Basant Lal v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hapur — 1982 DIGILAW 1352 (ALL)

ORDER A. Banerji, J. - These two writ petitions relate to the same property situate in Pilkhuwa, district Ghaziabad. The property in dispute is said to belong to the Idols of Shrimati Radhaji Maharani and Shri Krishna Ji Maharaj both installed in the temple known as Thakur Dwara Radha Krishna, Pilkhuwa. 2. Shri Raghunandan Prasad, the Manager of the Trust, moved five applications under S. 9-A, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for the revision of monthly rent to the District Magistrate payable by the five tenants. The Manager stated that the petitioner was a public religious institution within the meaning of S. 9-A read with S. 3(s) of the Act and the opposite parties were month to month tenants at the rates mentioned in the Petition and he had also mentioned the market value of the five shops and had prayed for enhancement of the monthly rent at least to double the existing rent. 3. Respondent Basant Lal was a tenant of shop 73, Jagdish Prasad was a tenant of shop 7 , M/s. Munni Lal Mukat Lal was tenant of shop 70 and Munni Lal, Mukat Lal, Smt. Maina, Smt. Dropti & Smt. Lachho were tenants of shop 72. They contested the application and in their written statement submitted that the petitioner was not a public religious institution within the meaning of S. 9-A, but a private eligious institution and Shri Raghunandan Prasad was not entitled to file applications on behalf of the temple, as he could not be deemed to be the Manager of the temple and had not been so authorised by the trustees of the temple. Further, the market value mentioned by the petitioner was denied. Lastly, it was urged that the District Magistrate was not competent to decide the applications. 4. The applications were heard by Shri P. K. Yadav, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who by his order dated 15-5-1979 held that the District Magistrate was competent to adjudicate upon the present proceedings under S. 9-A of the Act and the powers of the District Magistrate could be exercised by an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise, perform or discharge all or any of his powers, functions or duties. It was, therefore, held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was competent to adjudicate upon the applications. It was, therefore, held that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was competent to adjudicate upon the applications. On the question whether the petitioner is a public religious institution within the meaning of S. 9-A of the Act and the answer was in the affirmative. After considering the case law and the material on the record and the circumstances the Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that "there is a place of public worship in the temple and that the public does come to worship in the temple at that place of public worship. "The public have unfettered right to use the same and use the temple for worship as of right. The affairs of the temple were being also managed by the trustees and there was a provision for succession to the trustees. It was also held that the property in question had been dedicated to the public at large. Raghunandan Prasad was held to be competent to file the applications on behalf of the temple. However, in regard to refutation of the rent, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that the valuation made by the Manager was not relied and the valuation given by the tenants was relied upon. Consequently, there was only marginal adjustment of rent in the case of three shops whereas in the case of two shops it was held to be not revisable. The Idols of Shrimati Radhaji Maharani and Shri Krishna Ji Maharaj filed writ petition, 10457 of 1979, in this Court against that part of the decision which either refused to revise the rent or made only marginal adjustment of rent. This, petition has been filed mainly on the ground that the material furnished by the petitioner regarding the valuation of the property was illegally rejected by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The other writ petition 5099 of 1979 has been filed by the tenants against that part of the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate whereby it was held that the temple in question was a public religious institution and that the application by it was maintainable. 5. I will now take up the writ petition filed by the tenants, for if it is held that the temple is not a public religious institution then the applications under S. 9-A of the Act must fail and the rent of the five shops cannot be modified at all under the said provision. 5. I will now take up the writ petition filed by the tenants, for if it is held that the temple is not a public religious institution then the applications under S. 9-A of the Act must fail and the rent of the five shops cannot be modified at all under the said provision. On the contrary, if the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is upheld then the question would arise whether the order passed in regard o fixation of rent was in accordance with law and whether it sullen from any manifest error of law. 6. Lengthy and extensive arguments were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition 5099 of 1979, Mr. Raja Ram Agarwal and Mr. R. P. Goyal Advocates, appeared for the petitioner tenants. Mr. Raja Ram Agarwal contended that the scope of S. 9-A of the Act was limited and was not meant for deciding any complicated question of law or fact. Whether a particular institution was a public religious institution or not could not be decided summarily. Whether the institution in this case a temple, was a temple meant for