JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J.- This is a defendant's Second Appeal in a suit for possession over a piece of land 30 feet by 12 feet described at the foot of the plaint and also shown on a sketch map annexed to the plaint by the letters Ka Kha Ga and shaded red. The land was alleged to form part of plot No. 587 of village Bathuwa which is said to be within the Municipal limits of the town of Mirzapur Plot No. 587 having an area of 9 biswas was one of several plots of land obtained by the plaintiff on lease from the zamindars. The lease is dated the 15th June, 196l. It is a registered document and is Ext. 6 on the record. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant illegally occupied the land constructed a Khaprail shop thereon, wherein he was carrying on the business of repairing cycles, and, since the defendant did not vacate the land, hence the suit. 2. The defence was that the land was not situate in plots No. 587, was never leased out to the plaintiff and the plaintiff was not entitled to sue. Limitation was also set up as a bar to the suit. 3. The suit was by a judgment dated the 19th December, 1966, dismissed by the trail court. On appeal that judgment was set aside and the suit was remanded for a fresh trail by the judgment dated the 30th September, 1967 of the court of the Additional Civil Judge, Mirzapur. After remand, the plaint was amended and additional written statement was filed and issues were resettled. Of the issues, issue No. 1, whether the land in suit belongs to the plaintiff, was the main issue. There were two other issues, which have been raised at the hearing of this appeal, namely issue No. 3 whether the suit is barred by time and issue No 7 whether the disputed constructions lay in plot No. 587. The trial court held on issue No. 1 that the plaintiff is the owner ; on issue No. 3, that the suit was not barred by limitation which was taken to be twelve years ; and on issue No. 7, that the land lay in plot No. 587. The suit was decreed by the trial court. On appeal, the lower appellant court confirmed the said decree. 4. Mr. The suit was decreed by the trial court. On appeal, the lower appellant court confirmed the said decree. 4. Mr. C.B. Misra for the appellant urged firstly that the lease, on which the plaintiff relied upon, was of a kind which was not known to the U.P. Tenancy Act and did not, therefore, confer any title on the plaintiff. Secondly, he urged that, without a survey, it could not be said that the land in suit lay within plot No. 587 ; and lastly that, at any rate, the suit was of the nature of a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and the two courts below were, therefore, in error in taking the period of limitation to be twelve years. 5. Having heard learned counsel, I find that the lease (Ext. 6) though described as a Patta Istemrari might be taken to have made the plaintiff a hereditary tenant with transferable rights under Section 29 (c) of the U.P. Tenancy Act as there was nothing in the lease which might be contrary to the provisions of Section 4 of that Act. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the lease was of a kind not contemplated by the U.P. Tenancy Act. It was a perfectly valid lease. 6. As to the question whether the land in suit lay within plot No. 587, both the courts below have found it as a fact that it lay within plot No. 587. The finding is of fact and seems to be based on good evidence. Survey, particularly of lands covered by buildings is often a dangerous method of trying to fix the boundaries of plots as contained in the settlement Khasras and maps, for with the passage of time, it is difficult to find fixed points and even the slightest deviation in the angles at the time of survey makes the result wide off the mark. In the present case, the Lekhpal had deposed that the land lay within plot No. 587. I think that the Lekhpal's evidence is, on such point, quite reliable. He is the best person who knows about the identity of plot numbers. It has not been established that the finding suffers from any error of law. 7. In the present case, the Lekhpal had deposed that the land lay within plot No. 587. I think that the Lekhpal's evidence is, on such point, quite reliable. He is the best person who knows about the identity of plot numbers. It has not been established that the finding suffers from any error of law. 7. As to the question of limitation, the land was, undoubtedly, taken by the plaintiff on a lease, on the terms that he could use it for agricultural purposes. But he could use it for any other purpose whatsoever, and had transferable rights given to him under the lease. The defendant did not hold or occupy the land for any agricultural purpose. 8. He occupied it and erected a shop thereon. The land ceased to be land within the meaning of its definition under clause (10) of Section 3 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which expressly provides that land, as defined therein "does not include land for the time being occupied by buildings or appurtenant thereto other than buildings which are improvements". It is nobody's case that the shop was a building of the nature of an improvement as defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act. The land in suit being not land as defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act, Section 180 thereof was not attracted and the suit, which was filed in the civil court, was governed by the general law of limitation. Being a suit for possession, the limitation was twelve years. It was not suggested that the suit was barred by time if the limitation was twelve years. 9. I have, however, to add that with the enforcement of U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the vesting of agricultural areas as demarcated under the provisions of that Act, within the Municipal limits of the town of Mirzapur, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 ceased to be in force in that area. The result was that whether the land was demarcated as agricultural area or not demarcated as an agricultural area, no advantage could be taken of the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 which had already ceased to be in force before the institution of the suit giving rise to the Second Appeal. 10. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.