Judgment 1. By an order dated 16th March, 1982 N.P. Singh, J., directed that this case be placed before a Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the scope of S.65-A of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) - hence this case before us. 2. In this application under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari or any appropriate writ or direction quashing the order as contained in Annexure-4. There are other ancillary reliefs claimed which, it is not necessary for us to consider for the simple reason that if the order as contained in Annexure-4 is allowed to stand, the petitioners will not be entitled to any relief whatsoever if, on the contrary, the impugned order is quashed as being illegal and without jurisdiction the other reliefs prayed for shall follow as a necessary corollary. The impugned order dated 27-6-81 as incorporated in Annexure-4 has been passed by the Minister of Co-operation, Bihar, respondent 2, by which he has admitted Miscellaneous Case 59 of 1981 and stayed further proceedings pending final hearing of the revision application before him, in the purported exercise of his power under Sec. 65A of the Act. 3. The short facts relevant for the disposal of this application are these: There is a co-operative Society, named Rajmahal Boat Traffic Co-operative Society (to be briefly called the society hereinafter) in the district of Santhal Parganas, which is petitioner 4 in this application. It is a body corporate. Petitioners 1 to 3 are its office-bearers and claim to be the members of the managing committee of the society, petitioner 4. The management of the society vests in a committee of management constituted under Sec.14 of the Act read with Rules 20 and 22 of the Bihar Co-operative Societies Rules (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules) framed under the Act. The term of the committee of management prescribed by Sec.14(3) of the Act expired on 31st December, 1979 but the new managing committee was not constituted within the prescribed period. As a result, the old managing committee stood superseded with effect from 1st January, 1980. Because of the supersession of the managing committee, the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhagalpur, appointed a Special Officer by his order dated 4-2-1980 for the society. As a result, the old managing committee stood superseded with effect from 1st January, 1980. Because of the supersession of the managing committee, the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bhagalpur, appointed a Special Officer by his order dated 4-2-1980 for the society. Thereafter the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Bihar, appointed the District Co-operative Officer, Santhal Parganas, at Dumka, as a Special Officer of the society. None of these Special Officers, however, convened any annual general meeting for the purpose of constitution of a regular managing committee. The result was that the society remained under suspension for a period more than a year. In the meantime, the Governor of Bihar promulgated Ordinance 21 of 1981 inserting certain provisions in Sec. 41 of the Act. In exercise of the power under the said Ordinance, the State Government constituted a managing committee with a direction to continue in office till 30th June, 1981 or till the election was held. The notification relating to the constitution of the managing committee was published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary dated 6th March, 1981. In view of the aforesaid notification, the nominated committee took over the charge of the management of the society from the District Co-operative Officer on 7th March, 1981. Thereafter, the State Government, by notification dated 28-3-1981, removed four persons from the nominated committee and nominated respondent 3 as well as three other persons in their place. Against the nomination of the four persons as above mentioned, some of the members of the society filed a writ application in this Court which was registered as C.W.J.C. 1004 of 1981, and this Court directed the status quo to be maintained by its order dated 1st April, 1981. The aforesaid writ application was disposed of by this Court, by an order dated 24th April, 1981, with a direction that the nominated committee will not disturb the distribution of Ghats amongst the members of the Co-operative Society made by the earlier committee and that the ad hoc managing committee would hold election by 30th June, 1981. A copy of that order of this Court has been marked Annexure-1. Thereafter respondent 3 and three other persons filed another writ application which was registered as C.W.J.C. 1598 of 1981 for review of the order dated 24-4-1981. That application was disposed of by order dated 13th May, 1981, re-affirming the order dated 24-4-1981, passed by this Court. A copy of that order of this Court has been marked Annexure-1. Thereafter respondent 3 and three other persons filed another writ application which was registered as C.W.J.C. 1598 of 1981 for review of the order dated 24-4-1981. That application was disposed of by order dated 13th May, 1981, re-affirming