JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, M. - This is a second appeal by Mst. Sheokala against the judgment and order dated June 26, 1976 by the learned Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, allowing the appeal and setting aside the order dated July 30, 1974 by the learned trial court by which it had cancelled the Sanad Bhumidhari issued on July 28, 1970 in favour of Hari Singh husband of the appellant. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. Brief facts of the case are that Hari Singh deposited 20 times rent on July 28, 1970 and applied for issue of Sanad Bhumidhari. On the same day the order was passed to issue Sanad Bhumidhari and the Sanad was also prepared on the same day. On August 3, 1970, Hari Singh put an application for withdrawal of the 20 times rent, saying that he did not want to become a Bhumidhari and on August 6, 1970, he filed an affidavit alleging fraud played on him for the deposit of 20 times rent, that the amount was deposited telling him that it was being deposited in the small savings. Hari Singh expired on November 27, 1970 and on December 8, 1970, the appellant again repeated the request for refund of the amount. A sale-deed had been executed by Hari Singh in favour of the objectors Vishwanath and another as also in favour of Mst. Sheokala his wife on July 28, 1970 and was registered on the same day. The learned trial court from the circumstances of the case, found that a fraud existed and cancelled the Sanad by its order dated July 30, 1974. The learned Additional Commissioner found that the affidavit of August 6, 1970 could not be considered in evidence and found that the application dated August 3, 1970 did not contain any allegation of fraud, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned trail court dated July 30, 1974. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Additional Commissioner has not upset the finding of the learned trial court and cited a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 407 in support of his contention that if no counter-affidavit was filed by the order party then the allegations in the affidavits must be presumed to be correct. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Additional Commissioner has not upset the finding of the learned trial court and cited a ruling reported in A.I.R. 1962 Alld. 407 in support of his contention that if no counter-affidavit was filed by the order party then the allegations in the affidavits must be presumed to be correct. He further argued that in the appeal, no such ground was taken that the application dated August 3, 1970 had no allegations of fraud. He further argued that the scope of enquiry under Section 137-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is not limited by the application and its contents. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that there were no allegations of fraud in the application itself and no evidence beyond the application could be considered. Since the affidavit was beyond the pleadings, no counter-affidavit was needed. He further argued that the learned Additional Commissioner did upset the finding of the learned trial court. 5. I do not agree with the view taken by the learned Additional Commissioner that in the absence of any allegation of fraud in the application, the trial court was barred from looking into such allegations contained in the affidavit of Hari Singh himself, filed on August 6, 1970 which is quite within the period of limitation of 30 days from the date of issue of the Sanad. Section 141 of the C.P.C. says that in miscellaneous applications, the procedure meant for taking evidence etc. in the suits will also apply as far as practicable. The nature of the proceedings under Section 134 of the Act or 137 of the Act do not limit the enquiry to the submission in the application but these are special enquires meant to achieve a special purpose. Considering Section 137 of the Act, it is very clear that the requirements of the application are not defined in the section and it is sufficient that the application should be for cancellation of the declaration, the basis of such cancellation would be the grounds given in the sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) and such grounds can be established during enquiry. It would, therefore, be incorrect to presume that the affidavit which closely followed the application could not be considered for the purpose of enquiry. 6. It would, therefore, be incorrect to presume that the affidavit which closely followed the application could not be considered for the purpose of enquiry. 6. This being the sole consideration by the learned first appellate court, its judgment dated June 26, 1976 is liable to be set aside. The learned Additional Commissioner should have considered the whole evidence on record and then should have decided the appeal on merits. 7. It also appears from the learned trial court judgment dated July 30, 1974 that it was a mixed order under Section 134 as well as 137 of the Act. The grounds for cancellation of Sanad as revealed from the order dated July 30, 1974 are that the widow of Hari Singh and his daughter had insisted on the refund of the amount and the circumstances show that the application for enquiry, order to issue the Sanad and preparation of the Sanad on the same day i.e. July 28, 1970, indicated some interested action and that Hari Singh had not willingly deposited the amount. This order does not say that the Sanad was cancelled on the ground of fraud played on Hari Singh. Further, it is seen from the remand order by the learned Additional Commissioner on an earlier appeal No. 508 of 1971-Gonda dated April 30, 1973 that the question involved in that appeal was whether the Sanad had been granted or not in view of the fact that the order to issue Sanad had been passed, and the Sanad had been prepared but not granted. This aspect was also not considered by the learned trial court. On reading the judgment, it appears that the application dated August 3, 1970 was not for cancellation of the Sanad but only for withdrawal of the amount deposited with the request that the Sanad may not be granted. The learned trial court, however, cancelled the Sanad. 8. Unfortunately, the case file No. 222 under Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has not been available in spite of being required. The trail court had passed the order dated January 30, 1971 but it was set aside and the case was remanded to the learned trail court whereupon an order dated July 30, 1974 cancelling the Sanad was passed. The trail court had passed the order dated January 30, 1971 but it was set aside and the case was remanded to the learned trail court whereupon an order dated July 30, 1974 cancelling the Sanad was passed. This shows that the learned trial court unwillingly converted the proceedings under Section 134 into the proceedings under Section 137 of the Act. As observed above, the order dated July 30, 1974 also suffers from the defects of not being based on the grounds on which such order could be passed under Section 137 U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and, therefore, cannot be upheld. In the circumstances, I consider it necessary that the case should be remanded to the learned trial court for deciding it afresh after reconstructing the file, or in case it is found by further search in the trial court or Additional Commissioner's court, then after obtaining and utilising the old file. 9. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, the orders of the two courts below dated June 26, 1976 and July 30, 1974 are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial court for proceeding afresh in accordance with law.