K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the order dated 28-12-1981 of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, dt, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the DC) in case No. HRC (Civil) a. 139/81-82 (Annexure-C) affirming the order 'dated 21-10-1981 of the Rent and) accommodation Controller, Civil Area, bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) in case No. HRC/ 803 acc/81 (Annexurexb ). ( 2 ) ON 29. 9. 81, respondent No. 3 reported the vacancy of the first floor of residential premises bearing No. 405/a on Diagonal Road, Jayanagar III Block to the Controller under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the act) which was duly notified. In response to the notification of the said vacancy, the petitioner, respondent no. 2 and three others filed applications along with the requisite deposit seeking for allotment of the premises in their own favour. On the hearing date, the petitioner, respondent No. 2 and one other were present and pressed their respective claims. On a consideration of the rival claims made before him and the wishes of the landlord, the Controller by his order dated 21-10- 81 allotted the premises to respondent no. 2, rejecting the claim of the petitioner and another person. Against the said order of the Controller, the petitioner filed an appeal under S. 12 of the Act before the DC on 23-10-81 with an application for stay of the operation of the order challenged in that appeal. On the same day, the dc admitted the said appeal and stayed the operation of the order of the controller. But almost in defiance of the said stay order, the premises were delivered to respondent no 2 on a date and time that is not possible to gather from the records. After hearing the parties, the DC by his order 28-12-81 dismissed the said appeal of the petitioner. ( 3 ) AS early as on 23. 6. 81, the petitioner, a practising Advocate of this court and who was in occupation of another residential premises in the jayanagar extension, had suffered a decree for eviction under the Act in which he had been granted time till 30-6-82 to vacate. On 24-6-81 the petitioner had registered his name before the Controller for priority allotment under Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Act. On 24-6-81 the petitioner had registered his name before the Controller for priority allotment under Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Act. On the other hand, respondent No. 2 who was also in occupation of a tenanted premises, very close to the premises in dispute and had not suffered a decree for eviction, but against whom proceedings for eviction were pending, made an application on 17-9-81 for registration under Rule 4 of the Rules before the controller, who without examining its maintainability had registered the same. Before, the Controller, respondent No. 3 landlord indicated his preference to respondent No. 2 on certain grounds that will be noticed and dealt by me in due course. ( 4 ) BEFORE examining the rival contentions, it is useful to notice as to how the original and appellate authorities have dealt with the matter. ( 5 ) IN rejecting the claim of the petitioner and upholding the claim of respondent No. 2, the Controller found that the Act was 'substantive law' and the Rules framed under the Act were 'adjective' and, therefore the respective claims have to be examined with reference to the provisions of the Act only. On this view, the Controller further held that he was bound to 'honour' the consent or preference shown by the land lord and allot the premises to his 'nominee' - respondent No. 2. On these conclusions, the Controller virtually ignored the claim of the petitioner and did not satisfactorily deal with the same. ( 6 ) BEFORE the appellate authority the petitioner contested every one of the conclusions reached by the Controller and urged for his interference on more than one ground. But, the DC with his characterstic brevity, which is worth reproducing, dismissed the appeal in these words. "i have heard the arguments and have gone through the connected records of the case. The main grouse of the appellant here is that he has been evicted under Section' 21 (1) (h) and he had registered himself for priority allotment well before the respondent No. 2. He also sought to claim that respondent No. 2 on the day of registering for priority allotment was not even eligible for registration as he was not under order of eviction under Section 21 (h) on that day. One has to admit that the appellant is right technically in his approach. He also sought to claim that respondent No. 2 on the day of registering for priority allotment was not even eligible for registration as he was not under order of eviction under Section 21 (h) on that day. One has to admit that the appellant is right technically in his approach. After ail what matters before the trial Court is on the day oi allotment whether the allottee was under order of eviction. The reply is in the affirmative. He had an additional qualification in the sense that he had the consent of the land lord which was expressed in the vacancy report in Form-1. Humane considerations do also play a role in such matters. From the facts of the case, we see that a good deed and gesture has been done by allotting 'the premises to respondent No. 2. Though Rule 4 (b) does not explicitly mention, the consent of the landlord does play a role in matters like mis. Several decisions of the high Court confirm this point which has been clearly brought out in the case law reported in 1980 (2) KLJ p. 160. Besides section 8 (3) of the krc Act also gives due weightage to the opinion of the land lord. On the whole, I find that not only the law has been vindicated in the impugned order but also the canons of propriety and humane considerations have been upheld. I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The same is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. "while