the public managed on behalf of the public providing an unfettered right to the public to worship the temple as of right, the question of succession among the trustees being open to the public or not, and the question of dedication of the temple to the public raised complicated questions of law and facts. Further, when the matter was seriously disputed, it would require leading of voluminous evidence by the parties to prove their respective cases. The provisions of S. 9-A of the Act were never intended to decide such complicated questions in a summary manner. He further urged that there were two pre-requisites for exercising the powers under S. 9-A of the Act, viz., whether the building belonged to a public charitable or public religious institution, whether it had been let out to a tenant for the purposes of a shop or commercial establishment, then in that event of the matter, the landlord could apply to the District Magistrate for revision of monthly rent and there being a public charitable or a public religious institution had to be an accepted fact and similarly it must also be an accepted fact that the building had been let out to the tenant for the purpose of a shop or commercial establishment. Where these two conditions were fulfilled, the District Magistrate could exercise his powers under S. 9-A of the Act. Where these facts were disputed and was subject matter of controversy, it did not lie within the competence and jurisdiction of the District Magistrate or any officer exercising the powers of the District Magistrate to enter an investigation into these questions in a proceeding under S. 9-A of the Act. For example, the question whether the building belonged to a public charitable or a public religious institution could not be decided in a summary manner and had to be decided upon leading evidence. There being no possibility or scope for leading such evidence before the District Magistrate under S. 9-A of the Act, both parties were obviously under handicap. Further, the provision of the Act nowhere provides for any appeal against the decision of the District Magistrate. That order would become final whereas in a suit in the civil court any decision of the trial court on a question of fact touching upon the title of the party would be subject to an appeal on questions of fact. 7. Learned counsel then urged that the ingredients of an institution being a public religious institution had been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 . In the present case, all the ingredients were not there. Even on the question of dedication to the public, the finding was perverse. Learned counsel further contended that Raghunandan Prasad was not competent to file the application on behalf of the temple or the Idols and for these reasons the application was not maintainable and liable to be rejected. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents Mr. H. S. Joshi, however, contended that the question whether the building belonged to a public religious institution or not was a pure question of fact. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate clearly showed that it has considered the relevant case law and the material on the record as well as the circumstances emanating from the established facts that the institution was a public religious institution. This was a finding on a question of fact and could not be challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This was a finding on a question of fact and could not be challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The finding by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the application was maintainable under S. 9-A of the Act was in accordance with law. Learned counsel refuted the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that unless the two basic facts viz. the building being owned by a public religious institution and let out for commercial purposes were accepted facts there could be no exercise of any of the powers under S. 9-A of the Act. The power of the District Magistrate while deciding an application under S. 9-A of the Act also permitted him to take such evidence as was necessary and the provisions of S. 34 and Rule 22 of the Rules made under the Act provided ample scope for taking evidence and deciding the matter. The findings that the temple was a public religious institution and that Shri Raghunandan Prasad was its Manager-cum-President were established from the facts determined by the District Magistrate. The basis for these findings could not be challenged in this writ petition, for it was not open to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution to re-appraise the evidence. 9. I have given a brief summary of the arguments raised at the Bar so that it would be possible to appreciate the ambit of dispute between the parties. I have, therefore, to examine the provisions of S. 9-A of the Act minutely and see what exactly is the scope of the said provision and the intendment under the Act. 9. I have given a brief summary of the arguments raised at the Bar so that it would be possible to appreciate the ambit of dispute between the parties. I have, therefore, to examine the provisions of S. 9-A of the Act minutely and see what exactly is the scope of the said provision and the intendment under the Act. First of all let me reproduce the provisions of S. 9-A of the Act : "9-A. Revision of rent of commercial building let out by public religious institutions- (1) Where any building, belonging to a public charitable or public religious institution has been let out to a tenant for the purposes of a shop or commercial establishment, then notwithstanding any thing contained in this Chapter, or in any contract or lease, the landlord