the order dated 24-4-1981, passed by this Court. Thereafter, as is claimed by the petitioners, petitioner 1 being the President of the ad hoc managing committee of the society, directed the Secretary, respondent 3, to call a meeting of the managing committee for a decision to hold an annual general meeting for the purpose of constitution of the new managing committee. Petitioner 1, in purported exercise of his power conferred by the provisions of the bye-laws, claims to have called a meeting of the managing committee on 27th May, 1981 and the said committee at its meeting, decided to call an annual general meeting on 23rd June, 1981 at 1 p.m. in the High School at Udhwa. The petitioners assert that in pursuance of the aforesaid resolution an annual general meeting was held in which 421 out of 706 members were present and an election was held constituting the new managing committee. True copy of the resolutions passed at the annual general meeting on 23rd June, 1981 has been marked Annexure-3. It is further claimed that copies of the resolutions (Annexure-3) were sent to the authorities concerned. Thereafter petitioners 1 and 3 claimed to have started functioning as members of the managing committee. In the meantime, it is alleged, respondent 3 by manufacturing resolutions of another annual general meeting alleged to have taken place on 24th June, 1981, filed a petition straightway before respondent 2, the Minister, Co-operation, for a declaration that the annual general meeting on 24th June, 1981 was the only valid one and that the general body meeting on 23rd June, 1981 was wholly illegal. On such application having been filed, respondent 2, in the purported exercise of his revisional powers under Sec. 65A inserted in the Act by an Ordinance, has passed the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4. 4. It is in this context that the true construction of the provisions of S.65A of the Act is called for. On such application having been filed, respondent 2, in the purported exercise of his revisional powers under Sec. 65A inserted in the Act by an Ordinance, has passed the impugned order as contained in Annexure-4. 4. It is in this context that the true construction of the provisions of S.65A of the Act is called for. It is worthwhile to mention here that it is a fact that even before the election is claimed by the petitioners to have been held on 23rd June, 1981 electing the office-bearers a petition had been filed by some members before the District Co-operative Officer for a declaration that the meeting scheduled to be held on 23rd June, 1981 for the purpose of election is illegal. Before that application, however, could be disposed of, the election is claimed to have been completed and the results thereof declared at the meeting held on 23rd June, 1981. It is in this background that for the purpose of the instant case specifically the interpretation of S.65A is warranted for finding out the legality and propriety of the order passed by respondent 2 and even generally for the purpose of laying down the guidelines for the exercise of revisional power by the State Government under Sec.65A of the Act. 5. The relevancy of referring this case to a Division Bench may also be attributed, apart from the importance of the subject-matter, to two supposedly conflicting decisions of learned single Judges in the case of Lachandeo Sahni V/s. State of Bihar (1982 BBCJ (HC) 14) : ( AIR 1982 Pat 48 ) and Saryag Singh V/s. State of Bihar (1982 BBCJ (HC) 122). To these decisions we shall refer subsequently at a more appropriate place, but, before we do that, it is worthwhile to quote in extenso S.65A of the Act which runs as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the State Govt. To these decisions we shall refer subsequently at a more appropriate place, but, before we do that, it is worthwhile to quote in extenso S.65A of the Act which runs as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the State Govt. may, of its own motion or on an application made to it by any party aggrieved by the constitution, or reconstitution amalgamation, election, supersession, liquidation or any other matter concerning working of the society, call for any record of inspection or enquiry made under this Act or proceeding of any matter pending before the Registrar or his subordinate or any person acting under his authority and examine and pass such orders as it may deem fit." Before analysing the statutory provisions contained in this section, it will be desirable to mention a legal point raised by Mr. B.C. Ghose, learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the State Minister for Co-operation could not be equated with the State Government. The contention was that the State Government meant the Cabinet at a meeting passing a resolution to the effect that a particular member or officer was competent to exercise the power of the State Government under S.65A of the Act. We have mentioned this argument at the outset merely to reject it for the simple reason that the Rules of Executive Business do empower the Minister concerned to act on behalf of the State Government which have been duly taken notice of by Uday Sinha, J., in the case of Lachandeo Sahni (supra). When confronted with the relevant provisions of the Rules of Executive Business as mentioned in that decision, Mr Ghose could not pursue the matter further. 