JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member - In this reference dated January 27, 1977, the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, has recommended that the order of the learned Tahsildar dated December 26, 1975, dismissing the application of Ram Ujagir dated July 26, 1975, may be set aside and the application dated July 26, 1975 may be dismissed as the application was for pure injunction which is within the jurisdiction of the civil court and not the revenue court, and the order of December 26, 1975 was passed without opportunity to the revisionist and without his knowledge that proceedings for extinction of his rights and resumption of the Gaon Sabha land were being taken up. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the recommendation is proper that even if the order of the Tahsildar is deemed to be under Rule 115-F, it has to be remanded to the Collector for proper hearing and decision. He further argued that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to pass order under Rule 115-Q of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and that these were judicial proceedings and a judicial order since the rights after allotment cannot be automatically extinguished as held in the ruling reported in 1981 R.D. 291. 3. The learned counsel for the opposite party argued that the order of the Tahsildar dated December 26, 1975 based on the provisions under Rule 115-Q of the Rules was an executive order and not judicial order cancelling the allotment, hence no revision lies. He, however, agreed with the recommendation that the application had to be rejected. The learned counsel Sri S.D. Pathak further argued that in case the order of the learned Tahsildar was found to be without jurisdiction meaning thereby that some other revenue court was found to have jurisdiction, the principle of merger would operate and the whole judicial proceedings would be regularised by this order of the appellate or revisional authority which enjoys the jurisdiction as court of first instance or appeal or revision. In support, he cited rulings reported in 1976 A.W.C. 177 and 626 and 1977 A.W.C. 607 (para 8). No doubt, this subsequent argument was offered in case the order of the Tahsildar was held to be a judicial order, but without jurisdiction. In support, he cited rulings reported in 1976 A.W.C. 177 and 626 and 1977 A.W.C. 607 (para 8). No doubt, this subsequent argument was offered in case the order of the Tahsildar was held to be a judicial order, but without jurisdiction. This point is well taken and I agree with the principle, that the infirmity in the exercise of jurisdiction is cured by the appellate/revisional court having jurisdiction in the matters, but indeed this question will hardly arise in the present case as it has not been established that a jurisdiction under Rule 115-Q at all did exist. Besides, the learned Additional Commissioner himself held that the subject of pure injunction fell in the jurisdiction of the civil court only and so denied to himself the jurisdiction of entertaining the revision petition, no doubt, correctly. 4. Before discussing the legal questions, some facts may be given. Facts about possession/occupation are revealed by the report of the Naib Tahsildar dated October 16, 1975 made after the spot inspection. Plot number 112 and 113 are adjoining having area .16 acre and .08 acre respectively. An area of .07 acre out plot number 112 was purchased by Ram Ujagir from the L.W.C. in auction on December 24, 1972, although so much area did not remain vacant and available at the time. Durga Prasad opposite-party, is the father and Ram Ujagir applicant is his real son. The appellant Ram Ujagir wanted that Durga Prasad be estopped from restraining him in settling on the land obtained through auction. The spot inspection report shows that Ram Ujagir had possession on area .045 acre of 112(M) and Durga Prasad on area .107 acre of 112(M) amongst others on minor parts of 112. Even if .07 acre was vacant on that date of auction, it could not all the occupied by Ram Ujagir although he paid Rs. 140/- for .07 acre in auction. The learned Thasildar passed order on December 26, 1975 that since Ram Ujagir had not been able to construct house in 2 years period, his rights had been extinguished and the land would be deemed reverted to the L.M.C./Gaon Sabha. On an application by Ram Ujagir dated December 30, 1975 that the order of December 26, 1975 be stayed the Tahsildar ordered the same day that the order did not contain any operative part of and so there was no deed to stay it. On an application by Ram Ujagir dated December 30, 1975 that the order of December 26, 1975 be stayed the Tahsildar ordered the same day that the order did not contain any operative part of and so there was no deed to stay it. 5. The above outline of circumstance clears the whole position. The appeal to the Collector was rightly dismissed on June 30, 1976 as not maintainable on the ground that no appeal is provided against such order. Still, it is a pity, it did not strike any one that no judicial proceedings are provided under Rule 115-Q nor any forum is prescribed. The provisions under this Rule are like definitions in law, only showing the legal position. No proceedings and decisions are envisaged. The cancellation of allotment of the Abadi