N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE learned Judges also held that the suit property namely S. No. 228 was not the property of the plaintiffs predecessor and therefore cannot be the property of the plaintiff also. Here also the learned Judges have clearly gone wrong. They have relied upon two judgments of M. U. Shah. One is the case of Bapalal Godadbhai Kothari v. Charity Commissioner 7 G. L. R. 825 and the other is the case of Lallubhai v. Vijbhushanlal 8 G. L. R. 42. These judgments can be said to be no good law. Prior to these judgments there was holding the field a single Judges judgment. It is the case of Ishwarlal Nanalal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal R. Indian Law Reports 1963 (Vol. 4) Gujarat 767 which was delivered by late. Mr. Justice Mody There was one earlier judgment of J. M. Shelat J. in the case of Kuberbhai Shivdas v. Mahant Purshottamdas Kalyandas G. L. R. page 564 which held that the enquiry held by the Deputy or the Charity Commissioner under sec. 19 was by no means an administrative or an executive enquiry. This judgment of Justice J. M. Shelat also dealt with the scope of sec. 21 and 22 of the Act. The learned Judge stated in the course of his judgment as follows :"though retaining the final and conclusive character of the findings and entries made under secs. 20 and 21 sec. 22 and 22a make provision for changes to be made where such changes appear to be necessary either as a result of a change having occurred subsequent to the date of the entries or as a result of some particular having been left out from consideration in the previous inquiry". Late Justice Modys judgment clinched the question and he in unambiguous terms laid down that even if the inquiry was held ex parte the items mentioned under sec. 19 of the Act are conclusive and the person who felt aggrieved thereby had to take recourse to sec. 22a in order to ventilate his grievance. So the judgments of M. U. Shah in the abovementioned two cases cannot be said to be good law. A Single Judge is bound to follow the earlier judgments delivered by a Single judge. 19 of the Act are conclusive and the person who felt aggrieved thereby had to take recourse to sec. 22a in order to ventilate his grievance. So the judgments of M. U. Shah in the abovementioned two cases cannot be said to be good law. A Single Judge is bound to follow the earlier judgments delivered by a Single judge. However this particular aspect need not detain us any further because there is the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in the first appeal No. 222 of 1975 decided on 10-11-75. While upholding the view of Rane J. in the case of Bhatt Chimanlal Ratanji v. Patel Nanu Ladhu 13 G. L. R. 95 the Division Bench approved the reasoning of Rane J. who was a party to the Division Bench and held that they were therefore of the opinion that if the plaintiff is assumed for the sake of argument to fall in the category of a third party and it is such a third party who has come to the ordinary civil court for a declaration about the title to the immovable property which was held to be a property of the public trust in an inquiry held under sec. 19 of the Act the civil courts jurisdiction is ousted in view of the provisions of the Act to decide that question. They further held that the remedy to challenge the decision of the officer or the authority under the Act was as contemplated in our opinion by sec. 22-A of the Act. Finally the Division Bench confirmed that the learned trial Judge had rightly reached the conclusion that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Act and such a suit was not maintainable. ( 2 ) THE sum and substance of what has been stated above is this that it is the settled view of the Division Bench of this court that once a finding about a particular property being the property of the public trust is reached and an entry is made pursuant thereto in the register kept under sec. 19 of the Act the said entry becomes conclusive unless it is varied by the subsequent order under sec. 22-A of the Act. 19 of the Act the said entry becomes conclusive unless it is varied by the subsequent order under sec. 22-A of the Act. The present defendant challenged the inclusion of this property S. No. 228 as the property belonging to the plaintiffs predecessors-Sajana Trust He wanted to get that point adjudicated upon in this suit which it was not open to the civil court to do. Then the defendant in the course of the protracted hearing of this suit before the learned trial Judge had given an application Ex. 11 to the learned Judge with a request to stay the suit to that he may make an application to the competent authority under the Bombay Public Trust Act in order to get the property registered in the name of his trust. Nothing of the sort was done by him thereafter and he went to the trial. So the finding stands that the property was the property of the trustees of the Sajana Trust the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff and that those trustees had validly sold that property to the plaintiff as per the sale deed Ex. 67 dated 12-12-67 and as the said sale deed had been effected by the trustees after seeking the Charity Commissioners permission Ex. 94 under sec. 36 of the Act the said sale-deed was absolutely valid and it is not open to the defendant to challenge that entry existing in the public register at the relevant time. ( 3 ) MR. Vyas had tried to raise one point of law by invoking sec. 55 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. In his submission the suit could not proceed without a notice being issued to the Charity Commissioner under that provision. Such a notice under that section is necessary only when it appears to the court that any question affecting the public religious or charitable purpose was involved in the suit. Here there is no question of affecting a public religious trust on the contrary what was acknowledged to be a public trust property is being the subject matter of the judicial pronouncement already recorded by a competent authority and it was sought to be upheld for want of any competent challenge to the finding. So I say that no question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose was involved in the suit In my view therefore sec. 56-B has no application. So I say that no question affecting a public religious or charitable purpose was involved in the suit In my view therefore sec. 56-B has no application. If the defendant so thinks fit he may still have recourse to sec. 22-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. ( 4 ) IN above view of the matter I set aside the judgments of the courts below and decree the plaintiffs suit as prayed for. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The defendant shall hand over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff and shall pay costs of the plaintiff throughout. Appeal allowed. .