JUDGMENT - Jamdar M.S. J.- The only substantial question of law,, which is involved in this appeal is whether after the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Berar Leases Act) was repealed by section 113 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha. Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Vidarbha Tenancy Act), a. landlord is entitled to file a suit for evicting a tenant, whose applications under section 9(3) of the Berar Leases Act challenging the notice given by the landlord terminating the lease was rejected. 2. The facts leading to this reference are as under :- The Land Survey No. 95/1, which is the subject matter of the dispute originally belonged to one Poonamchand Gulabchand. This land was leased out to the respondent Nimbaji Bhiku before 1951–52. Nimbaji Bhiku there-fore, became a protected lessee under the Berar Leases Act, which came into force on 15th, November 1951. Punamchand served a notice under section 9(1) of the Berar Leases Act terminating the tenancy of the respondent at the end of the agricultural year (i. e. 31st March 1957). The notice, which was dated 21st December, 1956 was served on the respondent on 26th December 1956. On receipt of this notice, the respondent submitted an application to the Sub Divisional Officer (the Revenue Officer contemplated by section 9 of the Berar Leases Act) under section 9 (3) of the Berar Leases, Act for a declaration that the notice was not bona fide and had no effect. *The Revenue case No. 93/51-B of 1956–57, which was commenced on the basis of this application, was decided by the Sub Divisional Officer, on 17th July 1957 along with Revenue Case No. 222/51-B/56–57 which was commenced on an application filed by Punamchand under section 8(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act for orders terminating respondent's tenancy. Punamchand's application was dismissed, while respondent's application was-allowed and it was held that the notice dated 21st December 1956 was not bona fide. Being aggrieved by this order, Punamchand preferred two appeals-, one against the order passed under section 9 (4) and the other against the order passed under section 8 (1) Both these appeals were dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 30th August, 1958. Punamchand, therefore, filed second appeal to the Revenue Tribunal. Both these appeals bearing Appeal Nos. Being aggrieved by this order, Punamchand preferred two appeals-, one against the order passed under section 9 (4) and the other against the order passed under section 8 (1) Both these appeals were dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 30th August, 1958. Punamchand, therefore, filed second appeal to the Revenue Tribunal. Both these appeals bearing Appeal Nos. 152, 153/51-B/1958–59 were decided along with other appeals preferred by Punamchand against the orders passed in proceedings taken out by him against the other tenants. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed the appeals, which arose out of the proceedings taken by the tenants under section 9 (3) of the Berar Leases Act and held that the notices issued by Punamchand under section 9 (1) of the Berar Leases Act were bona fide. A a necessary corollary of this decision, the three appeals i. e. 150, 153, and 155, which arose out of the application filed by Punamchand under section 8(l)(g)r were also allowed. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, however, gave the following direction in the proceedings commenced by Punamchand under section 8(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act;- “As these are proceedings for termination of leases, it is obvious that they are governed by Sub section (3) (a) of section 132 of the Bombay Act No. 99 of 1958 and will have to be disposed of by the corresponding authority (Tahsildar or Naib Tahsildar having jurisdiction) in accordance with the provisions of that Act.” 3. After the second appeals were filed but before these appeals were •decided by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the Vidarbha Tenancy Act came into force on 30th December 1958 and by virtue of section 133 of the said enactment, the Berar Leases Act stood completely repealed with effect from that date. 4. After the decision of the Second Appeals, Punamchand filed Civil Suit No. 87 of 1961 against the respondent for possession of the land in question and also for recovery of mesne profit amounting to Rs. 154/-. Punamchand, however, died during the pendancy of the suit and the appellants were brought on record as his legal representatives on the basis of a will executed by him. 154/-. Punamchand, however, died during the pendancy of the suit and the appellants were brought on record as his legal representatives on the basis of a will executed by him. The Trial Judge dismissed the suit for possession holding that respondent's tenancy was not lawfully terminated by the notice dated 21st December 1956 because the proceedings for termination of respondent's lease, which were governed by sub section (3) of section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act were not finally disposed of. The Trial Judge did not grant the claim for mesne profits and held that the appellants were only entitled to lease money. However, even though the monetary claim was decreed on that basis, the suit was ultimately dismissed because the appellants failed to produce either a succession certificate or letters of Administration as directed. 