JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is judgment debtor's second appeal against the order dated February 2, 1980 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, dismissing Appeal No. 163 of 1978-79/Aligarh against order dated Apr. 26, 1979 ordering execution of decree rejecting objection of the J.D. dated October 19, 1978 and allowing execution holding that application for execution dated July 18, 1975 was within time. 2. On December 6, 1971 the suit for ejectment with damages and costs was decreed by S.D.O. The first appeal of the defendant was dismissed on September 1, 1973. The defendant had moved review application which was dismissed on August 17, 1974. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 4. It has been argued that the execution application was moved after one year and was beyond time as Serial No. 53 of Appendix III of Z.A. Rules was applicable; that review was not continuation of the suit, therefore, application for execution was clearly time barred and the courts below holding otherwise have committed illegality. Reliance has been placed on Pramod v. State of U.P., 1973 A.W.R. 155. It was also argued that if second appeal is found to be not maintainable it may be converted into revision for which prayer has been made in the memo of second appeal. 5. It has been argued in reply that second appeal was not maintainable; that serial Nos. 51 and 52 of Appendix III of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules are applicable as the decree was not only for ejectment but was also for costs and damages; that review is the continuation of the suit; that the defendant-appellant had applied for review and had obtained stay, therefore, the application for execution, was within time and in any case was within 3 years even if period spent after dismissal of first appeal in perusing the review is not considered. Reliance has been placed on Rajendra Nath Rewari v. Board of Revenue and others, I.R.L. 20 Alld. 401. 6. It has been argued in rejoinder that no stay order was obtained during the pendency of the review application. 7. According to the definition of the expression 'decree' formerly given in C.P.C. prior to amendment made to Cl. Reliance has been placed on Rajendra Nath Rewari v. Board of Revenue and others, I.R.L. 20 Alld. 401. 6. It has been argued in rejoinder that no stay order was obtained during the pendency of the review application. 7. According to the definition of the expression 'decree' formerly given in C.P.C. prior to amendment made to Cl. (2) of Section 2 of the C.P.C. the determination of any question under Section 47 of the C.P.C. amounted to a decree and as such an appeal and second appeal lay against such determination. Such provision in the code was mainly responsible for the delay in the execution of decree. The definition of the term 'degree' has been amended so that the determination of question under Section 47 may not amount to a decree. The repealing saving Section 97 of Act 104 of 1976 by its sub-section 2(2) lays down that the amendment shall not be applicable to appeals against determination of any such question as is referred to Sec. 47 of the C.P.C. and every such appeal shall be dealt with as the said Section 3 of the amending Act had not come into force, i.e. the amendment is not retrospective. 8. The new definition of expression decree of Act No. 104 of 1976 is not applicable to Act I of 1951 because Section 331(3) and (4) of Act I of 1951 after amendment of U.P. Act No. XXX of 1975 runs as follows:- "Section 331(3) - An appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under Section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or in order 43, Rule 1 of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a court mentioned in column No. 4 of Schedule II to this Act in proceedings mentioned in column No. 5 thereof. (4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) from the final order or decree, passed in an appeal under sub-section (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 6 of the schedule aforesaid. (4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) from the final order or decree, passed in an appeal under sub-section (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 6 of the schedule aforesaid. The aforesaid sub-section (3) provides for appeal from order under Section 47 of the C.P.c. and it being a provision in the special Act will over-ride the provision of the amended expression of decree by Act 104 of 1976, therefore, a second appeal on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (4) of Section 331 referred above is maintainable against an order passed under Section 47 of the C.P.C. i.e. an order passed in execution of a decree, therefore, this second appeal is maintainable being against an order passed in execution of decree under Section 47 of the C.P.C. 9. Appendix III of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules at Serial No. 51, 52 and 53 provides limitation for execution of all sorts of decrees passed under Act I of 1951. They run as follows:- Serial No. Section of the Act Description of suit, application and other proceedings Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run Proper court fees 1 2 3 4 5 6 51 .. For the execution of a money decree or a decree under Section 209 in so far as it relates to the payment of damages not being a decree for a sum exceeding Rs. 500 inclusive of the cost of executing such decree but exclusive of any interest which may have accrued after decree upon the sum decreed. Three years The date of final decree in the case. As in the Court Fees Act, 1870. 52 .. For the execution of any money decree or decree under Section 209 is so far as it relates to the payment of damages for a sum of money exceeding Rs. 500 inclusive of the costs executing such decree, but exclusive of any interest which may have accrued after decree upon the sum decreed. The period allowed for the execution of a decree of the Civil Court. As in the case of a decree of the Civil Court Ditto. 