of such building may apply to the District Magistrate for revision of the monthly rent payable therefor, and such rent shall be revised to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of ten per centum of the market value of the building under tenancy : Provided that the rent revised under this sub-section shall not exceed double the rent payable on the date of the application by the landlord under this sub-section. (2) The rent revised under sub-s. (1) shall be payable by the tenant from the commencement of the month of tenancy next following the date of the application. (3) Where the rent of any building has been revised in accordance with sub-s. (1), then the landlord shall not be entitled to move a fresh application under the said sub-section within a period of five years from the date of the final order. Explanation. In this section, the expressions "shop" and "commercial establishment" shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 as amended from time to time." In this context, it will be relevant to refer to the definition of the words "religious institution" as contained in . S. 3(s) of the Act : "3(s). "religious institution" means a temple, math, mosque, church, gurudwara or any other place of public worship and includes, waqf not being a waqf-alalaulad." 10. It will immediately be observed that the definition is of the term "religious institution", whereas S. 9-A of the Act uses the term "public religious institution". S. 3(s) of the Act : "3(s). "religious institution" means a temple, math, mosque, church, gurudwara or any other place of public worship and includes, waqf not being a waqf-alalaulad." 10. It will immediately be observed that the definition is of the term "religious institution", whereas S. 9-A of the Act uses the term "public religious institution". It is, therefore, evident from the above that the religious institution as such is not within the purview of S. 9-A of the Act. It has to be a public religious institution. Thus, unless a religious institution has a public character, it will not be in a position to ask for enhancement of rent of a commercial building owned by it. What I mean to say by the expression "public character" is that the religious institution must not only be for the benefit and interest of the public at large, but that its nature must be as opposed to a private religious institution. The same concept as that prevails in respect of a temple dedicated to an idol managed by the public or on behalf of the public and for the benefit of the public. 11. Whether a temple is public or private depends on the facts established in that case. Where there is user by the public it assumes importance in those cases where there is evidence of express dedication through documentary evidence, but there also the user by the public must be as of right. If the user of the temple as unrestricted to the members of the public, it would be fair to infer that the dedication was to the public. A private temple, on the other hand, is in which the public have no interest. If the case of a private deity the endowment made to it and its management and control being entirely in the hands of the family members of the founder and the user of the temple being restricted would undoubtedly lead to an inference that it is not a public temple. 12. A vast amount of case law has dealt with individual cases to find out whether the temple in the concerned case was a public or private one. 12. A vast amount of case law has dealt with individual cases to find out whether the temple in the concerned case was a public or private one. The four essential ingredients of a public temple are (a) endowment in favour of deity, (b) open for the visit and user by the members of the public as of right, (c) management and control in the hands of the public and (d) their succession not exclusively in the hands of the members of the founder's family. There may be cases where all these four ingredients may not be available, but dedication to the deity, the user by the public and as of right are absolutely essential in the case of a public temple. The question of management is an important ingredient but that by itself is not the sole criterion for judging whether the temple is public or private. A founder may nominate his family members for the management and control of the temple and dedicate the properties to the deity and also restrict the line of succession to the managers, but that, in my opinion, would not be conclusive. What is the nature of the endowment or the Trust? Is it private or public in its nature? Does it contemplate user by the public as of right? If it does then in that event even if the management is in the hands of a chosen few by the founder it would not affect the classification of the temple as a public one. Normally, a public temple is contemplated to be managed by the members of the public or on their behalf and the question of succession is open to the members of the public and not restricted to the members of the family of the founder, but it is also natural that the founder being conscious of the fact that he would not live for all times appoints such people as managers in whom he has trust. This may take effect during his lifetime of after his death. The founder may devise a scheme for the succession of those trustees. He may restrict them to be the heirs of the named person or leave it to the wisdom of the trustees. This may take effect during his lifetime of after his death. The founder may devise a scheme for the succession of those trustees. He may restrict them to be the heirs of the named person or leave it to the wisdom of the trustees. It will at once be evidence that if the trustees are not members of