6 Coming to the true construction of the relevant statutory provision, it may at once be noticed that the exercise of the special power of revision conferred by this section is a discretionary one and cannot be equated with the substantive right of appeal conferred by the statute under Sec. 48 of the Act. The right of appeal once prescribed by the statute vests such a right in an aggrieved person. A discretionary remedy confers no such right on the party aggrieved but merely vests the exceptional power of calling for records, examining the same and passing appropriate orders in hard cases by revisional tribunal even suo motu. The right of appeal once prescribed by the statute vests such a right in an aggrieved person. A discretionary remedy confers no such right on the party aggrieved but merely vests the exceptional power of calling for records, examining the same and passing appropriate orders in hard cases by revisional tribunal even suo motu. Merely because an aggrieved party files an application before the revisional authority, it cannot be said that it confers upon him any right to insist upon the revisional authority, namely, the State Government to decide the matter one way or the other. The State Government, in its revisional jurisdiction, may as well refuse or decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it. The provisions of the link nature must be construed in strictissimi juris. It is in this light that a true connotation has to be given to this statutory provision in juxtaposition of the appellate provision incorporated in Sec. 48 of the Act. 7. That at once brings us to the relevant provisions of Sec. 48 of the Act. The relevant provisions, for the purpose at hand, are sub-sections (1)(a), (2)(a) and (b) and (6) of Sec. 48. Sec. 48(1) stipulates that if any dispute touching the business of a registered society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society) arises: "(a) amongst members, past members, persons claiming through members, past members or deceased members and sureties of members past members or deceased members whether such sureties are members or non-members; or......". such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar. If there is any dispute with regard to the validity of an election matter, it goes without saying that it would be a dispute touching the business of a registered society amongst members of the society. It is now well settled by several decisions of this Court that such a dispute shall also include within its ambit an election dispute. Therefore, if there arises any dispute with regard to validity of any election amongst the members of the society, it will fall within the ambit of Sec. 48(1)(a) and such a dispute shall have to be referred to the Registrar. That is a mandatory provision of law. Therefore, if there arises any dispute with regard to validity of any election amongst the members of the society, it will fall within the ambit of Sec. 48(1)(a) and such a dispute shall have to be referred to the Registrar. That is a mandatory provision of law. S.47(1)(a) and (b) read thus :- "The Registrar may on receipt of such reference :- (a) decide the dispute himself; or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person exercising the powers of a Registrar in this behalf; or......" It may be pertinent to take notice of the well settled principles both on decisions as well as on the construction of the various provisions of the Act that the Registrar includes such persons as the Registrar himself appointed by the State Government under S.6(1) of the Act or any person appointed under sub-section (1) of Sec.6 to assist the Registrar who has been conferred on by the State Government by general or special order published in the official gazette all or any of the powers of the Registrar under the Act except the powers under Sec.26, with which we are not concerned. Therefore, although there may be only one Registrar of Co-operative Societies appointed by the State Government under Sec. 6(1), even such persons who have been appointed to assist the Registrar under S.6(1) of the Act may be conferred on all the powers of the Registrar in respect of matters not falling under Sec.26 by a general or special order of the State Government published in the official gazette. The parties have joined hands, as obviously they could not do to the contrary, that powers of the Registrar to dispose of the disputes under Sec. 48(1) read with Sec. 48(2) of the Act may be exercised either by the Registrar himself or by any person exercising the powers of a Registrar in this behalf by virtue of the provisions of sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 6 of the Act. If a dispute with regard to the validity of any election, therefore, arises, it shall have to be referred to the Registrar. The Registrar may, on such a reference, decide the dispute himself or transfer the matter to any other person duly authorised in that behalf exercising the power of the Registrar under sub-sec.