ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The facts, in brief, are these : - The petitioner was served with a notice under S. 10 (2) of the Act and he filed objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority and thereafter an appeal was filed. The same was dismissed by the appellate Court. Thereafter Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 2871 of 1978 was filed in this Court and the same was partly allowed by a learned Judge of this Court by the judgment dated 20-8-79, a true copy of which is annexure 1 to the petition. The appellate Court was directed to decide two questions afresh in accordance with law. The two questions are mentioned in the judgment of the writ petition. Thereafter the appellate Court gave a notice to the counsel of the petitioner, who is described in para 5 of the petition as the earlier counsel of the petitioner. It is asserted that no notice was given to the petitioner himself. The date fixed was 2-7-81. On the said date the petitioner's aforesaid counsel moved an application for adjournment and the appeal was fixed for hearing on 13-7-81. On 13-7-81 since no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner, the Court dismissed the appeal in default. Thereafter a restoration application was moved by the petitioner and the same was dismissed in default on 28-9-81. The petitioner asserts that on account of his illness he could not attend the Court on 28-9-81. Thereafter an application was moved for setting aside the order dated 28-9-81 dismissing the restoration application in default. The said application was supported by an affidavit. The said application, however, was dismissed by the appellate Court by its impugned order dated 23-11-81, a certified copy whereof is on record. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri H. P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. The learned counsel made the following contentions :- It was contended that when the case had been remanded by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, it was not open to the appellate Court to dismiss the appeal in default. 3. The learned counsel made the following contentions :- It was contended that when the case had been remanded by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, it was not open to the appellate Court to dismiss the appeal in default. Counsel placed reliance on the provisions of Order 41, R. 23, Civil P. C. Learned counsel emphasised that the paramount consideration should have been the consideration to do justice and there was a failure on the part of the appellate Court to act in accordance with law and in fact, it exceeded its jurisdiction in not deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with the direction of the remand order by this Court. In my view, counsel's contention cannot be accepted, inter alia, on the ground that the order which was passed on 13-7-81 was passed long ago and much beyond the period of 90 days, which is the normal period within which an order is allowed to be quashed in the writ jurisdiction. It should be seen that before the appellate Court the application was moved for setting aside the order dated 28-9-81, whereby the restoration application itself was dismissed in default. The impugned order dated 23-11-81 has dealt with the controversy as to whether the said order dated 28-9-81 deserved to be set aside or not. Unless the petitioner succeeded before the appellate Court in getting the said order dated 28-9-81 set aside, there was no question of the order dated 13-7-81 dismissing the appeal in default being set aside by the appellate Court. Therefore, so far as the independent challenge to the order dated 13-7-81 is concerned, which is being made in this Court, it is sufficient to say that the said order was passed, as I have stated above, much beyond the period of 90 days. Apart from the aforesaid aspect of the matter, I do not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when on remand an appeal is sent back to the appellate Court, the Court suo motu is bound to dispose of the appeal on merits even though the appellant and his counsel are absent on the date fixed. A similar argument was raised before the Supreme Court in Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 146 ). A similar argument was raised before the Supreme Court in Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 146 ). The contention which was raised before the said Court was as follows as noticed in the said case : - "The contention raised for the appellant is that the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal fixed for final hearing without considering the proceedings of the Trial Court and the memorandum of appeal before it and that the right of the appellant to have the case decided on merits on the material before the Court was not dependent on his addressing the Court." 4. In my view, the provisions contained in 0. 41, R. 17. C.P.C. which provide for the dismissal of an appeal for appellant's default will be applicable even to an appeal which has to be re-heard after its remand by the High Court. If any other interpretation is placed, it should be seen that practical difficulties will arise. There may be a situation where an appellant may not be interested in prosecuting the appeal. He might have compromised the dispute out of the Court or due to other reasons he may not be interested in pursuing his appeal. If the appellate Court is bound to decide the appeal on merits even in the absence of the appellant or his counsel, it will be absolutely a fruitless and uncalled for exercise. In my view, an appellate Court has always jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal in default of the appearance of the appellant or his 'counsel. 5. Learned counsel next contended that the appellate Court could not decide the appeal after remand without a fresh notice to the appellant himself. In my view, this contention is again untenable. It should be seen that the appellant was represented in the appeal through a counsel. That counsel appeared on 2-7-81 and moved application for adjournment and the same was allowed and 13-7-81 was fixed. There was no withdrawal of authority on the part of the said counsel and in such circumstances, it was not necessary that the fresh notice should have been given to the appellant after remand. 