his family or related to him the founder had already taken steps from vesting the management entirely within his family or relatives. If the provision is that trustees may name their successors any one who is not their own heir or relative, a further step is taken to alienate the management and the control from the members of the founder's family or relatives. It would thus be seen that if the succession is left to the choice of the successive trustees, it would indicate that the founder's intention was not to keep the temple a private one, provided also that the temple is open to the public and used by the public as of right. There are various shades of difference of these permutations and combinations but essentially the question is one of fact. Whether the temple is a private or public one will depend on the facts and the circumstances of each case. 13. In the case of Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 , the question of distinction between a private and a public trust was considered. Their Lordships observed : "The distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof. While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are ascertained, or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment." Their Lordships further observed (at p. 136) : "Applying this principle, a religious endowment must be held to be private or public, according as the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof." It was further observed : "Then the question is, who are the beneficiaries when a temple is built, idol installed therein and properties endowed therefor? Under the Hindu Law an idol is juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. Under the Hindu Law an idol is juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But does it follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment? Though such a notion had a vogue at one time, and there is an echo of it in these proceedings, it is now established beyond all controversy that this is not the true position ............... " Their Lordships then referred to a decision of Varadachariar, J. in the case of Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Veeraraghvacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 and quoted the following observation : "As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as public trust." Their Lordships then observed : "When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, theta the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers." The question again came up for consideration before their Lordships in the case of Narayan v. Gopal, AIR 1960 SC 100 . The question was whether Sri Balaji Temple at Nasik was public temple or not. The question was whether Sri Balaji Temple at Nasik was public temple or not. Their Lordships quoted with approval a passage from the decision of Varadachariar, J. in the case of Narayan v. Hindu Religious and Endowments Board, AIR 1938 Mad 209 . In that case, the learned Judge was dealing with the definition of "temple". The definition inter alia laid down : ".......a "temple" meant a place used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by the Hindu community, or any section thereof as a place of religious worship." The learned Judge observed as follows : "The question of intention to dedicate the place for the use of the public or of the user by the public being as of right is necessarily a matter for inference from the nature of the institution and the nature of the user and the way the institution has been administered...... once a long course of user by the public for the purpose of worship is established, and the fact of a separate endowment in trust for the deity is also proved, it is fair to infer that the institution must have been dedicated for user by the public (unless the contrary is established) particularly when the character of the temple, its construction, the arrangement of the various parts of the temple and the nature of the deities installed there are similar to what obtains in admittedly public temples. Similarly, when user by the public generally to the extent to which there is a worshipping public in the locality is established, it is not unreasonable to presume that the user by the public was as of right, unless there are circumstances clearly suggesting that the user must have been permissive or that the authorities in charge of the temple have exercised such arbitrary power of exclusion that it can only be ascribed to the private character of the institution." The above passage which has been cited with approval by their Lordships lays down that once it is established that the temple has been open to the public for us and as of. right then unless contrary is proved, it will be deemed to be a public temple. 14. right then unless contrary is proved, it will be deemed to be a public temple. 14. The matter again came up for consideration before their Lordships in the case of Bihar State Board of Religious Trust v. Palat Lal, AIR 1972 SC 57 . In this case certain properties were endowed in favour of an idol in the family house of the testator. The question was whether this dedication to the idol under the Will was a public trust to which provision of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act was applicable. Chief Justice Hidayatullah speaking for the Court observed (at p. 59) : "The facts here are that the idol had been in the family for a number of years and only the family was doing the seba-puja in the Thakur Dwara, and there is no mention anywhere that the public ever looked after this idol and were allowed a share in the worship as of right. Further, by the will also the author of the dedication did not make it clear that the