(2) of S.6. If a dispute with regard to the validity of any election, therefore, arises, it shall have to be referred to the Registrar. The Registrar may, on such a reference, decide the dispute himself or transfer the matter to any other person duly authorised in that behalf exercising the power of the Registrar under sub-sec.(2) of S.6. If the power is exercised under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Sec. 48 by a person other than the Registrar himself. although exercising the powers of Registrar, such an order shall be appealable under sub-sec.(6) of S.48 which reads thus :- "Any person aggrieved by any decision given in dispute transferred or referred under Clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (2) may, within three months from the date of such decision, appeal to the Registrar." In this case we are not concerned with Clause (c) of Sec. 48(2). We are directly concerned with clause (b) of Sec. 48(2). If a dispute has been decided by a person other than the Registrar, although vested with the powers of a Registrar under Sec. 6(2), the appellate forum has been clearly prescribed as the Registrar himself. On a careful examination of the relevant provisions of Sec. 48, as aforementioned it is manifest that once a dispute with regard to an election is raised, a reference has to be made to the Registrar and that is a must - under Sec.48(1). If on such reference having been made, the matter is transferred to a person although exercising the power of Registrar but not the Registrar himself, the party aggrieved has a substantive right to go in appeal before the Registrar himself who shall dispose of the matter finally. In some cases, however, the law lays down that on such a reference with regard to the dispute having been made in certain circumstances the Registrar may refer the matter to be decided, it goes without saying, where some difficult and controversial questions are involved, to the District Judge for his decision. Sec. 48, therefore, is all pervasive. Making of a reference of a dispute including an election dispute to the Registrar envisages not only that the Registrar will entertain such a reference but is a mandate to the party aggrieved to go in reference before the Registrar making a dispute. Sec. 48, therefore, is all pervasive. Making of a reference of a dispute including an election dispute to the Registrar envisages not only that the Registrar will entertain such a reference but is a mandate to the party aggrieved to go in reference before the Registrar making a dispute. And, in such a case a dispute will be pending either before the Registrar or before the person vested with the powers of a Registrar under the provisions of S.48(2)(b). If such a dispute is decided (as we have already said, we are not concerned with Sec.26 of the Act), the Registrar must entertain as appeal against such an order at the instance of the party aggrieved who has been given a substantive right to prefer such an appeal. If no appeal is preferred within the time prescribed under the law the Registrar is powerless. If, on the contrary an appeal has been preferred before the Registrar within the period of limitation, the Registrar has no option but to entertain the appeal and decide it in accordance with law. These are not the exigencies envisaged by Sec. 65A of the Act. The first and foremost point to be emphasised is that whenever a dispute has to be raised, it has to be referred by law under Sec. 48(1) of the Act, and if such a dispute is decided under S.48(1) read with Sec. 48(2)(b) of the Act, the appellate forum is the Registrar himself under sub-sec.(6) of Sec. 48. Can it then be said that even while the dispute has not been raised by way of a reference before the Registrar under Sec. 48(1) of the Act or, for that matter, when such a dispute has been decided by a person acting as the Registrar by virtue of Sec. 6(2) of the Act and no appeal is preferred under sub-section (6) of Sec. 48 of the Act, the State Government would be entitled to entertain such a dispute and decide the matter? The answer, in our opinion, is clearly in the negative. It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that all the parts of an Act must be read together to construe the true intent and purport of one particular statutory provision. The answer, in our opinion, is clearly in the negative. It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that all the parts of an Act must be read together to construe the true intent and purport of one particular statutory provision. Read in the light of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 48 of the Act, therefore, it cannot be said that the State Government, overriding the provisions of Sec. 48 of the Act, can straightway entertain any application at the instance of any party or move in the matter even suo motu. 8 That, however, we have stated merely for the purpose of showing as to why the provisions of Sec. 65A of the Act should be strictly construed. The very language of Sec. 65A, which