sites under Rule 115-Q is only on the ground that the allotment is irregular. There was no such allegation, nor finding by the Tahsildar to this effect leading to the cancellation of any specific allotment. The ground of his order was noncompliance of Rule 115-Q. This rule does not provide any proceedings. Naturally, rights involving compliance or otherwise of Rule 115-Q have to be determined by a competent court, if no revenue court is provided, then to the civil court. But the Tahsildar's order dated December 26, 1976 cannot be deemed to be a determination of rights it is merely an executive order stating the legal position. But as the Tahsildar himself admitted on December 30, 1975 did not affect, in the nature of determination the rights of any party nor was any party restrained from approaching the competent court for redress of its grievances. 6. Here, it becomes necessary to discuss the ruling in Gaon Sabha v. Sonpal 1981 R.D. 291 referred to above. In that case, it appears that, the trial court passed an order under Rule 115-Q dropping the proceedings for ejectment, holding that since the rights of allottee of house site would not be extinguished automatically under Rule 115-Q, there was no case for ejectment. It was held that because the Collector had power to extend the period beyond three years (in case of scheduled caste and scheduled tribes only), it was the Collector who had jurisdiction to extinguish the rights under Rule 115-Q (generally). Support is derived from Section 163 of the Act which requires a declaration of transfer to be void. It was held that because the Collector had power to extend the period beyond three years (in case of scheduled caste and scheduled tribes only), it was the Collector who had jurisdiction to extinguish the rights under Rule 115-Q (generally). Support is derived from Section 163 of the Act which requires a declaration of transfer to be void. Sections 189, 190(a) (b) (c) etc. and 191 have also been quoted but the extinction as provided in these Sections is declared under Section 163 only wherein the procedure etc. for declaration and forum is provided. The provisions under these sections being for extinction of tenancy rights, whose nature is specifically different, cannot be equated to any provision for extinction of civil rights as is the case under Rule 115-Q. Also no such declaration on the basis of Rule 115-Q is provided anywhere. Schedule II Serial No. 14 provides for declaration under Section 163 of the Act serial No. 18 of the same schedule provides for abandonment under Section 186, with provision of application and procedure in the section and, Section 191 by itself does not form the basis of any suit or proceeding and it is clear from item 19 that the suit for ejectment of Asami lies under Section 191 when read with Section 202(a). It is obvious that Rule 115-Q by itself cannot generate any suit or proceeding for declaration or decision and the aforesaid ruling remaining silent on the section which enables extinguishing rights and specifies form for suit, first appeal etc. it has to be considered only a part decision about Rule etc. 115-Q taking away the full utility of the ruling. In fact, the Rule 115-Q does not indicate who is to extinguish the rights and presumption of any authority, is full of risk. In consequence, no support from this ruling can be derived to the contention that any revenue court could pass a judicial order under rule 115-Q. 7. Similar provisions are there in the Act and Rules which only define the legal position. Section 123 and Rule 26, inter alia, may be cited as examples, not requiring any judicial proceeding and a judicial order for the purpose. Schedule II confirms the position about Section 123. In the instant case, the Tahsildar's order of December 26, 1975 was found by the Collector on June 30, 1976 to be one for which no appeal was maintainable. Schedule II confirms the position about Section 123. In the instant case, the Tahsildar's order of December 26, 1975 was found by the Collector on June 30, 1976 to be one for which no appeal was maintainable. The reason was plain, that it was no judicial order. It was no order at all under Rule 115-P. In Rule 115-Q the question of jurisdiction does not arise, nor does this rule provide for adjudication. 8. The learned counsel for the applicant has not been able to establish that the order dated December 26, 1975 is a judicial order, or that any authority at all has jurisdiction to pass order under Rule 115-Q. The learned first appellate court or the board also have no jurisdiction solely under Rule 115-Q and the revision petition also does not lie. There is no question of applying the principle of merger, or setting aside the executive order of December 26, 1975 which admittedly contains no operative part or judicial declaration. There is no question of remand either, or need of dismissing the application of July 26, 1975 on which no order of injunction has been passed. The applicant being unable to obtain the reliefs sought has necessarily to approach the proper and competent court for injunction, with or without demarcation, before or alongwith such injunction, as the need be. 9. In the circumstances, this revision petition being not maintainable, the reference is not acceptable and the revision petition is hereby dismissed.