public were to be admitted as of right thereafter. The whole of the arrangement shows that the further looking after of the Thakurji was to be the concern of the family, and it was only under the nomination of the family that a particular person of the Vaishavnava belief was to be in charge after the demise of the members of the family who were to become the mutawallis after the death of the testator." It was held on the above case that it was a family idol and the worshippers had all along been the members of the family. It is evident from this case that the members of the public had no right of worshipping the idol as of right. The user by the public as of right is an essential ingredient of a temple being of a public temple or a trust being of a public nature. Where this is absent, the trust cannot be held to be a public trust. Similarly, a temple in such a case cannot be deemed to be a public temple. 15. The matter had also come up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of G.S. Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas, AIR 1970 SC 2025 . Where this is absent, the trust cannot be held to be a public trust. Similarly, a temple in such a case cannot be deemed to be a public temple. 15. The matter had also come up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of G.S. Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas, AIR 1970 SC 2025 . The question was whether the temple belonging to Vallabh Sampradaya at Nadiad was a private temple or a public temple. Justice Hegde speaking for the Court observed : "Though most of the present day Hindu public temples have been founded as public temples, there are instances of private temples becoming public temples in course of time. Some of the private temples have acquired great deal of religious reputation either because of the eminence of its founder or because of other circumstances. They have attracted large number of devotees. Gradually in course of time they have become public temples. Public temples are generally built or raised by the public and the deity installed to enable the members of the public or a section thereof to offer worship. In such a case the temple would clearly to have originated as a public temple, nothing more is necessary to be proved to show that it is a public temple but if a temple is proved to have originated as a private temple or its origin in unknown or lost in antiquity then there must be proof to show that it is being used as a public temple. In such cases the true character of the particular temple is decided on the basis of various circumstances. In those cases the courts have to address themselves to various questions such as- (1) Is the temple built in such imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple? (2) Are the members of the public entitled to worship in that temple as of right? (3) Are the temple expenses met from the contributions made by the public? (4) Whether the sevas and utsavas conducted in the temple are those usually conducted in public temples? (2) Are the members of the public entitled to worship in that temple as of right? (3) Are the temple expenses met from the contributions made by the public? (4) Whether the sevas and utsavas conducted in the temple are those usually conducted in public temples? (5) Have the management as well as the devotees been treating that temple as a public temple?.........." "The circumstance that the public or a section thereof have been regularly worshipping in the temple as a matter of course and they can take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in that temple apparently as a matter of right is as wrong piece of evidence to establish the public character of the temple. If votive offerings are being made by the public in the usual course and if the expenses of the temple are met by public contribution, it is safe to presume that the temple in question is a public temple. In brief the origin of the temple, the manner in which its affairs are managed, the nature and extent of gifts received by it, rights exercised by the devotees in regard to worship therein, the consciousness of the manager and the consciousness of the devotees themselves as to the character of the temple are factors that go to establish whether a temple is a public temple or a private temple." His Lordship also referred to the case of Lakshmana v. Subramania, AIR 1924 PC 44 as well as the case of Mundacheri Koman v. Achutan Nair, AIR 1934 PC 230 which were also referred in the present case. It is not necessary to refer in detail about these decisions, for, in my opinion, the law laid down by his Lordship in the above case embraces in its fold all that had been decided earlier either by the Privy Council or the Supreme Court. 16. In the case of T.D. Gopalan v. Commr. of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, AIR 1972 SC 1716 , the question was whether the particular temple in Madurai was a temple within the meaning of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the law laid down in the case of Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Ranchhoddas Kalidas, AIR 1970 SC 2025 . 17. of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, AIR 1972 SC 1716 , the question was whether the particular temple in Madurai was a temple within the meaning of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the law laid down in the case of Shri Mahalaxmi Vahuji v. Ranchhoddas Kalidas, AIR 1970 SC 2025 . 