JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, J. 1. Death of young persons is always painful. This is more so when they are snatched away by the cruel hands in an accident. The tragedy for the family knows no bounds if the deceased be the sole bread-earner. That was the case with Dinendra Sinha (42) and Sisir Medhi (30). What has added poignance, almost insult to the injury, is the attitude adopted by New India Assurance Company who did not think it fit to pay a paltry sum of Rs. 8,000/- awarded against it as compensation for the death of the two souls and even suppressed the policy. Such actions do belie the high hopes which nationalisation had raised in the minds of all concerned. May we remind ourselves at this stage itself about what was stated in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur Vs. Narain Shanker and Others, , that it would be more humane and just if instead of indulging in wasteful litigation such a Company hastens compassionately to settle the claims so that goodwill and public credibility could be improved. 2. We have begun this judgment with this prefatory note as we have felt disturbed at the attitude adopted by the insurers, more particularly the New India Assurance Company--hereinafter called "New India" with whom the car bearing registration No. ASZ 6242 was insured. What had led to the filing of claim petitions, five in number, was an accident on 13.7.72 when there was a head-on-collision between the aforesaid car and a truck (ASZ 7796) which was insured with the Hindustan General Insurance Society, whose assets and liabilities devolved on National Insurance Company Limited. It may be stated that the Company which had insured the car formerly known as "New Premier Insurance Company". The accident saw three deaths and injuries to two others who are Lutfur Rehman and Benoy Krishan Ghose. 3. The death of Dinendra Sinha led his wife Jamuna Sinha and mother Bishnupriya Sinha to file claim petitions each praying for compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-. In so far as Sisir is concerned, his father, mother, two sisters and two brothers approached the Court claiming a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-. These three cases, namely M.A.C. Case Nos. 3. The death of Dinendra Sinha led his wife Jamuna Sinha and mother Bishnupriya Sinha to file claim petitions each praying for compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-. In so far as Sisir is concerned, his father, mother, two sisters and two brothers approached the Court claiming a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-. These three cases, namely M.A.C. Case Nos. 23 and 24 of 1973 and 46 of 1973 giving rise to M.A.(F) 58/75, 59/75 and 1/76, were tried together and by a common judgment the learned Presiding Officer, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shillong awarded compensation as follows: Case No. Total award Owner of the car Insurer of the car (New India) Owner of the truck Insurer of the truck (National Insurance) M.A.(F) 58/75 Rs. 80,000/- 37,000/- 3,000/- 31,500/- 8,500/- M.A.(F) 59/75 Rs. 5,000/- 1,000/- 1,000/- 1,500/- 1,500/- M.A.(F) 1/76 Rs. 18,000/- (sic) 4,000/- 4,000/- 12,000/- 10,000/- The two other cases, namely, M.A.C. 58 and 59/73 relating to the two injured were also tried jointly and the learned Presiding Officer awarded a sum of Rs. 55,000/- to Lutfur Rehman and it was ordered that the entire amount shall be paid by the Hindustan General Insurance Company within three months failing which interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum shall be payable. The award in favour of Benoy Krishan Ghose is for Rs. 45,000/- on the above terms. 4. Feeling aggrieved at the award, the claimants have preferred M.A. (F) 58 and 59 of 1975 and 1 of 1976. In the two other cases, appeals are by National Insurance Company as successor to the Hindustan General Insurance Company. As common questions were involved, all these appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. M.A. (F) 58 and 59/75 5. In these appeals, cross-objections were also filed on behalf of New India Assurance Company on 4.5.76 in which a point was taken that this Company was not liable at all inasmuch as the two deceased were gratuitous passengers. Relying on this stand taken by the company, Mr. P. Choudhury appearing on its behalf urged that these appeals may not be heard by us at this stage in view of reference of the question to a larger Bench of 5 (five) Judges as to whether the insurance company is liable in case of death or injury to a gratuitous passenger. P. Choudhury appearing on its behalf urged that these appeals may not be heard by us at this stage in view of reference of the question to a larger Bench of 5 (five) Judges as to whether the insurance company is liable in case of death or injury to a gratuitous passenger. That order has been passed in M.A. (F) 63 and 69 of 1979 on 22.4.81. We, however, did not feel inclined to accept this submission for the following reasons: (i) The plea that the aforesaid persons were gratuitous passengers had been taken for the first time in the cross-objection. At the stage of contesting the claim petition in the trial Court, all that New India had said in paragraph 6 of its written statement was that "the liability of this opposite party, if any is limited to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act applicable to a passenger in a motor car". Before this it was stated that it would file additional written statement if it was found that any condition of the permit issued for the vehicle was violated. It is because of this that no issue was framed whether the deceased were gratuitous passengers. In the entire evidence led by the claimants (and there was none on behalf of the opposite parties) nothing was brought out on this aspect. Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing for the Appellants, therefore rightly contended that New India may not be allowed to take up a new stand at this stage. (ii) The cross-objection is itself barred by limitation, even if it be conceded that cross-objections do lie in such a matter which itself is a debatable proposition. While allowing New India to appear as a Respondent by an order passed on 3.2.77 and to file its cross-objection, the question of limitation was left open. The objection in this regard has been taken by Mr. Bhattacharjee by drawing our attention to the fact that when notice in the name of New Premier Insurance Company was sought to be served on New India, the same was not accepted by stating that New Premier Insurance Company had been wound up. This was on 6.3.76. By referring to the provisions of the General Insurance Business Nationalisation Act, 1972, more particularly Section 6(3), it is contended by Mr. This was on 6.3.76. By referring to the provisions of the General Insurance Business Nationalisation Act, 1972, more particularly Section 6(3), it is contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee that notice on New India must be deemed to have been served on 6.3.76 and as such, their cross-objection filed on 4.5.76 was barred by limitation. We are inclined to accept this submission inasmuch as it is an admitted position that the assets and liabilities of New Premier Insurance Company has vested in New India and Section 6(3) of the aforesaid Act has provided that if any suit, appeal or other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any business of the undertaking is pending, the suit, appeal or proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the New India Assurance Company in which the undertaking has vested. One could therefore legitimately argue that for enforcing a right accrued against New Premier notice in its name had to be served on New India who is answerable for the former's liability. Refusal of notice because of wrong name is an act for which hardly any credit can be given to New India when it had been clothed with all the assets and liabilities of New Premier. A nationalised entity cannot be allowed to play hide and seek when dealing with the legitimate claims of a citizen. (iii) The ratio of Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and Others Vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. and Another, , has no application to the facts of the case. Reference of the aforesaid question to a larger Bench is because of this decision which has held that Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 has not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. It was, however, observed in paragraph 21 that an insurer can always take policies covering risks which are not covered by the requirement of Section 95. In Pushpabai itself the insurer had insured the risk to the passengers though there was limit to the liability which was to the extent of Rs. 15,000/-. It is because of this that the Supreme Court on the construction of the insurance policy had accepted the plea of the insurance company that it had insured the owner only to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- regarding the injury to the passengers. 15,000/-. It is because of this that the Supreme Court on the construction of the insurance policy had accepted the plea of the insurance company that it had insured the owner only to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- regarding the injury to the passengers. As such, it cannot be said that Pushpabai has held that no compensation can be awarded against an insurance company for death or injury to gratuitous passengers. It all depends on the particular contract. It is because of this that when New India raised the question of its "no-liability" on the ground that the victims were gratuitous passengers, this Court desired to have a look at the policy. Despite many adjournments being granted for this purpose, the New India only produced a proforma of insurance policy vide its affidavit filed on 14.3.78. It has been averred in this affidavit that the copy of the policy could not be obtained at the Mysore Office and so the proforma policy was filed. It would be useful to point out that the case had to be adjourned in the trial Court on a number of occasions to enable the insurance company to bring on record the policy. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee the New India is purposely suppressing the policy as it would have shown that it is comprehensive in nature and is not confined to death or injury to third party. To substantiate this plea, the Appellants filed an additional affidavit-in-opposition on 25.5.81 stating that New India had even paid a sum of Rs. 16,000/- to the owner of the car for damage to the vehicle and injury to the driver. The number of cheque was also given. It was stated in this affidavit that the policy which was comprehensive had been handed over to the company at the time of settlement of the claim. No counter to this affidavit was filed. Mr. Choudhury, however, contended that the relevant statement in this affidavit being true to the information derived from the owner of the vehicle, he must have come forward to have his say in the matter, which was, however, not done. No counter to this affidavit was filed. Mr. Choudhury, however, contended that the relevant statement in this affidavit being true to the information derived from the owner of the vehicle, he must have come forward to have his say in the matter, which was, however, not done. We are not impressed by this argument and we are of the clear view on the materials placed before us that the policy or its true copy or even the particulars which an insurance company is required to keep with it by virtue of Rule 11 of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Rules, 1946 have been with held from the Court. As the plea that New India is not liable at all in view of its contract with the owner, it was undoubtedly the burden of the insurer to bring the policy on record. See National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Narendra Kumar and Others, . (iv) Finally we would like to mention about a letter written by New India to the Learned Counsel for the Appellants, the same being letter No. GAU/MCL/110/Legal/8799 dated 26.12.75 by which it had wanted the counsel to inform it "per return the date of application for calculation of interest". The company also desired to know "in whose favour the drafts are to be purchased". This would clearly show that New India had accepted its liability, but for reasons not known it took to its head even to contest for a paltry sum of Rs. 8,000/- for which apportionment we find no basis as would be made clear later on. 6. Having rejected the contents to wait any further to dispose of these old cases, which have already caused incalculable sufferings to the survivors, let the merits of the appeals be examined. The submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee is that the learned Tribunal ought to have awarded more for the mother of the deceased. Reference to the award shows that the income of the deceased was accepted at Rs. 500/- per month. Of this, the learned Tribunal rightly felt that the deceased must have been spending at least Rs. 100/- per month on his own upkeep, leaving Rs. 400/- for their aged parents and his wife. Of this sum the Tribunal has allowed a sum of Rs. 300/- for the wife and Rs. 100/- for the parents. 500/- per month. Of this, the learned Tribunal rightly felt that the deceased must have been spending at least Rs. 100/- per month on his own upkeep, leaving Rs. 400/- for their aged parents and his wife. Of this sum the Tribunal has allowed a sum of Rs. 300/- for the wife and Rs. 100/- for the parents. As mother alone came forward, her dependency was calculated at a sum of Rs. 50/-. It is contended by Mr. Bhattacharjee that the calculation in favour of mother must have been atleast at the rate of Rs. 100/-. We cannot, however, agree to this, as out of Rs. 500/- per month, not more than Rs. 400/- could have been reasonably allowed for the dependants. If we were to allow more for the mother we would have to cut the slice of the widow which we do not propose to do. It is nextly urged that the probable age of the mother fixed at 70 years has proved to be not correct as the mother is still alive. But then no mathematical calculation with certainty is possible and if 8 years expectation was arrived at by giving the allowance that the mother would live up to the age of 70 years, no fault with the same can be found. As such we do not find any ground to enhance the compensation in these two cases. 7. So far as the widow is concerned, as already indicated, we do not propose to reduce her slice of dependency which was put at Rs. 300/- per month. But then it was not a case where the annual dependency should have been augmented by a multiplier of 23, as was done. As would be stated later, the maximum multiplier under normal circumstances has been accepted as 16, though in some cases multiplier of 20 has also been used. It has been noted by us that in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. Vs. Northern India Transport Insurance Co., , the Supreme Court being seized with the case of death of persons who are aged 42 to 43 years, as was the deceased in the present case, had accepted multiplier of IS. If we apply the same in the present case, the total would come to Rs. 54,000/-. As ultimately the learned Tribunal awarded Rs. If we apply the same in the present case, the total would come to Rs. 54,000/-. As ultimately the learned Tribunal awarded Rs. 60,000/- on this count to the widow, we do not propose to reduce the quantum, as an appellate Court should not interfere in these matters unless the amount awarded is too high or too low. But then we have to say a few words on the award of Rs. 20,000/- on account of loss of consortium. Whether compensation on this account can at all be given is a matter of doubt. This point has been examined by this Court in State of Assam and Others Vs. Nalini Kanta Doloi, and as stated in paragraphs 15 and 16 of that judgment, award on this head was not made in any of the decisions of the Supreme Court noted in paragraph 15. Still, keeping in view the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Mrs. Hira Devi Vs. Smt. Bhaba Kanti Das and Others etc. etc., , the most that could have been awarded for loss of companionship is Rs, 10,000/-. Even so, we cannot reduce this compensation, as the cross-objection has been held as barred by limitation. 