JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - Deoki Nandan. J. - By my judgment dated 9th April, 1982 I had allowed the appeal and, setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, decreed the suit for possession with pendent-elite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month. That judgment was however, rendered ex parte and was recalled inasmuch as the defendant-respondent did not have due opportunity of being heard. 2. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has been heard and the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellants was also reheard in reply to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent. 3. The appeal arises from a suit for possession based on title in respect of a house. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was a tenant and also claimed rent for three years before the suit at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month amounting to Rs. 180/-. The defendant denied the plaintiffs title and claimed that he was in possession as owner. The trial court believed the plaintiffs case and decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court has dismissed it on the ground that the suit was barred by time, inasmuch as it was proved that the defendant had been in possession, at any rate, since before the 1st October 1955, and had not paid any rent since that date. The further finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is that the plaintiff case that the house was let put to the defendant in June 1960, as unrolled in evidence, was false because a notice dated the 2nd September, 1958 (Ext. A-1) had been served by the father of the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 demanding rent of the house in suit from the defendant with effect from the 1st October, 1955, and that in his reply dated the 23rd September, 1958 to that notice, the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiffs father to the house and had asserted that he was in possession as owner. 1 and 2 demanding rent of the house in suit from the defendant with effect from the 1st October, 1955, and that in his reply dated the 23rd September, 1958 to that notice, the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiffs father to the house and had asserted that he was in possession as owner. The lower appellate court has further found that there is no evidence on the record to show that the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest ever asserted title to the house before the 2nd September, 1958 and there was thus no occasion for the defendant to deny the plaintiffs title at any time before the 23rd September, 1958 and thus, it is clear that there is no evidence to show that the defendant denied the plaintiffs title and asserted his own title at any time before the 23rd September, 1958. While the trial court took the date 23rd September, 1958 to be the date from which the twelve years period of limitation was required to be computed, the lower appellate court has on the other hand, held that the plaintiffs were out of possession since before the 1st October, 1955 and thus the suit filed in 1969 was barred by limitation, obviously under Article 142 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 4. Mr. A.K. Banerji, learned counsel for the appellants, had earlier urged that the lower appellate court was in error in applying Article 142 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or the principle of that Article, and that the suit having been filed after 1st January, 1964, it was clearly covered by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit being for possession of immovable property based on title, the limitation of 12 years under Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, commenced from the date when the possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiffs. The limitation of 12 years prescribed by Article 142 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 had not expired when the 1963 Act came into force on 1st January, 1964 even if the date of discontinuance of possession is taken to be the 1st October, 1955, which is the date from which the limitation of 12 years was computed by the lower appellate court. Holding that Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, was clearly applicable, I had held that the plaintiff having successfully proved their ownership of the house on the basis of the documents on record, it could not be said that the suit Was barred by limitation inasmuch as the date of the first assertion of hostile title by the defendant respondent, as proved on the record, was 23rd September, 1958, and that was within 12 years of the institution of the suit. 5. Mr. S.N. Singh, learned counsel for the defendant-respondent urged that it was established from the record that the defendant-respondent had been in possession since before 1st October, 1955, which was the date from which rent was demanded from him by the plaintiffs father by notice dated 2nd September, 1958 but no rent was paid and instead the defendant-respondent asserted hostile title by his reply dated 23rd September, 1958. The plaintiffs had in the present suit asserted that the defendant-respondent became their tenant in the year 1960. That was found to be false. Under the circumstances, the plaintiffs case of tenancy having been found to be false and it being clearly established that the defendant-respondent was in possession since 1st October 1955 and had not paid any rent ever since, the only inference which could have been drawn was that the defendant-respondent had been in adverse possession since before 1st October, 1955. He relied in support on Mohammad Umar v. Abdul Ghani, (A.I.R. 1939 All. 728), and Nannhey Khan v. Mt. Gomti, (A.I.R. 1949 All. 289). 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants on the other hand relied on Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao & others, (A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21), Mt. Allah Rakhi & others v. Shah Mohammad Abdur Rahim & others (A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 77), Monihar Das Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal and others (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 228), P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314), Ram Nath & others v. Neta, (A.I.R 1962 All. 604), S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1254), State Bank of Travuncore v. A.K. Panioter, (A.I.R. S.C. 966) and Madhao Pandurang & another v. Yashwant, (A.I.R. 1974 Bombay 12). 7. 604), S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1254), State Bank of Travuncore v. A.K. Panioter, (A.I.R. S.C. 966) and Madhao Pandurang & another v. Yashwant, (A.I.R. 1974 Bombay 12). 7. Having read these cases, it appears to me that non payment of rent for any length of time by the defendant was not sufficient to make possession of the defendant adverse. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity in publicity and extent, and a plea is required at the least, to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nee vi nee elam nee precario. 8. In the case in hand the lower appellate court observed first. In fact there is no evidence on the record to show that before 2-9-58 Jagannath had ever asserted his title to the suit house to the knowledge of the defendant, and if Jagannath or any other predecessor of the plaintiff had not asserted his or their title to the suit house to the knowledge of the defendant, the defendants had no occasion to deny their ownership "and secondly that" even if it is held that to the knowledge of the predecessor of the plaintiffs the defendant is in possession of the suit house since 1-10-55, the suit aforesaid was brought well beyond after expiry of period of 12 years, which is the period of limitation fixed by law of limitation for such suits. "These two observations clearly show that the approach of the lower appellate court was erroneous in law. The plaintiffs have established their title to the property. It was for the defendant to plead and prove the precise point of time since when his possession became adverse. It was not for the plaintiffs to assert their title. The plaintiffs title being proved, it was for the defendant to assert a hostile title and it was only if the plaintiffs had not sued the defendant within 12 years of such an assertion of hostile title that the defendant could be said to have prescribed title by adverse possession. 9. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs, on the finding that the lower appellate court was in error in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. 9. In the result the appeal is allowed with costs, on the finding that the lower appellate court was in error in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside. The decree of the trial court cannot, however, be confirmed as it is because the lower appellate court has found that the contract of tenancy alleged by the plaintiffs was not proved. That being so, the plaintiffs are entitled only to a decree for possession with pendent-elite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month, which appears to be reasonable, and the correctness of which was not contested before me. The plaintiffs will be entitled to their costs throughout.