53 .. For the execution of any other decree than money decreed. One year The date of final decree in the case. Ditto. 10. Serial Nos. The period allowed for the execution of a decree of the Civil Court. As in the case of a decree of the Civil Court Ditto. 53 .. For the execution of any other decree than money decreed. One year The date of final decree in the case. Ditto. 10. Serial Nos. 51 and 52 provide for execution of money decree or a decree under Section 209 in so far as it relates to the payment of damages not being a decree for a sum exceeding Rs. 500/- inclusive of costs of executing such decree but exclusive of any interest which may have been occurred after the decree upon sum decreed and the period is 3 years and serial 52 provides for execution for money decree and damages for a sum exceeding Rs. 500/- and the period is provided to be the period for the execution of decree of the Civil Court. 11. For execution of any other decree than money decree Serial 53 provides limitation of one year, therefore, period of one year will be applicable in the present case for the execution of ejectment decree passed under Section 209 of Act I of 1951 and not 3 years which will be applicable only for execution of money decree. 12. The application for execution dated July 18, 1975 is for execution of money decree for an amount not exceeding Rs. 500/- for which 3 years limitation will be applicable according to Serial 51 of Appendix III of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules but it is also for execution of ejectment decree for which only one year's limitation shall be applicable according to Serial 53 of the said Appendix. 13. The said period of limitation for execution of money-decree and ejectment decree shall start to run from September 1, 1973 when the first appeal was dismissed because the decree dated December 6, 1971 passed by the S.D.O. will merge in the final decree passed by first appellate court on September 1, 1974 as has been held in Rajendra Nath Tewari v. Board of Revenue and others (supra) as follows:- "The limitation for execution of such a decree provided for in Item 53 of Appendix III of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, 1952. This item provides a period of limitation of one year for the execution of any decree other than a money decree. This item provides a period of limitation of one year for the execution of any decree other than a money decree. The limitation starts from the date of the final decree in the case. When appeals have been carried from the decree of the trial court then the only executable decree is the decree of the final court. As held by the Allahabad High Court in Durga Singh v. Wahid Raza the doctrine of merger applies even where a second appeal has been dismissed by the High Court summarily under Order XLI, Rule 11 C.P.C. and that in such a case the High Court's decree is the final decree and the decree of the first appellate court merges with it." 14. The pendency of the review application and its dismissal on August 17, 1974 is of no help to the parties the period consumed by review application will not be available to the decree-holder because review application is not continuation of the suit unless it is allowed and the appeal is revived for hearing as has been held in Maya Ram v. Ram Dayal, 1973 A.W.R. 155 as follows:- "The pendency of an application for review does not take away the operative efficacy of a decree passed by a court. The decree remains executable and in force so long as it not set aside either by way of a review or by an appellate decree. The pendency of the review application not having any adverse effect upon the binding nature of the decree, the fact that the hearing of that application was stayed under Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act would equally be ineffective to take away the enforceability of the decree. Merely applying for a certificate of fitness to appeal will equally not affect the finality of the decree. In case the certificate had been granted and an appeal had been lodged, it could then be said that since the decree was under appeal, its finality was effected. Mere pendency of the application for certificate could not, affect the decree." The aforesaid view finds supports from 1979 R.D. 36 (Summary of cases) (F.B.). I.L.R. 20 Alld. In case the certificate had been granted and an appeal had been lodged, it could then be said that since the decree was under appeal, its finality was effected. Mere pendency of the application for certificate could not, affect the decree." The aforesaid view finds supports from 1979 R.D. 36 (Summary of cases) (F.B.). I.L.R. 20 Alld. 411 is not relevant to the present case in which it was held that when an application for review is presented in a suit in forma pauperis that application lies and the plaint in the suit is not liable to any court fee and in that connection the review application was held to be a proceeding connected to the suit but it has not been laid down in it that review application against appellate court's judgment was continuation of the suit, hence it is not relevant to the facts of the present case. 15. Thus it is clear that the execution application as far as ejectment is concerned is barred by time but as far as execution of costs and damages is concerned it being within 3 years from September 1, 1973, it is within time. Thus this appeal is liable to be allowed partly and is liable to be dismissed partly. 16. In view of the above, this appeal is partly allowed and the orders passed by both the courts below dated February 2, 1980 and April 26, 1978 are partly set aside and the application for execution regarding ejectment being time barred is rejected as such and the aforesaid orders passed by the courts below are partly maintained and are confirmed regarding execution of the money decree being within limitation of 2 years from September 1, 1973. The parties shall bear their own costs.