JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C.J. - This is a Defendant's appeal against an order of remand. 2. The Plaintiff-Respondent brought a suit for an injunction to restrain the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiff's repairing of the tiles and the walls of the room in his tenancy, to keep it wind proof and water proof. The Defendants 2, 3 and 5 contested the suit. They denied that the Plaintiff was their tenant. In the alternative, they pleaded that the suit was barred by the provisions of Sections 26, 28 and 38 of the Rent Control Act No. 13 of 1972. 3. The trial Court framed seven issues of which issue No. 3 was whether the Plaintiff's suit was barred as aforesaid. This issue was taken up as a preliminary issue. The trial Court held that the suit was barred by those provisions of the Rent Control Act. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff went up in appeal. 4. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding. He held that the suit was not barred by Sections 26, 28 and 38 of the Act of 1972. On this view, the appeal was allowed. The decree of the trial Court was set aside and the case was remanded for trial according to law. The Defendants have now come to this Court in appeal. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the suit was not maintainable. The Plaintiff was, if at all, entitled to relief only under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. I find no merit in this submission. 6. The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 regulates and controls certain aspects of the relationship between landlord and tenant. Section 26 of the Act lays down certain obligations of the landlord as well as the tenant. For instance, under Sub-section (2) of Section 26, the landlord is bound to keep the building under tenancy wind proof and water proof and carry out periodical repairs. Section 28 provides a detailed procedure for the enforcement of the landlord's obligations regarding repairs, etc. mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 26. Section 38 says that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 7. Section 28 provides a detailed procedure for the enforcement of the landlord's obligations regarding repairs, etc. mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 26. Section 38 says that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 7. In the present suit, the Plaintiff claimed to be a tenant of the Defendant-Appellant but the Defendant-Appellants denied this relationship. There is nothing in Sections 26, 28 and 38 which will help the Plaintiff in getting his title as a tenant determined by the authorities prescribed under the Rent Control Act. So far as this part of the suit is concerned, it cannot be said that it is at all covered by Section 26 or 28 of the Act so as to be barred by some implications flowing from Section 38. 8. Section 28 lays down the procedure for enforcement by a tenant of landlord's obligations, inter alia, to keep the building under his tenancy wind proof or water proof. Under it if the landlord fails to carry out the obligations, the tenant can give him one month's notice. If the landlord fails to comply with the notice, the tenant may himself carry out the repairs if they do not cost more than two month's rent and deduct the expenditure from the rent or, if the cost is likely to exceed that amount he may apply to the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority may, after hearing the parties, require the landlord to carry out the requisite repairs within the specified period and, on his failure to do so, permit the tenant to carry out those repairs at the estimated cost affirmed by it. Under Sub-section (6) of Section 28, the tenant has to furnish an account of the expenditure to the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority then certifies the amount recoverable by the tenant, and such amount unless paid or otherwise adjusted by the landlord, can be deducted by the tenant from the monthly rent payable by him. 9. Thus the scheme of the Act is that u/s 26 certain obligations are cast on the landlord which can be enforced u/s 28 at the cost of the landlord. 9. Thus the scheme of the Act is that u/s 26 certain obligations are cast on the landlord which can be enforced u/s 28 at the cost of the landlord. A person who is a tenant of an accommodation can make use of Section 28 in a case where he wishes to have some repairs done at the landlord's expense. Sections 26 or 28 do not, in any manner, prohibit the institution of a suit in the regular civil Courts if the relief claimed is of having some repairs done by the tenant himself, without imposing any financial liability on the landlord. 10. Section 38 does not prohibit the institution of suits in the civil Courts. It only says that the provisions of this Act will override the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of the Act will have primacy and supervening efficacy in so far as they apply, even in a suit in the civil Courts. In view of the summary remedy u/s 26 read with Section 28, no tenant is likely to file a suit in the regular civil Courts, which normally takes longer time for disposal, if he wants a relief that the landlord be forced to effect repairs at his own cost. 11. In the present case, the Plaintiff alleged that he was the tenant of a room in house No. 38, Zero Road, Allahabad, since 1964 on a rent of Rs. 75/-per month. He was at first running a workshop but due to labour problem he began to use the same as a godown. The installed machinery continued to remain in it. The Defendants, who were the landlords, wanted to enhance the rent and, failing to get a response, they started harassing the Plaintiff. The Defendants on August 2, 1979 began to remove the tiles of the roof whereupon the Plaintiff objected with the result that there was a fracas and the