JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. - This writ petition has been filed against an order passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad in an appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Prescribed Authority, Hapur, had rejected the application of the landlord under Section 21 of the Act for the release of the building. On appeal the 1st Additional District Judge had allowed the application of the landlord and ordered ejectment of the tenant under Section 21 of the Act. 2. The dispute property belongs to a temple with deities. An application had been moved through the Manager under Section 21 of the Act. The petitioner Shibboo was the tenant of a Kotha along with open land. The applicant landlord claimed that the building in dispute was in a dilapidated condition and was not fit for residence and the landlord wanted to demolish it and raise new construction to augment the income of the temple. It was further claimed that the tenant had alternative accommodation and the requirement was for public good and the applicant had means to re-construct it. The application was contested by the tenant. He also disputed the rate of rent and the right of the Manager to move the application. There was a denial that the building was dilapidated and that it needed re-construction. The Prescribed Authority held that the landlord had failed to satisfy the conditions under Rule 17 and there was no justification for allowing the application of the landlord. The landlord went up in appeal and the respondent No. 1 while allowing the appeal and the application held that the landlord had been able to make out a case. The application made by the landlord through the Manager Bhagwati Prasad was maintainable. The building was in a dilapidated condition and it required fresh construction. The landlord had sufficient means for reconstruction and the requirement of Rule 17 and been complied with. There was surplus appurtenant land and there was no reason why the tenant should be allowed to continue in possession of such appurtenant land. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and that order of ejectment of the tenant under Section 21 of the Act was passed. 3. There was surplus appurtenant land and there was no reason why the tenant should be allowed to continue in possession of such appurtenant land. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and that order of ejectment of the tenant under Section 21 of the Act was passed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of the Ist Additional District Judge is vitiated by error of law. He urged that the finding in regard to bonafide need was bad in law. Secondly, there was no compliance with the requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act, inasmuch as the landlord's financial capability of making new construction was not considered but that of the Manager. The affidavit of the Architect and the report of the Engineer on behalf of the tenant (Annexures 6 and 7) to the writ petition had not been considered. Thirdly the Commissioner's report filed in the case, although inadmissible in evidence, was relied upon. Fourthly, in regard to the question of hardship, the provision of Rule 16 had not been taken into consideration or complied with. I have also heard the learned counsel for the respondent. 4. The Appellate Authority has examined in great detail the question also to whether the building under tenancy was in a dilapidated condition. Respondent No. 1 came to the conclusion that the building was in a dilapidated condition. This finding was challenged on the ground that the building was not dilapidated; that the landlord did not have the financial capacity for the demolition and new construction and the financial capability of the Manager was of no consequence and had to be ignored. The first question therefore to be considered is whether the finding on the question of dilapidated condition of the building under tenancy is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 5. Three reasons have been given. Firstly, the evidence has not been properly appreciated. Secondly, inadmissible evidence, namely, Commissioner's report had been read in evidence and thirdly, the affidavit of the Architect and the report of the Engineering Firm had been ignored. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on the record, I find no merits in any of the contentions. 6. On behalf of the landlord the affidavit of the Manager Bhagwati Prasad was there and it had been considered. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on the record, I find no merits in any of the contentions. 6. On behalf of the landlord the affidavit of the Manager Bhagwati Prasad was there and it had been considered. The tenant had given his affidavit as well as one of Haneef and certificates of two Architects. The Appellate Authority also relied on a report of the Commissioner in civil suit between the parties. The Commissioner had visited the spot on 12.10.1975 and had mentioned that four Karis had fallen down and planks were broken as also the wall had fallen down on one side. This was the condition of the house in 1975, when admittedly the application under Section 21 of the Act had not even been moved. The argument that the Commissioner's report could not be read because the Commissioner had not been examined will not make the report inadmissible in evidence. That report was a part of the judicial record of a suit between the parties. A certified copy of the judicial record can certainly be admitted in evidence to be considered on the merits. The report of the Commissioner in a judicial proceeding would be a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act, and certified copy of a public document would therefore be admissible in evidence. The contention to the contrary is not tenable. 7. In regard to the affidavit of the parties, the Appellate Authority observed that Bhagwati Prasad, the Manager had no personal interest in the matter and was prepared to invest his own money in the establishment of the temple. It was held that his affidavit was, therefore, to be given greater weight. In regard to the tenant's affidavit the appellate authority held that the tenant was clearly interested in the matter. It was also observed that the tenant had even taken the plea that Bhagwati Prasad and Vishwanath were not the Managers of the temple and had no right to look after its affairs, yet he admitted that the property had been let out to him by Bhagwati Prasad. The appellate authority has given reasons to rely on the affidavit of Bhagwati Prasad rather than that of the tenant. The appellate authority has given reasons to rely on the affidavit of Bhagwati Prasad rather than that of the tenant. In regard to the affidavit of the Architects there is no discussion in the order about its contents, but the affidavit (Annexure 6' to the writ petition) has certainly been mentioned. He certainly stated that the building was in a sound state of health and each wall was two quarter feet wide. This report is dated 29th July, 1980. There is another report by a Firm known as Singhal Associates dated 28th July, 1980 which has also stated that the disputed building was in a sound state of health. Both these reports mentioned the area of the land covered by Kotha as 14' x 7 feet. As against this there is a certificate by Shri N.S. Singhal, Engineer. Bhagwati Prasad had filed a rejoinder affidavit before the Appellate Authority controverting the allegations in the affidavit of Rajendra Prasad and the certificate of Singhal Associates. He also denied the measurement of the building given by the Architects. The landlord also filed a certificate of Shri N.S. Singhal, Architect and Engineer dated 17th August, 1979. He stated that the house was in a dilapidated and dangerous condition and may collapse any time, and further that it required immediate demolition and re-construction. This report has also been considered by the Appellate Authority. This report was criticised on the ground that it did not contain any details but more or less similar was the position with the reports of the Architects on behalf of the tenant. In my opinion, the finding arrived at by the appellate authority on the question of dilapidated condition of the building does not suffer from any manifest error of law to call for any interference. Even if there is some error in appreciation of evidence, it does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. Consequently, the finding on the question of dilapidated condition has to be accepted. 