the DC agrees with the legal contention urged for the petitioner before him, he appears to negative his claim on considerations of 'property and humane considerations'. ( 7 ) BEFORE me, the petitioner argued his own case with commendable restraint and fairness. In the course of my order hereafter I will refer to the petitioner Sri K. S. Hanumantha rao - as Sri Rao. ( 8 ) SRI Rao urged that the DC and the Controller have not genuinely examined all the contentions urged by him and have negatived his claim on illegal and irrelevant considerations and that on a proper view of the legal position, and the undisputed facts and circumstances, they were bound to allot the premises to him in preference to respondent No. 2, ignoring the preference or consent of the landlord respondent No. 3. ( 9 ) AT the direction of this Court sri R. G. Devadhar, learned High court Government Pleader has appeared for respondent Nos. 1 and 4 and has produced the records. Sriyuths j. Rangarajan and L. S. Venkatakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing cor respondents 2 and 3 respectively, in my opinion, very fairly and rightly stated that every one of the reasons on which the authorities had found against the petitioner were legally unsustainable. But, they valiantly sought to sustain the orders on different grounds which will be noticed bv me and dealt in due course. ( 10 ) SO far as the legal contention urged by the petitioner on the question of registration which had! been rejected by the Controller on an astounding conclusion, the DC disposes of the same in one cryptic sentence to the effect that the petitioner was technically right. Except for this bald statement which is bereft of reasons, there is no genuine consideration much less any discussion on the important question that was urged before him. In this view, this Court cannot attach anv importance to the views expressed by the DC. ( 11 ) ANOTHER interesting reason given bv the DC is that 'propriety and humane considerations' did call for upholding the order of the controller The word 'propriety' in the context has rcallv no meaning After all 'humane considerations', a term that is difficult to precisely define cannot in anv event be a ground to ignore the positive provision of an enactment. Without anv doubt, such vague and irrelevant considerations only blur the proper consideration and disposal of a case before an authority or a Court. Hence, this second and important reason given by the DC has necessarily to be excluded in deciding the controversy. ( 12 ) AS regards the consent of the land lord relied an by the DC, I will examine the same when I deal with it as an independent question ( 13 ) THE Controller-Sri A. S. Srikantha a member of the Karnataka administrative Service of the rank of assistant Commissioner with a law degree to his credit, has held that the rules made under the Act are adjective in nature and the provisions ot the Act were substantive in nature and, therefore he was in duty bound to give effect to the provisions of the act only. A detailed discussion on the substantive law or the adjective law or the law of procedure, is at any rate, unnecessary as even the respondents did not seek to support the astounding legal proposition of the controller. But, it is enough to point out that substantive law is that which defines the 'right', while adjective law or procedural law determines the remedies. The rules made under an Act by a subordinate legislative authority have the same force as the Act or the law under which they are made and they cannot be ignored by branding them as adjective An Act and the Rules made thereunder may contain substantive provisions as also provisions relating to procedure An Act in its entirety may not be a substantive law Which provision of an Act or rule is substantive or adjective cannot he stated without examining the relevart provisions of the Act or the rules itself and its effect Without any doubt the view expressed by the controller and the entire approach made bv him on the erroneous view he formed, is manifestly illegal. ( 14 ) SRI Rao has urged that Rule 4 of the Rules providing for order of priorities was imperative and he was entitled for preference as against respondent No. 2 whose registration for the same was invalid. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for respondents 2 and 3 combating the contention of Sri rao urged that Rule 4 was directory and not mandatory. Elaborating the same or alternatively they have urged that the application made by respon No. 2 for registration though not maintainable as on the date it was made, must be deemed to have been validly registered on the basis of the subsequent decree for eviction made against respondent No. 2. ( 16 ) SECTION 8 (2) of the Act directs the Controller to observe such order of priority as is prescribed by the Rules made under the Act. Rule 4 of the Rules that prescribes the order of priorities carries out the purposes and object of S. 8 (2) of the act. Both S. 8 (2) and Rule 4 (1) by employing the term 'shall', direct the controller to follow the order of priprities enumerated in great detail in rule 4 of the Rules in respect of non-residential and residential buildings. Both S. 8 (2) and Rule 4 (1) by employing the term 'shall', direct the controller to follow the order of priprities enumerated in great detail in rule 4 of the Rules in respect of non-residential and residential buildings. ( 17 ) THE use of the word 'shall' in an enactment or a Rule raises a presumption that the provision is imperative or mandatory though that by itself is not decisive. But, in the context, it is manifest that the order of priorities provided by Rule 4 is imperative or mandatory and the priorities provided by the rules with great care in the public interest cannot be disregarded by the authorities. In the absence of a direction, the authorities have to follow