JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - There are four petitioners in this case, all of them are inter related. Petitioners No. 1 to 3 are own brothers while petitioners No. 4 is son of petitioners No. 1, Madhukar Kapoor. The petition is directed against ex parte order dated 21.12.1976 Annexure-4 and another order dated 12.8.1981, Annexure-10 by competent {authority, Agra and the Notification under Section 10, sub-clause (3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No. XXXIII of 1976) and the order of the District Judge, respondent No. 3 dated 12.9.1980 Annexure-B which are sought to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 2. A direction in the nature of mandamus is further sought directing respondent to decide the application dated 24.3.1976 submitted by M.A. Gideon, under Section 21 of the Act (Annexure-2) and her application for setting aside the ex-parte order riled on 28.1.1977, Annexure-6. A mandate is further sought directing respondents not to interfere with the possession of petitioners over an area measuring 985 square metres in premises No. 5/161, Sonth Ki Mandi. Agra declared as surplus by competent authority, any other suitable writ, order or direction along with costs of this petition is also sought. 3. Dispute relates to premises No. 5/161, Sonth Ki Mandi Agra. Admittedly these premises were held by Mrs. A Gideon, widow of Dr. C.T. Gideon. Total area of the premises was 2,485 square metres covered area in the premises measured 545 square metres; as it was a residential unit, so appurtenant land under Section 2 (g) (i) of the said Act was 1000 square metres; ceiling area permissible to Dr. Mrs. A Gideon was 1500 square metres vide Section 4, sub-clause (c) of the Act. Thus there is little dispute on the point that Mrs. Gideon was not holding vacant land in excess of her ceiling limit when she was served with a draft statement under Section 8, sub-clause (3) of the aforesaid Act. Thirty days time was allowed to her to file objections to the draft statement; she submitted an application dated 17.11.1975, Annexure-3 addressed to competent authority concerned with the request to extend the time of filing the objection up to a period of three months as she was ailing and her son was out and thus she was unable to comply with the directions within stipulated time. This application was sent through registered post. This application was sent through registered post. She did not receive any reply although it is alleged that a period of thirty days was allowed to her to prefer her objection vide order of competent authority on this application; she was not apprised about that order. Learned competent authority proceeded ex parte and declared an area measuring 985 square metres as surplus on 21.12.1976 vide Annexure-4. 4. A Notification under Section 10-A was also published in Gazette dated 15.1.1977. 5. Dr. Mrs. A Gideon received the ex parte order aforesaid on 28.12.1976 and submitted an application dated 28.1.1977 before the competent authority informing him about the pendency of her earlier application by which she had sought extension of time for preferring the objection and which had not been disposed of; there was also a prayer to set aside the ex parte order made against her vide Annexure-6 dated 28.1.1977. This application also remained undisposed of and Notification under Section 10 sub-clause (3) of the said Act was published under orders of Sri Banarsi Dass the then competent authority Agra, vide annexure-5 dated 9.3.1977. Dr. Mrs. Gideon died on 12.12.1977. 6. Petitioners purchased premises in dispute after obtaining permission from competent authority Sri Banarsi Dass aforesaid under Section 27, sub-clause (2) of the said Act vide Annexure-1 dated 23.6.1978. The sale deed was executed by son and daughters of Dr. Mrs. A Gideon on 2.9.1978 the legatees under her will dated 30.7.1977 after receiving a sum of Rs. 2,25,000/-. The petitioners also invested more than Rs. 10,000,00/- in raising constructions and installing machines for printing, etc. on this site. Final orders under Section 10, sub clause (5) of the Ceiling Act for delivery of possession were passed on 23.7.1978. Petitioners contested that notice and filed an appeal against the order directing delivery of possession; their appeal failed on 12.9.1980 vide Annexure-8; petitioners also applied before the competent authority for setting aside the ex parte order and the consequential order vide annexure-9 dated 5.5.1981 ; competent authority rejected this application on 12.8.1981 vide Annexure-10, as the petitioners had no other alternative remedy so they filed the present writ petition with the said prayers. Parties also filed affidavit and counter-affidavit. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Parties also filed affidavit and counter-affidavit. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. (1) It was conceded before me by learned counsel for the parties that having regard to the nature of premises and the provisions aforesaid there was no vacant surplus land with Dr. Mrs. A. Gideon so as to attract Section 3 of the said Act. Thus when Dr. Mrs. Gideon had no vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit there was hardly any question of declaration of her land as surplus under Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the said Act. Thus learned competent authority acted beyond his jurisdiction in declaring 985 square metres of land of these premises as surplus land. (2) Sri P.K. Misra, learned Standing counsel argued on the strength of judgment annexure-8 in Misc. Appeal No. 156 of 1979 that as the proceedings became final during life time of Miss. Gideon herself and her will was operative after her death so it was not open to the petitioners to reopen this controversy. 7. Sri P.K. Misra further argued that after publication of the Notification under Section 10(3) of the said Act in official Gazette the land vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances and so could not be divested now. 8. This contention could have been weighty provided the vesting could have taken place in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In State of U.P. and another v. Someshwar Prasad and another, 1982 All. L.J. 920, it was pointed out that an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly construed even though such legislation has been enacted for public good. The authorities under the Act are under a duty to see that the provisions of the Act are duly and fully complied with before any land is declared surplus. 9. If there has been non-observance of the proper procedure and violation of the principles of natural justice ; this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction shall be fully competent to set aside all these decisions as the competent authority was discharging a quasi-judicial function. Admittedly any functionary exercising quasi-judicial function has to act in accordance with the provisions of natural justice, Natural justice means fundamental rules which are necessary for the proper exercise of every kind of power. It is a cardinal principle of natural justice that a man cannot be condemned unheard. Admittedly any functionary exercising quasi-judicial function has to act in accordance with the provisions of natural justice, Natural justice means fundamental rules which are necessary for the proper exercise of every kind of power. It is a cardinal principle of natural justice that a man cannot be condemned unheard. Any violation of natural justice by any authority while functioning in a quasi-judicial manner cannot violate the principles of natural justice, Just a power to act as it, thinks fit, does not allow a public authority to act unreasonably or in bad faith, so it does not allow disregard of the elementary doctrines of fair procedure. In this connection I may refer with advantage to the observations of H.W.R. Wade on Administrative Law, III Edition, page 172 which are in point :- "As lord Selborne once said, Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works, (1885) 10 App. Cas 229. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice. Thus violation of natural Justice makes the decision void, as in any other case of ultra vires reported in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) A.C. 40. Section 8, sub-clause 4 of the aforesaid Act reads : - "After objections have been received the competent authority is enjoined to consider and decide them. It is required to give the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard. This opportunity will include an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the objections. It will be noticed that there is no second party who will be there to cross-examine witnesses or to object to the admissibility or relevancy of documentary evidence sought to be produced by the objector. The competent authority is there to protect the interests of the State. These proceedings will be similar to proceedings before the land acquisition collector in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act. The expression, "pass such orders as it thinks fit" apparently refers to the order disposing of the objections. The objections which may be filed to the draft statement will be of wide range. The objector may raise objections to the manner in which a competent authority has calculated the ceiling limit or to the competent authority's decision about the validity of transfer referred to in Section 5 (1). The objections which may be filed to the draft statement will be of wide range. The objector may raise objections to the manner in which a competent authority has calculated the ceiling limit or to the competent authority's decision about the validity of transfer referred to in Section 5 (1). We have seen that in preparing the draft statement the competent authority, on the basis of enquiry made by it, comes to a prima facie tentative conclusion on many of these points. When these tentative opinions are challenged in an objection, sub-section (4) contemplates a fairly detailed enquiry into the merits of the objections. One may presume that in, trying these objections and in coming to its decision the competent authority will make the material collected by it at the preliminary enquiry under Section 8(1) available to the objector so that he may be in a position to meet it. The function of the competent authority under this sub-section is quasi-judicial while under subsection, (1), the enquiry was administrative in character." 