has already been extracted, clearly indicates that it is a sort of a power of general superintendence in matters of enquiry, investigation or disputes pending under the Act to see that there is no deliberate or indeliberate miscarriage of justice. That then brings us to the language of S.65A itself. It is not necessary to reproduce the language here as it has already been quoted in paragraph 5 above. Let us proceed to dissect the provisions of Sec. 65A of the Act. The first part of it merely lays down the fields in which the powers of the State Government can operate, such fields being disputes with regard to constitution or reconstitution, amalgamation, election, supersession, liquidation or any other matter concerning the working of a society. We are concerned in this case with the question of election only although for the purpose of true construction of Sec. 65A that will not make any difference. We assume, therefore, that these are the fields which are open pasture grounds for the State Government. But the second part of the section circumscribes the scope within which such fields can be utilised. In such matters as enumerated above what can the State Government do? The second part of the section gives a clear answer to this. The State Government may call for any record of inspection or enquiry made under this Act or proceedings of any matter pending before the Registrar or his subordinate or any person acting under his authority. In such matters as enumerated above what can the State Government do? The second part of the section gives a clear answer to this. The State Government may call for any record of inspection or enquiry made under this Act or proceedings of any matter pending before the Registrar or his subordinate or any person acting under his authority. It would be seen from this part of the section that the State Government has the power only to call for any record of inspection or enquiry made under the Act or the proceedings of any matter pending before the Registrar or his subordinate. This part, therefore, clearly indicates the circumstances in which the State Government may exercise its discretion, although very sparingly, namely, where there is any grievance with regard to any inspection or enquiry made under the Act, the State Government may call for the record of such an inspection or enquiry to see as to whether any miscarriage of justice has been done. If, on the contrary, any proceeding of any matter is pending before the Registrar or his subordinate, which means if any dispute is raised and a reference made to the Registrar under Sec. 48(1) or decided either by the Registrar himself under clause (a) of Sec. 48(2) or by the authority to whom the Registrar has transferred under Cl.(b) of Sec. 48(2), the records of such pending proceedings may be called for by the State Government merely to see that the purpose of justice is not defeated through any deliberate or inadvertent procedural lapses on the part of either the person acting as Registrar or the Registrar himself under Sec. 48(2)(a) or Sec. 48(2)(b) read with Sec. 48(6) of the Act. Taking the broad view, therefore, shorn of the facts of this case, in our considered opinion, the scope of Sec. 65A of the Act is very limited. It cannot override the provisions of Sec. 48(1) read with Sec. 48(2)(a) of the Act or sub-sec.(6) of Sec. 48 read with Sec. 48(2)(b) of the Act. Taking the broad view, therefore, shorn of the facts of this case, in our considered opinion, the scope of Sec. 65A of the Act is very limited. It cannot override the provisions of Sec. 48(1) read with Sec. 48(2)(a) of the Act or sub-sec.(6) of Sec. 48 read with Sec. 48(2)(b) of the Act. That apart, there must be a report at enquiry or an inspection which may stand a justifiable scrutiny for the purpose of seeing as to whether such a report is mala fide or has otherwise caused any miscarriage of justice by contravention of any of the provisions of the Act as the section itself says that the enquiry or investigation must be under the Act, and with regard to the pending disputes either before the person acting as the Registrar or the appellate proceedings before the Registrar under Sec. 48(6) or a dispute raised on reference being decided by the Registrar himself under Sec. 48(2)(a) of the Act. If, during the continuance of such proceedings, it comes to light that a gross miscarriage of justice is supposed to ensue for some reason or the other, say, for instance, the authority under Sec. 48 acting mala fide adopting dilatory tactics, not observing the procedure as laid down under the Rules, the State Government may intervene by way of its general power of superintendence to set the matter right before it is too late. 9. Coming to the facts of this case, now, we have already indicated earlier that the petitioners have asserted that a general meeting of the society held on 23rd June, 1981 at 1 p.m. in the high school at Udhwa the managing committee was duly elected. The grievance of the contesting respondent (No. 3) is that the election held at the meeting of the 23rd June, 1981, was illegal as the requisitioning of the meeting