8. Mr. Choudhury would plead for reduction of the amount awarded which is Rs. 80,000/- for the wife and Rs. 5,000/- for the mother by relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mrs. Hira Devi Vs. Smt. Bhaba Kanti Das and Others etc. etc., , wherein a deduction of 20 per cent for uncertainty of life and of 10 per cent for lump sum nature of the award was ordered. We have not felt inclined to concede to this prayer at the instance of New India having noted that the case is of 1972 and the value of money is almost half by now than it was about a decade earlier. Reference in this connection may be made to Lim Poh v. Camden Health Authority 1979 A.C.J. 362 (C.A., England). This is besides the belated filing of cross-objection. 9. We have now to address ourselves on the question of apportionment of the aforesaid sums in between the two owners amount as aforesaid by referring to the provisions in Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is applicable only to a goods vehicle and to a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward. 9. We have now to address ourselves on the question of apportionment of the aforesaid sums in between the two owners amount as aforesaid by referring to the provisions in Section 95(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is applicable only to a goods vehicle and to a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward. No doubt, that section would come into operation so far as the truck is concerned but there is nothing to show its applicability as to the car in question as there is no material to hold that it was a taxi. Even if this provision was to apply, the liability of the insurance company could not have been at all limited the way it has been done. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Motor Owner's Insurance Company v. J.K. Modi 1981 A.C.J. 509 (S.C.), has added another leaf to this branch of law. 10. As, however, the responsibility for the accident has been placed equally with both the car and truck drivers, we would apportion the awarded amount equally between the two insurance companies. The result is that out of Rs. 80,000/- awarded to the widow, Rs. 40,000/- would paid by New India and Rs. 40,000/- by the National Insurance Company. So far as the sum of Rs. 5,000/- awarded to the mother is concerned, this would also be borne equally by the two insurance companies. M.A. (F) 1 of 1976 11. In this case, we are concerned with the death of a young man aged about 30 years who was of sound health at the relevant time. He left behind him his parents, two sisters and two brothers. The Tribunal on evidence accepted the monthly income at Rs. 1,000/- as the deceased was in contract business and was even an income tax payee and was maintaining a car also. Thereafter, it stated that the deceased must have been spending about Rs. 600/- on his dependants. Mr. Bhattacharjee has no grievance so far. But then the deduction of a further sum of Rs. 300/- on the ground that the deceased must have been spending that amount for himself is rightly criticised. Having already deducted a sum of Rs. 400/- on that count, a further deduction of Rs. 300/- was really uncalled for. We would, therefore, place the monthly dependency at Rs. 600/-. The annual dependency, therefore, comes to Rs. 7,200/-. 300/- on the ground that the deceased must have been spending that amount for himself is rightly criticised. Having already deducted a sum of Rs. 400/- on that count, a further deduction of Rs. 300/- was really uncalled for. We would, therefore, place the monthly dependency at Rs. 600/-. The annual dependency, therefore, comes to Rs. 7,200/-. It has now to be seen what multiplier would be proper in such a case. The question of appropriate multiplier is not Tree from difficulty and it is because of this that a Full Bench of five learned Judges had gone into this question in Lachhman Singh and Others Vs. Gurmit Kaur and Others, . The unanimous Court speaking through Harbans Lal, J. after a thorough probe of this matter by referring to Indian and English decisions stated that whereas the Courts in England have so far gone to the extent of multiplying the basic figure of annual dependency by 16 years' purchase, the Supreme Court approved in one case 20 times as the suitable multiplier. The case where multiplier of 20 was accepted by the Supreme Court is that of M.