JUDGMENT NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J. 1. The petitioners in the two writ applications have been removed from service in view of an order dated 24.12.1981 passed by the Assistant Security Officer, Eastern Railway in purported exercise of the powers under rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules. 1959 (hereinafter, to be referred to as 'the Rules'). A copy of the said order is Annexure-1 in both the writ applications. As common questions of law and facts are involved in the two writ applications they have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioners were appointed as Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force and at the relevant time they were posted at Garhara, Eastern Railway. It is said that in the night of 5/6th December, 1981 while the petitioners were on duty as Rakshak in the railway yard, theft was committed of 3 bales of Handloom cloth from the wagon standing on the siding line by some miscreants. Some of such accursed persons were arrested later. As already stated above, on 24.12.1981 the impugned orders were passed by the Assistant Security Officer removing these petitioners from service with immediate effect saying that he was fully satisfied that the petitioners were guilty of serious misconduct of statel1ent of theft while on duty in the night of 5/6th December, 1981, meaning thereby that these petitioners had made wrong statements about their duty beats on 6.12.1981 it is an admitted position that no opportunity was given to the petitioners to show cause against the proposed action. The Assistant Security Officer while dispensing with the requirement of communication of charge and enquiry thereof as provided by rule 44 of the Rules has observed as follows:- "Whereas the circumstances of the Case are that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner prescribed under Rule 44 of RPF Rules 1959." 3. On behalf of the petitioners the Impugned orders have been challenged on several grounds. On behalf of the respondents the orders were justified in view of the provision of rule 47 which enables the disciplinary authority for reasons to be recorded in writing not to follow the procedure prescribed under rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Rules and to consider the circumstances of a particular case and to pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. 4. 4. Rule 44 of the Rules prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalty and it enjoins the disciplinary authority to frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. It requires the disciplinary authority to communicate in writing the charges so framed and to give the member of the Force an opportunity to file written statement of his defence and, thereafter, to hold an enquiry, consider documentary and oral evidence, as may be relevant or material in regard to the charges. The member of the Force has a right to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and to give evidence in his defence. Thereafter, the finding on the materials have to be recorded. The disciplinary authority may impose any punishment after conclusion of the enquiry aforesaid. For major punishments, before such punishments are imposed, the enquiry report has to be furnished to the member proceeded against and a notice has to be given in respect of the proposed action to be taken against him. A representation against such notice can be filed which has to be considered while imposing penalty. In other words, rule 44 contains a detailed procedure for imposing major penalties which are consistent with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Rule 47, however, is a special provision where under certain contingencies the procedure contained in aforesaid rules 44, 45 and 46 need not be followed before imposing a penalty on a member of the Force. In other words, rule 44 contains a detailed procedure for imposing major penalties which are consistent with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Rule 47, however, is a special provision where under certain contingencies the procedure contained in aforesaid rules 44, 45 and 46 need not be followed before imposing a penalty on a member of the Force. Rule 47 is as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 44, 45 and 46, where a penalty is imposed on a member of the Force (a) on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." On a plain reading of this rule it is clear that it vests power in the disciplinary authority to pass such orders as such authority may deem fit against member of Force without holding any enquiry when (a) the conduct or such member of the Force has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, Or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in rules 44, 45 and 46. The proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and contains similar provision. Rule 14(1) of the Railway Servants (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1968 is similar to clause (a) of rule 47 of the Rules. The scope of this rule was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of the Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another V. T.R. Challappan where it was observed that even in cases where the delinquent employee has been convicted on a criminal charge the disciplinary authority will have to embark upon a summary enquiry as to nature and extent of the penality to be imposed on the delinquent employee. It was observed as follows :- “... It was observed as follows :- “... the position is that the conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee and in the course of the inquiry if tile authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very salutary provision which has been enshrined in these Rules...... The statutory provisions referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service.” In the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court it has been held in respect of a parallel provision under rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules that although the Rules vest power in the disciplinary authourity to make any order as it deems fit in cases where the conduct of a railway servant has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, still the rule enjoins that before taking a final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case should be objectively considered. 5. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court a Bench of this Court in the case of Singasan Rabid Das V. Chief Security Officer, Railway Protection Force, South Eastern Railway, Garden Road Calcutta and others while considering the scope of rule 47 with which we are concerned came to the conclusion that although that rule vests power in the disciplinary authority not to follow the provisions of rule 44, still the said rule requires an active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority and an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent employee before a penalty is imposed against him. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the petitioners have not been convicted on any criminal charge and their case is not convered by clause (a) of rule 47 of the Rules. Here, the action has been taken against the petitioners under clause (b) of rule 47 because it was not practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in Rule 44 of the Rules, i.e., to frame charges and to hold enquiry against the petitioners It is also an admitted position that before imposing the penalty aforesaid no notice was given to the petitioners nor they were asked to show cause as to why action under rule 47 be not taken against them. In my view this case is covered by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court as well as the Bench decision of this Court, referred to above. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, however, pointed out that the Supreme Court has granted a special leave against the judgment of this Court in the case of Singasan Rabi Das and several other cases arising out of the provision similar to rule 47 in different Rules are pending consideration before the Supreme Court. He also informed us that the Supreme Court is to consider the ratio of the aforesaid judgment. The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and another, V. T.R. Challappan (Supra). In my opinion, till the said case of Challappan is not overruled by the Supreme Court it is binding on this Court and the respondents were enjoined at least to hear the petitioners before imposing the penalty against them, even if they have decided not to hold any enquiry in accordance with rule 44 of the Rules. 7. However, there is another defect in the impugned orders. 7. However, there is another defect in the impugned orders. Even if it is assumed that rule 47 of the Rules vests a discretion in the disciplinary authority to pass such orders as it deems fit in cases where it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in rule 44, that very rule requires the disciplinary authority, if so advised, "for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rules." The requirement of rule 47 is that the disciplinary authority must state the reason in writing as to why it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in rules 44, 45 and 46. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has simply quoted the words from rule 47. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not point out as to what was the special features of this case where the procedure under clause (b) of rule 47 had to be followed. I have already pointed out that rule 47 is an exception to rule 44 and is against the well settled principles of natural justice and that procedure should be adopted as a special case to meet the exceptional situation. As such, the disciplinary authority should have recorded reasons for not following the procedure of rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Rules. A Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Maksudan Pathak v. The Security Officer, Eastern Railway, Moghulsarai and another, has held that such reasons should be recorded in writing in the order itself. 9. Taking the aforesaid circumstances into consideration, I am left with no option, but to hold that the orders have been passed in contravention of the requirement of rule 47 of the Rules itself, and, as such, liable to be quashed. Accordingly, both the writ applications arc allowed and the impugned orders contained in Annexure-1 in the two writ applications are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. It is made clear that it will be open to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law, if they are so advised. Anand Prasad Sinha, J. I agree. Application allowed.