6. That counsel appeared on 2-7-81 and moved application for adjournment and the same was allowed and 13-7-81 was fixed. There was no withdrawal of authority on the part of the said counsel and in such circumstances, it was not necessary that the fresh notice should have been given to the appellant after remand. 6. The learned counsel next contended that even if there was a lapse on the part of the Counsel still, in view of the authority in Rafiq v. Munshi Lal ( AIR 1981 SC 1400 ) : (1981 All L J 704) the appellant was entitled to have the order dismissing the appeal in default set aside. I have considered the said decision of the Supreme Court in certain other petitions and have distinguished the same. It should be seen that in the said case the petition was pending in the High Court and it was emphasised that after a litigant engages a counsel in the High Court, he is cut off from his counsel as litigants are generally not residents of Allahabad where the principal seat of the High Court is situate. The ratio of the decision laid down in the said case has to be confined only to the cases pending in the High Court and those considerations cannot be extended to the proceedings in the Courts below where the litigants are generally residents of the surrounding areas and have opportunity to attend the Courts. It should further be seen that in the High Court there is a system of daily cause list and the cases remain on the daily cause list very often for a long time during which it is not possible for the litigant to remain present in the High Court. In the Courts below a date is fixed and there is no system of the cause list where the case may remain pending for long duration. Needless to say that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was taking into consideration the practical difficulties of the litigants and, therefore, in the facts of the particular case, the ex parte order was thought fit to be set aside. It should be seen that it was never intended to lay down a proposition in' the broad terms that no litigant should be allowed to suffer on account of the lapse or incompetence of a counsel. It should be seen that it was never intended to lay down a proposition in' the broad terms that no litigant should be allowed to suffer on account of the lapse or incompetence of a counsel. In this connection, attention may be drawn to the law laid down by the Privy Council in Rampal Singh v. Balbhaddar Singh, (1903) ILR 25 All 1 (PC). It was laid down as follows : - "By S. 229 of the Contract Act it is enacted that any notice given to, or information obtained by, an agent in the course of his business transacted by him for the principal shall, as between the principal and third parties, have the same legal consequence, as if it had been given to, or obtained by, the principal. And the same is repeated in S. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It may be that these enactments are not directly applicable to the matter now in dispute, but they are only declaratory of a general principle of legal proceedings which are usually conducted through an agent, and it would be impossible to conduct such business, and it would lead to grave inconvenience and injustice if it were required to prove afterwards that the client had personal knowledge of the contents of the pleadings or of some document in suit or of the general nature of the claim made against him. It is not a mere question of constructive notice or inference off act, but a rule of law which imputes the knowledge of the agent to the principal, or (in other words) the agency extends to receiving notice on behalf of his principal of whatever is material to be stated in the course of the proceedings." 7. Lastly, it was contended that in ignoring the affidavit of the petitioner, the Court acted illegally inasmuch as the same remained uncontroverted. In this connection reliance was placed on Juggi Lal v. R. J. Gupta ( AIR 1962 All 407 ). It was further emphasised that the counsel of the petitioner had made a statement before the appellate Court giving the reason why he could not appear in Court on 28-9-81. In this connection an affidavit of Sri Yogendra Singh, Advocate, has been filed along with the writ petition and the same is marked as Annexure 4 to the petition. It was further emphasised that the counsel of the petitioner had made a statement before the appellate Court giving the reason why he could not appear in Court on 28-9-81. In this connection an affidavit of Sri Yogendra Singh, Advocate, has been filed along with the writ petition and the same is marked as Annexure 4 to the petition. So far as the said affidavit of the counsel is concerned, it should be seen that in the said affidavit it is not stated that he made any statement to the Court of the kind which referred to in para No. 23 of the Writ petition. In the affidavit it is only stated that on 23-9-81 he could not attend the Corn, due to the reason stated in the said affidavit. Nothing has been said in the affidavit that the counsel made any statement before the Court. So far as the authority reported in AIR 1962 All 4C7 (supra) is concerned, it should be seen that the observations were made in appeal should like to emphasise that I am or exercising any appellate jurisdiction while deciding a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, The cause shown may be sufficient or insufficient but it is not for this Court in a revision or writ to decide whether the Court below has rightly held the cause sufficient or insufficient. In this connection reference may be made to Manindra Land & Buildings Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Baneiji ( AIR 1964 SC 1336 ). The Court below cannot be said to be acting without jurisdiction in holding the cause to be insufficient and it is not for this Court in a writ petition to substitute its own judgment in place of the judgment of the Court below. Apart from this aspect of the matter, it should be seen that the appellate Court has stated that the affidavit of the petitioner was wholly unsatisfactory and bad in law inasmuch as it was verified both on personal knowledge and belief. In this view of the matter, there was no proper affidavit as such before the appellate Court. In my view, it will, not be correct to interfere with the impugned order as held in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1964 SC 1336 (supra). I have really no jurisdiction to interfere with the said order. 8. The petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.