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Sudhakar, 1977 ACJ 290 (SC) . There the Court was seized with the question of just compensation for the death of the wife of the claimant who was aged about 23 years. We have also noted that in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Subhagwanti and Others, , the apex Court applied the multiplier of 15 having to deal with the death of a person aged about 30 years. In this connection, we have also come across a recent decision in Asha Rani and Others Vs. Union of India, , wherein it has been held that the age of the deceased is not a conclusive factor in this regard and multiplier of 16 should normally be applied. As we have accepted multiplier of 15 in the case of Dinendra Sinha who was aged about 42 years at the time of death, we would think that it would be reasonable to apply the multiplier of 20 in the present case. If it is so done, the total amount payable to the claimants would come to Rs. 1,44,000/-, which we round up to Rs. 1,40,000/-. As the Tribunal has apportioned the blame equally between the two vehicles, the liability of the two has also to be fixed equally. If it is so done, the total amount payable to the claimants would come to Rs. 1,44,000/-, which we round up to Rs. 1,40,000/-. As the Tribunal has apportioned the blame equally between the two vehicles, the liability of the two has also to be fixed equally. In so doing, we order that out of Rs. 1,40,000/- a sum of Rs. 70,000/- shall he paid by the insurer of the car, namely, New India and Rs. 50,000/- by the insurer of the truck as that is the limit for one accident in case of a goods vehicle. The remaining amount of Rs. 20,000/- shall be paid by the owner of the truck. It may be stated that the limit of liability mentioned in Section 95(2) does not apply in the case of the car in question which was a private vehicle as appears from the evidence of the claimants. M.A. (F) 42 and 43 of 1978 12. These are cases of two injured. The award in M.A. (F) 42 of 1978 is of Rs. 45,000/- and in the other case of Rs. 55,000/-. As the cause of accident by the learned Member of the Tribunal who decided these two cases was held to be the rash and negligent driving of the truck alone (which finding has not been assailed before us), both the sums were ordered to be payable by the Hindustan General Insurance Company which has since merged with the National Insurance Company. 13. Mr. Sen appearing for the insurance company has urged that in arriving at the aforesaid figure as compensation for the injury sustained by the two claimants, learned Tribunal has not given any basis at all. According to him, the awards are not just and the same merit interference at the hand of this Court. 14. Before proceeding to examine the question of quantum at the behest of the insurance company, it may be pointed out that the Learned Counsel was heard on this matter keeping in view the provisions of Section 110-C(2A) of the Motor Vehicles Act inasmuch as the owner of the truck had not contested the claim. To determine the reasonable compensation in these two cases, we have to note the injuries sustained by them. The claimant in M.A. (F) 42 of 1978 is a practising lawyer of Goal-para bar. He had suffered fracture of his right femur. To determine the reasonable compensation in these two cases, we have to note the injuries sustained by them. The claimant in M.A. (F) 42 of 1978 is a practising lawyer of Goal-para bar. He had suffered fracture of his right femur. He was hospitalised till 1.12.72, the occurrence having taken place on 13.7.72. According to Mr. Ghose the claimant, he cannot walk properly even now or drive his scooter on account of disablement. According to Dr. Patil who was examined as C.W. 4 in the other case, Mr. Ghose had suffered from partial disablement. The claimant prayed for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as general damages, Rs. 6,868/- as special damages and a sum of about Rs. 1,25,000/- as consequential damages. The question of awarding anything as "consequential damages" does not arise as there is nothing to show if the expectation of life of Mr. Ghose has been reduced because of the injury caused in the accident or if he is really required to keep any attendant for himself these being the two main heads for claiming consequential damages. As to the special damage, the claimant could bring on record the payment made in the hospital amounting to a sum of Rs. 1,845/-; and under the law he is entitled to the sum. As for spending on food etc. at Shillong there is no clinching evidence and this in any case is not reimbursable. 15. Question is as to how much compensation can reasonable be awarded under the head of general damages. As is known, general damages are those which are assumed to exist in such cases and include pain and suffering undergone by the injured. We do not propose to burden this judgment with the case law on the subject as a Division Bench of this Court in The State of Assam Vs. Urmila Datta and Others , had occasion to deal with a case where the injured had suffered permanent disability and had to walk even limpingly after the accident. The limping aspect would be relevant for us when we shall come to the next case, which is of Lutfur Rehman. The Division Bench awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as general damages. It further ordered payment of Rs. 10,000/- for disfiguration and deformity. 16. Reference may be made to some of the later decisions as well on this point. In State of Mysore and Another Vs. The Division Bench awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as general damages. It further ordered payment of Rs. 10,000/- for disfiguration and deformity. 