What is required to be determined in this proceeding is as to when an enquiry under section 116 of the Criminal Proce­dure Code can be said to have commenced. The importance of determining the date of commencement lies in the fact that under sub-section (6), if an enquiry is not completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, it stands terminated, unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing the Magistrate otherwise directs. As per the proviso, where any person has been kept in detention pending enquiry, the period cannot also be extended beyond six months. The necessity of determining the point of commencement of the enquiry is also relevant when order for interim bond is passed under sub-section (3). 2. There has been a difference of opinion among the diffe­rent High Courts of the country on the question as to when an enquiry can be said to have commenced. The majority of the High Courts which includes those of Bombay, Patna, Raja-sthan, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh have taken the view that the date of appearance of the person sought to be proceeded against is the starting point of the enquiry. The Calcutta view is that the enquiry commences when the opposite party challenges the allegations made against him or refuses to admit the same, or submits a show cause against his accusation. As per the Orissa High Court, however, the enquiry commences when the Magistrate proceeds to ascertain the truth of the allegations by application of a Judicial mind, that is, when the Magistrate attempts in a legal way to put the allegations to test for find­ing out whether they are factually correct. 3. The Supreme Court had occasion in two cases in the main to interpret some provisions which found place in the corresponding section 117 of the old Code, they are Madhu Limaye vs. Ved Murti, ATR 1971 SC 2481 and Madhu Limaye vs. Ved Murti, AIR 1971 SC 2486 . The Third case Govinder Singh vs. Bachubhai, AIR 1972 SC 528 had dealt with a little diff­erent point. The Third case Govinder Singh vs. Bachubhai, AIR 1972 SC 528 had dealt with a little diff­erent point. The two Madhu Limaye cases are relatable to orders for interim bond, and it is for this reason that all that has been laid down in those opinions have not been held by all the High Courts to be applicable to decide the controversy at hand in as much as to order execution of interim bond comm­encement of the enquiry alone is not sufficient, because for this purpose the Magistrate has to be further satisfied that execution of the same is necessary for the prevention of the breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility, the commission of any offence or for the public safety. Before finding out as to what was laid down by the Supreme Court in those cases, it may be pointed out that the phraseology of old section 117 (3) was a little different from section 116 (3). Under the old section, interim bond could be ordered "pending the completion of the enquiry" under sub-section (1). The words now are "After the commencement, and before completion of the enquiry under sub­section (1)". The change, however, seems to be a mere change in the terminology without bringing any real difference in the operation of the two sub-sections. This would be clear from the observations in first of the two Madhu Limaye's cases itself wherein it has been stated in paragraph 16 that the expression "during the completion of the enquiry" postulates a commencement of the enquiry. Thus, even under the old sub-section it was required to be found out as to when did the enquiry commence. It was stated in the aforesaid paragraph itself, that commencement of the enquiry means "commencement of a trial according to the summons proce­dure". Reference to the summons procedure was made because under sub-section (2) of both the sections such an enquiry has to be made as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner pre­scribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons cases. One of the reasons for difference of opinion among the different High Courts has been as to when can a trial in summons case be said to have commenced. 4. One of the reasons for difference of opinion among the different High Courts has been as to when can a trial in summons case be said to have commenced. 4. The High Courts which have accepted that the enquiry commences from the date of appearance have really held so because, according to them, all summons trial commence with the reading out of the particulars of the offence to the accused when he appears or is brought before the Magistrate whereupon, under section 251, the Court is required to explain the particulars of the offence. Under section 112 of the Code also, the court is to read over and explain the substance of the order to the person if he is present in the Court : If he is not so present, a summon or warrant may be issued, and evidently when the person appears or is brought, he has to be explained the substance of the order which has been passed under section 111. The latest decision accepting this view is that of the Delhi High Court in J. C. Mehta vs. State, 1982 Crl. L.J. 1488. As it has made reference to a Full Branch decision of the Patna High Court, it would be appropriate to know the reasons given by the Full Bench in Sita Ram Singh vs. State, AIR 1980 Patna 257. In this case the majority held that the enquiry commences with date the opposite party appears in the court, whereas according to the minority some further step has to b2 taken to enquire into the truth of the opinion before enquiry can be said to have commenced. The majority have taken the aforesaid view because it has been held in the decisions noted by it that in a summons case, the trial begins when the accused is brought before the Magistrate. This is what was stated in this regard in paragraph 5 :- "It admits of no doubt that the moment the accused has appeared and the substance of the accusation is explained to him, a summons trial has commenced. The point of commencement of a proceeding under section 107 of the Code, must, therefore, be determined in the same terms. Section 112 provides for the reading over or explaining the substance of the accusation and the satisfaction of the Magistrate. Section 112 thus is akin in content to that of section 251. The point of