4(A). Being aggrieved by this decision, the appellants preferred Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1965. The learned Assistant Judge relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra v. Tukaram1 held that the proceedings started by deceased Punamchand under section 9(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act for termination of the tenancy before the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act would be governed by the Berar Leases Act and not by the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and that only the procedural part of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act would apply to these pending proceedings. He also held that all rights accrued to the original plaintiff Punamchand under the Berar Leases Act were saved by section 132(2) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. He further held that as no order under section 8(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act was passed in favour of the appellants by the Revenue Officer terminating the lease of the respondent, the lease continued. He further held that the combined effect of sections 8, 9, 19 and 16-B of the Berar Leases Act was that the delivery of possession of the field which is in possession of the protected lessee to the landholder falls with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer and that the Civil Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to grant that relief. He also held that the appellants were not entitled to get any mesne profits for the relevant years. Consequently the learned Assistant Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree appealed against. He also held that the appellants were not entitled to get any mesne profits for the relevant years. Consequently the learned Assistant Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree appealed against. It is against this decision, that the appellants have preferred this second appeal, which the learned Single Judge in referring to the Division Bench for decision. 5. Shri S. N. Kherdekar, the learned Advocate for the appellants con-tended that section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act is just an enabling provision and that the remedy by way of an application contemplated by sec-tion 19(1) is an alternative remedy for ejectment of a tenant. He further contended that once the tenancy of the protected lessees was terminated, it was open to the landlord either to file an application under section 19(1) for ejectment of the protected lessees or to file a suit for recovering possession of the land, it being a civil right. He further contended that though the Second Appeals preferred by Punamchand to the Revenue Tribunal were decided after the Berar Leases Act was repealed, the termination of lease of the respondent became effective on 31st March 1957 at the end of the agricultural year as contemplated by the notice and thus the right to evict the respondent stood accrued in favour of Punamchand before the Berar Leases Act was repealed and hence by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 132, this right was saved. He further contended that even assuming that as long as the Berar Leases Act was in operation, the only remedy to landlord for evicting the tenant was the one provided in section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act, the remedy by way of suit became available to the appellants after the Berar Leases Act ceased to be on the statute book with effect from 31st December, 1958. According to Shri Kherdekar, as section 19(1) was no longer in existence, the only remedy the appellants had to enforce the right accrued in their favour before the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, was by way of a suit. 6. According to Shri Kherdekar, as section 19(1) was no longer in existence, the only remedy the appellants had to enforce the right accrued in their favour before the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, was by way of a suit. 6. Shri Kalele, the learned Advocate for the respondent, however, con-tended that as no order of ejectment was passed against the respondent, his rights as protected lessee were not finally determined and hence no right, which could be protected under section 132(2) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act had accrued in favour of the landlord at the commencement of the said enactment. According to him, a proceeding under section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act is a continuation of a proceedings under section 8(l)(g) or section 9(3) of the Berar Leases Act and unless an application under section 19(1) is instituted and finally decided, the proceedings under section 8(1)(g) or section 9(3) will not be deemed to have been decided finally and the tenancy of a protected lessee would not stand terminated till then. He further urged that for final determination of the rights of a protected lessee and for evicting him, section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act was not the only remedy. He further contended that by virtue of section 19(1) read with section 19(2), the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was impliedly ousted, while sections 19(3) read with 16(3) operated as express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Shri Kalele further argued that even assuming that a right to evict the respondent had vested in Punamchand before the Berar Leases Act was repealed, he was not entitled to file a suit because the remedy by way of an application under section 19(1), which was the only remedy for evicting a protected lessee continued to be available to him even after the Berar Leases Act was repealed. According to him, it was open to Punamchand and the appellants to file an application under section 19(1) even after the Berar Leases Act was repealed and that such an application could have been disposed of by Revenue Officers having corresponding jurisdiction as that of the Revenue Officers under the Berar Leases Act. 7. According to him, it was open to Punamchand and the appellants to file an application under section 19(1) even after the Berar Leases Act was repealed and that such an application could have been disposed of by Revenue Officers having corresponding jurisdiction as that of the Revenue Officers under the Berar Leases Act. 7. At the hearing of the appeal, we were taken through various decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court on the question about ejectment of a protected lessee under the Berar Leases Act and about the effect of the repeal of the said enactment by section 133 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. 