the kobala, Ext. 4(a), dated 20th March, 1932, Golap Sundari's son also joined his mother in the matter of execution of the document. 9. It appears that the approach of both the courts below to the points in dispute was not proper as they did not give proper weight which the entries in the record-of-rights were entitled to under the law. The approach also was wrong as the case was viewed with the assumption that Golap Sundari as a Hindu widow was a limited owner and the purchaser in order to derive valid the must show that the sale was for legal necessity. The entire approach has thus been wrong and there has been misplacement of onus. Having regard to the materials on record it appears that the defendants were not able to rebut the presumption of correctness of the record-of-rights. The entire approach has thus been wrong and there has been misplacement of onus. Having regard to the materials on record it appears that the defendants were not able to rebut the presumption of correctness of the record-of-rights. The plaintiff's title on the basis of her purchase from Bijoli Bala, whose father had earlier purchased the suit property from Golap Sundari, who was recorded as the owner of the property in the c.s. record-of-rights, has to be declared. The learned courts below have considered the question of possession only with regard to the point whether the plaintiff could acquire title by adverse possession. The learned lower appellate court has negatived the question of adverse possession on the ground that it does not run until the life interest of the limited owner becomes extinct and as the transfer by Radhapada took place within a few months of Golap Sundari's death, there was no question of limitation. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit arising out of the entries in the r. s. records. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgments and decree of both the courts below are set aside and the suit be decreed, The plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction prayed for. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs through out. Appeal Allowed.