10. In the instant case there is ample evidence on record to show that the widow Dr. Mrs. Gideon applied for three months time to prefer an objection against draft statement. She was never informed about any order passed on her application. She had given cogent ground for further inability to prefer her objection timely vide Annexure-3. Sri P.K. Misra, learned Standing Counsel pointed out that on her application time to prefer objection was allowed upto 30.11.1976. However, that order is not on record ; petitioner has denied knowledge of any such order to Mrs. Gideon. Mrs. Gideon herself denied total ignorance of such order. She had sent her application through registered post and no order drawn on that application was intimated to her. Even in the counter affidavit Sri Suresh Chandra Saxena, Tehsildar Urban Ceiling Area, Agra in para 12 did not allege that any order was passed on that application and it was intimated to Smt. Gideon. On the other hand it was mentioned that although such application was filed by Smt. Gideon but it did not disclose any sufficient reason for extension of time and so competent authority rightly passed the ex parte order. Thus para 12 of the counter-affidavit simply supports the allegation of petitioner that her application remained undisposed of. On the other hand it was mentioned that although such application was filed by Smt. Gideon but it did not disclose any sufficient reason for extension of time and so competent authority rightly passed the ex parte order. Thus para 12 of the counter-affidavit simply supports the allegation of petitioner that her application remained undisposed of. Had the matter been different, in her subsequent application for setting aside the ex parte order Smt. Gideon could not have made a grievance of the fact. 11. Her subsequent application for setting aside the ex parte order Annexure-6 again shows that Smt. Gideon prayed for cancellation of the ex parte order as she was kept in dark about these proceedings. There was a prayer to modify the ex parte order and to allow her time to be heard. That application also remained undisposed of. 12. In para 15 of the counter-affidavit no reason was given as to why learned authority did not dispose of that application also. He could have rejected the prayer and informed Dr. Mrs. Gideon. That was not done. It was mentioned in para 15 that application was not disposed of as it was not important enough to be decided. This is no reason for keeping the application on the file without disposal. The matter was of utmost importance to the lady even though it might not have any importance in the eyes of authorities who did not stand to lose by keeping this application on the file undecided such procedure has manifestly resulted in gross injustice to Smt. Gideon and assignees from her legatees. In Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A.C. 40, it was observed : "The right could only be taken away by the clearest possible words in a statute. Alternatively where natural justice is not observed, that is akin to acting without jurisdiction and results in the decision being a nullity. If the dismissal was a nullity, there was nothing about which to appeal to the Secretary of State and, if the appellant chose to appeal and the Secretary of State purported to deal with the matter, that was also a nullity...". "The analogy of the proviso to Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, should not be invoked; see Halsbury's Statutes of England, 2nd Ed..., Vol. V, pp. 929-930, and Fisher v. Keene, 11 Ch. D. 353. "The analogy of the proviso to Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, should not be invoked; see Halsbury's Statutes of England, 2nd Ed..., Vol. V, pp. 929-930, and Fisher v. Keene, 11 Ch. D. 353. The result of the proceedings of the watch committee is that its decision was void and of no effect. The cases which establish that this is the effect of a denial of natural justice are Bagg's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 93b, 98, Rex v. Cambridge University 1 Str. 557, 567, and Wood v. Woad, (1974) L.R. 9 Ex. 190." 13. Hence it is plain that in the instant case also there has been a gross violation of procedural rules and the principles of natural justice and so all these decisions by competent authority were without jurisdiction, non-set and nullity. Principles of natural justice incorporate rules above procedural fairness and regularity which are of indispensable essence of liberty. It was observed by justice Prank Further in M.C. Nebb v. United States, 318, U.S. 332, 1943, the history of liability has largely been the history of the observance of procedural Safeguards." 14. Learned Standing Counsel Sri P.K. Misra relied upon Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Sri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 S.C. 1576 , in support of his contention that the land which vested in the Government once could not be divested. So his contention was that after vesting of the land in the State it could not be divested. 