the priorities stipulated in the Rules. Any violation of the same is impermissible. ( 18 ) SO far as the application made by the petitioner, its earlier registration and its validity, learned counsel for the respondents, in my opinion, rightly did not take any exception. ( 19 ) ON the foregoing discussion it follows that the petitioner was legally entitled for priority under Rule 4 (1) (b) (5) of the Rules and the same has been disregarded by the authorities either by their non-consideration or by erroneous consideration. ( 20 ) SUB-RULES (2) to (8) of Rule 4 of the Rules deal with applications io bp made for registration, the fee to be paid, the orders to be made and the incidental matters. Sub-rules (2) to (3) is a complete code in itself. ( 21 ) SUB-RULE (2) of Rule 4 enable a person who is eligible for allotment under sub-rule (1) to make an application in form No. 1a for registering his name. The word 'may' occurring in sub-rule (2) enables a person to make an application but does not compel him to make an application cannot be depended for construing the priorities provided by Rule 4 (1) as directory. The word 'may' occurring in sub-rule (2) enables a person to make an application but does not compel him to make an application cannot be depended for construing the priorities provided by Rule 4 (1) as directory. Sub rule (2) being an enabling provision, the word 'may' has been properly used and that term can hardly have any relevance in construing whether sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 is a mandatory provision or a directory provision ( 22 ) SUB-RULE (4) of Rule 4 requires the Controller to verify the correctness of the particulars stated in the application for registration and if he finds them correct and complete and the applicant is eligible then only register his name and not otherwise. An application made for registration cannot be mechanically registered as has happened in the case of respondent No. 2. ( 23 ) ON a combined reading of sub-rules (2) to (7) and in particular sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 4 of the rules, it is clear that the relevant date for consideration and registration of the application is the date of the application for registration and not the date of allotment. If a person is found ineligible for registration as on the date of his application, the Controller cannot at all register his application and is bound to reject the same. ( 24 ) ON the language of sub-rules (2) to (7) of Rule 4 it is not possible to treat the application made by respondent No. 2 for registration as if it was a valid application made with reference to the later decree made against him. On any legal principle it is difficult to treat the application made by respondent No. 2 as a valid application and the order made thereto as a valid registration. ( 25 ) WHEN respondent No. 2 made his application for registration he, had not suffered a decree for eviction and, therefore, his application was not maintainable and should have been rejected by the Controller. The fact that the controller mechanically registered the application has to be treated as non est and ignored. ( 26 ) IN his intimation of vacancy as also before the Controller, the land-lord-respondent no. 3-expressed his preference for allotment to respondent no. 2 and not the petitioner. The fact that the controller mechanically registered the application has to be treated as non est and ignored. ( 26 ) IN his intimation of vacancy as also before the Controller, the land-lord-respondent no. 3-expressed his preference for allotment to respondent no. 2 and not the petitioner. On this question, the Controller held that he was bound by the preference shown by the landlord and that that was the effect, of S. 8 (3) of the Act as interpreted by this Court in Ramachandra rao v. Dy. Commr. (1), Rukmani ammal v. House Rent Controller (2) and Umesh Rai v. S. Saifulla (3 ). In appeal the DC did not go so far as the controller but expressed that due weightage should be given to the opinion or preference expressed by the landlord ( 27 ) S. 8 (3) of the Act directs the controller io take into consideration the causes shown by the landlord or other person in possession, in case the premises is a part of a building with reference to customs, manners and social conventions of persons occupying the remaining portions of the building in, so far as such customs, manners and social conventions are not opposed to law, public order, morality or health. The causes to be shown by the land-lord or the other person who is in occupation of a portion of the building must necessarily relate to the customs, manners and social convention of the persons occupying the remaining portions of the building. ( 28 ) EVEN the causes pleaded or preferences shown by the landlord or other person with reference to the relevant matters, has necessarily to be examined by the Controller in conjunction with all other relevant factors. The Act and the Rules nowhere provide for the 'consent' of the landlord before allotting the premises to needy person. The cause shown choice or preference of a landlord with reference to relevant matters enumerated in S. 8 (3) of the Act, cannot" be treated as consent of the landlord and the authority was bound by the same. The choice of the landlord provided. it is relevant, is a factor to be taken into consideration but cannnot be read as the authority 'hand bound' and is compelled to allot the premises to such person only and no other. The choice of the landlord provided. it is relevant, is a factor to be taken into consideration but cannnot be read as the authority 'hand bound' and is compelled to allot the premises to such person only and no other. A Controller cannot act as a post office and blindly allot the premises to the person in whose favour the landlord has expressed his choice. An authority is not required to 'honour' such choice but is only