17. On the question of dedication of property to an idol their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra Shukla v. Shree Mahadeoji, AIR 1970 SC 458 at p. 464 observed : "A dedication of property for a religious or a charitable purpose can, according to Hindu Law, be validly made orally and no writing is necessary to create an endowment except where it is created by a will. It can be made by a gift inter vivos or by a bequest or by ceremonial or relinquishment. An appropriation of property for specific religious or charitable purposes is all that is necessary for a valid dedication. As stated by the Privy Council in Vidyavaruthi v. Balusami Ayyar, (1922) 48 Ind App 302 at p. 322 : AIR 1922 PC 123 at p. 126 a trust in the sense in which it is understood in English law is unknown in the Hindu system. Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols, to religious institutions and for all purpose considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system ................. Hence, what are purely religious purposes, and what religious purposes will be charitable purposes must be decided according to Hindu notions and Hindu law." 18. It is clear from a consideration of the cases cited above that where there is a deed in writing or a will dedicating a temple and endowing it with property that would be the best piece of evidence to find out as to whether it is for the public or is a private endowment. Where the origin of the temple is lost in antiquity or there , is no documentary evidence or where the temple originally was a private temple, but in course of time is being used by the public a different approach is required to find out whether it is a private or a public temple. Apart from leading documentary evidence as to i s origin even oral evidence, where available, would be a relevant circumstance. Apart from leading documentary evidence as to i s origin even oral evidence, where available, would be a relevant circumstance. It is imperative in such cases to find out as to who are using the temple and whether the members of the public or a section thereof are using it as of right and whether the votive items are being utilised for the user of the temple and the deity and whether the income of the property is being similarly utilised. Apart from this another circumstance would be whether the endowment is private or public and the nature of the management and control. Whether it it confined to the members of the family (Naslan-bad-Naslan) or is it open to others who are neither members of the family nor relatives of the founder. It would also be necessary to find out what is the nature of the control exercised by the trustees or the Managers. If these indicate that it is being used for the benefit of the worshippers who are members of the public then all these circumstances cumulatively would point out that there is a public endowment i.e. a public temple as opposed to a private endowment and a private temple. 19. I am satisfied that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate exercising the powers of the District Magistrate has applied the correct test and has come to the correct conclusion. The order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate shows that he has applied his mind to the question, considered the case law cited before him and applied the correct principles to the questions of fact as found by him. There is no denying of the fact that the members of the public have an access to the temple as of right. The votive offerings and the income of the temple go for the management and up-keep of the temple and the endowed properties. The only point was whether the office of the Manager or the Trustees was open to the members of the public. Even if it was not, it would not matter in the present case, for, as seen above, that consideration by itself would not be able to defeat the claim that the temple was a public temple. Applying the principles as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was correct and in accordance with law. 20. Applying the principles as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was correct and in accordance with law. 20. The finding by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as to whether the property belonging to a public religious institution is an essential point to be decided, where disputed, before the provisions of S. 9-A of, the Act would be attracted. It was necessary for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to find out from the available material on the record whether the shops in dispute were the property of the temple and whether the temple partook of the nature of a public temple. If it was so, then in that event section 4 of the Act would be attracted, provided the other requirement viz. the building was let out for commercial purposes was full filled. In the present case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had to be satisfied that property belonged to a public institution and that it had been let out of commercial purposes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate had held in favour of the applicants on both the points. I do not find any manifest error of law in the findings arrived at by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and secondly, the exercise of the power by him to determine the rent under S. 9-A of the Act was permissible. 