Judgment 1. This is an appeal by the defendants second party under S.43, R.1(u) of the Civil P.C. (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") against the judgment of reversal. The trial court by its judgment dated 29-3-1976 had dismissed the suit as being barred by principles of res judicata. By the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Additional District Judge dated 23-3-1979 the appeal was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial court for going into the question of adverse possession after affording the parties reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence on the merits of the case. 2. The subject matter of dispute is a parcel of land comprising 3 acres and 65 decimals in plots Nos. 44 and 45 of Khata No. 139. The erstwhile landlord of the Touzi in question made a gift of/8/- Annas share in the suit property to one Baikunth Singh father of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 by a registered deed dated 21-5-1925. Initially a dispute cropped up between the parties as to whether the lands involved in the suit were Bakasht lands of the ex-landlords or raiyati lands of the defendants-respondents. Without giving any detail with regard to the genesis and the culmination of that title suit, it will be sufficient to narrate only the relevant points. 3. The respondent No. 6 with others instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 126/20 of 1947/51 in the court of the Munsif, Patna. The suit was for a declaration that the lands in question were his raiyati lands and not Bakasht lands of the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No. 6 who were predecessors-in-interest of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 who in their turn were original landlords. 4. The claim was founded on the ground that they had been continuing in possession of the lands qua raiyats and that the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 the successors-in-interest of the ex-landlords had no manner of right, title or interest over the lands in question as being their Bakasht land. 5. The aforesaid suit, namely, Title Suit No. 126/29 of 1947/51 was valued at Rs. 1,800/-. The valuation was never challenged nor could it be so challenged because the suit had been instituted in the court of the permanent Munsif who had jurisdiction to entertain the suit up to the valuation of Rs. 4,000/-. 5. The aforesaid suit, namely, Title Suit No. 126/29 of 1947/51 was valued at Rs. 1,800/-. The valuation was never challenged nor could it be so challenged because the suit had been instituted in the court of the permanent Munsif who had jurisdiction to entertain the suit up to the valuation of Rs. 4,000/-. Subsequently, however, the suit was transferred to the file of an Additional Munsif who had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain a suit only up to the sum of Rupees 1,000/-. Be that as it may, the suit was decreed with a finding by the trial court that the plaintiffs of that suit, namely, the respondents here had established their right, title and interest as raiyats of the lands in question having remained for long in possession on payment of rent to the ex-landlords. The present respondents Nos. 1 to 5 went up in appeal before the first appellate court who upheld all the findings of the trial court. The appellants in this case thereafter preferred an appeal (Second Appeal) in this Court, and the judgment and decree passed by the two courts below were affirmed in Second Appeal No. 609 of 1952 which was disposed of on the 25th of April, 1957. These are admitted facts. 6. Thereafter the respondents filed an application before the revenue authorities for mutation of their names in the landlords (State of Bihar) Sirishta. Ultimately, the prayer of the respondents was allowed and after protracted litigation right up to the Board of Revenue, the decision was confirmed. 7. Subsequent thereto the present suit was filed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 praying merely for declaration that the order of the Revenue authorities mutating the names of the present appellants, was without jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the suit as being barred by the principle of res judicata. The lower appellate court taking a queer view of the matter, has remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of taking into evidence the question with regard to adverse possession entitling the plaintiffs of the present. suit, namely, respondents Nos. 1 to 5 by virtue of their acquisition of right, title and interest by prescription and adverse possession. This has led to this Miscellaneous Appeal. 8. Mr. suit, namely, respondents Nos. 1 to 5 by virtue of their acquisition of right, title and interest by prescription and adverse possession. This has led to this Miscellaneous Appeal. 8. Mr. Thakur Prasad learned counsel for the appellants urged that the case was clearly barred by the principles of res judicata and the question with regard to acquisition of title by adverse possession by respondents Nos. 1 to 5 was wholly alien to the scope and the subject matter of the suit. Mr. Bindeshwari Prasad, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5, however, contested this contention and tried to persuade us to hold that the suit cannot be held to be barred by the principles of res judicata. 9. Before we refer to the case-law on the subject, it is worthwhile to take notice of certain facts contended at the Bar. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for the appellants, urged that since the matter with regard to possession and title (raiyati interest of the appellants) having been confirmed in the earlier suit culminating in the decision by this Court in a Second Appeal, the question could not be gone into since the judgment of this Court was delivered in the year 1957 and the present suit was instituted in the year 1965. There could thus be no question of acquisition of title by prescription. Learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 5, however, urged that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional Munsif in Title Suit No. 126/29 of 1947/51 was absolutely without jurisdiction and a nullity as that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of the value of Rs. 1000.00 (sic) (1800?). As we have already mentioned earlier, the plaint was presented in a court of competent jurisdiction, since the permanent Munsif had jurisdiction to try suits up to the value of Rupees 4,000.00 which was much above the value of the suit, namely, Rs. 1,800/-. He, therefore, contended that as a necessary corollary the judgment and decree, passed by the first appellate court as well as by this Court in a Second Appeal, ought to be treated as nullity. Thus, it was contended, there could be no question of res judicata. The argument has been noticed merely to be rejected. The point is covered squarely both by the decision of the Supreme Court as well as Bench decisions of this Court. Thus, it was contended, there could be no question of res judicata. The argument has been noticed merely to be rejected. The point is covered squarely both by the decision of the Supreme Court as well as Bench decisions of this Court. Without multiplying the number suffice it to say that the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh V/s. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) has held that the principle that underlies S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation is not to be treated as what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to the jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The same principle has been adopted in S.21 of the Civil P.C. with reference to the objections relating to territorial jurisdiction. The policy underlying S.21 and S.99 of the Code and S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature had been to treat objections to the jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The prejudice on the merits contemplated by S.11 must be directly attributable to overvaluation or undervaluation. An error in a finding of fact reached on a consideration of the evidence cannot be said to have been caused by overvaluation or undervaluation. Mere errors in the conclusion on the points for determination cannot, therefore, be held to be prejudice within the meaning of that section. The jurisdiction that is conferred on the appellate courts under Sec.11 is an equitable one, to be exercised when there has been erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by a subordinate court as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation and a consequential failure of justice. In that case a suit was valued at Rs. 2950/-. The defendants did not object to the jurisdiction as in the present case. In that case a suit was valued at Rs. 2950/-. The defendants did not object to the jurisdiction as in the present case. On losing the suit after an elaborate trial, the plaintiff appealed to the District Court which he was bound to do on his valuation. Even that decision went against the plaintiff on merits. He then appealed to the High Court and the stamp reporter valued the plaint at Rs. 9980/-. He paid the additional fee and raised contention that on the revised valuation, the appeal lay to the High Court and that the decree passed by the District Court was a nullity, as the Court had no jurisdiction. On these facts it was held by the Supreme Court that it would be an unfortunate state of the law, it the plaintiff who initiated proceedings in a Court of his own choice could subsequently turn round and question its jurisdiction on the ground of an error in valuation which was his own. In principle we do not find any distinction between the case of a plaintiff who has put his own valuation and the case of a defendant who has raised no objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and invited a decision on merits. It is pertinent to note here that having lost in the trial court in earlier suit, respondents Nos. 1 to 5 filed an appeal in the first appellate court putting the same valuation and never raised any objection with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court. The same act was repeated again in this Court where having faced with an adverse decree they came up in Second Appeal. Having lost in all these proceedings it is now not permissible for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 to argue that the judgment and decree duly passed by the courts below in the earlier title suit, were a nullity and should be treated as non est in law for the purpose of invoking the principle of res judicata. 10. Having lost in all these proceedings it is now not permissible for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 to argue that the judgment and decree duly passed by the courts below in the earlier title suit, were a nullity and should be treated as non est in law for the purpose of invoking the principle of res judicata. 