15. The aforesaid contention is not weighty. It appears that in the aforesaid authority the question which came up for consideration before the Court was about scope of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was found that after possession had been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17 (1) of the said Act the land vested in the Government and it was not open to the Government to cancel that notification under Section 21 of General Clauses Act nor could the notification be withdrawn in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view to enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. 16. Any other view to enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. 16. In the instant case, Government does not want to withdraw that notification in exercise of their powers but as these proceedings have been shown to be nullity so the aforesaid notification shall not hamper the petitioners in getting the relief sought in this case. It is further significant to note that the land had been declared surplus in final notification under Section 10 (3) which was issued by Sri Banarsi Dass, competent authority ; it is further significant to note that Sri Banarsi Lass himself accorded requisite permission to the petitioners to purchase these premises under Section 27, sub-clause (2) of the said Act. He was bound to conduct necessary enquiry in the matter before according the requisite permission. The draft of the sale-deed was before him. Had he taken the least care he could have known that the sale deed related to the same premises a portion of which had been declared surplus. There was only one item to be checked. It looks strange that he did not care to see the record of premises no. 5/161, Sonth ki Mandi, Agra. Had he cared to see it he could have well known about all the infirmities and the declaration of the land as surplus under his signature on 9.3.1977. It does not lie in the mouth of the same authority to urge through the Tehsildar in para 26 of the counter-affidavit that that permission was taken by concealing the facts. There is nothing in the counter affidavit to disclose such concealment. Thus the permission was accorded by the competent authority under Section 27 of the said-Act. As a result of that permission petitioners were free to validly raise constructions on that land. They have raised constructions worth Rs. 10,000,00. The competent authority must have been aware about the sale consideration amounting to Rs. 2,25,000/- which was paid by these petitioners as price of these premises. Under these circumstances the competent authority is estopped now under law from taking possession over 985 square metres of land declared as surplus. 17. In M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. 10,000,00. The competent authority must have been aware about the sale consideration amounting to Rs. 2,25,000/- which was paid by these petitioners as price of these premises. Under these circumstances the competent authority is estopped now under law from taking possession over 985 square metres of land declared as surplus. 17. In M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another AIR 1978 S.C. 621, it was observed :- "Doctrine of promissory estoppel has been variously called 'promissory estoppel' 'requisite estoppel' 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel', it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relation or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term..." 18. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term..." 18. It appears that in that case the appellant, a Limited Company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of sugar cold storage plant and steel foundry was led away by a news item published on 10.10.1968 in the National Herald in which it was stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh had decided to give exemption from sales tax for a period of three years under Section 4A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act to all new industrial units in the State with a view to enabling them" to come on firm footing in developing stage." This news item was based upon a statement made by Sri M.P. Chatterjee the then Secretary in the Industrial Department of the Government. The appellant got it confirmed from Director of Industries and other authorities and set up Vanaspati factory when he was assured of sales tax holiday for a period of three years ; the State Government wanted to go behind this representation by challenging that there was waiver on the part of appellant; it was the that even if there was any waiver, the State Government was bound ro carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected by it in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production. 19. Thus in view of the aforesaid reasons the petition is allowed with costs. Impugned orders dated 21-12-1976 Annexure-4, 12-8-1981, Annexure-10 and notification, Annexure-5 and order of District Judge dated 12-9-1980 Annexure-8 are quashed. Respondents are restrained from interfering with the possession of petitioners over 985 square metres of land in premises no. 5/161 South Ki Mandi, Agra declared as surplus by the competent authority.