commencement of a proceeding under section 107 of the Code, must, therefore, be determined in the same terms. Section 112 provides for the reading over or explaining the substance of the accusation and the satisfaction of the Magistrate. Section 112 thus is akin in content to that of section 251. If a summons trial com­mences with the reading out the particulars of the offence to the accused. Which must be held to be so, a proc­eeding under section 107 also must necessarily be deemed to have commenced with the reading over the substance of the information received." Reference was then made to Madhu Limaye AIR 1971 SC 2481 . The majority stated that on the social facts of that case their Lordships had observed that it was not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask the petitioner to furnish a bond for good conduct. But the ratio of that case was stated to be that interim bond can be asked if enquiry cannot be completed and the expression "completion of enquiry" meant enquiry according to the procedure prescribed for summons trial, that is, such enquiry would com­mence when a summons trial can be said to have commenced, which is the date the accused appears or is brought before the court and substance of the accusation is explained to him. 5. This decision was followed, as already noted, in J. C. Mehta (supra). The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court further disagreed with the view expressed by the Orissa High Court in Sana Khan vs. State, 1981 Crl. L.J. 39, which is also Full Bench decision. That case examined this aspect in the context of an order to furnish an interim bond. Refere­nce was first made to the two Madhu Limaye's cases. It was noted that in the first of these decisions mere appearance was not held to be sufficient. In the second of these decisions, the Court took note of the difference of opinion in the High Courts. It was stated that one the of the views was that action on interim bond could be taken as soon as the person appeared, because then the Magistrate can be said to have entered upon the enquiry. In the second of these decisions, the Court took note of the difference of opinion in the High Courts. It was stated that one the of the views was that action on interim bond could be taken as soon as the person appeared, because then the Magistrate can be said to have entered upon the enquiry. The other view was that the Magistrate must pro­ceed to enquire into the truth of the information and only after prima facie satisfying himself about the truth and after recording the reasons in writing, an interim bond could be asked for. The Supreme Court approved of the second view. This approval had, of course, something to do with the fact that as the execution of interim bond involves the liberty of the person, a strict construction on the powers of the Magistrate was felt necessary. It was, therefore, stated that some enquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. The Full Bench then referred to Govinder Singh (supra) wherein order for interim bond had been passed after the affected person had been examined and also the police Sub-Inspector. 6. It is, therefore, clear that so far as exercise of power under sub-section (3) for ordering interim bond is concerned, the view expressed by the Orissa High Court in Son Khan is impeccable. Indeed, in Chandreswar vs. State of Assam, 1982 (1) G.L.R. 589, a learned Judge of this Court has taken the same view. Shri Barua appearing for the petitioner has contended that, what has been held by the apex Court in the aforesaid decisions relating to interim bond, cannot be applied whole-hog to determine the question of commencement of the enquiry inasmuch as under sub-section (3) commencement of enquiry alone is not enough to pass under order under that sub-section. Though enquiry must commence even for ordering interim bond, sub­section (3) further requires that such an order is deemed nece­ssary for prevention of breach of peace etc. Now, to coma to this satisfaction there must be some materials before the court. Mere passing of an order under section 111 cannot be sufficient in this regard, because that order is passed on hearsay whereas the enquiry contemplated under section 116 is to ascertain the truth, as pointed out in Madhu Limaye's case ( AIR 1971 SC 2486 ). Now, to coma to this satisfaction there must be some materials before the court. Mere passing of an order under section 111 cannot be sufficient in this regard, because that order is passed on hearsay whereas the enquiry contemplated under section 116 is to ascertain the truth, as pointed out in Madhu Limaye's case ( AIR 1971 SC 2486 ). The question of liberty of a person which is involved when he is asked for to execute an interim bond, is not pre­sent, states the counsel, when the question as to when as enquiry commenced is being examined. But, then, as pointed out in the aforesaid case of Madhu Limaye, the enquiry for the pur­pose of interim bond cannot be described "as an enquiry within an enquiry". Further, the meaning which has to be ascribed to this expression for the purpose of sub-section (3), lias also to be accepted while interpreting sub-section (6). It is worth pointing out that in Chandreswar (supra) the question examined by this Court, though it also dealt with the case of interim bond, was as to when an enquiry can be said to have comm­enced, and it accepted that the enquiry does not commence as soon as the delinquent appears and the order under section 111 is read over. 7. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the Calcutta view expressed in Paresh Chandra vs. Ahitosh, 1978 Crl. L.J. 1171, As per this decision, the enquiry commences as soon as the opposite party challenges the allegation made against him and the Magistrate proceeds to ascertain the truth of the allegation by taking evidence or otherwise. This view was taken because the Bench felt that in the summons case the enquiry or trial, as the ease may be, does not begin with the mere appearance of the accused as, after appearance substance of the accusation has to be explained and on the accused not pleading guilty, the Magi­strate proceeds to hear the prosecution. By referring to the word "proceed" in section 116 (1) it was slated that mere appearance does not commence the enquiry. 