8. We would first like to refer to a Full Bench decision of this Court in (Jayantraj Kanakmal and another v. Hari Dagdu and others)'2 because that is the first case in point of time and also because the facts in that case and the facts in the case before us are exactly similar. In that case also, the Revenue Tribunal allowed the appeal of the landlord in a proceeding commenced on an application by the tenant under sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Berar Leases Act. In that case also, the decision was given by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal before the Vidarbha Tenancy Act came into force. However, in that case, the landlord filed an application under sec-tion 19(1) after the Berar Leases Act was repealed. The question that fell for the consideration of the Full Bench was whether an application made by the landholder under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (XXIV of 1951), after the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958 (XCIX of 1958), should be decided under the provisions of the former Act or under the provisions of the latter Act. In answering this question, the learned Judges analysed the relevant provision relating to termination of lease of a protected lessee and his eviction and after clubbing sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 8 proceeded to observe as follows in para 6 of the judgment: - “Under this section, therefore, a landholder could not himself terminate a tenancy. In order to terminate the tenancy, he had to make an application to a Revenue Officer and obtain an order for the termination of the tenancy. In order to terminate the tenancy, he had to make an application to a Revenue Officer and obtain an order for the termination of the tenancy. Sub-section (1) of this section contemplated an order for the termination of a tenancy. This is made further clear by the opening words in sub-section (2) 'No order for the termination of a lease' In sub-section (3), however, the proceedings before the Revenue Officer are referred to as 'proceedings for ejectment'. This shows that a proceeding instituted under sub-section (1) for obtaining an order for the termination of a lease was regarded as being essentially a proceeding for ejectment. The purpose or object of securing an order for termination of a lease is to get back possession of the land from the lessee. Ejectment is, therefore, ordinarily a necessary consequence of the order terminating a lease. The draftsman did not, therefore, consider it material whether the proceeding under section 8 was described as a proceeding for termination of a lease or as a proceeding for ejectment, for (except where the application was dismissed) it ultimately resulted in the eviction of the tenant.” The learned Judge then quoted section 19 and observed that the landlord could not take possession of his land from his lessee, even though he had obtained an order from the Revenue Officer for the termination of the lease, He had to make a separate application under sub-section (1) of this section for ejecting his tenant. Proceeding further, the learned Judges observed as follows in para 8 of the judgment: “The position, therefore, was that in order to obtain possession of his land from a protected lessee, the landholder had first to obtain an order from the Revenue Officer for the termination of the lease under sections, and thereafter make an application under sub-section (1) of section 19 for ejecting the protected lessee. After receiving the latter application, the Revenue Officer had to make a summary inquiry, and thereafter make an order for restoring possession of the land to the land-holder. It may be noted here that the order which, under this section the Revenue Officer could make in favour of a landholder, is referred to as an order for restoring possession of the land. It may be noted here that the order which, under this section the Revenue Officer could make in favour of a landholder, is referred to as an order for restoring possession of the land. If this sec-tion 19 is read along with section 8, and in particular sub-section (3) of section 8, it will be clear that the Legislature regarded both the proceedings under section 8 and section 19 as being parts of one proceeding, which is described in some places as a proceeding, for termination of a lease and in others as a proceeding for ejectment. The proceedings commenced with an application under sub-section (1) of section 8 and ended with an order under sub-section (3) of section 19. The application under sub-section (1) of section 19 was only a second step in the proceeding initiated under sub-section (1) of section 8 to obtain back the possession of the land. Even though, therefore, a separate application had to be made under sub-section (1) of section 19, the proceeding under this sub-section was a part or continuation of the proceeding under section 8. In other words, the proceeding under section 8 did not come to an end until an order had been made under sub-section (3) of section 19. In paras 9 and 10 of the judgment, the learned Judges analysed the scheme of section 9 and observed that if the Revenue Officer, after holding the enquiry contemplated under sub-section (4), came to the conclusion that the notice was valid, he had to make an order for the termination of the lease. Particular emphasis is laid by Shri Kalele on the observations that followed; the relevant observations appear in para 11 and read as follows: - “Thereafter, the landholder could make an application under sub-section (1) of section 19. Although this section required a separate application for ejection of a protected lessee, the proceeding under this section was really a part or continuation of the proceeding under sub-section (3) of section 9, for, the lessee's right could not be said to have been effectively determined until an order for the ejectment had been made under section 19. An order for the termination of a lease by itself serves no useful purpose, unless it is followed by an order for ejectment. An order for the termination of a lease by itself serves no useful purpose, unless it is followed by an order for ejectment. In cases in which the lessee had initiated the proceeding under sub-sec-tion (3) of section 9, the proceeding cannot, therefore, be said to have finally terminated until either his application had been granted and the notice had been held to be invalid, or alternatively, until an order had been made under sub-section (3) of section 19.” The learned Judges then went on to answer in the affirmative the question that arose for their consideration holding inter alias that an application made under section 19 of the Berar Leases Act after the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act is an application in a pending proceeding of the kind referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and such proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. 