itself was not in accordance with law and that the election which he alleges to have taken place on 24th June, 1981 electing another managing committee was the only valid one. The election having been completed on the 23rd of June, 1981 as asserted by the petitioners or on the 24th June, 1981 as alleged by contesting respondent 3 is clearly an election dispute. It would squarely fall within the ambit of the provisions of Sec. 48(1). The election having been completed on the 23rd of June, 1981 as asserted by the petitioners or on the 24th June, 1981 as alleged by contesting respondent 3 is clearly an election dispute. It would squarely fall within the ambit of the provisions of Sec. 48(1). In the instant case no such dispute has been referred, as is enjoined by the law, to the Registrar under Sec. 48(1) of the Act. After the election, the contesting respondent straightway went to the Minister, Co-operation (representing the State Government) challenging the election of the 23rd June. The subject-matter before the Minister of Co-operation, respondent 2, was neither any enquiry nor any investigation nor was his power invoked under Sec. 65A because there was no proceeding pending with regard to any dispute either before the Registrar or before a person appointed as Registrar vested with the powers of Registrar under sub-section (2) of Sec. 6. It was contended by Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra learned counsel for respondent 3, that a petition having already been filed before the District Co-operative Officer prior to the meeting of 23rd June, 1981, the requisitioning of such a meeting was improper and illegal. Mr. Mishra, therefore, has contended that that amounts to a dispute arising out of the election and the matter was pending before the District Cooperative Officer. This argument is fallacious and cannot be accepted. A petition having been filed before the election has taken place can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be an election dispute after the election is held. Once the election is held and the candidates comprising the managing committee are declared as successful ones, the election has come to an end. Any application filed with regard to any dispute in the matter of convening the general meeting on 23rd of June will not fall within the ambit of an election dispute. Such an argument is in the nature of a wild concatenation, although the analogy may not be very accurate. Nonetheless, institution of an objection having been raised with regard to the validity of the requisition of an annual general meeting for the purpose of holding an election cannot, in any manner, be treated as challenging the results of the election once held and successful candidates declared. Nonetheless, institution of an objection having been raised with regard to the validity of the requisition of an annual general meeting for the purpose of holding an election cannot, in any manner, be treated as challenging the results of the election once held and successful candidates declared. After such an election the only course open was to rake a dispute with regard to the validity of the election and make a reference before the Registrar under Sec. 48(1) of the Act. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Registrar or a person vested with the powers of a Registrar - and in the latter case when an appeal is pending before the Registrar under Sec.48(6) of the Act - can the State Government call for the records of the proceedings pending? If, prima facie, the State Government is satisfied that for one valid cause or the other there is a strong reason to believe that the pendency of such a proceeding before the competent authority under Sec. 48 of the Act was patently irregular and illegal in matters of procedure either on the grounds of mala fide or for other cogent reason, it can, in exceptional circumstances, call for the records and pass appropriate orders as envisaged by the last part of Sec. 65A which says that after examining such proceedings of any matter pending, the State Government can pass such orders as it may deem fit. 10. In the instant case, (i) no exceptional circumstances has been pointed out; (ii) the dispute with regard to the election was never referred to the Registrar under sub-sec.(1) of Sec. 48 and there was no dispute pending under the Act before any authority; (iii) there was no enquiry or investigation under the Act under challenge and (iv) no such reference was decided either by a person acting as the Registrar himself either under Sec. 48(2)(a) or while exercising his power under sub-sec.(6) of Sec. 48 of the Act. For all these reasons, therefore, we must hold that the order of the Minister, Co-operation (respondent No. 2) was absolutely illegal and wholly without jurisdiction and the impugned order as contained in annexure 4 has to be quashed. 11. Having reached this conclusion as a matter of first impression, it is also our bounden duty to take notice of the two decisions of the learned single Judges referred to above. 