Plaintiff and his servants received multiple injuries. The plaint goes on to allege that Defendants formed an association of desperadoes on August 5, 1979 and began to dismantle the roof and also damaged the walls of the said room. The Plaintiff lodged a report with the police. The machineries, etc. stored in the room became buried under debris and were likely to be damaged by rains and pilferage. The Plaintiff lodged a report with the police. The machineries, etc. stored in the room became buried under debris and were likely to be damaged by rains and pilferage. The Plaintiff wanted to remove the garbage and made proper security arrangements of the machines and their parts stored in the said room but the Defendants did not permit the Plaintiff to remove the garbage and to ensure safety of the articles lying in the room. Paragraph 9 of the plaint stated that the Defendants are malafide, arbitrarily and wrongfully taking the law into their own hands otherwise than in accordance with law by removing the tiles and damaging the walls. It was stated that Plaintiff was entitled to full enjoyment of the rights of a tenant and the Defendants have no right to make the accommodation unsafe in view of their evil designs during the course of his tenancy. 12. In paragraph 12, it was alleged that the Defendants are duty bound to keep the accommodation water proof, sun proof and in a good habitable condition but they are adamant to coerce the Plaintiff and are prepared to cause wrongful loss damaging his stock and machines lying in the premises. The cause of action for the suit was stated to have arisen on August 5, 1979 when the Defendants damaged the tiles and walls. 13. The relief claimed was that the Defendants be restrained by means of permanent injunction not to interfere with the repairing of the tiles and the walls of the room in the tenancy of the Plaintiff so that it may remain wind proof and water proof. 14. Thus the Plaintiff charged the Defendants with acts of mischief and nuisance and deliberate damage to the accommodation. He claims the relief that the Defendants be restrained from interfering with the Plaintiff's repairing the tiles and the walls. There is not even a whisper in the plaint that the Plaintiff desired the Defendant-landlords to repair the tiles and the walls. The reliefs claimed in the suit are not within the contemplation of Section 28 which, as already stated above, applies where the tenant desires the landlord to carry out the repairs, etc. failing which he may be permitted to do so at the cost of the landlords. It is evident that the suit was not barred by any of the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1972. 15. failing which he may be permitted to do so at the cost of the landlords. It is evident that the suit was not barred by any of the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1972. 15. Learned Counsel for the Appellants invited my attention to Section 29 of the Rent Control Act. Sub-section (1) thereof provides: 29 (1) where in consequence of the commission of mischief or any other offence in the course of collective distrubances, any building under tenancy is wholly or partly destroyed the tenant shall have the right to re-erect it wholly or partly, as the case may be, at his own expense within a period of six months from such injury; Provided that if such injury was occasioned by the wrongful act or default of the tenant he shall not be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of this provision. This section applies only where mischief or any other offence is committed in the course of collective disturbances. This section has no application to the commission of mischief by the landlord or anyone else, individually. 16. Section 9 CPC confers an all embracing jurisdiction on the Civil Court except to the extent it is excluded by express provisions of law or even impliedly. In Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, AIR 1969 SC 78 Hidayatullah,C.J , speaking for the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, laid down several propositions regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court. Three of the propositions are material for our purposes. His Lordship stated: Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit... In the present suit no order of any special tribunal created by the Rent Control Act is being questioned or challenged. Section 37 of the Rent Control Act provides that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. Thus the only exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is confined to what Section 37 provides. This section is not attracted to the present case. Section 37 of the Rent Control Act provides that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court. Thus the only exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is confined to what Section 37 provides. This section is not attracted to the present case. Another proposition laid down was: Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. 17. Another proposition laid down by his Lordship was that an exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions laid down apply. 18. There is no express bar in the Rent Control Act excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Court in all cases or disputes between landlord and tenant. Section 38 provides that the provisions of the Act will have supervening afficacy over the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. As we have already seen the rights and the relief claimed by the Plaintiff in the present suit cannot be obtained by him before the authorities constituted by the Rent Control Act. 19. In my opinion, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The lower appellate Court correctly decided the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the trial Court. 20. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.