9. The next decision which was delivered on the next day is the one in (Ramchandra Harishchandra v. Tukaram Kant and others)3. In this case, the Division Bench, which consisted of two learned Judges, who were parties to the decision in Jayantraj's case, reiterated the position so succinctly stated in Jayantraj's case and held further that an application under section 19(1) should be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision viz; section 36(2) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and has to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions, of the said Act. The learned Judges then went on to consider the question that arose in that case as to whether sec-tion 38 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act was applicable to such a proceeding. They held that section 38 (1) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act will not apply in “ respect of proceedings pending on the date of commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, which under sub-section (3) of section 132, are deemed to have been instituted under the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. They held that section 38 (1) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act will not apply in “ respect of proceedings pending on the date of commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, which under sub-section (3) of section 132, are deemed to have been instituted under the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. They further held that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act also does not apply, but sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 would apply to all applications for obtaining possession of land for personal cultivation made under section 19 of the Berar Leases Act, which were pending or which are to be deemed to have been pending on the date of the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. 10. Shri Kherdekar, tried to urge that the decision of this Court in Ramchandru's case was overruled by the Supreme Court and hence the dicta laid down in that case is no longer good law. It is true that the High Court decision in Ramchandra Harishchandra v. Tukaram Kara and others was overruled by the Supreme Court by the decision reported in 1965 Mh. L J 850. But the reversal of the High Court's decision was only to a limited extent. It will be seen from the observations appearing “in para 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court that the correctness of the view of the judgment in Jayantraj's casee was not canvassed before the Supreme Court. What was challenged and what was over-ruled was the decision of the High Court that to a proceeding under section 19 (1) filed after the Berar Leases Act repealed, sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act were attracted. Their Lordships held that once-an order was passed under section 8(1)(g) of the Berar Leases Act by the Revenue Officer, the only enquiry contemplated to be made on an application under section 19 was a summary enquiry before order for possession was made and at that stage there was no scope for the application of the conditions and restrictions prescribed by sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and these provisions would not apply to proceedings to enforce rights acquired when the Berar Leases Act was in operation. It is pertinent to note that the reversal did not embrace the dicta laid down in Jayantraj's case and which was reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in Ramchandra 's case (citation supra). 11. To what extent the decision in Ramchandra's case was overruled by the Supreme Court, was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in (Smt. Johrabi w/o Abdul Wahid v. Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur and 3 others')* after quoting the observations in para 8 of the High Court judgment in Ramchandra's case, the Learned Judges of the Full Bench observed as follows: - “We are especially emphasizing this part of the decision in Ramchandra v. Tukaram here for a special reason. As we shall presently show, the case went up by grant of special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and it was precisely upon this point alone that the decision was challenged before the Supreme Court and reversed. It was not reversed in so far as it followed the earlier Full Bench decision in Jayantraj's case, nor, as we shall presently show, was Jayantraj's case at all in dispute before the Supreme Court.” They elaborated this position in para 14 of the judgment. We would like to quote these observations :- “The Supreme Court judgment against the decision of the Division Bench in Ramchandra v. Tukaram is reported in 1965 Mh. L J 850. What was the point which fell for determination before the Supreme Court will immediately be highlighted, if we reproduce the argument by counsel for the appellant as stated by the Supreme Court itself. (See para 5 page 854.) 