11. Having reached this conclusion as a matter of first impression, it is also our bounden duty to take notice of the two decisions of the learned single Judges referred to above. In the case of Lachandeo Sahni ( AIR 1982 Pat 48 ) (supra) the facts were that there was a co-operative society. The annual general meeting of that society was to be held on 21-12-1980 and the elections for the managing committee of the society were also to be held on the same date. On 16-12-1980 a member of the society filed an application before the District Co-operative Officer in which a prayer was made that the meeting should be stayed as all the members had not been given due notice of such a meeting. The District Co-operative Officer, in his turn, stayed the holding of the annual general meeting and the election scheduled to be held on 21-12-1980. He registered a dispute in terms of Sec.48 of the Act and fixed 3-1-1981 as the date for hearing of the dispute. Despite the order of the District Co-operative Officer staying the holding of the election some of the members purported to hold an annual general meeting on 21-12-80 as scheduled and results were declarer The result of the election was challenged before the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, wielding the powers of the Registrar. There was thus a reference made under Sec. 48(1) of the Act and a dispute was duly pending before the Deputy Registrar. The Deputy Registrar also passed an interim order that the functioning of the newly elected managing committee shall remain stayed pending the final hearing of the dispute. That order was challenged before the State Government, namely, the Minister in charge, who entertained the application and passed some interim order. It would thus be seen that a proceeding with regard to an election dispute was duly pending under S.48 of the Act in which some interlocutory order was passed by the Deputy Registrar exercising the powers of the Registrar. It was in such circumstances that the order of the State Government was upheld as valid and tenable. We are not aware of the exceptional circumstances in which the Minister in charge found it fit to intervene in the matter. It was in such circumstances that the order of the State Government was upheld as valid and tenable. We are not aware of the exceptional circumstances in which the Minister in charge found it fit to intervene in the matter. Nonetheless, one thing is quite clear that the entertainment of a petition by the State Government under S.65-A of the Act was in course of a pending proceeding with regard to an election dispute pending before the Deputy Registrar under S.48 and the proceeding of that pending dispute had been called for to be examined. There is, thus, in principle, nothing wrong with what the decision in that case lays down. It would bear repetition to say that the main point argued in that case was with regard to the power of the Minister concerned to act under S.65-A of the Act. So far as this question is concerned, we have already answered it upholding the view of Uday Sinha, J., that the Minister, Co-operation, would be deemed to be the State Government within the meaning of the Rules of Executive Business. 12. The case of Sri Saryug Singh 1982 BBCJ (HC) 122 (supra) decided by L.M. Sharma, J., is to our mind in no way contrary to what either Uday Sinha, J., has held or what we have already duly considered and laid down as, in our opinion, is the law. In that case what was held was that when a dispute had been finally considered and decided, the powers of the State Government could not be invoked under S.65-A of the Act when there is no dispute pending. 13. There is, thus, no inconsistency between the two decisions of the learned single Judges referred to above. But we must again emphasise that apart from the question as to whether a proceeding is pending or not the power under S.65-A has to be very sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances resorted to in order to prevent grave miscarriage of justice, which would certainly be a question of fact, to be determined in each individual case. 14. For the reasons given above, we are constrained to hold that the order dated 27-6-81 passed by respondent 2 as contained in Annexure-4 is wholly without jurisdiction and must be quashed. This application accordingly succeeds and the impugned order is quashed. 14. For the reasons given above, we are constrained to hold that the order dated 27-6-81 passed by respondent 2 as contained in Annexure-4 is wholly without jurisdiction and must be quashed. This application accordingly succeeds and the impugned order is quashed. It is not for us to either suggest or advise as to whether, if the law so permits, respondent 3 may raise an election dispute under S.48 of the Act or not for that is not the subject-matter before us. It goes without saying that if the law still leaves a remedy open to the contesting respondent 3, he may be at liberty to take recourse to any such legal remedy. But so far as this case is concerned, as we have already held, the application is allowed and the impugned order contained in Annexure-4 is quashed. Costs payable by respondent 3 to the petitioners - hearing fee assessed at Rs. 250.00 only.