21. The plea that a complicated question of fact and law cannot be decided in a proceeding like the present one is not quite correct. Whenever an authority is called upon to decide any question of fact or law, he has to be satisfied that the conditions envisaged in the Act are there and for this he has to rely on the material on the record. Section 34 Rule 22 gives him power to summon any record, take any evidence which he deems necessary for deciding the question. It is true that when a matter is disputed, the parties have to lead evidence and such evidence can be voluminous also, but then that will not be a reason to say that whenever a dispute is raised as to whether a building is owned by a public religious institution, the matter would be beyond the purview of the District Magistrate under S. 9-A of the Act. That is not the intention under the Act. That is not the intention under the Act. The matter was to be decided according to law as laid down in the Act and the Rules. It is not the case of any party that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had precluded the parties from leading any evidence or arguing any matter. On the contrary, the parties had, as the order shows, led evidence and cited extensively from the case law. I am unable to accept the contention that whenever there is a dispute as to whether the religious institution was a public or not, it was not a matter which could be decided by the District Magistrate under S. 9-A of the Act. 22. To give such a meaning to the provisions of S. 9-A of the Act would be to make the provision nugatory. The intention of the Legislature was quite clear. The benefit was intended to be given to a public religious institution by enhancing the rent of commercial premises owned by the institution. The provision was not extended to a private religious institution and was also not available in regard to residential accommodation. The test whether a particular institution was public or not is well settled and it is not an impossible task for any authority acting quasi-judicially to determine the same. A quasi-judicial authority has to give reason for his order. In the present case that has been done. It is, therefore, in my opinion, wholly incorrect to argue that the question whether an institution is a public religious institution or not cannot be decided by the District Magistrate in exercise of his powers under S. 9-A of the Act. 23. On the question whether Raghunandan Prasad was competent to file the application under S. 9-A of the Act on behalf of the religious institution has also been considered by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in his order. He has referred to several orders passed by the Courts touching upon the question as to whether Raghunandan Prasad was the Manager. In one case Raghunandan Prasad was restrained from acting as Manager. However, rent receipts were issued to various tenants carrying the signature of Raghunandan Prasad as Manager and there is also material on the record to show that there was settlement between Krishna Kumar and Raghunandan Prasad. In one case Raghunandan Prasad was restrained from acting as Manager. However, rent receipts were issued to various tenants carrying the signature of Raghunandan Prasad as Manager and there is also material on the record to show that there was settlement between Krishna Kumar and Raghunandan Prasad. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate has drawn inference from the above facts and the fact that no one else claimed to be the Manager of the trust and held that Raghunandan Prasad was competent to file the application on behalf of the religious institution. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to assail the position of Raghunandan Prasad as Manager on the basis of the material on the record, but this Court cannot re-appraise the evidence on questions of fact. The finding arrived at by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate will have to be accepted as correct. I do not find any manifest error of law in this finding arrived at by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 25. Having given the matter the consideration it deserves, I am satisfied that the sub-divisional Magistrate decided the questions regarding the temple being a public religious institution and the competence of Shri Raghunandan Prasad to make the application under S. 9-A of the Act in accordance with law. I do not find any merit in Writ Petition No. 5099 of 1979. This writ petition must, therefore, fail. 26. In Writ Petition No. 10457 of 1979 the deity through its Manager Shri Raghunandan Prasad has challenged the later part of the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the ground that the market value of the five shops belonging to the public religious institution had not been determined in accordance with law. The relevant facts are that the deity owns several shops out of which the dispute in the present case is in respect of five shops. On behalf of the deity it was claimed that the temple was a public religious institution and the shops had been let out for commercial purposes to different persons who are arrayed as respondents 2 to 9 in Writ Petition No. 10457 of 1979. It was claimed on behalf of the deity that the requirement of S. 9-A of the Act having been fulfilled, the rents paid by the various tenants of these shops were liable to be revised. It was claimed on behalf of the deity that the requirement of S. 9-A of the Act having been fulfilled, the rents paid by the various tenants of these shops were liable to be revised. On behalf of the deity the Manager gave the market value of the five shops and claimed that the rent should be accordingly fixed. On behalf of the tenants-respondents it was urged that the market value shown by the Manager was incorrect and the correct valuation was a much lower figure. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate by the impugned order dated 15-5-1979 accepted the valuation given by the tenants and did not rely on the valuation given by the Manager. There was only marginal adjustment in the landlord's valuation and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the order accordingly. Aggrieved, the deity has come up to this Court in the Writ Petition. 