required to consider the same. ( 29 ) AN authority or a Court is required to render justice according to lay and not according to whims and fancies proprieties and humane considerations which are not capable of a precise connotation. ( 30 ) EVERY one of the rulings of this court relied on by the DC or the Controller or the unreported Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Syed Sibgathullah v. C. M. Abdul Azeez Khan (4) relied on by Sri Venkatakrishna, do not lay down a contrary proposition. In none of these cases, this Court has expressed that the Controller is bound by the choice or preference shown by the landlord. ( 31 ) IN Ramachandra Rao's case, the landlord happened to be a vegetarian and one of the applicants for allotment, who failed before the Controller but succeeded before the DC in appeal was a non-vegetarian. It is on those facts this Court affirmed the order of the Controller who allotted the premises to a vegetarian taking into consideration the choice expressed by the vegetarian landlord. In my view, the ratio in Ramachandra Rao's case on which strong reliance was placed by the authorities and the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3, does not lend itself to the conclusion that the authority is bound by the choice of the landlord. ( 32 ) THE petitioner, the landlord respondent No. 3- and respondent No. 2 are all brahmins and vegetarians. Before the authorities or before this court, it is not the case of the landlord that the petitioner is an unsuitable person having regard to his customs, manners and social conventions ( 33 ) IN his intimation of vacancy and the affidavits filed, the landlord stated that respondent No. 2 was known to him well and he has been of great assistance to him particularly after the death of his wife. He has also averred that respondent No. 2 and his wife were service-minded people and are dear to him. On these grounds, which were reiterated by respondent No. 2, he expressed his preference to respondent no. 2 and opposed the allotment to the petitioner. ( 34 ) I will assume that every one of the pleas of respondent No. 3 in his affidavit are true and correct. But, still i am of the opinion that all those factors do not fall within the meaning of the terms customs, manners and social conventions of the person occupying the remaining portion of the building' and therefore, could not be made a ground to ignore the mandatory provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules and the superior claims of the petitioner. ( 35 ) AS on the day of allotment by the Controller, while the petitioner had time to vacate the premises till 30-6- 1982, respondent No. 2 had time to vacate the premises till 31-12-1981. More than this, the petitioner had failed in any number of attempts in securing a suitable accommodation. As on the date the Controller made his allotment. the need of the petitioner was more acute pressing and genuine rather than the need of respondent No. 2 who voluntarily suffered a decree for eviction in post-haste and produced that order before him. If the Controller had legally, fairly and properly evaluated the needs of the competing applicants, he should have allotted the premises to the petitioner and not to respondent No. 2. ( 36 ) THE Act does not contemplate a nomination by a landlord and a blind acceptance of the same by the authorities as in the present case. In any-view, the allotment and rejection is on irrelevant considerations. For all these reasons, it is necessary to quash the impunged orders and in their substitution allot the premises to the petitioner. ( 37 ) EARLIER I have noticed that despite a stay order issued by the DC, respondent no. 2 had obtained possession of the premises and has continued to be in its occupation ever since then. For all these reasons, it is necessary to quash the impunged orders and in their substitution allot the premises to the petitioner. ( 37 ) EARLIER I have noticed that despite a stay order issued by the DC, respondent no. 2 had obtained possession of the premises and has continued to be in its occupation ever since then. Even though, I have held that the premises should be allotted to the petitioner in preference to respondent No. 2, it is necessary to grant reasonable time to respondent No. 2 to vacate the premises and hand over its possession to the controller to enable him to deliver the same to the petitioner. In my opinion, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to grant time till 30-9-1982 or till the controller allots another premises to respondent No. 2, whichever is earlier. ( 38 ) IN the light of my above discussion, i make the following orders and directions: (A) I quash (i) the order dated 28-12-1981 of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore in Case No. HRC (Civil) a. 139/81-82; and (ii) the order dated 21-10-1981 of the Rent and accommodation Controller, Civil area, Bangalore in case No. HRC 803/acc/1981; (B) I direct respondent No. 1 to allot the premises to the petitioner on the same rate of rent as had been fixed by him. (C) I grasnt time till 30-9-1982 to respondent No. 2 to vacate the premises or till another premises is allotted to him by the Controller whichever is earlier and on the expiry of such time, he shall deliver possession of the same to respondent No. 1 and not to respondent No. 3 who shall thereafter deliver possession of the same to the petitioner. But, if on the expiry of the time so granted, respondent no. 2 does not vacate and hand over possession of the premises, respondent No. l, shall forcibly avict respondent No. 2, take vacant possession of the same and deliver its possession to the petitioner without any loss of time. ( 39 ) RULE issued is made absolute. But, in the circumstances of the case, i direct the parties to bear their own costs. ( 40 ) LET a copy of this order be communicated to respondent No. 1 within 10 days from this day. --- *** --- .