'Mr. Patwardhan for the appellant has, for the purpose of this appeal, not sought to canvass the correctness of the view of the judgment in Jayantraj Kanakmal Zambad, but has submitted that the High Court has not correctly interpreted section 132 (3) of the Tenancy Act:” It was this point which the Supreme Court proceeded to answer. It pointed out that section 38 which made provisions in the new Tenancy Act equivalent to the provisions of section 19 in the Leases Act consisted of two parts i.e. a procedural part and a substantive part. It pointed out that section 38 which made provisions in the new Tenancy Act equivalent to the provisions of section 19 in the Leases Act consisted of two parts i.e. a procedural part and a substantive part. In the sub-stantive part sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 laid down several additional conditions which had to be fulfilled by the landlord before he could obtain an order terminating the tenancy on the ground of his personal cultivation. They then pointed out that upon the facts in Ramchandra v. Tukaram an order had already been passed on 2–7–1957 terminating the tenant's lease with effect from If4–1958, upon the landlord's ' application under section 8(1)(g). The tenant in that case, as in the present case, had not moved under section 9(8). They also held that between section 19 (3) of the Leases Act and section 36(3) of the New Tenancy Act in the matter of procedure there did not appear any sub-stantial difference, but to the trial of the application for enforcement of the right acquired under the Leases Act, section 38 of the Tenancy Act could not be attracted. Section 38 is, in terms, prospective and does not purport to affect rights acquired before the date on which the new Tenancy Act was brought into force. They, therefore, upheld that part of the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court where it held that if a valid notice is once given under section 9(1) then a fresh notice under section 38(1) was not necessary, but they did not accept the view of the High Court that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 apply to an application filed or deemed to be filed under section 19 of the Leases Act. They pointed out that the words in section 132(3) shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act', though no doubt general, clearly indicate that they were intended to apply to tenancies determined under section 38 (1). They pointed out that the words in section 132(3) shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act', though no doubt general, clearly indicate that they were intended to apply to tenancies determined under section 38 (1). Once an order was passed under section 8(1) (g) of the Leases Act by a Revenue Officer, the only enquiry contemplated to be made was under section 19 of the Act and at that stage there was no scope for the application of the conditions laid down in sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38, for, in our view, these provisions do not apply to proceedings to enforce right acquired when the Leases Act was in operation. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court only reversed the decision of this Court in Ramchandra v. Tukaram on the scope of applicability of section 132 and the provision of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 in consequence of the interpretation which they put upon the provisions of section 132 (3) of the New Tenancy Act and the decision in Ramchandra v. Tukaram based upon the Full Bench decision in Jayantraj's case were not at all touched, nor was the decision in Jayantraj's case at all in question before.” 12. This aspect of the matter was considered by another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Tulzapurkar and Shimpi JJ. in Gopal Shivram Bliankhode v. Smt. Sagirbegum Kazi Mohimuddin5 in which case, the material question that fell for the consideration of the Learned Judge was whether an order under section 8(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act is necessary for effectively terminating the tenancy after an application by the protected lessee under section 9 (3) challenging the notice is rejected by the Revenue Officer. In that case, the Learned Judges profusely quoted from the judgment in Jayantraj's case and then went on to consider the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra v. Tukaram on the scheme of the provision of sections 8, 9 and 19 of the Berar Leases Act as propounded by the Full Bench of this Court in Jayantraj's case and made the following observations: “It may be stated that this later part of the Full Bench decision was not approved and was actually overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramchandra v. Tukaram but the scheme of the Berar Act, 1951 and particularly sections 8, 9 and 10 thereof, as was propounded by the Full Bench in Jayantraj's case, was not touched or dissented from by the Supreme Court. In fact before the Supreme Court, counsel, who appeared for the appellant in that case, did not touch on the correctness or other-wise of the view which the Full Bench in Jaya.nlraj's case had taken on the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act, but had merely raised a contention that the High Court had not correctly interpreted sec-tion 132 (3) of the Tenancy Act, 1958. In other words, the scheme of the provisions of sections 8, 9 and 19 of the Berar Act, 1951, as propound-ed by the Full Bench of this Court in Jayantraj's case that proceedings taken under section 8 read with section 19 and proceedings taken under section 9 read with section 19 were part and parcel of one and the same proceedings was neither disapproved nor dissented from by the Supreme Court. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court, only reversed the view of the High Court on the scope of applicability of section 132 and the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 in consequence of the interpretation, which was put upon the provisions of section 132 of the New Tenancy Act.” 13. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court, only reversed the view of the High Court on the scope of applicability of section 132 and the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 38 in consequence of the interpretation, which was put upon the provisions of section 132 of the New Tenancy Act.” 13. In support of the proposition that unless an order directing delivery of possession to the landlord is passed against a tenant, the latter's rights as lessee are not finally determined, Shri Kalele placed reliance on the decisions in (Madhav v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur and others)0 and (Vikann Yeshwanta and others v. Eknath Trimhak Gadekar and others)'7 The material question for our consideration, however, is not whether respondent's rights as lessee were finally determined. The material question is whether any right had accrued in favour of Punamchand to apply to evict the respondent. There is a distinction between termination of tenancy and final determination of lessee's rights. For moving the machinery provided in a statute for evicting the tenant, it is not necessary that all rights of the lessee must be finally determined. What would be necessary is termination of the tenancy. As soon as the tenancy is terminated, the landlord acquires a right to take appropriate proceeding for obtaining possession. Under the Berar Leases Act, no application under section 19(1) could be filed unless the landlord acquired the right to eject the tenant. The said provision contemplated that only a landlord, who has obtained an order in his favour in a proceeding under section 8 or 9 could apply for ejectment of the tenant. Section 8 (1) of the Berar Leases Act laid down that notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a court of law, the lease of any land held by a protected lessee shall not be terminated except under orders of a Revenue Officer made on the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of the said section. One of this grounds on which the Revenue Officer could pass an order terminating a lease of the protected lessee, was that the protected lessee had been served with the notice by the land holder as provided in section 9. One of this grounds on which the Revenue Officer could pass an order terminating a lease of the protected lessee, was that the protected lessee had been served with the notice by the land holder as provided in section 9. It is, therefore1, clear that merely serving the protected lessee with a notice terminating his tenancy was not sufficient to terminate the lease held by a protected lessee and it was necessary that the notice was followed by an order of a Revenue Officer terminating the lease. It is this order, which gave a right to the landholder to file an application under section 19(1) for ejecting a protected lessee. An order of the Revenue Officer terminating the lease may not be necessary if the notice given by the landholder to the protected lessee under section 19(1) is challenged by the lessee on either of the two grounds mentioned in sub section (3) of section 9. if the challenge succeeds .then there is no question of passing an order under section 8(1) terminating the lease and if the challenge fails, it is not necessary to obtain a further order under section 8(1) terminating the tenancy. The Revenue Officer while passing order under sub-section (4) of section 9 on an application filed by the protected lessee challenging the notice is bound to pass an order terminating the lease and even if the Revenue Officer fails to pass such an order, the order rejecting the application of a protected lessee on the ground that the notice terminating the lease was bona fide would operate as termination of the lease. This view is supported by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Shivram's case (citation supra). In that case one of the material questions that fell for consideration of the Learned Judges was whether after the application of the protected lessee challenging the notice served an him by the landholder under section 19 (1) on the ground of lack of bona fide is rejected, it is necessary for terminating the tenancy to obtain an order under section 8(1) (g) of the Berar Leases Act. The Learned Judges made a distinction between the class of cases where a notice simpliciter under section 9(1) of the Berar Leases Act is not followed by any challenge to the same and the class of cases in which such notice is challenged by the tenant under section 9(3) and on enquiry the order is passed by the Revenue Officer under section 9 (4) and held that in the former class of cases a notice by the landlord under section 9(1) by itself would not be sufficient to effectively terminate the tenancy of a protected lessee, without an order being obtained under section 8(l)(g) but in cases where a notice under section 9(1) is followed up by an application by the protected lessee under section 9(3) challenging the notice on the grounds available to him and an appropriate order is passed by the Revenue Officer under section 9(4) rejecting the tenant's challenge to the notice, the lease of the protected, lessee would be effectively terminated even where the order does not specifically state that the tenancy is terminated and it would not be necessary for the landlord to take any further steps under section 8(1) (g) of the Act It is thus clear that under the Berar Leases Act, the tenancy of a protected lessee stood terminated either when the notice given under section (9)(1) is followed by an order under section 8(I)(g) or when his application under section 9(3) challenging the notice is rejected by an order under section 9(4). This termination gives a right to the landholder to avail of the summary remedy provided by section 19 (1) for evicting the tenant. 14. In the case before us, not only the application filed by the respondent under section 9(3) for challenging the notice failed but the application filed by Punamchand for an order under section 8(l)(g) was allowed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in the Second Appeals preferred by Punamchand. That this is a complete and independent right is recognised by the Supreme Court in Ramchandra v. Tukaram. As a matter of fact, it is on this footing, Their Lordships held that sub section (3) of section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act would not be attracted to an application under section 19 (1) of the Berar Leases Act and that such an application would be separate proceeding for enforcement of a right to obtain possession. As a matter of fact, it is on this footing, Their Lordships held that sub section (3) of section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act would not be attracted to an application under section 19 (1) of the Berar Leases Act and that such an application would be separate proceeding for enforcement of a right to obtain possession. The relevant observations appear in paras 6 and 7 of the Judgment. This is what, their