8. The courts which have, however, accepted appearance alone to be sufficient for the purpose, have stated that the adjo­urnment after appearance and denial of the accusation is for the purpose of proceeding with the enquiry (see paragraph 8 of Sita Ram). Similarly, in J. C. Mehta (1982 Crl. 8. The courts which have, however, accepted appearance alone to be sufficient for the purpose, have stated that the adjo­urnment after appearance and denial of the accusation is for the purpose of proceeding with the enquiry (see paragraph 8 of Sita Ram). Similarly, in J. C. Mehta (1982 Crl. L.J. 1488), it was stated that the act of asking the person to show cause on his not admitting the accusation on appearance is itself a step in the enquiry. As to Madhu Limaye ( AIR 1971 SC 2486 ), it was pointed out in J. C. Mehta (supra) that the observation therein that some enquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered, was relatable to the execution of interim bond and had no relation with the point of time when an enquiry can be said to have commenced. 9. I would, however, think that the second case of Madhu Limaye had rejected the view that an enquiry can be said to have commenced on the appearance of the person. This would be clear from what has been stated in paragraphs 42 and 43, as the view that "action can be taken as soon as the person appears because then the Magistrate may be said to have entered upon the enquiry" had found disapproval of the Court. The requirement of sect ion 116 (1) that the Magistrate must "proceed-to enquire into the truth of the information" would show that after exercise of questioning the person is over, some further step must be taken before enquiry can be said to have commenced. It is no doubt correct that the time granted to show cause on denial of the allegation is a step in the direction of enquiring into the truth of the information, but real enquiry cannot com­mence before show cause is filed, as only then the full mind of the person proceeded against would become known. No doubt, the provision in sub-section (1) of section 116 that the Magistrate must take "such further evidence as may appear necessary" would indicate that further evidence may not be necessary in all cases which would be the position where the person concerned admits the allegation, but as is common experience, these allegations are very rarely admitted, if at all. No doubt, the provision in sub-section (1) of section 116 that the Magistrate must take "such further evidence as may appear necessary" would indicate that further evidence may not be necessary in all cases which would be the position where the person concerned admits the allegation, but as is common experience, these allegations are very rarely admitted, if at all. Thus, the real stage for, commencement of the enquiry comes after the show cause has been filed and thereafter the Magistrate decides to proceed to enquire into the truth of the information. This would be so when a date is fixed for recording evidence. This is the minority view expressed in Sitaram's case by Sharma, J. and I find myself in respectful agreement with that view. This accords with what has been stated in the two cases of Madhu Limaye and would also advance the object behind putting a time limit of the proceedings. It would take care of undue harassment on the one hand and allow fructification of the proceedings in most cases, which may not be so if the period is to be counted from the first appearance, as the opposite party may on various pretexts prolong the proceed­ing even for filing his show cause. If the opposite party prolongs the enquiry by asking for time to file show cause, he cannot blame others and no fault should be found for it with the Magistrate. It may be stated that the view I have taken is very close to that expressed by my learned brother Saikia, J., in Chandreswar. 10. In the present case, the written statement was filed on 10.7.81 and on that date itself, the learned Magistrate had ordered for recording of evidence. I would, therefore, regard the afore­said day as the date of commencement of the enquiry. As six months period had expired counting from that day by 28.1.82, I hold that the proceeding had stood terminated by the force of sub-section (6) on 28.1.82. As such, the learned Magistrate could not have ordered on that day for continuance of the enquiry by virtue of the powers conferred on him by sub-section (6) of section 116. It is not disputed before me, and rightly, that the power to continue the enquiry beyond the period of six months for special reasons has to be invoked before the expiry of the said period. 11. It is not disputed before me, and rightly, that the power to continue the enquiry beyond the period of six months for special reasons has to be invoked before the expiry of the said period. 11. Another point urged by the learned counsel of both the parties may also be dealt with. The question is as to whether in counting the period of six months, the time taken in revision before the higher courts will be excluded or not. I would think that this has to be done, as otherwise in many cases such a proceeding can be rendered in fructuous merely by approaching the higher courts in revision against one order or the other passed by the Magistrate. Though Shri P. K. Baruah submits that in the absence of any specific provision like that of one finding place in section 470 Cr. P. C. to exclude the time taken in revision, such period may not be allowed to be excluded. Shri Bhattacharyya contends that the time can be excluded, even if not specifically provided for. He has referred in this connection to Sagarmal vs. Pushraj, 1974 ALR 97 wherein the time taken before the learned Sessions Judge was excluded in counting the period of limitation for preferring a revision before the High Court though not provided by the Code. In Arakhita Swain vs. Bansidhar Sahu, 1981 Cr. L.J. 41, the contention that the time taken for revision should be included in the period of six months was not accepted. As a right of revision exists, it would be unreasonable to count the time taken in revisional court for the -.purpose of sub-section (6) of section 116, as otherwise all cases where revisions are preferred would become futile and sterile. 12. The result is that the petition is allowed with the declaration that the impugned proceeding stands terminated.