JUDGMENT Hari Lal Agrawal, J. Petitioners 1 to 3 were the Class IV employees of the Allahabad Bank and their services have been terminated allegedly on the basis of a circular letter dated 22.9.1980 (Annexure 2) issued by the Regional office of the Bank, directing that the temporary employment should not exceed the period of 90 days. The petitioners accordingly have prayed for quashing Annexure 2 and for a writ of mandamus directing the Bank not to interfere with the services of the petitioners 1 to 3. 2. Petitioner no. 1 was first appointed temporarily as Peon-Cum-Farrash on 1.2.78 at Giridih where he worked for 286 days in that year and his services were thereafter terminated. He was re-employed after about a year on 4.12.79 and was again terminated on 15.5.80 after working for about 87 days. Petitioner no. 2 was similarly appointed temporarily sometime in the year 1979 at Khudaganj Branch (Nalanda) and after working for 44 days his services were terminated on 18.12.79 He was also re-employed on 9.1.80 at the Patna Main Branch. Petitioner no. 3 was similarly appointed as Peon-cum-Farrash in the Pataliputra Branch on 5.1.76. His services were also terminated and he was re-employed from time to time, serving 157 days in 1976, 131 days in 1977, 246 days in 1978, 138 days in 1979 and 63 days in 1980. 3. The petitioners have impleaded two employees of the Bank as respondents 6 and 7 on the ground that although they were employed subsequent to petitioners 1 to 3 in similar situations, they have been allowed to continue and on this basis they have also challenged their termination as discriminatory. The further ground of challenge to the order of termination is that the petitioners 1 to 3 having worked continuously for more than 240 days, their services could not be terminated without complying with the provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act which requires one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment. 4. Let me first take up the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Tara Kant Jha on the basis of the provisions contained in section 25F of the Act. On the face of it, the argument if at all, was available only to petitioners 1 and 3. From the facts stated it is apparent that petitioner no. 4. Let me first take up the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Tara Kant Jha on the basis of the provisions contained in section 25F of the Act. On the face of it, the argument if at all, was available only to petitioners 1 and 3. From the facts stated it is apparent that petitioner no. 1 had worked for 286 days in the year 1978 and petitioner no. 3 for 246 days in the year 1978. petitioner no. 2 had not reached that stage. This ground, however, cannot be pressed into service on behalf of these petitioners for various reasons. Firstly that they have not challenged the respective orders of termination of the year 1978. They have challenged their termination sometime in the month of May 1980, but even assuming for the sake of argument that they had challenged the said orders, they having accepted the re-employment in the Bank in the year 1979, the ground of attack on this score disappears on account of the acceptance of the re-employment, on applying the principle of waiver. 5. In the case of Ross T. Smyth & Co. V. Bailey, Son & Co. Lord Wright observed that the word 'waiver' was a vague term used in many senses. “It is sometimes used in the sense of election as where a person decides between two mutually exclusive rights". A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The petitioners must be presumed to have full knowledge of their rights to challenge the orders of their termination in the year 1978, and by accepting a fresh employment it must be held that by that action they have waived and forgone that enforceable right, because it is always open to a party by its conduct to release its right by implication also, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of Dawson's Bank Ltd. V. Nippon Menkwa Kaushiki Kaisha. 6. It is not necessary to multiply the instances of waiver of cause of action as the facts of the present Case are so imperative that the argument has got to be rejected. There are innumerable Cases of Indian High Courts where default clauses in instalment decrees have been held not to be enforceable in case the decree holder accepts any instalment out of time. There are innumerable Cases of Indian High Courts where default clauses in instalment decrees have been held not to be enforceable in case the decree holder accepts any instalment out of time. Similarly, under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, where under section 11A of the old Act and under section 13 of the new Act, a provision has been made for an order on the tenant for payment of arrears and current rent within a period of 15 days and if a default is committed by him in carrying out that order and deposit is made after the prescribed period, but nonetheless where a landlord withdraws the deposited rent and subsequently also applies for striking out the defence on the ground that the defendant had committed breach of the court's order, it has been repeatedly held that the plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived his right to make such an application, accrued to him, by withdrawing the amount (without any protest). Reference may be made to an unreported decision of this Court in (Shankar Lal Hazarika V. Kanhai Lal) and Ranchhod Lodha V. Madhabji Kanji. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners, 7. The other point regarding the vires of the circular letter issued by the Bank (Annexure 2) also does not contain any substance therein. It appears that there is a Recruitment Board for controlling the services in the Banks, known as Banking Service Recruitment Board. The Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (Banking Division) under its letter dated 13th June, 1979 (annexed to the counter-affidavit of the Bank) had issued certain directions for regulating the appointment and promotion of the officers of the Bank. In order to avoid the mischief of making appointments against existing vacancies in the garb of appointment of temporary hands, it was directed that with a view to meet the immediate requirement of the Bank, employment of temporary hands of part-time employment should not be allowed to become an instrument to exclude the jurisdiction of the Recruitment Board. One of the guidelines given in this regard was that no temporary hands should be employed for a period of more than 90 days. One of the guidelines given in this regard was that no temporary hands should be employed for a period of more than 90 days. It has been pleaded in the counter-affidavit that Annexure 2 was issued in pursuance of this circular and there was nothing wrong in it as it was most reasonable and in keeping with the policy of employment in the larger interest of the Banks as well as to minimise the irregularities in the employment.. Learned counsel for the petitioners failed to cite any authority whereby an employer was debarred from terminating any temporary or daily-rated employee unconditionally. The only protection contemplated under the law with respect to such employees is contained in section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and if any employee has not become eligible to claim the benefits and protection of this provision, then, unless his case is protected by some other principles governing the services, such as "first come and last go" and mala fide etc, his termination cannot be challenged in a Court. 8. The next argument of Mr. Jha was that while keeping respondents 6 and 7 in its employment and terminating the services of the petitioners 1 to 3, the Bank was guilty of discrimination, I do not find any substance in this argument either, unless the petitioners establish any right they cannot challenge the continuance of the services of respondents 6 and 7. No material was placed before us as to whether these respondents had qualified to be retained under section 25F of the Act or whether they are still seniors or juniors to these petitioners. 9. Be that as it my, in the counter-affidavit it has been asserted by the respondents that respondent nos. 6 and 7 also have not worked in the Bank for more than 90 days in aggregate and in that view of the matter this point also has no substance. 10 Yet another argument was made, as already indicated above, on the basis of the provisions contained in section 25G of the Act. A decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. V. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co Ltd was also cited to show that the petitioners being senior to respondents 6 and 7 their services could not be terminated while the Bank allowed the services of the said respondent to continue. A decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. V. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co Ltd was also cited to show that the petitioners being senior to respondents 6 and 7 their services could not be terminated while the Bank allowed the services of the said respondent to continue. The reliance upon the provisions of section 25G of the Act by Mr. Jha on the facts of the instant case is entirely misconceived because according to the existing pattern of service, an employee who completes the period of 90 days earlier has to be terminated and an employee who gets an employment subsequent to such an employee but has not completed 90 days period, although being junior to him, has got to be retained by virtue of the above direction. It is not a case where a general recruitment and a general termination has been made 11. Mr. Jha lastly argued that by virtue of the provisions contained in section 25H of the Act the petitioners (retrenched workmen) must be given an opportunity by the Bank for re employment as they must be given a preference over other persons. This argument seems to have some substance. An opportunity provided by this section should be given to the petitioners in the manner prescribed therein and in accordance with other rules framed, under the law and relevant circulars' to govern the services of the Bank, and the petitioners' offer for re-employment in response to any employment notice may be considered accordingly. 12. Subject to the above observations, this application has no substance and must fail. It is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. I agree. Application dismissed.