Lordships have observed : “6. The appellant had acquired a right to obtain possession of the land on determination made by the Revenue Officer by order dated July 2, 1957 and a legal proceeding in respect thereof could be instituted or continued by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 132 as if the Tenancy Act had not been passed. The exception made by sub-section (3) of sec-tion 132 in respect of proceedings for termination of the tenancy and ejectment of a tenant which are. pending on the date of the commencement of the Tenancy Act is limited in its content. Proceedings which are pending are to be deemed to have been instituted and pending before the corresponding authority under the Act and must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. By the use of the expression 'shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act' apparently the Legislature intended to attract the procedural provisions of the Tenancy Act, and not the conditions precedent to the institution of fresh proceedings. To hold otherwise would be to make a large inroad upon sub-section (2) of section 132 which made the right, title or interest already acquired by virtue of any previous order passed by competent authority unenforceable, even though it was expressly declared enforceable as if the Tenancy Act had not been passed. 7. The High Court was, in our judgment, right in holding that the application filed by the appellant for obtaining an order for possession against the first respondent must be treated as one under section 19 of the Berar Act, and must be tried before the corresponding authority. 7. The High Court was, in our judgment, right in holding that the application filed by the appellant for obtaining an order for possession against the first respondent must be treated as one under section 19 of the Berar Act, and must be tried before the corresponding authority. Being a pending proceeding in respect of a right acquired before the Act, it had to be continued and disposed of as if the Tenancy Act had not been pass-ed (sub-section 2), subject to the reservation in respect of two matters relating to the competence of the officers to try the proceeding and to the procedure in respect of the trial. The appellant had obtained an order determining the tenancy of the first respondent. The order had to be enforced in the manner provided by section 19(1) i.e. the Revenue Officer had to make such summary inquiry as he deemed fit, and had to pass an order for restoring possession of the land to the landholder and to take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to his order. Since the repeal of the Berar Act the proceeding pending before the Revenue Officer would stand transferred to the Tahsildar. The Tahsildar was bound to give effect to the rights already acquired before the Tenancy Act was enacted, and in giving effect to these rights he had to follow the procedure prescribed by the Tenancy Act.” 15. Shri Kalele, however, contended that as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal gave the decision long after the Berar Leases Act was repealed, it cannot be said that Punamchand had acquired a right to obtain possession before the Vidarbha Tenancy Act came into force. We are unable to accept this argument because even though the order was passed after the Berar Leases Act was repealed, the effect of the order was that the tenancy stood terminated as per the notice at the end of 31st March 1957 and hence as a result of the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the landholder would be deemed to have acquired a right to obtain possession of the land before the Berar Leases Act was repealed. 16. Section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act contains provisions relating to repeals and savings. Sub-section (1) lays down that the provisions of the enactments specified in Schedule I are repealed to the extent specified in column 4 of the said Schedule. 16. Section 132 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act contains provisions relating to repeals and savings. Sub-section (1) lays down that the provisions of the enactments specified in Schedule I are repealed to the extent specified in column 4 of the said Schedule. As mentioned above, the whole of the Berar Leases Act stood repealed by virtue of this provision. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 132 which are relevant for our purposes read as follows:- “(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall, save as expressly provided, in this Act, affect or be deemed to affect: (i) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act, or (ii) any legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, title, interest, obligation or liability or anything done or suffered before the commencement of this Act, and any such proceedings shall be instituted, continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) - (a) all proceedings for the termination of the tenancy and ejectment of a tenant or for the recovery or restoration of the possession of the land under the provisions of the enactments so repealed, pending on the date of the commencement of this Act before a Revenue Officer or in appeal or revision before any appellate or revising authority shall be deemed to have been instituted and pending before the corresponding authority under this Act and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and * (b) in the case of any proceeding under any of the provisions of the enactments so repealed, pending before a civil Court on such date, the provisions of section 125 of this Act shall apply.” A plain reading of the provision will show that a right already acquired as accrued before the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and any legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right are not affected by the repeal and that legal proceedings for enforcing a right acquired before the commencement of the Act cannot only be continued but can also be instituted as if the Vidarbha Tenancy Act is not passed. The contention, therefore, that as the Berar Leases Act was repealed, the remedy by way of an application under section 19(1) was not available to the appellants after repeal of the Berar Leases Act is without any substance. In our view what-ever remedies were available to the land owner in respect of rights accrued before the commencement of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act continued to be available to him as if the Vidarbha Tenancy Act was not passed, even after the repeal of the Berar Leases Act. 17. This brings us to the question as to whether an application under section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act was only one of the remedies available to the landholder or whether that was the only remedy available to the land-holder. Other facet of this question is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to grant the relief contemplated by section 19(1) of the Berar Leases Act was barred and 'continued to be barred even after the Berar Leases Act was repealed. 