10. A more direct case is to be found in a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rajaram Sah V/s. Narad Thakur ( AIR 1960 Pat 136 ) wherein Ramaswami, C.J. speaking for the Bench, held that S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act and S.21 of the Code are exceptions to the fundamental rule of law that a judgment of Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that want of jurisdiction, cannot be waived. The principle which both the sections embody is that in cases falling under them the defects are not fundamental in character and are no more than a mere irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction and, therefore, where no objection to the valuation or jurisdiction was taken by a party to the suit in the manner and to the extent mentioned in S.11 of the said Act, it cannot be allowed to be raised in the appellate court. There is no distinction in principle in a case where on the valuation stated in the plaint, the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and a case in which after determination of the valuation by the appellate court the suit by reason of the increase in the valuation becomes incompetent for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It was further held that the objection about want of jurisdiction cannot, having regard to the provisions of Sec.21 of the Code and S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act, be allowed also in an execution proceeding and other collateral proceedings or a separate suit. This completely answers the submissions of Mr. Bindeshwari Prasad Sinha, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5. 11. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 5, then contended that at the time when the previous suit was instituted the value of the land was Rs. 1,800.00 only whereas the valuation given in the present plaint is Rs. 6,000/-. Therefore, it cannot be said that the previous court was a court of competent jurisdiction to try the present suit. 1 to 5, then contended that at the time when the previous suit was instituted the value of the land was Rs. 1,800.00 only whereas the valuation given in the present plaint is Rs. 6,000/-. Therefore, it cannot be said that the previous court was a court of competent jurisdiction to try the present suit. This argument is also one of desperation, for it is completely covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jeevantha V/s. Hanumantha ( AIR 1954 SC 9 ) wherein their Lordships have held that in order to determine whether a Court which decided the former suit had jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit regard must be had to the jurisdiction of the Court at the date of the former suit and not to its jurisdiction at the date of the subsequent suit. If at that time such a Court would have been competent to try the subsequent suit, had it been then brought, the decision of such Court would operate as res judicata although subsequently by a rise in the value of the property that Court had ceased to be a proper Court, so far as regards its pecuniary jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit relating to that very property. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents then tried to persuade us to hold that in any event if the possession of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 became adverse even during the pendency of the previous suit then that order is germane to the issue in this suit. We are afraid this argument is without any substance. As already stated above, the judgment in Second Appeal of this Court was delivered in 1957 up to which date it was held that the present appellant was in continuing possession entitling him to be declared to the status of a Raiyat. The instant suit has been instituted in 1965. The question of adverse possession, therefore, does not arise at all. 13. Apart from all these the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 which came into force with effect from 25th Sept., 1950 lays down in S.6 that any Bakasht or Zirat land or Gairmazrua land in direct cultivating possession of the landlord shall be deemed to be statutorily settled by the State in favour of such an ex-landlord on determination of a fair rent. In the year 1947 the previous suit was instituted and it was found that the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 were not in Khas cultivating possession of the land, but on the contrary the positive finding was that the appellants were in Khas cultivating possession of the lands in question. In this view of the matter the question with regard to the Bakasht nature of the land in Khas cultivating possession of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 or for that matter any acquisition of right, title or interest by adverse possession after 1950 does not arise. If it were a case between the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 and the State, the matter may have been different but that is not the case here. In this view of the matter also respondents Nos. 1 to 5 cannot be entitled, in any manner, to acquisition of any right, title or interest in the property in question. 14. We thus find that there is no apparently any justification for the appellate court remanding the case to the trial court for going into any evidence to be adduced by the parties with regard to acquisition of right, title or interest of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 by prescription and/or adverse possession. 15. For the reasons stated above this appeal is accordingly, allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are hereby set aside. In the circumstances of the ease, however we shall make no order as to costs.