8. The next question to be considered is what is the requirement of law if the landlord is able to establish that the building is in a dilapidated condition. It is necessary for him to prove that such building is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. 8. The next question to be considered is what is the requirement of law if the landlord is able to establish that the building is in a dilapidated condition. It is necessary for him to prove that such building is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. As such, there is no question of considering bonafide need even where the building is found to be in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. The question that the building is bonafide required in its existing form or after demolition comes under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. All that the law requires is that the Prescribed Authority or the Appellate Authority as the case may be, is satisfied that the ground in clauses (a) or (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act is made out for ordering the eviction of a tenant from the building in dispute. Once landlord is able to prove that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction the order of the eviction of the tenant would follow. But as been above there must be a finding that it is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. In this context a perusal of Rule 17 would be material. That provision states that before allowing an application for release of a building under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act on the ground that it is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction, the Prescribed Authority has to satisfy himself (1) that the building requires demolition (2) that a proper estimate of expenditure and new construction has been prepared (3) that a plan has been duly prepared in accordance with bye-laws and regulation of the local authority and (4) that the landlord has financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. As far clause (1) is concerned, there is a finding that the building required demolition. Nothing was addressed in regard to clause (2) about the proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction. In regard to third clause also the Appellate Authority held that the Municipal Board has given a certificate that the map for the construction has been approved. Nothing was addressed in regard to clause (2) about the proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction. In regard to third clause also the Appellate Authority held that the Municipal Board has given a certificate that the map for the construction has been approved. The factum that the plan had been prepared and presented to the Municipal Board could not be denied and the fact that it had been approved by the Municipal Board could also not be denied. 9. The main contention of the learned counsel was that clause (iv) of Rule 17 has not been complied with. He argued that what has been shown to be the financial capacity was of the Manager and not of the deities. The Manager was not the landlord, he urged. The deities were the landlord and therefore the financial capacity of the deities, the landlords, had to be established, and as such there was non-compliance with the requirement of clause (iv) of Rule 17. This argument will have to be rejected as untenable. A deity cannot act by itself. It has to act through a Manager or Trustee, in other words, an agent or attorney. There is no dispute that there is a Trust in respect of the temple and that it manages the affairs of the trust. A dispute was certainly raised as to whether Bhagwati Prasad was the Manager of the Trust. The contention that he was not the Manager of the Trust has to be rejected for the tenant had clearly accepted the position that he had taken the Kotha on rent from Bhagwati Prasad who was the Manager of the temple. There is thus no manner of doubt that Bhagwati Prasad was the Manager and Trustee of the deities qua the tenant. 10. The definition of the word 'landlord' as contained in Section 3(j) of the Act reads as follows : "3(j) "Landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person;" There is no dispute now that the building was let out to the tenant by Bhagwati Prasad Manager. He would, therefore, be the agent or attorney on behalf of the deity. He would, therefore, be the agent or attorney on behalf of the deity. Therefore, under definition clause 3(j) Bhagwati Prasad would be deemed to be the landlord qua the tenant. Consequently, the financial capability of Bhagwati Prasad could be seen for the purposes of clause (iv) of Rule 17. If he had the financial capacity for the demolition and reconstruction of the building on behalf of the deity, would fulfil the requirement of law. The finding by the Appellate Authority is that he did have the financial capacity for demolition and reconstruction of the building in dispute. 11. In the case of Smt. Kailash Devi v. III Addl. District Judge, 1978 All. Rent Cases 392 a learned Single Judge was considering clause (iv) of Rule 17 and the meaning of the word "financial capacity". The word "capacity" refers to capability, ability or opportunity of collecting money for the purposes of construction. It is not necessary that he should have the entire money required for the demolition and construction ready in cash. He should have the means to raise the amount required and that would come under the term 'financial' capacity. In the case of Chaudhary Mohd. Usman v. Prescribed Authority, Farrukhabad, 1979 All. Rent Cases 60, the question related to the financial capacity of a Waqf to make new construction. The Court observed that if the Mutwalli had the required capacity, it would be sufficient. Same would be the position in regard to a Manager or Trustee of the temple. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the financial capacity of the Manager was a valid consideration in determining whether the landlord had the financial capacity for the purposes of demolition and new construction. 12. For the reasons indicated above I do not find any error of law apparent on the face of the record in regard to the finding on this point by the Appellate Authority. 13. In view of the above, the appellate authority was quite justified in not considering the provision of Section 21(1)(a) for the purposes of deciding the application for the release of the accommodation by the landlord. It was in fact not necessary at all. Once he came to the conclusion that the case has been made out under clause (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act, he had to allow the application for release made by the petitioner. This has been done. It was in fact not necessary at all. Once he came to the conclusion that the case has been made out under clause (b) of Section 21(1) of the Act, he had to allow the application for release made by the petitioner. This has been done. I do not find any error of law apparent on any of the findings arrived at by the appellate authority, nor do I find any merit in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition must, therefore, fail. 14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.