18. Shri Kherdekar laid particular emphasis on the language of sub-section (1) of section 19 in support of his proposition that the said provision is just an enabling provision. In order to appreciate his argument, it would be worthwhile to quote the said provision: “A landholder may apply to the Revenue Officer to eject a protected lessee against whom an order for the termination of the lease has been passed under section 7 or 9.” According to Shri Kherdekar, the use of the word 'may' signifies that ordinary remedy by way of a suit was available to a landholder who had obtained an order for termination of the lease under section 8 or 9 of the Berar Leases Act. He also tried to draw support from the language in sub-section (2) in section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and contended that when the Legislature intended that no other remedy except the one provided by the statute was to be available, it made the position specifically clear by using language, which unmistakably conveyed the sense. Sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act reads as follows:- “Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3A), no landlord shall obtain possession of any land, dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. Sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act reads as follows:- “Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3A), no landlord shall obtain possession of any land, dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit held by a tenant except under an order of the Tahsildar. For obtaining such order he shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land, dwelling house or site, as the case may be, is deemed to have accrued to him.” On comparison of the language used in sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Berar Leases Act with the one used in sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, the argument advanced by Shri Kherdekar appears to be attractive. But as rightly contended by Shri Kalele, sub-section (1) of section 19 cannot be read in isolation and it will have to be read along with sub-section (2). According to him, when sub-section (1) of section 19 is read along with sub-section (2), the implied bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is obvious. Sub-section (2) of section 19 reads as follows: - “Any protected lessee who has been dispossessed by the landholder of his land except in accordance with the provisions of this Act may, within one year from the date of such dispossession, apply to a Revenue Officer for reinstatement of possession.” As rightly contended by Shri Kalele, this provision clearly means that no other mode of dispossessing the protected lessee governed by the Berar Leases Act was contemplated and that the landholder, if he wanted to evict the protected lessee, could do so only in accordance with the provisions of the Berar Leases Act. Obtaining a decree for possession in a Civil Suit does not amount to dispossession of the protected lessee in accordance with the provisions of the Berar Leases Act. Hence even if the suit, filed by the landholder against the protected lessee governed by the Berar Leases Act, is decreed, that decree would be without jurisdiction and if the protected lessee is dispossessed in execution of such a decree, he would be entitled to file an application under sub-section (2) of section 19 to recover back the possession of the land. This view was taken by Dharmadhikari J. in (Rameshwar Bhurala Sharrna v. Vithal Sukhdeo Rathod' and others)8 and with respect we affirm that view. 19. Not only the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to eject a protected lessee governed by the Berar Leases Act was impliedly barred but the said enactment contained provisions which operated as express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Section 16-B of the Berar Leases Act laid down as follows:- “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted, or application, made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a Revenue Officer is by or under this Act empower-ed to determine, decide or dispose of.” Sub-section (3) of section 19 empowers the Revenue Officer to decide an application under section 19(1). Sub-section (3) of section 19 lays down that on receipt of an application under sub-section (1) or (2), the Revenue Officer, may, after making such summary enquiry as he deems fit, pass an order for restoring possession of the land to the landholder or the protected lessee as the case may be and may take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to his order. This provision shows that not only the Revenue Officer is empowered to decide an application under section 19(1) or 19(2) but he is also empowered to take such steps as may be necessary to give effect to his order. Shri Kalele, therefore, rightly urged that sections 8, 9 and 19 of the Berar Leases Act contain a complete code for ejectment of a tenant. The suit filed by Punamchand was, therefore, completely misconceived because the only remedy he had, was to file an application under section 19(1) of the Berar Lease Act. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. As this appeal involves important questions of law, there would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----