JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, M. - In this second appeal, appellant No. 1, Mangali, died on March 18, 1974 and substitution application was filed in May 1974. This substitution application is within time and there is no against it. Hence, I allow this substitution application and order that Jai Karan, Phool Chand, Khichari and Sheo Nath be substituted in place of appellant No. 1, Mangli. 2. Chhedi, respondent No. 3, and Chaturi, respondent No. 4 also died before 1978 and substitution application was given in April 1982. Obviously, this substitution application is beyond time and, therefore, an application for condonation of the delay has also been given. Bhiragu, appellant No. 4, also died before 1978 and substitution application was filed in 1982. 3. Toofani, respondent No. 5, died on June 1982 and substitution application was filed in August 1982. This application is within time and is allowed. 4. Regarding the substitution application filed beyond time, the appellants had pleaded bona fide mistake and desired that benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given to them. This appeal was admitted on October 18, 1975 and was pending in the office. On March 15, 1982, it was listed before the court for trial hearing for the first time and on that date the respondent gave information that Chhedi and Chaturi respondents had died. Thereafter the substitution application was given. 5. It is no doubt true that the appellants knew about the year of the death of these respondents and according to law they should have applied for substitution of their heirs within 90 days of their respective deaths. However, this fact is also to be kept in mind that from October 8, 1976 to March 25, 1982 the case remained in the officer of this court without any date being given to all parties. It is not reasonable to expect that the parties will come to court without having been informed of the date fixed in the case. When cases are listed after such a long duration and without giving nay intermediate date to the parties some complications are bound to occur and one of the complication of such long adjournment is that the parties are unable to file substitution application within time. When cases are listed after such a long duration and without giving nay intermediate date to the parties some complications are bound to occur and one of the complication of such long adjournment is that the parties are unable to file substitution application within time. In such cases, I think that the parties should not be punished for delay in giving the substitution application because such delay occurs only due to the fact that cases are kept pending in the office undated. In Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 'sufficient cause' has not been defined also it has been left to the courts to interpret in particular circumstances of particular cases as to whether sufficient cause of the delay in giving the substitution application existed or not. In my opinion, where cases are kept undated for several years, the delay in giving substitution application must be held due to sufficient cause. 6. In A.I.R. 1979, Calcutta, 353, Mrs, Jyotirmoyee Nag, learned Judge, held that "in cases of illiterate women living in Parda and knowing nothing about law and procedure, delay in giving substitution application must be condoned holding that the delay was bona fide. The learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1925 Calcutta 684(1). The learned Judge, Smt. Jyotirmoyee Nag, observed that that is case where also due to ignorance substitution was not made and consequently the appeal abated. But upon the explanation being given to the effect that they were ignorant and did not know at all the statutory provision of law or that is was at all necessary that the legal heirs be substituted their lordships condoned the delay as he explanation for the delay was sufficient and it was by bona fide mistake". I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge, Smt. Jyotirmoyee Nag. In the instant case also, as I have tried to show, the bona fide mistake about the requirement and necessity of giving substitution application within 90 days even if the case was pending in the court undated. How can one reasonably expect from clients that they will come to the court even on these dates which had not been fixed by the court. After filing appeal in the Board of Revenue it is ordinarily told to the clients that they had to appear in the court upon receiving notice. How can one reasonably expect from clients that they will come to the court even on these dates which had not been fixed by the court. After filing appeal in the Board of Revenue it is ordinarily told to the clients that they had to appear in the court upon receiving notice. In these circumstances, where the case remains pending for long years without any date being given in it, the clients do not know that in case of death of a party they have to go to the court to move substitution application and that also without any information received from the court about the date fixed in the case. In these circumstances, they do not come to the court during the intervening period appear in the court only after receiving notice from the court, the delay in moving the substitution application be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, I condone the delay in moving the substitution application and allow all the substitution application filed by the appellants. The memo of the appeal shall be amended accordingly. 7. The learned counsels for the parties have stated before me that consolidation proceedings is going in the village in which the land in dispute is situated. In this view of the matter, the appeal along with the suit is abated under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.