27. On behalf of the petitioner deity, it was urged by Mr. H. S. Joshi that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in respect of valuation was manifestly erroneous, for he rejected the valuation given by the Manager on a wholly insufficient ground. The reason given by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was that in the case of five tenants exactly similar affidavit of valuation had been given by the Manager in which only the value of each shop was differently shown. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate in his order has remarked as follows: In fact a common affidavit has been typed and that on the copies signatures are made besides this it is relevant to note that in para 20 of each of the five affidavits Sri Raghunandan Prasad has stated on oath that the length, width, size and type of construction are identical to the shop 142 Gandhi Bazar Pilkhuwa which was sold for Rs. 8,000/- by Smt. Mlaho wife of Bhikan to Laloo son of Sis Ram and Sis Ram son of Khacheroo Mal in the year 1970, the photostat copy of the sale deed of which has been filed. Sri Raghunandan Prasad has thus deposed that the five shops involved in the five cases filed should have been the same areas, type of construction etc. as the other. Sri Raghunandan Prasad has thus deposed that the five shops involved in the five cases filed should have been the same areas, type of construction etc. as the other. However, in para 21 of the affidavits he has stated on oath that the market value of the shops are different from each other and 25,000/- , 25,000/- , 15,000/- , 50,000/- and 25,000/- respectively which is written in ink by the two persons are contradictory. The market value thus seems to have been filed by connivance and the affidavits appear overtly false. Thus none of the affidavits filed by Sri Raghunandan Prasad or Sri Krishna Kumar can be deemed to have any evidentiary value." 28 The fact that five identical affidavits had been filed in respect of five different shops will not make them inadmissible in evidence. Merely because the valuation given in each one of them appeared to be different will also not make them inadmissible in evidence. The matter that should have been seen is whether the averment that each of the five shops were identical or not should have been verified, I take that their location was at the same place, but they could not have a wide variation in their value on the ground of location. Of course, the valuation could be different provided the size, area, nature of construction and the fitments were not the same. This could cause a difference in the valuation. In case each shop was exactly similar and located in the same area, they should have more or less a similar valuation, unless there was something to distinguish as to the nature of the construction and the fitment. In such cases the lowest valuation of the five shops, which had been given by the petitioner, should have been examined and considered. The exemplar given by the petitioner was in respect of a similar size of shop sold for Rs. 8,000/- in the year 1970. The present matter was being decided in the year 1979. It is common knowledge that prices of immovable property have been rising over all these years and particularly between 1975 and 1976 onwards. It was, therefore, essential to consider whether the lowest valuation given by the petitioner was justified or not. On the other hand, affidavits filed by the tenants of the five shops gave valuation of Rs. 6,000/- , Rs. 3,000/- , Rs. 8,000/- and Rs. It was, therefore, essential to consider whether the lowest valuation given by the petitioner was justified or not. On the other hand, affidavits filed by the tenants of the five shops gave valuation of Rs. 6,000/- , Rs. 3,000/- , Rs. 8,000/- and Rs. 4,500/- . If each shop was, exactly of the same size and built then how could there be a variation between Rs. 3,000/- and Rs. 8,000/- . If the reasoning adopted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in rejecting the affidavits of Raghunandan Prasad on the ground of identical shops had been valued differently, the same argument would apply to the valuation put by the tenants to the five shops. It appears to me that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not correctly applied the norms of valuation in respect of these five shops. Increase in the market value has been a marked phenomena. Each affidavit should have been considered for its intrinsic worth. It has also to be borne in mind that the affidavits are of interested person. The contents of such affidavit are to be carefully weighted. Further, effort must be made to find out the basis of the valuation given by the parties. The norms for determining market value, which are well settled, have to be kept in mind, in determining the market value. 29. It is, therefore, obvious that the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the question of valuation of the shops is manifestly erroneous in law and this part of the order cannot be sustained. In my opinion, this part of the order will have to be quashed and the case sent to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for a fresh decision on the question of valuation in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. 30. In the result, therefore, the Writ Petition No. 5099 of 1979 filed by the tenants is dismissed with the costs. 31. The Writ Petition No. 10457 of 1979 filed by the deity is allowed. The order determining the valuation of the five shops by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is set aside and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is directed to re-determine afresh the market value of the five shops in accordance with law. In this case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.