JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Sawaimadhopur, Camp Gangapur City, dated 27th August, 1981, whereby he set aside the order passed by the learned Additional Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Karauli, dated 20th May, 1980. 2. Brief facts leading to this revision arc that non-petitioner Hari Charan lodged a report at police station, Karauli, on 20th August, 1978, with the allegations that Bishan Singh Gujar and Ramdayal Rana had pledged certain gold and silver ornaments on different dates and took loan of Rs 15,460/- against the pledge of such ornaments. These persons at the time of pledging the articles had stated that the ornaments were of pure gold and silver. It was also mentioned in the report that at the time of pawning the ornaments, the petitioner Sonpal and Ram Bilas goldsmiths had also accompanied them and they gave a guarantee that the ornaments were of pure gold and silver. It was further mentioned that when the complainant further pledged these ornaments then he came to know that the same were not genuire, and the amount of Rs 15,460/- has been taken by Bishan Singh, Sonpal, Ram Dayal and Ram Bilas by practising a fraud. It was further mentioned that in the same manner these persons had pledged ornaments with Chothi Lal s/o Mool Chand Mahajan and obtained thousands of rupees. On the basis of the above report the police registered a case under Section 420 IPC and filed a charge-sheet against Shri Bishan Singh, the present petitioner Sonpal, Ram Dayal and one Moil Lal. The learned Additional judicial Magistrate by his order dated 20th May. 1980, discharged Moti Lal and Sonpal and framed charges against Bishan Singh and Ram Dayal only under Section 420 IPC. Aggriewed against the order discharge against Sonpal the complainant Hari Charan filed a revision before the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated 27th August, 1981, held that the order discharging Sonpal was improper and there was sufficient material on record to proceed against accused Sonpal and as such set aside the order of the learned Magistrate so far as discharging the petitioner Sonpal was concerned and remanded the case with a direction to take further proceedings in accordance with law. In these circumstances Sonpal aggrieved against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, has filed present petition. 3. It was contended by Mr. Tibrewal, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the learned Magistrate had taken into consideration the record of the case and the statements recorded by the police during investigation and had given cogent reasons for discharging the petitioner Sonpal. It is contended that the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the propriety of the merits of the order passed by the learned Magistrate when it did not suffer from any error of law or when it did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. It is contended that the Magistrate has already framed charge against the main accused and there was no evidence on record to directly connect the petitioner Sonpal in the offence. It was also argued that the case was instituted on police report and the order of discharge was not challenged by the State and Shri Hari Charan as a complainant had no right to challenge such order except where there was exceptional circumstances which occasion failure of justice. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Gupta, appearing for the complainant supported the judgment of the learned Session Judge. It was contended by the learned counsel that the learned Magistrate was not justified at this stage to appreciate the evidence in detail and it was his duty to merely see whether there was any evidence on record or not which could have connected the petitioner in the crime. It was further submitted that under Section 239 Cr. P. C. an accused could have been discharged only when there was no ground at all for framing any charge against such person. It was further submitted that in the F.I.R. a clear case was made out against the petitioner and apart from the evidence of the complainant himself there was also evidence of Chothu and Jugal Kishore to connect the petitioner directly in the crime. 5. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. 6. I would first deal with the scope of a revision filed by a complainant an order of discharge in a case instituted on police report. In 1978 Cr. 5. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. 6. I would first deal with the scope of a revision filed by a complainant an order of discharge in a case instituted on police report. In 1978 Cr. L. J. 1569, a Division Bench of the Sikkim High Court after taking into consideration various decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court it was held that on the basis of Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar: AIR 1966 SC 911 , it is usually urged that the Supreme Court had put a blanket embargo on the right of a private complainant to move any revision. But one bears in mind as one should in an earlier as well as letter decision of Supreme Court, spreading over a period of about 25 years, it would be clear that no such all embracing embargo was over intended to be laid down in Thakur Ram's case (supra) The right of a private party to move in criminal revision has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Bishu Naghoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 714 and Dhirandra Nath Mitra and another v. Makanda Lal Sen, AIR 1955 SC 584 . The principle laid down in these cases appears to be that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by a private complainant but it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The question as to what should constitute such exceptional cases, the Supreme Court has observed in K. Chinnaswanmy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , as under: "It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defact in the procedure or there is a manifest arror on a point of law and consequantly there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-Section (4) of S 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision These cases may be: were the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439(4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles." Thus, I am also of the view that it cannot be said that the Supreme Court in Thakur Ram's case (supra) has put a complete embargo on the right of a priva e party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction in a case instituted on police report. However, in order to call for an interference it must fall in the category of exceptional cases as pointed but by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswami's case (supra) In the Para quoted above from Chinnaswami's case (supra) an example can be seen of the category of such cases. Thus, keeping in view the above principles it has to be determined whether this case falls into the category of such exceptional cases in which a criminal court could have exercised its revisional jurisdiction on a revision filed by a private complainant in a case instituted on a police report. 7. Section 239 Cr P.C. lays down where an accused can be discharged. According to this provision if, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. Thus, under the above provision it is only where the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless then he can discharge the accused by recording his reasons. At this stage it is not proper for the Magistrate to go into the niceties and details of the merits of the case or to balance the weight of evidence or to discuss the evidence so as to see that any case would be finally proved against the accused or not. In the present case the learned Magistrate while discharging the accused has not held that he considered the charge against the accused Sonpal to be groundless. On the contrary he discussed certain inconsistencies in the statement of the complainant given under section 161 Cr.P.C. and also considered the circumstance that the document of pawn did not contain the signature of the petitioner Sonpal and also considered the circumstance the Rameshwar and Bharosi had not stated that the petitioner Sonpal had accompanied Bishan Singh at the time of pledging the ornament. This circumstance at this stage could not have been taken into consideration as the same could be explained at the stage of trial. This circumstance at this stage could not have been taken into consideration as the same could be explained at the stage of trial. After discussing the above circumstance, the learned Magistrate himself arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner Sonpal could not be found guilty of any fraud or dishonesty. But as already observed by me above, he did not record the finding that the charge against Sonpal was totally groundless. Thus, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the learned Magistrate in discharging the accused Sonpal committed a manifest error of law in not applying the well settled principles of considering the case at the stage of framing the charge. That apart, the learned Magistrate has omitted to take into consideration the entire evidence recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and which was material in the case. According to the prosecution case the complainant was deprived of a huge amount of Rs. 15,460/- by pledging false and spurious ornaments in which the petitioner Sonpal was also a party. Thus, not framing a charge against a person and discharging him when there was prima facie evidence against him in a case like the present one, it would certainly amount to miscarriage of justice. The learned Sessions Judge, in these circumstances, was quite justified in the exercise of his powers of revision to set aside such order of discharge. It was observed in Chinnaswamy's case (supra) that a case of misapprehension of law stood on a stronger footing than the case of misapprehension of evidence and in such circumstances a court of revision has the power to interfere with an order of discharge on a misapprehension of law. 8. In the result I find no force in this revision and the same is accordingly dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******