16. Reference may be made to some of the later decisions as well on this point. In State of Mysore and Another Vs. Fatima Manvail Fernandis and Others, , an award of Rs. 28,000/- for injury to a girl student aged about 6 years whose right leg below the knee-cap had to be amputated was up held. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. P. Sridhar Rao, , was a case of fracture of left femur of a typist aged about 31 years who had to walk with a limp after the accident. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 13,200/- which was upheld by the Court. Lastly, in Ayub Yusuf Bhai Kbarawala and Another Vs. Prabhudas Hiralal Prajapati and Others, , a sum of Rs. 15,000/- on account of pain, shock and suffering was regarded as reasonable by the Court. (See para 17). It may be stated that that was a case where the leg of the injured was shortened by about 2 inches after the accident, as in the case of Lutfur Rehman. Though in that case, the High Court had ultimately enhanced the award to Rs. 43,000/- that was also to take care of loss of earning which is absent in any of the two cases at hand. 17. Keeping in view the above decisions, we would think that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as general damages on account of sufferings undergone by Mr. Ghose would be a just compensation. More than this, he is not entitled as it was found by the learned Tribunal that Mr. Ghose continued to be a competent voice, was found strong and he had shown no signs of fatigue. Thus, the total compensation payable to Mr. Ghose comes to Rs. 11,845/- the whole of which would be paid by the insurer namely, National Insurance Company. 18. Coming to the case of Lutfur Rehman, he had suffered three injuries: (i) fracture of the neck of left humerus. (ii) commuted fracture of shaft of the left femur; and (iii) fracture of the left little finger. Ghose comes to Rs. 11,845/- the whole of which would be paid by the insurer namely, National Insurance Company. 18. Coming to the case of Lutfur Rehman, he had suffered three injuries: (i) fracture of the neck of left humerus. (ii) commuted fracture of shaft of the left femur; and (iii) fracture of the left little finger. The fracture of the femur had left Rehman who was at the relevant time the Vice Principal of Goalpara College with shortening of his leg by about 2 inches, because of which he has to walk with a limp. It is stated that after the accident Rehman has been deprived of the pleasure of playing games, like badminton, table tennis and football and he cannot undertake long journeys. 19. Mr. Rehman laid claim to the extent of Rs. 2,16,465/-, of which Rs. 50,000/- was claimed as general damages; Rs. 8,825/- as special damages and the remaining sum as consequential damages. 20. We have nothing on record before us to substantiate the plea of loss of earning or of loss of expectation of life. As to the case of an attendant also, we are not much satisfied. We would, therefore, confine ourselves to general damages and special damages. As to the special damages, Mr. Rehman could bring on record documents showing payment of Rs. 1,825.00 as hospital charges and this has to be allowed. Beyond this, there is nothing conclusive or authentic under the head of 'special damages'. As to the general damages, we grant a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for pain and suffering undergone as we have done in the case of Mr. Ghose. Mr. Rehman is also entitled to some award on account his permanent partial disablement which has been caused due to the shortening of his leg because of which he even limps. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- for this deformity should be adequate compensation in view of what has been stated by this Court in The State of Assam Vs. Urmila Datta and Others as noted above. We, therefore, award a total sum Rs. 21,825/- to Lutfur Rehman, the whole of which would be payable by National Insurance Company. 21. The result of the above discussion is that M.A. (F) 58 and 59/75 stand dismissed subject to alteration in the apportionment of liability; and M.A. (F) 1/76 and M.A. (F) 42 and 43/78 are allowed. We, therefore, award a total sum Rs. 21,825/- to Lutfur Rehman, the whole of which would be payable by National Insurance Company. 21. The result of the above discussion is that M.A. (F) 58 and 59/75 stand dismissed subject to alteration in the apportionment of liability; and M.A. (F) 1/76 and M.A. (F) 42 and 43/78 are allowed. The quantum of compensation awarded and its apportionment as ordered by us stand as below: Case No. Total (Rs. ) Liability of the owner of car Liability of the insurer of the car (New India) Liability of the owner of the truck Liability of the insurer of the truck (National) Insurance) M.A. (F) 58/75 80,000/- ... 40,000/- ... 40,000/- M.A. (F) 59/75 5,000/- ... 2,500/- ... 2,500/- M.A. (F) 1/76 1,40,000/- ... 70,000/- 20,000/- 50,000/- M.A. (F) 42/78 11,845/- ... ... ... 11,845/- M.A. (F) 43/78 21,825/- ... ... ... 21,825/- These sums would carry interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till today and at the rate of 12 per cent from this date till realisation. We part with the hope that the authorities concerned will take necessary steps to restore the confidence of the people in the impartiality of New India and of its sincerity to serve the people which is the raison detre of its being a nationalised unit of the country.